Signing ECFA: Tactics and Strategy

Signing ECFA: Tactics and Strategy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2009

The Ministry of Economic Affairs has released a research report explaining the economic consequences of our participation in ECFA. The report describes the impact ECFA will have on our economy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs reports says that once Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA, the Taiwan region's GDP will rise at least 1.65 to 1.72 percentage points. But individual industries, such as electronics, textiles, and the petrochemical industry, may be both positively and negatively impacted. In addition to the aforementioned high profile impact on the GDP, the report also detailed the direction Taipei and Beijing may take regarding investments, the industry value chain, Early Harvests, dispute settlement, industrial cooperation, and relief mechanisms. At the tactical level, the Ministry of Economic Affairs current study on economic and trade development can be considered complete.
The tactical level refers to what Taipei must do and cannot avoid doing in response to the current international situation. Many once thought that when Taipei joined the WTO in 2002, it could smoothly integrate itself into the international trade environment. But actual developments have not been as expected. Early setbacks during the Uruguay Round talks led to a wave of regional trade agreements. The past two decades have seen the emergence of the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, Mercosur, and a hundred complex, overlapping, and intertwining regional trade frameworks. These regional trade agreements offer terms of trade even more favorable than the WTO. They also eliminate the principle of "most favored nation" applicable to WTO Member States. This has isolated Taipei, which has only "entry level" WTO membership. Such a development obviously represents a hardship for Taipei.

Conceptually, these so-called regional trade agreements are little circles formed by a number of countries. Those within the circles are perceived as our own. Those outside the circle are perceived as outsiders. Aggressive countries such as Korea and Singapore are signing free trade agreements with other countries in every direction. They have joined a whole range of little circles. Everyone treats them as their own. Economic and trade activities always work to their benefit. But Taipei is internationally isolated. Many countries are reluctant to sign trade agreements with us. Over time, Taipei has been increasing regarded as an outsider. Within these circles insiders encounter few trade barriers. They enjoy low tariffs and participate in mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges. Complex "rules of origin" have led to a number of countries setting up factories and investing within these circles. Economic and trade relations within these circles naturally tend to increase. By contrast, outsiders like Taipei will always be the ones to suffer. When it comes to economic and trade relations, we are relegated to feeding off table scraps left by insiders. Our situation is extremely disadvantageous.

As we know, ASEAN plus One is already in operation. ASEAN plus Three will begin operation next year. Almost every important country in East Asia will be included. The data reveals that the most important driving force behind ASEAN plus Three is the Chinese mainland. Circumstances have forced Japan and South Korea to join. One cannot rule out the possibility that Beijing is promoting the agreement to isolate Taipei. In the face of such adversity, if Taipei fails to break through, if Taipei fails to enter the circle, it will end up in an economic blind alley. Therefore tactically, signing ECFA in order to open up cross-strait economic and trade exchanges is a road we must take. Indeed, signing ECFA is the way out. It is the way to survival. Only this can ensure our economic survival. This is why we need the so-called "early harvest" provision. It is because we hope to catch up with South Korea.

But a mere tactical response to the two pronged attack by ASEAN plus One and ASEAN plus Three, is merely the passive amelioration of an unfavorable situation. It is not enough to open up new economic and trade horizons. Media reports have focused on the quantitative impact of signing ECFA on our GDP. These numbers may be easy to understand. But they are not the key to ECFA. The real challenge to our economic future is our industrial positioning and our economic niche. ECFA may help us remove roadblocks. But it is not clear whether our future positioning can be laid out in one fell swoop. The Executive Yuan has trumpeted its six new industries. What sort of bridge can Green Industries establish with the Chinese mainland? How can the biotech industry establish itself inside the mainland market? How will it apply to specific diseases? Can agriculture on the Chinese mainland develop e-resume control of satellite farms on Taiwan? Is there an economic niche for Chinese language literary output? Can international medical treatment attract mainland patients? These are all items on ECFA's cross-Strait agenda. We must take this opportunity to plan properly. The Ministry of Economic Affairs report still lacks structure, and requires further effort.

For the sake of our economy, signing ECFA with Beijing is a tactical necessity. It is also essential to our strategic positioning. We are pleased that the Government is taking steps in the right direction. We hope future negotiations are not limited to adding or subtracting existing industries. Given greater effort, new industries, along with new positioning and cooperation, can open up new possibilities for our economy in one fell swoop.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.07.30
社論－簽署ECFA的戰術與戰略觀
本報訊

經濟部日前公布了我國參與ＥＣＦＡ經濟後果的研究報告，分若干面向描述ＥＣＦＡ對台灣經濟的衝擊。經濟部的報告指出，台灣與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，將使我國ＧＤＰ上升至少一點六五到一點七二個百分點，但就個別產業而言，則電子、紡織、石化等各業不同，所受衝擊有正有負。除了前述眾所矚目的ＧＤＰ衝擊之外，該研究報告亦詳述ＥＣＦＡ對服務業、投資、產業價值鏈、早期收穫、爭端解決、產業合作、救濟機制等兩岸可能簽署方向。就經貿發展戰術層次而言，經濟部目前提出的研究內容堪稱完備。

前文所謂戰術層次，是指ＥＣＦＡ實為台灣面對當前國際情勢所必須要做、不得不做的因應。原本，國人以為台灣自二○○二年加入ＷＴＯ之後，能夠順利融入國際經貿環境，但事實的發展卻不如人意。在早年烏拉圭談判不順等因素的刺激下，國際上興起一波「區域貿易協定」的簽署風潮。二十年間，世界上已出現了歐盟、北美自由貿易協定、東協、南錐協定等百餘個區域貿易架構，繁複綿密且交互重疊。這些區域貿易協定所刻劃的貿易條件都比ＷＴＯ更優惠，又能排除其他ＷＴＯ會員國申請適用「最惠國原則」，故使台灣這樣的ＷＴＯ「陽春」會員國形同孤立。這樣的局勢發展，對台灣顯然是十分艱困的。

在概念上，所謂區域貿易協定，就是若干國家之間結合而形成的小圈圈，圈內諸國視為自己人、圈內與圈外則彼此為「外人」。有些國家積極如韓國、新加坡者，就四處與別國簽署自由貿易協定，把自己劃在許多個國際小圈圈的交集之內，大家都視他們為自己人，經貿活動遂無往不利。但是像台灣這樣國際上相形孤立的國家，由於許多國家都不願意和台灣簽貿易協定，久而久之，台灣就被越來越多的國家視為外人。由於圈內自己人之間貿易障礙少、關稅低、經貿發展互利，復因「原產地規定」而造就出許多在圈內國家設廠投資的需求，彼此之間經貿自然日漸暢旺。相對而言，遭殃的則永遠是像台灣這樣的圈外人；在經貿選項上只能撿些圈內人吃剩的殘果餘羹來發展，殊為不利。

大家都知道，東協加一已開始運作，而東協加三即將於明年起生效，幾乎將東亞重要國家全數涵納在內。資料顯示，東協加三的最主要推手也就是中國大陸，日、韓迫於形勢才不得不積極加入。客觀而言，中國推動該協定背後的原因，也難謂沒有「孤立對手」的布局考量。台灣面對這樣的不利局勢，如果再不突圍、再不加入圈內競逐，則經貿上只有死路一條。因此，在戰術上，簽署ＥＣＦＡ以打開兩岸經貿局面是一條不得不走的路。的確，簽ＥＣＦＡ是突圍之路、生存之路，非如此不足以保台灣經濟之生機。正因為如此，才有所謂「早期收穫」之必要，希望讓台灣趕緊跟上韓國的腳步。

但是台灣單單在戰術面因應東協加一與東協加三之包圍夾擊，只是消極地改善客觀環境，尚不足以積極地開創經貿新局。媒體報導著重簽署ＥＣＦＡ對ＧＤＰ影響百分比的數字效果；這數字固然簡單易懂，但ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵卻不止於此。台灣經濟未來真正的挑戰，在於我國的產業布局與切入利基。ＥＣＦＡ固然能幫台灣清除路障，但未來能不能藉勢一舉布局卻未見明朗。以行政院敲鑼打鼓的六大新興產業而言，究竟綠能產業能與對岸搭上什麼橋？生技業能如何切入對岸的廣大市場與特殊疾病？農業有沒辦法在中國大陸開拓電子履歷管控的台灣衛星農場？華人文創有沒有兩岸共同的利基？國際醫療能否吸引對岸華人的手術與健檢案例？這些都是兩岸ＥＣＦＡ談判所及的積極布局面向，必須要藉此機會妥為規畫。但目前經濟部的報告中，卻仍未見骨架，尚需進一步努力。

總之，對台灣經濟而言，與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ既是突圍戰術之必須、也是布局戰略之必要。我們樂見政府往這個正確的方向積極邁進，也希望未來的談判研議，不要侷限於現有產業的加減爭取，更能在新興產業布局方面再加琢磨、多所努力，庶幾一舉開創台灣經濟的新局面。