The Financial and Economic Cabinet: Change Your Thinking, or Find a New Job

The Financial and Economic Cabinet: Change Your Thinking, or Find a New Job
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 18, 2008

The global financial crisis rages on. Taiwan's economy is on its knees. As expected, through the auspices of the Presidential Office and Executive Yuan Financial and Economic Task Force, Vice President Vincent Siew, replete with his prefabricated smile, has assumed responsibility for the nation's financial and economic policy. Was this sophisticated political calculation? Or was it merely the last card the admininstration had left to play? It makes no difference. For the cabinet's financial and economic experts, Vice President Siew riding to the rescue was a slap in the face. Everyone knows Vincent Siew is merely a symbol of the administration's committment to rescuing the economy. But the key to success remains the cabinet's financial and economic experts. One hundred days have passed. These financial and economic experts have received a failing grade on their first pop quiz. If they continue spinning their wheels, they may need to be replaced.

The Ma administration's financial and economic cabinet was formed on May 20. Since then its confidence building measures have encountered numerous setbacks. Its unfreezing of gasoline prices, tax reform, stimulation of domestic demand, response to global changes, and attempts to prop up the stock market, have all fallen flat due to indecision and waffling. Even the reduction in the stock transaction tax was spun as a "sell out for long." The cabinet's term test is still to come. The US subprime mortgage crisis is causing a bleed out. Financial crises arrive one after another. The global economic outlook looks grimmer by the day. The domestic economy must confront a simultaneous loss of wealth and reduction in income. More trials await the cabinet.

Merely adding Vincent Siew to the team will not allow us to see a new financial and economic dawn. The problem is not a lack of people to coordinate policy. The problem is too much policy coordination. In response to major economic events, the Executive Yuan established a number of policy task forces. These include a price stability task force, an economic measures response task force, a cross-strait restrictions task force, an underprivileged groups task force, a Second Financial Reform Review task force, and a Tax Reform Commission. These task forces are headed by Vice Premier Chiu Cheng-hsiung, Political Affairs Commissioner Chu Yun-peng, and Tsai Hsun-hsiung. An Asia-Pacific Finance Center centre Coordinating Committee has yet to be established. Add to this Vincent Siew's Presidential Office and Executive Yuan Financial and Economic Task Force, and one is inundated by redundancy. Too many task forces. Too many representatives. The result is the same financial and economic experts shuttling back and forth between conference rooms.

The Executive Yuan may think that establishing task forces does more than proclaim the administration's committment, that it also coordinates policy. But just picture all those financial and economic experts holding conferences day and night inside the Executive Yuan, and you know how ineffective they will be, and how little they will have to show. Too many task forces will turn special projects into routine projects. They will become meaningless. Establishing task forces for every problem that comes along leads to centralized decision-making. It leads to an excessive concentration of decision-making authority in the Executive Yuan. It undermines the decision-making process. It reduces ministries to purely administrative entities. It encourages ministries to shirk responsibility, to habitually pass the buck upward, to deviate more and more from the ministries' hierarchical decision-making procedures. The decision-making power and decision-making ability of ministers diminishes in a downward spiral.

Economic development has become diversified. Inter-ministerial coordination has become the norm. But all policies must have an overarching theme. Decisions should have been made by qualified ministries. These ministries should bear responsibility for their success or failure. Let's not forget that ministers are political appointees. They are not unelected officials. Even assuming financial and economic policies are so complex as to require inter-ministerial coordination, the Executive Yuan's Council for Economic Planning and Development was established for precisely that purpose. Its members are also Ministry of Finance officials. The existing mechanisms are not being put to use. Instead, redundant task forces are proliferating. Premier Liu Chao-hsuan blamed the Council for Economic Planning and Development for inefficiency. He didn't realize he was responsibile for making it inefficient. Now, belatedly, Ma Ying-jeou wants to put the Vice President in charge of coordinating financial and economic policy. Will this solve problems, or create more problems? An integrated system with integrated policies. Even the administration can't even achieve this, what can it achieve?

This really is a "people" issue. The financial and economic subcabinet, filled with PhDs in economics, does not lack expertise. But not everyone has sufficient administrative experience. Economics stresses optimum decision making under controlled conditions. But policy-making decisions are often political science issues. Scholars may be able to thoroughly weigh the pros and cons of policy decisions. But they may lack administrative experience and self-confidence. The prevailing climate within the organization may not encourage sticking one's neck out and showing initiative. Major financial and economic policies may be bandied about without resolution. Even the reduction in stock transaction taxes was sent to President Ma Ying-jeou for his final approval. The premise being that a decision was right if the right person made it. Now that things have gone wrong, it means the people who made it were the wrong people. That constitutes a problem.

During periods of economic turmoil, financial and economic officials have it hard. The public understands. But if the problem is systemic, if the officials are not up to the job, they must be replaced.

財經內閣：若不換腦袋，就該換位置
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.09.18 02:46 am

果 不其然，副總統蕭萬長帶著他的制式微笑，在全球金融風暴肆虐、台灣經濟疲軟無力之際，透過府院間的財經議題任務編組團隊，重掌國家財經決策的主導權。無論 這是精密的政治算計，還是有步變到沒步的不得不然，都已狠狠摑了財經內閣一耳光──竟然做到要請副總統出馬協調的地步。但是，大家心知肚明，蕭萬長只是政 府宣示拚經濟的象徵，成敗關鍵仍在於財經內閣；如果百日初試已不及格的財經閣員還是原地打轉，恐怕要請他們換位置了。

馬政府的財經內閣自 五二○成軍以來，從油價解凍、稅制改革、擴大內需、因應國際變局到挽救股市、振興景氣的連串作為，出了非常多的狀況，連一個降低證券交易稅的對策，也因政 策反覆而從利多變成利空，出台之後更被以利多出盡解讀。但是，經濟大考還沒有過去，美國次貸風暴血流不止，金融危機接踵而至，國際經濟局勢日趨險峻，國內 經濟也正面臨財富、所得雙縮水的痛苦調整，還有更多的考驗在等著財經內閣。

只是加個蕭萬長，大家仍然看不到財經施政振衰起敝的曙光；因為 問題不在少了一個政策協調人，反而是問題正在於協調人太多了。行政院為了因應各項重大經濟事件，成軍未久就設立了多個政策任務小組，包括穩定物價小組、因 應景氣對策小組、兩岸鬆綁小組、弱勢關懷小組、檢討二次金改小組、賦稅改革委員會等，分由副院長邱正雄、政務委員朱雲鵬、蔡勳雄負責，未來還要再成立亞太 金融中心協調委員會；若再加上蕭萬長領銜的府院財經小組，頗像是疊床架屋，任務小組多，代表會議多，結果就是同樣的一批財經官員在不同組合下穿梭於會議室 之間。

政院或許認為，政策任務編組不只宣示政府重視的象徵意義，也具政策協調、整合的實質意義。但是，只要想像一下財經首長一天到晚鑽進 行政院開會的畫面，就知道難有效率可言，而實際結果也是如此。因為過多的任務編組，讓專案成了通案，宣示意義不再；況且，事事任務編組，也導致決策機制強 幹弱枝，不只過度集中行政院，更削弱部會的決策功能，讓部會成了純事務機關；甚至鼓勵部會推諉卸責、凡事上呈，日趨偏離分層決策的組織原理。部長的決策 權、決策能力愈來愈小，實是因果惡性循環！

再者，經濟發展多元化後，跨部會協調亦屬常態，但凡事總有個主體，原應由主管部會決策，並負成 敗之責，別忘了部長是政務官，不是事務官；就算財經政策複雜到必須跨部會協調，行政院向有「財經小內閣」之稱的經建會原就是為此而設，其委員會成員也都是 財經相關部會首長，卻晾著現有機制不用、又搞了眾多任務小組疊床架屋，行政院長劉兆玄巡視時還責怪經建會功能不彰，殊不知讓經建會無能的是自己啊。如今， 馬英九還要再加一個本來就有充分建言、指導角色的副總統當協調人，這到底是在解決問題，還是製造問題呢？整合的體制，整合的政策；倘若連這一點都做不到， 遑論其他？

再來就真的是「人」的問題了。財經內閣裡不乏學有專精的經濟學博士，卻非個個都有足夠的行政經驗；由於經濟學講究的是情境控制 下的最適選擇，但政策選項的決策卻經常偏向政治學，因而學者首長能將一個政策的利弊得失分析得頭頭是道，卻因缺乏行政歷練賦予的政治自信，加上現有組織氣 候不鼓勵勇於承擔，以致重大財經政策常是會而不議、議而不決，竟連證交稅降不降這種僅屬戰術層級的決策，也要尋求馬總統的背書。人對了，事就對了；如今事 不對，代表人不對，這可是個大問題。

處此經濟動盪時期，財經官員確實難為，人民尚能體諒；但是，若問題出在機制錯置、用人不當，那就必須另請高明了。