The Democratic Progressive Party Should Assume the Role of a Loyal Republic of China Opposition Party

The Democratic Progressive Party Should Assume the Role of a Loyal Republic of China Opposition Party
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 27, 2008

September 28 is the 22nd anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party. Over the next few days, the Democratic Progressive Party must decide whether to hold a demonstration march over ARATS President Wang Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan.

Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's position remains unclear. She said that before taking to the streets, the DPP must first make clear what it is protesting. It must then put forth its own opposition party policy proposals. Only then should it take to the streets. In other words, it must first understand why it is protesting before it decides whether it ought to be protesting.

The Democratic Progressive Party has lost power and become the opposition party. The Ma administration has unintentionally provided the DPP with a wide range of issues to complain about. But the Democratic Progressive Party's efforts have been for naught. It has not received a positive response from the general public. People have their doubts about the KMT. But it does not follow that they trust the Democratic Progressive Party. The Democratic Progressive Party has been like a squirrel on a treadmill. Lots of energy expended, but no forward movement. Tsai Ing-wen put her finger on the main problem. The Democratic Progressive Party has yet to formulate a new political vision. That is why the Democratic Progressive Party has been unable to offer the public a new political vision.

When the Democratic Progressive Party challenges the ruling KMT, it emerges with both guns blazing. But over the past 20 years, the shock has worn off. The Democratic Progressive Party trumpets its defense of "Taiwan's sovereignty." But over the past 20 years, the public has developed cobwebs in its ears. The Democratic Progressive Party still has enough strength to organize something like the August 30 protest march. But after 20 years the Democratic Progressive Party's large scale demonstrations no longer thrill. Such political moves are akin to a squirrel on a treadmill. They no longer have any meaning for the DPP. They no longer have anything to teach Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen just returned from her visit to the United States. When asked if the DPP would hold a demonstration march in October, she replied "March? Didn't we just have a march?"

Given Chen Yunlin's visit, the theme of the DPP's protest march would of course be cross-Strait relations. The theme of the August 30 protest march was "uphold sovereignty" and "oppose Ma Ying-jeou selling out Taiwan." Does the DPP really intend to replicate the August 30 protest march? The Ma administration's cross-Strait and foreign policy may have many blind spots and involve considerable risk. But we hardly need the Democratic Progressive Party to tell us that. Talking heads have already talked our ears off. The DPP probably cannot take to the streets in October with the same slogans they did on August 30. As Tsai Ing-wen said, it must offer new policies. If the march is still aflutter with Taiwan independence flags, if not a single Republic of China flag can be seen, if the banners still read "Eject the Republic of China government in exile!" then what can one say, except "Didn't we just have a march?"

The new policies Tsai Ing-wen spoke of is the clear need to establish a new thesis regarding national identity. Without such a thesis on national identity, then one has no thesis on cross-Strait relations. The Democratic Progressive Party is critical of the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. But if after all is said and done, its alternative is still "Taiwan independence," then the Democratic Progressive Party must make clear that its cross-strait policy is predicated on the founding of an independent Nation of Taiwan and the overthrow of the Republic of China.

Chen Shui-bian seized the initiative, calling for demonstrations in October. Now the DPP is in a dilemma. If it doesn't hold a protest march, Taiwan independence elements will demand explanations. If it does hold a protest march, it will be the same as bestowing the position of spiritual leader upon Chen Shui-bian. On top of which, Chen Shui-bian is hardly the Democratic Progressive Party's only problem. Taiwan independence elements have already become an integral part of the DPP's body politic. They can no longer be simply excised. In May Tsai Ing-wen defeated Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min in her bid for the party chairmanship. Yet the very first Green Camp demonstration, the August 30 protest march, was led by none other than Koo Kuan-min and other Taiwan independence advocates. The Democratic Progressive Party's ecological makeup has already been clearly revealed. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot free itself from Taiwan independence bondage, how can it possibly offer any new policy prescriptions?

Tsai Ing-wen has reiterated that "the Democratic Progressive Party must be a responsible opposition party." Translation: "The DPP should assume the role of a loyal Republic of China opposition party." If the Democratic Progressive Party's thesis on national identity is still its "Nation of Taiwan" or "Republic of Taiwan," how can the Democratic Progressive Party get a majority of the public to accept its cross-Strait thesis?

Chen Yunlin is coming to Taiwan. The DPP is planning a large scale protest march. What is the theme of this protest march to be? That cross-Strait exchanges must be conducted with caution? That Ma Ying-jeou is "leaning towards China and selling out Taiwan?" That the DPP is serving notice on Chen Yunlin that Taiwan is about to declare Independence? That the DPP intends to "eject the Republic of China government-in-exile from Taiwan?" As Tsai Ing-wen said, before taking to the streets one must first make clear what one is protesting, then put forth one's own proposals.

Otherwise, what can one say in response to the announcement of another march in September, except, "Didn't we just have a march?"

民進黨應回歸中華民國在野黨的立場
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.09.27

九月二十八日是民進黨二十二周年黨慶。在未來幾天之內，民進黨必須決定，要不要因海協會長陳雲林來訪舉行大遊行。

蔡英文主席的立場尚不明朗。她說，在上街遊行之前，第一階段應作好論述，第二階段是提出在野黨政策，最後才是街頭運動。也就是說，要先弄清為何遊行，才能談要不要遊行。

民 進黨失去政權而成為反對黨以後，馬政府「提供」的題材很多，但民進黨雖努力表現，卻力戰無功，並未獲得主流社會的積極回響。國人質疑國民黨，但仍不信任民 進黨。這段期間的民進黨，猶如滾籠裡的松鼠，動作很大，卻只是原地打轉；主要的問題正是出在如蔡英文所說，民進黨自己尚未建立新論述，而國人亦看不到民進 黨的新論述。

現在的民進黨，質詢時火力熾烈，但這在二十年前國人已經司空見慣；現在的民進黨，極力護衛「台灣主權」，其實國人幾十年來也 已聽得耳朵長繭；現在的民進黨，仍有發動八三○大遊行的實力，但二十年來民進黨的壯盛遊行場面又豈是罕見？這些政治動作，皆如滾籠松鼠，究竟對民進黨自己 有什麼新意義？對整個台灣又有什麼新啟示？難怪蔡英文日前訪美歸來，被問及十月是否遊行，她反問：「遊行，不是剛遊行過嗎？」

陳雲林來 訪，遊行的主題自然是兩岸關係。八三○的遊行主題是「顧主權」及「反對馬英九傾中賣台」，難道十月的遊行還要複製一次？馬政府的兩岸及外交政策或許有許多 盲點與風險，這些其實皆不必民進黨來說，輿論的批評已是盈目貫耳。民進黨恐怕不能在十月再舉著八三○同樣的標語再掃街一趟，而應如蔡英文所說，提出論述與 拿出政策；倘若遊行隊伍仍是台獨旌旗招展，不見一面國旗，標語大字寫著「中華民國流亡政權滾出去」，那麼，遊行，不是剛遊行過嗎？

蔡英文所說的「提出論述」，就是必須建立明確的「國家論述」；無國家論述，即無兩岸論述。倘若民進黨今日批評馬政府的兩岸政策，其最後的對策仍然是「台獨建國」；則民進黨即必須先說清楚，它的兩岸政策，是建立在台獨建國與推翻中華民國的前提之下。

陳 水扁先聲奪人，號召十月遊行，使民進黨進退失據。不舉行，不能給獨派交代；舉行，又等於讓陳水扁坐上精神領袖的地位。何況，民進黨的問題絕不在陳水扁一 人，而是體內有一個血肉相連已經無法切割的所謂「獨派」；五月蔡英文打敗獨派辜寬敏贏得黨主席選舉，但至八三○首場綠營大遊行卻是由辜寬敏等獨派主導，已 將民進黨的生態顯露無遺。民進黨若不能擺脫獨派的挾持，豈能奢論什麼「新論述」？

蔡英文不斷重複一句話：「民進黨要做一個負責任的在野黨。」其實，這句話應當落實為：「民進黨應回歸為中華民國的在野黨。」倘若民進黨的「國家論述」仍然是「台灣國」，則民進黨如何讓多數國人接納其「兩岸論述」？

陳雲林來訪，民進黨籌劃大遊行。這是主張兩岸交流必須慎重的大遊行？或這是抗議馬英九「傾中賣台」的大遊行？這是向陳雲林宣示「台獨建國」的大遊行？或這是叫中華民國流亡政府滾出去的大遊行？正如蔡英文所說，在走上街頭之前，難道不應提出論述、拿出政策？

否則，遊行，不是剛遊行過嗎？