Political Support for the DPP Not in QuestionUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 2, 2010

Summary: Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."

Full Text below:

Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains.

Each time a protest march is held, the organizers' estimates differ from the police estimates. This is true for the Blue and Green camps alike. Actually, the DPP should not be terribly concerned about the number of people participating in any particular protest march. Nor should outsiders jump to conclusions about the DPP's political support based solely on the number of people who participated in a given DPP protest march.

After all, the DPP is a political party that still commanded 5.4 million votes during the 2008 presidential election, i.e., 41.55% of the total votes. During the 2008 presidential election, the DPP hit a low due to the Chen Corruption and Money Laundering Scandals. The Referendum on Joining the UN and other political moves made it impossible for Taipei to talk to Beijing and Washington. Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh was also a highly controversial figure. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's political momentum was unstoppable. Pan Blue voters' morale was sky high. But even admidst such dire circumstances the DPP still commanded 5.4 million votes. Such political support is as solid as the Rock of Gilbraltar. Who dares to underestimate it?

During the 2008 presidential election ballot counting stage, we pointed out that although Ma Ying-jeou's KMT won with approximately 58% of the vote, the Democratic Progressive Party remained the key factor determining the rise or fall of Taiwan. If the DPP is unwilling to allow the Republic of China to survive, then it will not survive.

Twenty years of party politics on Taiwan has shown that the DPP's political support is growing. During the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian received 39% of the vote. In 2004, that number increased by 5%. The DPP's political support is rock solid. Even in 2008, when the party was in crisis, support for the DPP held at 42%. Several by-elections over the past two years show that support for the DPP has stabilized. Admittedly one reason is Pan Blue voters have boycotted recent elections. But even more interestingly, after 2008 it was widely assumed that the Democratic Progressive Party would draw a line in the sand between itself and Chen Shui-bian's corruption, and that it would change its stand on Taiwan independence. But these predictions turned out to be grossly mistaken. Today the "Chen Shui-bian connection" has become one wing of the DPP. Furthermore, the Democratic Progressive Party has mobilized in opposition to ECFA, and reverted to shouting "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet, the rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle."

These phenomena show that although the DPP has refused to disown Ah-Bian, and persists in supporting Taiwan independence, it nevertheless commands solid support. One might even say that in order to maintain its political base, the DPP cannot afford to disown Ah-Bian, and cannot afford to amend its Taiwan independence stance. This is why the DPP is able to ensure that its political support never falls below a certain level. But it is also the reason the DPP is unable to transform itself.

In the wake of ECFA, one can safely draw the following conclusion. The Democratic Progressive Party will not undergo any transformation prior to 2012.

From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to demonize ECFA. Now it is too late to change its tune. If the DPP were to change its tune, how could it continue its mayoral campaigns for the five directly administered municipalities? The primary plank in the five municipalities mayoral elections is "opposition to [mainland] China." If the DPP wins in 2012 on the basis of an "opposition to [mainland] China" platform, does it really intend to abolish ECFA. Does it really intend to force everyone to start over from scratch?

There is no possibility of the DPP undergoing transformation. At the same time, the DPP has a solid base of political support. This gives the DPP enough power to divide the nation. It also encourages the DPP to divide the nation to ensure its own political survival and political growth. But if the DPP wins the five mayoral elections, or even the 2013 presidential election, won't it lead Taiwan down a dead end?

Compare the current Democratic Progressive Party with the "DPP" of 2000, which proclaimed its support for "Five Noes." Compare it with the DPP of 2004, which demanded a referendum to purchase missiles. Compare it with the DPP of 2008, which demanded a referendum to join the UN. The DPP of 2010 has adopted an even harder line on Taiwan independence. Its party chairman refers to the ROC as "a government in exile." It is trying even harder to divide the nation. It has equated opposition to ECFA with hatred for [mainland] China and hatred for the rich. It is less likely to undergo transformation, and less willing to undergo transformation. It believes that if it changes, it will collapse, and be unable to justify its former rhetoric. It feels no need to undergo transformation. After all, it still retains a 42% level of political support from 2008.

DPP supporters are diehards who stubbornly persist in supporting the party despite Chen Shui-bian's flagrant corruption. They are diehards whose support cannot be shaken even by globalization and Taiwan's marginalization. This is why the Democratic Progressive Party feels no need to undergo transformation prior to 2012. This is why the DPP does not dare undergo transformation, and will not undergo transformation prior to 2012.

On the one hand, such stubbornly unwavering political support provides the DPP with skeletal support. On the other hand, it is also consumes the DPP's marrow. Therefore, pay no attention to how many people attend the DPP's protest marches. After all, the DPP once held an island wide demonstration involving one million people. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."

不用質疑民進黨的社會實力
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.02 03:22 am

上周六民進黨發動反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，宣稱參加者達十五萬人；但據警方統計，出發時約三萬兩千人，到達凱道時下起大雨，剩下約一萬六千人。

每次遊行，主辦單位宣稱的人數，與警方的估計皆有出入；此種情況，藍綠皆然。其實，民進黨不必太過在意一次遊行人數的多寡，而外界也不能只因一次遊行人數多寡而論斷民進黨的社會實力。

畢竟，民進黨是一個在二○○八年總統大選中「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票的政黨（得票率四十一‧五五）。二○○八年總統大選之際，民進黨因扁案幾已陷於谷底，入聯公投等操作又與北京及華府鬧得不可開交，總統候選人謝長廷也是高度爭議性人物；相對而言，其競選對手馬英九的聲勢銳不可當，藍營選民更是士氣如虹；但即使在那般艱困的情勢中，民進黨在二○○八年「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票，這樣的社會實力簡直已是鐵板一塊，豈容輕估？

二○○八總統大選開票時，我們即曾指出，馬英九的國民黨雖以約五十八％贏得政權，但相對而言，民進黨卻仍是決定台灣興衰存亡的關鍵因素，如果民進黨不願意中華民國活下去，中華民國仍是活不成。

台灣經歷二十餘年政黨政治的激盪已可證明，民進黨的社會支持是在成長（二○○○年總統大選，陳水扁三十九％，二○○四年升至五○％），而且十分堅實（即使在二○○八的艱困情勢下，仍維持四十二％）。近二年的幾次補選，亦顯示民進黨的社會支持已告盤穩（雖然主要原因是藍營選民不投票）。更值得注意的是，二 ○○八後一般想像民進黨會與陳水扁的貪腐切割，及修正其台獨路線，但這些預測卻竟皆是大謬不然；如今非僅「陳水扁連線」已寄身民進黨內，且民進黨更因操作反ＥＣＦＡ，又走回「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的獨派路線。

這些現象皆在顯示：即使民進黨不與扁切割，或仍然維持台獨路線，民進黨依然會保有堅實的社會支持；甚至可反過來說，民進黨為保有其社會支持，所以不能與扁切割，也不能修正其台獨路線。這是民進黨所以維持不墜的原因，但這也是民進黨不可能轉型蛻變的原因。

經歷ＥＣＦＡ的激盪，台灣的政治又可獲得一個階段性的論斷，那就是：民進黨在二○一二年以前，已完全沒有轉型蛻變的可能性。

民進黨一開始就把ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化，現在已無改口的可能性；倘若改口，民進黨的五都選舉還能選得下去嗎？而五都選舉既以「反中」為主軸，到了二○一二總統大選恐怕也只有硬撐到底（連蘇貞昌也已正面反ＥＣＦＡ）；接著，倘若在二○一二年民進黨又以「反中」路線贏得了選舉，到了執政後難道真要廢止ＥＣＦＡ而教台灣一切重新來過嗎？

民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，而民進黨又有十分堅實的社會支持；這使民進黨有撕裂國家的實力，且亦使民進黨必須藉撕裂國家始能生存發展。但是，這樣的民進黨即使贏得了五都選舉，甚或即使贏得了二○一二總統大選，難道不會將台灣帶上死路一條？

現在的民進黨，比二○○○年的「民進黨」（四不一沒有），比二○○四年的民進黨（買飛彈公投），亦比二○○八年的民進黨（入聯公投），路線上更獨（黨主席說中華民國是「流亡政府」），也更撕裂台灣（反ＥＣＦＡ將「仇中／仇富」聯結）。民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，更不敢轉型蛻變（變了就垮了，如何自圓其說），亦更不必轉型蛻變（畢竟也許有從二○○八年四十二％起跳的社會支持）。

民進黨的支持者，是連陳水扁貪腐也不離不棄的支持者，亦是連國際全球化及台灣邊緣化也不能動搖的支持者。這是民進黨在二○一二年前不必轉型蛻變之所寄，也是民進黨在二○一二年前絕不敢且絕不可能轉型蛻變的原因。

如此堅實頑強的社會支持，一方面支撐著民進黨的骨架，另一方面亦在噬食民進黨的骨髓。因而，不必計較民進黨遊行人數多寡，畢竟民進黨也曾發動過號稱百萬人的環島示威，誰能質疑民進黨的社會實力？但是，即使反ＥＣＦＡ遊行真有十五萬人，一如過去每次遊行，走到凱達格蘭大道，也就已是民進黨「登峰造極」的終點與盡頭了。