Boao Forum: What's Behind the Veil

Boao Forum: What's Behind the Veil
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2012

Summary: Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.

Full Text below:

Vice President-elect Wu Den-yih has finished registering for the Boao Forum. He expects to attend in early April. Beijing may send current Mainland Vice President Xi Jinping, who will assume the Presidency in the fall. Or they may send current Mainland Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who will assume the Premiership.

Authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are undergoing personnel changes. The upcoming Wu Xi Summit or Wu Li Summit suggests that authorities on both sides will continue their previously established policy path. This path was set in mid-2008, at the Boao Forum, by Vice President elect Vincent Siew and Mainland President Hu Jintao.

The 2008 Boao Forum was a major milestone for cross-Strait relations. In 2005 the Lien/Hu Meeting reached an agreement on the 1992 Consensus and Peaceful Development. The 2008 Boao Forum transformed a shared vision between two political parties, the KMT and CCP, into a real world working arrangement between two political authorities.

Let us put the known pieces of the puzzle together. Consider the Boao Forum four years ago. On March 22, 2008 Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, with 58% of the vote. That night, National Security Council Secretary-General designate Su Chi suggested that next month's Boao Forum offered a perfect opportunity to break the cross-Strait ice. Four days later, on March 26, Mainland President Hu Jintao spoke with U.S. President George W. Bush on the hotline. Hu said, "The Chinese Mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. This means that both sides recognize that there is only one China, but each side will define one China its own way." Hu Jintao defined the 1992 Consensus as "One China, Different Interpretations." One China, Different Interpretations became the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. When Ma Ying-jeou listened to Hu's remarks, he was "very surprised." He decided to send Vice President elect Vincent Siew to the Boao Forum, as a further measure of the two sides' political path. The registration deadline had already passed. But two days later they received confirmation. Forum officials had arranged a fifty-seater private charter plane to fly Vincent Siew from Hong Kong to Haikou, but only charged him for an ordinary commercial flight.

Two events during the meeting underscored the important policy implications. One. Vincent Siew and Mainland Commerce Minister Chen Deming held a round-table. The Mainland press release said the two sides "participated in a dialogue under the One China Principle." When Vincent Siew objected to the wording. Mainland officials deleted it. Two. Vincent Siew conveyed President Ma's concept of "Face reality, create the future, shelve disagreement, pursue win/win." Hu Jintao responded in kind: "Work shoulder to shoulder, establish mutual trust, shelve disagreements, create win/win." Chen Deming withdrew his press release. Vincent Siew spoke of "facing reality." As we can see, the 2008 Boao Forum enabled the two sides to test each other's bottom lines and to agree on the 1992 Consensus. It enabled the two sides to experience four years of Peaceful Development.

We are now at an historical turning point. One point is especially worth affirming. Leaders on both sides of the Strait today have sound judgment, They appreciate the value of this historic opportunity. They know enough to take advantage of it. For example, when Hu Jintao spoke to Bush on the hotline, he did not inform Ma Ying-jeou in advance. But he exercised initiative. He showed good faith. He established a new pattern for Washington/Beijing/Taipei relations. For example, when Ma asked Siew to attend the Boao Forum, it was not at the invitation of Beijing. But he seized the initiative. He gave Beijing the opportunity to "refrain from repudiating" Siew's assertion that he was the Vice President elect of the Republic of China. For example, when Chen Deming deleted the controversial wording from Beijing's press release, he did so quietly and without protest. This enabled Siew and Hu to reach a consensus on "shelving disputes and co-creating a win/win scenario." These bits and pieces may seem trivial today, But at the time they crossed a high and risky historical threshold.

Forty days from now. Wu Den-yih will attend the Boao Forum. It will be the second time a "Vice President elect of the Republic of China" attends the meeting. This means that even though Beijing does not recognize the Republic of China as a matter of law, it must nevertheless recognize the Republic of China's system of direct presidential elections. Bejing knew that Vincent Siew and Wu Den-yih were Vice Presidents elect. Therefore, the Boao Forum shows that cross-Strait relations are evolving. They are evolving from mutual non-repudiation, toward mutual recognition. In other words, they are moving toward the Bush/Hu Hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations. Over the past four years, officials from both sides have seated themselve at the same negotiating table. But the Boao Forum veil of "Vice President elect" remains.

Rumor has it that in 2008 President elect Ma Ying-jeou envisioned attending the Boao Forum in his capacity as President elect of the Republic of China. Had he actually done so, he might have overplayed his hand. He might have betrayed impatience. But the Republic of China government and the People's Republic of China government may sign a Peace Agreement one day. This is a goal both governments look forward to. When can the veil over the Boao Forum be pulled back? That may depend on how the two sides interpret the Bush/Hu hotline version of One China, Different Interpretations.

何時揭去博鰲論壇那一層薄紗 【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.15

候任副總統吳敦義，已完成博鰲論壇的報名手續，可望於四月初赴會；北京方面可能由即將在今秋接任國家主席的現任國家副主席習近平，或即將接任國務院總理的現任國務院副總理李克強出面接待。

即將登場的「吳習會」或「吳李會」顯示，在兩岸政府皆出現換屆遞繼之際，雙方的兩岸政策皆可望依既定方向延續發展；而這個方向，則是在二○○八年，當時的候任副總統蕭萬長，與大陸國家主席胡錦濤在當年的博鰲論壇上所確立。

二○○八年的博鰲論壇，是兩岸關係的重大里程碑；它使二○○五年「連胡會」所建立的「九二共識／和平發展」原則，由國共兩黨的憧憬共識，轉移成了自二○○八年以來雙方政府所實際執行運作的具體政策。

且依目前已知的資訊進行拼圖，來看一看四年前那一次博鰲論壇的概貌。二○○八年三月二十二日，馬英九以百分之五十八的選票贏得首任總統大選；當晚，內定為國安會秘書長的蘇起即提議，可藉下月舉行的博鰲論壇為兩岸破冰的契機。四天後，三月二十六日，大陸國家主席胡錦濤在熱線中對美國總統小布希說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」在此，胡錦濤將「九二共識」定義為「一個中國／各自表述」；而「九二共識／一中各表」，儼然也成為「布胡熱線／一中各表」。馬英九在事後追述說，他看到胡錦濤的談話「十分驚訝」，於是決定請候任副總統蕭萬長出席博鰲論壇，進一步試測雙方的路數。當時，報名已經逾期，但兩天後即收到確認；博鰲官方並安排了一架五十人座的私人包機，協助蕭萬長一行由香港轉往海口，僅收取一般客機的票價。

會議期間，有兩個事件可以點出此會的政策意義。一、蕭萬長與大陸商務部長陳德銘舉行圓桌會議，會後大陸方面的新聞稿出現「在一個中國的原則下展開對話」等語；經蕭萬長提出異議，大陸方面加以刪除。二、蕭萬長向胡錦濤提出馬總統所楬櫫的「正視現實／開創未來／擱置爭議／追求雙贏」十六字箴言；胡錦濤則回以「共同努力／建立互信／擱置爭議／共創雙贏」十六字訣。由此可見，陳德銘的撤回新聞稿，與蕭萬長「正視現實」的表態，使二○○八的博鰲會可謂是兩岸政府對「九二共識」內涵的相互試探與定調，於是兩岸有了四年來的「和平發展」。

在這個歷史大拐點中，最值得肯定的是兩岸領導人對當時出現的歷史機遇皆有明智的判斷力，並知所珍惜。例如，胡錦濤在布胡熱線中的談話，事先當未告知馬英九；但他操持了主動，並表現了善意，建構起美中台三邊的政策新格局；又如，馬英九請蕭萬長赴博鰲論壇，亦非出於北京方面的邀請，而是主動出牌，給北京製造「不否認」蕭萬長為「中華民國候任副總統」的場域；再如，陳德銘刪除了強勢的片面語言，及蕭胡達成「擱置爭議／共創雙贏」的共識。這些點點滴滴，在今日看來皆似理所當然，但在當年卻是邁過了一個又一個高大危疑的歷史門檻。

再過四十幾天，吳敦義將出席博鰲論壇，這也是第二位「中華民國候任副總統」赴會。此中意義顯示，北京方面雖在「法理上」未承認中華民國，卻不能不面對中華民國公民直選總統的體制，因為明知蕭萬長及吳敦義皆為「候任副總統」；因此，博鰲論壇顯示，兩岸關係可由「互不否認」朝往「相互承認」的方向發展，也就是循「布胡熱線」及「一中各表」的方向發展。然而，四年來兩岸政府官員雖皆已直接上了談判桌，但在博鰲論壇上卻仍存有「候任副總統」的這一層紗簾。

據說，二○○八年曾有由「中華民國候任總統」馬英九親赴博鰲論壇的擬想。倘若當時真的那麼做了，也許是過猶不及，太過躁進。但是，未來可由中華民國政府與中華人民共和國政府，商簽建立《和平協議》等機制，應是兩岸政府可以期望的目標。博鰲的那一層薄紗何時可以拉開，也許要看「布胡熱線／一中各表」在兩岸政府換屆後如何解讀與發展。