ECFA and the Destiny of the DPP

ECFA and the Destiny of the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2010

The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will be signed in Chongqing on the 29th of this month. The Democratic Progressive Party will initiate a new round of anti-ECFA political moves.

Once the agreement is signed, it will be a done deal. Even if a referendum is held, the wording of the referendum will have to be changed to read, "Should the already signed ECFA agreement be repealed?" If the DPP demands a referendum, it will be compelled to unambiguously declare, "We oppose ECFA." It will no longer be able to bob and weave, and claim it is calling for a referendum merely as a matter of "democratic procedure." If during Legislative Yuan deliberations the Democratic Progressive Party demands an "item by item review," it will mean it has changed its tune, and is asking merely for "partial revisions" rather than a "total repudiation." Will that mean the DPP is prepared to accept the results of a legislative review and vote? Conversely, if the DPP still wants "total repudiation," why bother with an "item by item review?" Moreover, if the Legislative Yuan submits ECFA to an "item by item review," how can a referendum "totally repudiate" it?

The DPP must make a choice. Is it demanding a "total repudiation of ECFA," or is it merely "in partial disagreement with ECFA?" It must decide. One or the other. Otherwise, it will merely be contradicting itself.

During this round of ECFA negotiations, the DPP has indeed contributed by playing the role of bad cop. The Democratic Progressive Party has taken advantage of ECFA to incite Blue vs. Green conflict. This may be one reason Beijing made major concessions. But now that Beijing has made major concessions, it has left the DPP in a quandary. The DPP may be scratching its head, wondering, "Just why did Beijing make so many major concessions?"

ECFA has become a hot button issue on Taiwan. This is why the content of ECFA has taken on an obvious political coloration. Objectively speaking, based on the content made public so far, ECFA is an astonishingly lop-sided trade agreement seldom seen in the world. Taiwan's early harvest list includes 539 items, worth a whopping 13.83 billion USD. Mainland China's early harvest list includes 267 items, worth a mere 600 million USD. Seventeen of Taiwan's weaker industries were included on the early harvest list. Eighteen of Taiwan's agricultural and fishing products were included on the early harvest list. Mainland agricultural products will not be sold on Taiwan. Mainland workers will not enter Taiwan. Taipei hopes to sign an FTA with Washington. But American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt said that even beef and rice would have to be negotiated. By contrast, look at the ECFA early harvest list. If it weren't for our unique political status, would Beijing have made so many major concessions?

But the most significant aspect of ECFA is that given the threat ASEAN plus N poses for Taiwan, it has achieved an equal footing with the mainland. ECFA will also improve Taiwan's chances of becoming an international platform. ECFA will help Taiwan confront the challenges of globalization and international coopetition. This is why the benefits of ECFA outweigh the deficits, and the gains outweigh the losses. This is why it is not easy for the DPP to flatly repudiate ECFA.

Furthermore, any trade agreement is inevitably going to be a "potluck dinner." If I want to eat the dishes you brought, I can hardly tell you not to eat mine. Hence, the tug of war between liberalization and protection. The Democratic Progressive Party is not about to oppose the benefits Taiwan has received is it? Or does it intend to oppose the inclusion of 100 petrochemical industry items on the early harvest list? Does it intend to oppose the inclusion of orchids and groupers? The DPP has no basis for its allegation that "The government failed to demand what it should have demanded." From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party opposed seeking any relief on tariffs. Tsai Ing-wen even favored "building plants on the mainland for high tariff industries." That being the case, all the Democratic Progressive Party can do is demagogue the 267 items on the mainland's early harvest list. But if the DPP compares the pluses and minuses on the two sides' early harvest lists, it will be forced to conclude that Taiwan's benefits outweighed its deficits, and its gains outweighed its losses.

This round of negotiations over ECFA once again underscored the DPP's destiny. During cross-Strait negotiations, when the DPP plays bad cop, it does indeed provide an assist. But that's it. The DPP's role is limited to playing bad cop, nothing more. It is incapable of taking the lead in cross-Strait relations amidst increasing globalization. This is the DPP's political destiny. ECFA does indeed offer both advantages and disadvantages for Taiwan. It does indeed involve both gains and losses. But it unquestionably offers more advantages than disadvantages, and more gains than losses. After all, the DPP did not totally repudiate ECFA. It could only point to a few of the deficits and losses, in an effort to incite conflict and divide society. On the one hand, the DPP is unable to offer any alternatives. On the other hand, it is unable to deny that ECFA's advantages outweigh its disadvantages, and its gains outweigh its losses. All it can do is tear society apart as it engages in internal struggles over the party's future. Such is the DPP's political destiny.

ECFA has effectively been signed. The Democratic Progressive Party sees this as more grist for its political mill. The prospect of another issue to demagogue fills it with glee. But ECFA has again revealed the DPP's increasing marginalization and negation in the mainstream of cross-Strait affairs and globalizaton. In cross-Strait affairs it invariably plays bad cop. On Taiwan it invariably incites social divisions. Can the DPP escape its sorry destiny?

從ECFA看民進黨的角色與宿命
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.25 03:38 am

兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）可望於廿九日在重慶簽署，民進黨的「反ＥＣＦＡ」操作，亦將進入新階段。

完成簽署，木已成舟。就公投言，題旨就必須改變成「是否同意廢止已經簽署完成的ＥＣＦＡ」；亦即，民進黨若主張「公投」，就勢須正面表態「反對ＥＣＦＡ」，已無閃避的空間，而說只是主張「公投」的「民主程序」而已。另就立院的審議言，則民進黨若主張「逐條審議」，即表示改採「局部修正」的路線，而非「全盤否定」的路線；然則，民進黨是否即應接受審議表決的結果？反之，若主張「全盤否定」，則又何必進行「逐條審議」？再者，倘若在立院「逐條審議」，則在公投又如何「全盤否定」？

也就是說，民進黨在「全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ」及「局部不同意ＥＣＦＡ」之間，必須作出抉擇。否則便是自相矛盾。

這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，民進黨的黑臉確實扮演了「側翼」的助攻角色。民進黨藉ＥＣＦＡ升高了藍綠鬥爭，應是北京方面考慮大幅「讓利」的因素之一。然而，北京如今既已大幅讓利，卻使民進黨陷於難以著力的困境。或許，民進黨現在真正的難題是：「北京為何讓利那麼多？」

由於ＥＣＦＡ在台灣成為尖銳的「政治性」議題，所以使ＥＣＦＡ的內容也呈現了明顯的「政治性」元素。就迄今公開的內容看，客觀而言，ＥＣＦＡ應是舉世罕見的「利益不對稱」的經貿協定。台灣早收五三九項，金額一百卅八億點三美元；大陸二六七項，廿八點六億美元。十七個台灣弱勢產業納入早收清單，十八項台灣農漁產品也上了榜。大陸農產品不銷台，大陸勞工不入台……。台灣若要與美國談ＦＴＡ，美國在台協會理事主席薄瑞光還說，牛肉及稻米都要談；如今看兩岸ＥＣＦＡ的早收內容，倘非緣於特殊的政治情勢，北京方面豈可能「讓利那麼多」？

然而，ＥＣＦＡ最重要的意義，是台灣在東協加Ｎ的威脅中，對大陸市場取得了平等的立足點；再者，ＥＣＦＡ亦使台灣成為國際平台的條件獲得加分與改善，有利於台灣面對全球化的競合挑戰。這也是使ＥＣＦＡ可以獲得「利大於弊／得大於失」評價的主要理由，遂使民進黨不易「全盤否定」ＥＣＦＡ。

再者，任何貿易協定皆是「攜菜派對」。我要吃你的菜，就不能不讓你也吃我的菜；於是發生了「開放」與「保護」的角力。民進黨如今恐怕不至於反對台灣在ＥＣＦＡ獲利的部分；難道會反對石化一百項列入早收？難道會反對文心蘭、石斑魚列入清單？甚至似乎也沒有立場攻擊「該要的要不到」的部分，因為民進黨自始即反對爭取任何減免關稅，蔡英文甚至主張「高關稅產業赴大陸設廠」。倘係如此，民進黨勢必只能在大陸二六七項早收清單中找尋政治鬥爭的題材；但即使就雙方早收清單的對比利害而論，民進黨恐亦必須接受對台灣「利大於弊／得大於失」的宏觀評價。

這場ＥＣＦＡ談判，再次呈現出民進黨在台灣政治上的角色及宿命。就兩岸關係言，民進黨的政治黑臉，確實對兩岸角力具有「側翼助攻」的效應；但民進黨在兩岸的角色，仍也僅止於扮黑臉而已，然在全球化的兩岸互動中不可能扮演主導的角色，這是民進黨的政治宿命。再就台灣內部言，ＥＣＦＡ誠然有利有弊、有得有失；卻無疑是利大於弊、得大於失。民進黨終究沒有全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ的正當性，而只能凸顯其中的弊與失，來鼓動政爭，撕裂社會；也就是說，民進黨一方面拿不出「替代方案」，另一方面又不可能全盤否定利大於弊、得大於失的ＥＣＦＡ，而只能在黨內路線分歧下，繼續扮演鼓動政爭、撕裂社會的負面角色，這豈不也是民進黨的政治宿命？

ＥＣＦＡ簽定，民進黨視為政爭題材，似有見獵心喜之情。但若從另一角度看，ＥＣＦＡ簽定，卻也再度呈現了民進黨在全球及兩岸主流趨勢中的邊緣化與負面化。在兩岸始終扮黑臉，在台灣始終搞撕裂，民進黨如何走出這等噩運？