The DPP is Behind the Times

The DPP is Behind the Times
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2012

Summary: The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.

Full Text below:

The DPP lost the presidential election by 800,000 votes. The DPP is currently reviewing why it was unable to close the gap. In fact the remaining gap is the gap between the times the DPP lives in, and the way the DPP defines itself.

Outsiders have sharply criticized the DPP's post-mortem review of its election defeat. Many within the party have raised questions about what went wrong in the DPP's bid to return to power. Why was it unable to go the distance? Many within the party have demanded serious soul-searching. Most agree that the DPP's stance on cross-Strait issues is the reason it is unable to gain the public trust. But most know that when faced with this problem, the DPP remains incapable of offering concrete alternatives. Internal dissent could even lead to a split within the party. Does the DPP really want to remain stuck where it is, unable to go the final mile?

Many charges have been leveled against outsiders. One charge is that the DPP was unfairly portrayed as opposed to Taiwanese businessmen. Another charge is that the KMT engaged in economic intimidation, and the intimidation worked. But these are all tactical matters. The real reason the DPP is stuck. is the way the DPP perceives itself. It is also the way outsiders perceive the DPP and its raison d'etre.

Taiwan was once under authoritarian rule. Local consciousness and local culture were suppressed. Cross-Strait confrontation led to a prolonged Mainland diplomatic blockade and military intimidation. It did not take long for "ethnic" (communal group) demagoguery to appear within the pro democracy movement. This "ethnic" demagoguery characterized the Kuomintang as a regime from the mainland whose goal was to annex Taiwan. It cast the KMT as the enemy of Taiwan. Inciting "ethnic" divisions and antagonisms became a convenient tool for political mobilization. Local people suffered many historical traumas. They feared and loathed Mainland authority.

The DPP became the spokesperson for this fear and loathing. The DPP habitually accused others of being "traitors who are selling out Taiwan." It cast itself as Taiwan's solitary champion. It made Taiwan independence the party's Holy Grail. It swore to defend Taiwan from Mainland China. This has been the core value of the DPP since its very inception. These are its most distinctive trademarks. That is why the DPP must cast the Chinese Mainland as a Evil Incarnate, and itself as Taiwan's only salvation. But what happens when the enemy is no longer the enemy? What happens when the cross-Strait standoff winds down? What happens when confrontation gradually becomes exchanges and cooperation? The reason for the DPP's existence begins to look outdated. Time has marched on. It has cast aside the life and death cross-Strait struggle. But the DPP knows only how to battle the "Communist bandits." Little wonder it has been left behind by the general public.

The DPP's self-definition is a throwback to a past in which the two sides faced each other with swords drawn. But the situation has changed. One. People on both sides of the Strait have spontaneously engaged in close interaction. Tourism, education, business, investment, marriage, medical treatment, and other exchanges have steadily increased. Two. The Chinese Mainland is increasingly important, politically and economically, to the international community, Europe looks to the Mainland for its debt problems. Businessmen from Taiwan are even more dependent upon the business opportunities made available. The United States needs Mainland cooperation on North Korea and Syria. Three. The Chinese mainland is changing. Economic growth, the free flow of information, and Internet communications, have steadily loosened its formerly monolithic rule. Wu Kan Village protests and elections are seen as an important step in the fight for democracy. The DPP has not addressed or dealt with these changes.

The changes on Mainland China have not occurred as quickly as the outside world might wish. There is still much to criticize. Cross-Strait sovereignty disputes remain unsolved. But the changes are already obvious, Yet the DPP's attitudes remain rigid and its policies calcified, inapplicable to a cross-Strait situation in which the two sides no longer face each other with swords drawn. Instead of changing with the times, the DPP has chosen to turn a blind eye to the changes that have taken place. It has chosen to minimize or distort their significance.

The DPP rejects Mainland China. It refuses to recognize its importance. The DPP is out of touch with reality. People on Taiwan have real world concerns about their continued livelihood. Worse still for the DPP, cross-Strait relations continue to increase. As a result, the DPP is increasingly perceived as obdurately obstructionist. It forfeited the opportunity to function in a positive manner. The public sees this. The DPP is a political party that remains mired in the past, incapable of dealing with the present. It is incapable of offering a practical blueprint for the future. How can it possibly win the peoples trust?

Let us speak frankly, from the heart. The people do not believe that if the DPP were to return to power, that it would make a genuine effort to reduce cross-Strait tensions and promote reconciliation and cooperation, Any such effort would be antithetical to the DPP's very justification for existence. Meanwhile, whenever the KMT promotes cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, it is invariably the target of DPP character assassination. This confirms and bolsters the impression that the DPP is unregenerate in its Sinophobia.

The DPP has begun discussing how to deal with the 1992 Consensus. It has begun talking about a new cross-Strait policy approach. But none of these matters are basic. They are all superficial matters of secondary importance. The DPP equates severing relations with Mainland China with maintaining "Taiwan's sovereignty." It defines itself as a party that knows only how to make war with the Chinese Mainland, not how to make peace. The fact is it no longer needs to define itself in this manner. The DPP is not merely behind the times. It is falling further and further behind the times. This is why it has been forced to engage in its post election defeat review. The DPP's definition of its role and its goal, must be rethought, from top to bottom.

民進黨落後時代一哩路
2012-02-21中國時報

總統大選以八十萬票落敗，民進黨正在檢討為什麼走不到這最後一哩路。其實，這一哩路的差距，就是民進黨的核心自我定位與時代的距離。

外界對民進黨敗選檢討報告的初稿有不少批評，對於民進黨重返執政的這最後一哩路出了什麼問題，黨內也提出了許多檢討。大部分人都同意，兩岸問題是民進黨無法取得人民信任的最重要關鍵；但大部分人也發現，對於這個問題，民進黨仍然拿不出什麼具體對策，而且也不保證將來討論時不會引發黨內分裂。民進黨，真的就要卡在這最後一哩了嗎？

現在許多檢討，包括被塑造成反台商、國民黨的經濟恐嚇奏效等等，其實都是戰術面的問題，真正把民進黨卡住的，是自己認定、也被外界認定的核心價值與基本功能定位。

台灣過去被威權統治，本土民意與文化都被壓抑，加上兩岸對抗下中國長期以外交封鎖與軍事威嚇對付台灣，台灣的民主運動在開始沒多久就出現了族群化的現象，簡單地把來自大陸的國民黨政權和一直想併吞台灣的中國都打成台灣的敵人。族群切割與對立是很好的動員工具，尤其是本省族群承受了不少歷史創傷，對來自中國大陸的力量有深刻的恐懼與仇視。

民進黨於是成為這種創傷、恐懼與仇恨的代言人，並且在經常指控別人是賣台叛徒後，把自己打造成台灣唯一的捍衛者，更把台獨列為政黨目標。保護台灣對抗中國大陸，是民進黨之所以存在至今的最核心價值，也是最鮮明的商標。所以，中國大陸必須是妖魔般的敵人，而唯有民進黨才能和敵人作戰。可是，當敵人不再是敵人，或者兩岸的對抗趨緩，逐漸走向交流合作時，民進黨的存在基礎就開始顯得過時。當時代往前走，把兩岸的你死我活拋下時，只會對匪作戰的民進黨，也跟著被主流民意拋下了。

民進黨的自我設定擺在過去的兩岸對峙狀況，但現在情況已經大有變化。第一、兩岸人民自發的互動綿密進行，旅遊、求學、經商、投資、通婚、就醫，交流不斷擴大深化。第二、中國大陸在國際舞台的政經地位愈形重要，歐債想找中國幫忙，台商更是不能放棄大陸商機，美國要處理北韓、敘利亞，一樣需要中國合作。第三、中國大陸內部也在改變，隨著經濟成長、資訊流通與網路傳播，原本鐵板一塊的統治不斷在各角落出現鬆動，烏坎村的抗爭與選舉更被視為爭民主的重要一步。而這些，民進黨都沒有好好正視及因應。

當然，中國大陸的變化沒有外界希望地快速，許多方面仍然遭到批評，而兩岸主權之爭仍然無解。但是，當時代變化已經非常明顯時，民進黨卻因為理念與政策路線太過僵化，不能適用在一個不再劍拔弩張的兩岸關係裡，因此選擇對變化視而不見、淡化或扭曲。

但是，民進黨排斥中國大陸、拒絕承認其重要性的態度，和當前台灣人民要生活的現實是脫節的。更糟的是，在未來兩岸發展的可能性裡，民進黨因而被視為一味阻撓交流的負面因素，失去了產生正面功能的機會。人民的眼睛是雪亮的，一個政黨，如果只背負著過去，卻沒有能力因應現在，更提不出什麼未來可行藍圖，如何得到人民的付託？

其實，更坦白講，打從心底，民眾就不相信如果民進黨上台執政，會真心想降低兩岸緊張、積極推動和解合作，因為這和民進黨本身的存在設定是完全相反的。而國民黨推動兩岸交流合作總是遭到民進黨人士批判，也一再印證並強化了民進黨「逢中必反」的形象。

民進黨內部已開始討論如何面對「九二共識」、要提出新的兩岸論述等等，但和更本質的東西相比，這些都只是次要的、表面性的東西而已。民進黨把切斷與中國的關係，和維護台灣主權劃上等號，把自己設定為只會戰不會和的角色，其實未必需要如此。現在民進黨不但落後時代一哩，距離還日益擴大。眼前固然要檢討敗選原因，但整個黨的核心定位與功能目標，更需要徹底做一番省思。