For Beijing, Forcible Reunification is Not the Best Option

For Beijing, Forcible Reunification is Not the Best Option
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 6, 2008

The eyes of the world are on the Beijing Olympics, which open tomorrow. Tibetan independence and and Xinjiang independence elements have been using the Olympic Games to draw attention to their causes. A grenade attack in Kashi, which killed 16 police officers and injured 16 more, was even more alarming. By comparison, cross-Strait relations in recent years have been a rare show of calm and stability. This suggests some thought-provoking political lessons.

In dealing with Taiwan, Beijing has at most three options: One. Unilateral, forcible reunification. Two. Accept "the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan." Three. Preserve the Republic of China. Rationally speaking, until mainland China's democratization and economic development is further along, the worst of the three options is unilateral, forcible reunification. The best is to preserve the Republic of China.

Why? First, let's consider reunification: One. Until mainland China's democratization and economic development is further along, reunifying Taiwan will almost certainly require military or quasi-military state violence. Two. Forcible annexation of Taiwan will inevitably make ruling the region a dilemma. Three. The Taiwan region has undergone four direct presidential elections. It already has a democratic system. If the forcible annexation of Taiwan leads to bloodshed and hatred, Taiwan will be more difficult to control than Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. For Beijing, unification may not be that difficult. All it needs to do is send troops. But forcible reunification will open up a Pandora's Box.

Why should Beijing "accept the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan" before it considers it "forcible reunification?" One. Because Beijing considers Taiwan independence provocative. Because the international community regards it as "unilaterally changing the status quo." If Beijing uses force in response, it will be interpreted as a defensive reaction, and not an aggressive declaration of war. Two. If Taiwan independence elements provoke a cross-Strait war, it may validate the aforementioned logic of "forcible reunification" as well as the resulting bloodshed and hatred.

Therefore the best option for Beijing is to "preserve the Republic of China." No matter how you look at it, Beijing has no reason to force Taiwan to become another Xinjiang, Tibet, or Hong Kong. Forcible reunification is unwarranted. One. Forcible reunification may result in a Pyrrhic victory. Two. Forcible reunification may lead to endless headaches. Three. Taiwan would become even more difficult to rule than Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. In fact, the Beijing authorities have in recent years already substantially altered its thinking regarding Taiwan: One. From opposing the status quo, it has changed to maintaining the status quo. Beijing once opposed the status quo,
because the status quo was a divided China. Now it advocates maintaining the status quo. It implicitly recognizes the reality of "divided rule." Two. From proclaiming that "the Republic of China has already perished," it has changed to "opposition to de jure Taiwan independence."
In other words, it merely opposes changing the name to "Taiwan." In order to reaffirm that a Republic of China does not equate with Taiwan independence, it wants to reaffirm that the Republic of China has not perished.

Therefore our list of Beijing's Three Options in its Taiwan Policy, in order of preference, is not merely our subjective opinion, but reflects objective facts the Beijing authorities must confront in their formulation of policy. For Beijing, only "preserving the Republic of China" can avoid the problems attendant with forcible reunification, as well as the risk of Taiwan independence. The best indication that this is Beijing's best option vis a vis Taiwan policy, is that Beijing already appears to be moving in this direction.

Cross-Strait relations must move from purpose-oriented old thinking to process-oriented new thinking. Purpose-oriented thinking stresses only the purpose -- either reunification or Taiwan independence. It only considers only purpose and ignores process. Process-oriented thinking is based on a win-win philosophy and goodwill. It concentrates on the process, on positive interaction, on the building of trust. Process-oriented thinking considers the achievement of a purpose the natural result of changing conditions. One may not pick fruit that is not ripe. The Beijing authorities' position has changed from "opposing the status" to "maintaining the status quo," From the "Republic of China has already perished" to "opposition to de jure Taiwan independence." This may be regarded as a move from purpose-oriented thinking to process-oriented thinking. This move may be strategic, or it may be pragmatic. It may be merely the result of encountering a situation and not knowing how to respond.

When the Beijing authorities look at the situation in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, they know that the situation in Taiwan is not the same. They know that in dealing with the Taiwan issue, they cannot resort to their old "destroy the Republic of China" approach. But instead must seek to "preserve the Republic of China." That may be why Beijing has moved from denying the 1992 Consensus to recognizing the 1992 Consensus. During the Bush/Hu hotline conversation, and the English transcript published by Xinhua, Hu Jintao recognized "One China, Different Interpretations." The indications are thatBeijing's top leaders see this, but the rank and file have yet to familiarize themselves with it. Some readers may see this analysis as political trickery. They may not be able to set aside past prejudices, to adopt new values. The highest value in cross-Strait relations must be to establish a symbiotic, win-win relationship, and avoid mutual destruction.

Hu Jintao said: "To seek truth from facts and to seek a mutually acceptable solution, to genuinely solve problems, to create long term stability." Since reunification on Beijing's terms is unacceptable to Taipei, and Taiwan independence is not acceptable to Beijing, the best solution, the mutually acceptable solution, is to preserve the Republic of China.

統一不是北京的好選項
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.08.07 03:06 am

舉世矚目的北京奧運明天揭幕。利用奧運的聚焦效應，藏獨與疆獨皆生事端，日前喀什的手榴彈攻擊事件造成公安人員十六死十六傷，更是怵目驚心；相對而言，這段期間海峽兩岸的關係卻呈現出近年來難得的平和與安定，仔細思量，其間應有發人深省的政治啟示。

北京的對台政策，不外三個選項：一、片面強行統一；二、面對「台灣國成立」；三、維持中華民國。理智思考，在中國大陸的政治民主及經濟發展未達相對成熟的境界之前，對北京而言，上述三個對台政策的選項，最差的就是片面強行統一，最佳的則是維持中華民國。

為 何有此說法？先談統一：一、在中國大陸的政治民主及經濟發展未臻相對成熟前，若欲強行統一台灣，不免訴諸武力或接近武力的政治暴力；二、以武力或政治暴力 強行併吞的台灣，必然成為統治的難題；三、因為，台灣經歷四次總統直選，已有完整的民主體制，若以強力併吞的方式統一台灣，釀成血仇，台灣必較新疆、西藏 及香港更難治理。綜上所述，對北京而言，「統一」也許不難，出兵即有可能；但強行統一後，如同打開了潘朵拉魔盒。

再者，為何「面對台灣國 成立」的排序在「統一」之後。一、因為，台獨被北京視為挑釁，被國際視為「片面改變現狀」，屆時北京若採武力因應手段，可以解釋為被動作為，不是主動宣 戰；二、然而，台獨若引爆兩岸戰爭，則又不啻可能進入前述「強力統一」的邏輯之中，其後續血仇效應無異。

因此，對於北京而言，「維持中華民國」乃最佳選項。不論從任何觀點看，北京皆沒有將台灣強行變成新疆、西藏或香港的道理，亦即沒有強行統一台灣的道理：一、強行統一的過程可能玉石俱焚；二、強行統一後的局面可能後患無窮；三、台灣必將是比新疆、西藏及香港更大的統治難題。

其 實，北京當局近年來已然大幅調整了對台政策的主軸思維：一、由反對現狀，變成了「維持現狀」。過去北京反對現狀，因為現狀就是分裂；現在主張維持現狀，則 是默認「分裂分治」的現實，二、由宣稱「中華民國已亡」，變成「反對法理台獨」；換句話說，只是反對改名換姓的「台灣國」，但確認中華民國不是台獨，亦確 認中華民國未亡。

因此，本文指出「北京對台政策三選項」的排序，或許並非僅是出自主觀想像，而是點出了已經顯現於北京當局政策抉擇的客觀 事實。因為，對於北京來說，唯有「維持中華民國」，始能避免「統一」的難題，也才能避免「台獨」的風險；這應是北京對台政策的最佳選項，跡象顯示，北京似 乎也正朝這個方向移動。

我們曾經指出，兩岸關係應當從「目的論」的舊思維，改換成「過程論」的新觀念。所謂「目的論」，就是只知強調統一 或台獨之「目的」，甚至因「只問目的」而「不擇過程」；所謂「過程論」，則是基於雙贏的善意，不斷地在良性互動的過程中，累積互信；就「過程論」的觀點而 言，「目的」可以水到渠成，但不可「果未熟強摘瓜」。準此以論，北京當局從「反對現狀」變成「維持現狀」，從「中華民國已亡」變成「反對法理台獨」，皆可 視為由「目的論」向「過程論」的移動；這個移動，也許是謀定而動，亦可能是務實面對情勢而渾然尚不自知。

北京當局看一看新疆、西藏及香港 的情勢，即知台灣的情勢更非一般；若要處理台灣問題，必然不能如過去以「消滅中華民國」為手段，反而應在如何「維持中華民國」。或許正因如此，北京從否認 「九二共識」，變成承認「九二共識」；且胡錦濤更在布胡熱線及新華社英文稿中承認「一中各表」。跡象顯示，北京高層似乎已經漸有此見，但一般工作層次對此 尚無體會；或者，有此念者亦將此視為權謀，卻不能認知這是一個跳出過去窠臼的新信仰與新價值。因為，兩岸關係的最高信仰及最高價值，應是雙贏共生，而不是 相互毀滅。

胡錦濤說：「要實事求是地尋求（兩岸）雙方都能接受的解決辦法，真正解決問題，做到行穩致遠。」既然「統一」不為台灣接受，「台獨」不為大陸接受，就本文的論題而言，這個「雙方都能接受」的辦法就是：維持中華民國。