Saturday, August 9, 2008

The KMT is the Key to Ma Becoming a President for All the People

The KMT is the Key to Ma Becoming a President for All the People
China Time editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2008

In order to break out of the vicious cycle of partisan Blue vs. Green struggles, President Ma has attempted to position himself as a "president for all the people." His advisers have urged him not to assume the role of KMT Chairman. His Examination Yuan and Control Yuan appointments were earnest attempts to rise above partisanship. Even when his political performance was under attack, he never used the opportunity to blame his predecessor's misrule. Although we all can see the effort he is making in this regard, the real question is how long he will be able to stay the course. This is not merely a harsh test for President Ma, it is a harsh test for Taiwan's politics. Will it be a test too harsh to survive?

President Ma has positioned himself as a "president for all the people." But neither the political opposition nor his own party appreciates what he is doing. He has even been booed and undermined. He appointed Lai Hsing-yuan as Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council. Obviously his intent was to transcend partisanship. Instead it became the focal point for Blue vs. Green crossfire. He hoped his Examination Yuan and Control Yuan nominations would rise above partisanship. But instead they became stalled by a backlash from members of his own party. President Ma genuinely hoped to rise above the dilemma of Blue vs. Green polarization. Instead he found himself in the middle being squeezed from both ends. fighting a war on two fronts.

The irony is that his predecessor President Chen also experienced this same dilemma. When Chen Shui-bian took office eight years ago, he boasted that he would be a "president for all the people," and would even form a "government for all the people." He nominated former Defense Minister Tang Fei as Premier, and recruited numerous Blue Camp heavyweights to his cabinet. He invited Lee Yuan-tseh to become the convener of a group to "establish a cross-Strait framework for peace and stability." He hoped to resolve the differences between the ruling and opposition parties. No matter what the results may have been, at least President Chen tried to become a "president for all the people."

We already know what happened. This "voyage of the century" was fraught with peril. The Tang Cabinet lasted less than a year. Chen announced the cessation of construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. In one fell swoop, this destroyed the atmosphere of reconciliation Chen had created. After this, no solution to ruling vs. opposition party deadlock was possible. The 2004 "Bulletgate Incident" deepened this opposition. Chen Shui-bian even attempted to achieve reconciliation by cooperating with James Soong. In the end his attempt died a natural death from internal pressures. During the latter part of his term, scandals continually erupted. The Chen Shui-bian government incited Blue vs. Green antagonisms to maintain his own political momentum. President Chen became a Deep Green Godfather. He endlessly manipulated the most sensitive issues in society, in order to intensify confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. The scars inflicted during this period have still not fully healed.

Today President Ma has also chosen to become a "president for all the people." He is also encountering resistance and pressure from both camps. Whether he will be able to stay the course is hard to say. He has only been in office two months. But President Ma has a number of advantages over former President Chen. One. For eight years, President Chen was a minority president confronting a majority legislature. Confrontation between the executive and the legislature resulted in continued deadlock. Reconciliation was even more difficult. This at least is something President Ma will not have to face. Two. The KMT is ideologically more flexibile than the DPP. At least the KMT is unlikely to play the "Ethnicity Card" in order to trump its opponents and hijack the policymaking process. Three. The current Executive Yuan consists mostly of ivory tower technocrats. These officials are not adept at communicating with the grassroots. But at least they are not predisposed to ideological demagoguery at the drop of a hat. Nor are they predisposed to politicizing every issue that arises.

A number of political disputes have arisen since the second change in ruling parties. The DPP launched surprise attacks over the "green card issue." Over the past few months, besides ideological issues, it has raised such issues as oil price increases, stimulation of domestic demand, tax reform, typhoon forecasting, and flood control programs. All these were policy issues rather than ideological issues. A number of sensitive issues, such as Japan's ramming of the Union, a Taiwanese fishing vessel, and the cross-Strait debate over the "Chinese Taipei" name for the Olympic team, were all resolved at the practical level and not blown out of proportion. The Ma administration's style has to some extent changed the manner in which the opposition DPP attempts to check and balance the ruling KMT. On issues such as the recent wave of oil price increases, tax rebates, and flood control, the DPP has been waging all out guerilla warfare against a larger force. It has maximized its ability to check and balance the ruling KMT. The KMT is exhausted and on the defensive. This kind of public policy debate and interaction between the government and the political opposition, is precisely what we want to see.

Whether President Ma will be able to become a "president for all the people" will not depend entirely upon whether the DPP engages in obstructionism. It will depend even more upon whether the KMT is sufficiently flexible. Many people in the Kuomintang are unwilling to rise above the level of Blue vs. Green confrontation. How long Ma Ying-jeou can remain committed to being a "president for all the people" will be hard to say.

馬要做全民總統 國民黨是關鍵
2008-08-04
中國時報

為了擺脫藍綠纏鬥的惡性循環,馬總統上任後一直努力維繫「全民總統」的定位,他在內部的勸進下堅持不兼黨主席,也在內閣重要人事布局、乃至考、監兩院委員的提名上,努力展現某種政治高度,他甚至在政績飽受抨擊之際,從不藉機牽拖前朝的失政,這些努力雖說大家都看得到,但真正的考驗還是在於這種堅持究竟能挺多久?這不僅對馬總統是一次嚴苛的考驗,對台灣政治,何嘗不也是一次嚴苛的考驗?

其實誰都看得出來,馬總統對「全民總統」的自我定位,不要說在野黨不領情,在執政黨內部也未得到任何掌聲,甚至還領受不少噓聲及扯後腿。他布局賴幸媛接掌陸委會,當然有超越黨派的寓意,但卻先後淪為藍綠駁火與撻伐的焦點,他刻意想在考、監兩院的提名人事上展現高度,卻硬是栽在自己黨內同志的反彈上。換言之,儘管馬總統衷心想跳出藍綠二元對立的困局,期望打開中間力量活動的空間,卻還是面臨被兩端擠壓,甚至是陷入兩面作戰的窘境。

很反諷的是,這種困境上一任的陳前總統也整套經歷過。陳水扁八年前甫上任之際,不僅積極標榜要做「全民總統」,甚至還籌組「全民政府」,除提名前國防部長唐飛擔任閣揆,也陸續延攬多位藍營重量級人士入閣,並請出李遠哲出任「建立兩岸和平穩定的互動架構」推動小組召集人,期盼整合朝野分歧。事後結果怎麼樣姑且不論,最起碼陳前總統原始初衷,還是希望能成就「全民總統」的。

事後的發展大家也都知道,這波「世紀首航」走得非常辛苦,唐內閣的壽命一年都不滿,核四停建案的宣布,幾乎同步摧毀了扁連會所營造的和解氛圍,之後這個僵局幾乎就沒解過,二○○四年兩顆子彈的效應,讓這種對立更形深化,陳水扁甚至一度尋求與宋楚瑜合作以促成另類和解,終究還是在內部壓力下無疾而終。待執政後期陸續爆出弊案之際,扁政府幾乎就是以擴大藍綠對立來維持動能了。那時節的陳總統,宛如深綠版塊的教主,不斷操縱最敏感的議題來激化朝野對立,這段期間所烙下的傷痕,不諱言說到此刻都未完全平復。

如今馬總統同樣選擇以「全民總統」自許,也同樣承受來自兩大陣營的抵制與擠壓,挺不挺得過去,才兩個月當然很難評斷,但馬總統較之陳前總統,還是占了幾項優勢:首先陳前總統終其八年都處在「朝小野大」的劣勢中,在行政立法持續對峙僵局下,和解之途難上加難,這點最起碼是馬總統不必面對的;其次,國民黨在意識形態的彈性上還是較民進黨寬鬆,至少國民黨不至動輒祭出「神主牌」,去凌駕政策的選擇;第三,目前行政院的核心團隊泰半皆技術官僚出身,這些官員在與基層民眾溝通上或許予人「隔一層」的感覺,但至少可以確定他們不會動輒就上綱到意識形態的層次,也不會動不動就將議題「政治化」。

二次政黨輪替後截至目前為止的若干政治紛擾,除民進黨一開始發動奇襲的「綠卡議題」還帶些意識形態色彩外,這幾個月來從油價調漲、擴大內需、賦稅改革、颱風預報,到最近治水方案等,幾乎所有爭議都只限於政策方案的抉擇,而非意識形態上的爭執,若干敏感的議題,如台日聯合號撞船事件,如兩岸有關奧運「中華台北」稱呼等,也都在務實面對下未將事端擴大,這種風格也一定程度上影響了在野黨的制衡操作,最近幾波從油價、退稅到治水等議題,民進黨團一路以小搏大,制衡戰力的極致發揮,打得國民黨簡直可說是疲於奔命,這種集中公共政策的朝野互動模式,其實也正是我們期待見到的模式。

也可以說,未來決定馬總統能否成就其「全民總統」定位的主要因素,並不全在民進黨的抵制,更多還在於國民黨是否願意調整,國民黨內部若還有許多人不願走出昔日藍綠對抗的窠臼,那馬英九對「全民總統」的自我期許還能堅持多久,就真的很難說了。

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