ECFA: Economic Interests and a Race Against Time

ECFA: Economic Interests and a Race Against Time
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 29, 2010

Today in Chongqing, Taipei and Beijing signed a Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This is undoubtedly the most important step the two sides have taken to promote economic and trade relations since normalization, and constitutes a landmark event. ECFA is rooted in economics and trade. It helps cross-Strait economic interaction take a certain path. It helps Taiwan integrate itself into the regional economy. But the benefits ECFA provides will not appear magically merely because the agreement has been signed. Taiwan is running a race against itself, against the world, and against time. We do not have a moment to waste.

ECFA includes an early harvest list of 539 goods and 11 services. The mainland will allow these to be implemented first. The window of opportunity will be opened further in the mid to long term, and allow other governments to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with Taipei. This will enable Taiwan to integrate itself into the regional economy and avoid marginalization. From a larger perspective, ECFA will kickstart Taipei's accession to the WTO, begun nine years ago. The importance of this large-scale economic reform cannot be overstated.

Before the benefits of the early harvest list materialize, many things can happen. The immediate benefits of the early harvest list are time-sensitive and fleeting. Our chances of signing FTAs with other governments has been improved. But whether any FTAs will actually be signed is not entirely up to us, and remains far from certain. Can Taiwan survive the pain of economic reforms? That will depend on the determination and ability of those in power. These three factors, interacting with each other, will enable Taiwan's economic metamorphosis.

Take the early harvest list. This is a special arrangement that allows the two sides to enjoy the benefits of liberalization even before negotiations over trade liberalization have begun. This allows industries on the early harvest list to enter the mainland market in advance, and be more competitive. This is why the government is promoting ECFA so vigorously. What the government is not saying however, is that these early harvest items are time sensitive. These goods and services must be liberalized within six months after ECFA goes into effect. This means that the sooner the two sides complete their negotiations, the sooner they will liberalize, and the shorter the early harvest period. The two sides however did not clearly define the length of the consultation phase. Therefore the consultation phase has a beginning, but no end. This makes the definition of the early harvest phase uncertain. Businesses naturally want the early harvest phase to last as long as possible. But that is neither consistent with Beijing's interests nor with international norms. It could also encourage corporate complacency. The best response is to take advantage of the early harvest provisions as soon as possible, and establish a competitive position in the mainland market.

Now take FTAs. ECFA is a essentially the phased implementation of an FTA, but it is not an FTA as such. Politically, a high degree of mistrust lingers between Taipei and Beijing. Economically however, the two sides have a special relationship, and a high degree of economic interdependence. This makes ECFA very different from normal international trade agreements. For example, the early harvest list accounts for fully 16.5% of all trade. This far exceeds normal FTA standards, and makes ECFA very different from other FTAs. The explicit timetables for the start of negotiations are all special cases. But these special cases may become the model other governments use when signing FTAs with Taipei and Beijing. They may provoke challenges from the opposition. They may become obstacles when Taipei attempts to sign agreements with foreign governments. The government must anticipate such problems.

Also, Taipei hopes that through ECFA, and Beijing, it can participate in the process of world-wide regional integration. This is increasingly likely, given improved cross-Strait relations, but it remains a unilateral expectation. Taipei must offer incentives sufficient to induce foreign governments to sign FTAs. This is a practical matter that the government must consider during the post-ECFA era. Now that the two sides have signed ECFA, this may accelerate the pace at which the South Korean and other governments sign FTAs with Beijing. This will affect Taipei's interests vis a vis ECFA. The world continues to turn. Taipei must not assume that just because it has signed ECFA, it can sit back and rake in all manner of benefits. If so, it has signed ECFA in vain.

As Japanese strategist Kenichi Ohmae astutely noted, ECFA is a multivitamin formula tailored for Taiwan. Vitamins can help one stay fit. But they cannot ensure one's survival. Therefore, in order to maintain our competitive advantage and economic development, it is not enough merely to take a multivitamin. One must also have a strategy for keeping fit. The key is whether the government can use the leverage provided by ECFA to promote economic reform. That is why President Ma intends to announce a post-ECFA global economic strategy. We for one, are eager to hear what he has to say.

ECFA的經濟利益與時間賽跑
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.29 03:13 am

就在今天，兩岸在重慶正式簽署兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）；這無疑是兩岸推動經貿關係正常化以來最重要的一步，更是劃時代的關鍵歷史事件。由ＥＣＦＡ架構而起的經貿機制，讓兩岸的經濟互動有了具體的方向及可循的軌跡，並將開啟台灣進入區域經濟整合的道路。然而，ＥＣＦＡ的一切預期效益不是簽署即現，這是一場台灣與自己、與世界、更與時間的競賽，絲毫虛耗不得。

從預期效益而言，ＥＣＦＡ將快速顯現的，自是內含五百卅九項貨品及十一項服務業的早收清單，將可享受彼岸先開放市場的好處；中長期來說，則是為台灣與他國洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），以融入區域整合及避免邊緣化，開啟了更多機會之窗；更宏觀的是，ＥＣＦＡ將啟動台灣繼九年前加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）以來最大規模的經濟改革工程，對台灣經濟發展的意義不言可喻。

但是，這一切預期效益的收割結果，仍存有很多的變數；因為立即受惠的早期收穫，是有時效性的，非永久的；與他國洽簽ＦＴＡ，機會雖然變大了，卻非可完全操之在我，仍存有高度不確定性；至於台灣能否順利通過經濟改革工程的調整之痛，那更與執政者的決心及執行力密不可分了；而這三者間又彼此交互影響，交織而成台灣經濟的蛻變期。

即以早收為例，這是兩岸在進入貿易自由化協商前，互予提前享受開放利益的特別安排，確可讓列入早收產業在進軍大陸市場時，擁有更強的競爭力，這也是政府強力促銷ＥＣＦＡ的焦點所在。但是，政府沒有說出口的是，既是「早期」收穫，就有一定時效性，而其時效與須在ＥＣＦＡ生效後六個月內展開的貨品及服務貿易自由化協商息息相關，意即雙方談得愈快、開放愈快，早收期就愈短；但因雙方沒有明訂完成協商的期限，顯示這是「有起點沒有終點」的協商，也讓早收期變得不確定。對企業而言，自然希望早收期愈長愈好，但其不僅不符大陸利益及國際規範，也會讓企業更怠惰，最好的對應還是儘速運用早收優勢，在大陸市場建立競爭利基。

再看ＦＴＡ，ＥＣＦＡ是分段到位的ＦＴＡ，但畢竟還不是ＦＴＡ；尤其，兩岸在政治上的相互不信任、但經濟上高度依存的特殊關係，讓ＥＣＦＡ與國際間通用模式非常不同，例如早收項目的貿易占比達百分之十六點五，遠高於所有ＦＴＡ的標準，也未比照其他ＦＴＡ，明訂啟動自由化協商的時間表等，都是特例；但這個特例既有可能成為他國與兩岸洽簽ＦＴＡ時比照參照的模式，也可能面臨異議的挑戰，甚至可能成為台灣對外洽簽的障礙，政府須預為綢繆。

另方面，台灣期望透過ＥＣＦＡ，借道中國，進入全球區域整合的網絡，雖是兩岸關係日趨和緩下的可能結果，但畢竟仍以官方的主觀期待居多，台灣要拿出多少吸引各國與我洽簽ＦＴＡ的誘因，將是後ＥＣＦＡ時期政府須務實思考的事。更值得注意的是，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，反而可能加速南韓等其他國家與大陸洽簽ＦＴＡ的進度，這自然牽動台灣的ＥＣＦＡ利益。這說明的是，世界是轉動的，台灣不要以為簽了ＥＣＦＡ，所有好處就手到擒來，遂以不變應萬變。果如此，ＥＣＦＡ就白簽了。

日本策略大師大前研一說得好，ＥＣＦＡ是顆為台灣精心調製的維他命，但維他命可用以強身，卻無法保命；因此，要保住台灣經濟發展的競爭優勢，吃了ＥＣＦＡ這顆維他命是不夠的，還須有相應的強身健體之策，其關鍵在於政府能否借力使力，運用ＥＣＦＡ的兩岸經貿自由化開放壓力，推進台灣的經濟改革工程。因此，馬總統本周要提出的後ＥＣＦＡ全球經濟戰略至關重要，我們拭目以待。