The DPP Must Recognize the Republic of China, But Can It?

The DPP Must Recognize the Republic of China, But Can It?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 6, 2012

Summary: The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. DPP leaders remain deadlocked over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. The DPP's dilemma is that one the one hand it must recognize the Republic of China. But on the other hand, it cannot recognize the Republic of China.

Full Text below:

The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. DPP leaders remain deadlocked over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

Internally, the 1992 Consensus means accepting the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. It means accepting that the nation was born in 1912 of the Xinhai Revolution. It means accepting that a century of constitutional and political evolution resulted in the Republic of China we have today. For both Taipei and Beijing, the 1992 Consensus is an example of One China, Different Interpretations.

During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait rhetoric changed. She began arguing that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." But this merely describes the geographical extent of the Republic of China's current jurisdiction. This has nothing to do with its political sovereignty. This evades the Republic of China's historical reality. In other words, the Republic of China that Tsai Ing-wen refers to is not the Republic of China as defined by the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. It is not the Republic of China of 1912, which evolved into the Republic of China we know today.

Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" is yet another example of "backdoor listing." She pays lip service to the Republic of China. But she refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. She refuses to use the Constitution of the Republic of China to resolve the cross-Strait dispute that has persisted since 1949. In other words, her "Republic of China" is the "Republic of China" of the "two states theory." It is not the "Republic of China" of One China, Different Interpretations.

This is the DPP's cross-Strait policy bottleneck. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." On the surface she appears to have abandoned calls for the "Founding of a Republic of Taiwan," and the DPP's "Taiwan independence party platform." But she refuses to accept One China, Different Interpretations as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. She persists in repudiating the constitutional framework of the Republic of China.

Internally, Tsai Ing-wen's "Republic of China" departs from the Republic of China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. In cross-Strait relations, it departs from the Republic of China as defined by One China, Different Intepretations. Therefore, her "Republic of China" is not the same as the Republic of China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. Nor is it the Republic of China as defined by hard cross-Strait realpolitik. Her "Republic of China" is merely another variant of the Taiwan independence movement's "backdoor listing" tactic.

The DPP is currently reviewing its cross-Strait policy. Its fundamental problem however, is that refuses to recognize the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. Under this framework, cross-Strait policy means One China, Different Intepretations. But the DPP opposes One China, Different Interpretations. Therefore it repudiates the 1992 Consensus. But a more fundamental question looms. Since the DPP repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can it recognize the Republic of China, as defined by the Republic of China Constitution?

The global strategic picture as well as the state of the nation have evolved. The possibility of Taiwan independence today is zero. When Tsai Ing-wen argues that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan," she is merely reciting the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is one step removed from Taiwan independence. But it has nothing to do with the Republic of China, as defined by the Republic of China Constitution, or with harsh cross-Strait reality.

Reformers within the Democratic Progressive Party know they must abandon their support for Taiwan independence. But they cannot bring themselves to do so. They are afraid to fully accept the Republic of China. This is the problem the DPP's post-election review is up against. Fully accepting the Republic of China, means fully accepting the Republic of China Constitution. Fully accepting the Republic of China Constitution, means accepting One China, Different Interpretations as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. This is what we said at the beginning. The DPP 's post-election review has stalled. It remains stalled over whether to accept the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

The possibility of Taiwan independence is now zero. Looking to the future, cross-Strait economic and trade relations are bound to become closer. The pressure to resolve the cross-Strait political schism will intensify. The only way to respond to political pressures arising from cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, is to uphold One China, Different Interpetations, and the Republic of China Constitution. In other words, resisting the pressure to reunify, or promoting peaceful development, will require the Republic of China Constituion and One China, Different Interpretations. One cannot rely on Taiwan independence, the "two states theory," or "backdoor listing."

The DPP now has three cross-Strait policy options. One. It can cling to its "Taiwan independence party platform." I can insist that "Taiwan's status is undetermined," and that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime." Two. It can refuse to admit that the Republic of China dates back to the Xinhai Revolution of 1912. It can persist in perceiving the Republic of China through the lens of the 2/28 Incident of 1947. It can argue on the basis of geography that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan." It can persist in "backdoor listing" and continue opposing One China, Different Interpretations. Three. It can recognize the Republic of China Constitution. It can use One China, Different Intepretations and cross-Strait peaceful development to regulate cross-Strait relations. It can adopt a more rational approach in order to arrive at a clearer goal for cross-Strait developments.

The DPP's current posture combines option one and option two. But only option three offers the DPP a way out. Unfortunately the DPP has never been willing to recognize the Republic of China. This began during the "dang wai" era. It persisted for decades. National flags never appear at any of its mass rallies. This remains true even today. The DPP has never been willing to recognize the Republic of China. That is why it cannot lead its supporters in a new direction. The DPP cannot recognize the Republic of China because if it recognizes the Republic of China, it will lose its core support. This is the DPP's dilemma.

The DPP's dilemma is that one the one hand it must recognize the Republic of China. But on the other hand, it cannot recognize the Republic of China.

中華民國，民進黨是不是回不去了？
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.02.06

民進黨的選後檢討報告難產，問題仍然卡在是否接受「九二共識／一中各表」。

九二共識，對內而言，就是在中華民國憲法的架構下，接受一九一二年肇建、並歷經百年來憲政演化及政局變遷而發展至今的中華民國；九二共識，對兩岸而言，即是一中各表。

在選季，蔡英文的兩岸論述曾經發展至「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」的表述；但這只是從現實的地理概念來界定中華民國的現況，卻迴避了中華民國的歷史意涵。亦即，蔡英文並未正面接受這個中華民國是在中華民國憲法的架構下，所承繼並發展至今的中華民國。

蔡英文的「中華民國論」，仍是一種「借殼上市」。她雖表示接受中華民國，卻不肯接受以中華民國憲法的準據，來解決自一九四九年以來發展演化至今的兩岸關係；換句話說，她的「中華民國」，是「兩國論」的中華民國，而不是「一中各表」的中華民國。

這正是民進黨兩岸政策的瓶頸。蔡英文說「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」，看起來似已放棄了「建立台灣共和國」的《台獨黨綱》；但是，她拒絕以「一中各表」為兩岸互動的準據，這仍是否定及背離了「中華民國憲法」的架構。

因此，蔡英文的「中華民國」，對內是脫離了「中華民國憲法」的中華民國；對兩岸，則是脫離了「一中各表」的中華民國。所以，這樣的「中華民國」，其實不是憲法上及兩岸現實上的「中華民國」，而只是「借殼上市」的台獨化身。

民進黨此時檢討其兩岸政策，根本的問題即在要不要回歸到「中華民國憲法架構下」；在此一架構下，兩岸政策的準據即是「一中各表」。然而，民進黨因反對「一中各表」，所以否定「九二共識」；其更深一層的問題卻是，民進黨既否定「一中各表」，將如何回歸到中華民國憲法與中華民國？

世局國情發展至今，台獨的可能性已趨於零。蔡英文說「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」，只是趨從《台灣前途決議文》，且再離開了「台獨」一小步；但是，並未就此回歸到憲法上及兩岸現實上的「中華民國」。

然而，民進黨內的改革派均知必須脫離「台獨」，但又不願、不敢完全接受「中華民國」，這正是民進黨選後檢討的難題所在。因為，完全接受「中華民國」，即應完全接受「中華民國憲法」；而完全接受「中華民國憲法」，即是接受以「一中各表」為兩岸互動的準據。這正是文首所說，民進黨選後檢討報告難產，問題仍然卡在是否接受「九二共識／一中各表」的道理。

台獨的可能性已趨於零。瞻望未來，兩岸經貿關係必將愈來愈密切，而兩岸政治解決的壓力也將愈來愈大；但無論如何，因應兩岸經貿交流及政治壓力的唯一方案，皆在依據中華民國憲法的「一中各表」。也就是說，不論是欲抵拒「統一」的壓力，或要提升改善「和平發展」的品質，皆要依憑中華民國憲法及一中各表；不可能靠「台獨」、「兩國論」，或「借殼上市」。

此際，民進黨在兩岸政策上的選項有三：一、繼續維持《台獨黨綱》，主張「台灣地位未定論」，並認定「中華民國」為「外來政權」；二、否定「一九一二年辛亥革命的（延續式）中華民國史觀」，主張「一九四七年二二八事件的（斷裂式）中華民國史觀」，以「台灣就是中華民國，中華民國就是台灣」的「地理論」來「借殼上市」，並反對「一中各表」。三、完全回歸中華民國憲法，並以「一中各表」為兩岸「和平發展」的準據，藉以節制兩岸關係，「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。

民進黨現今的立場，其實是第一選項及第二選項的混合體；但只有第三選項才是民進黨的出路。問題卻在於，民進黨自黨外時代以來，花了幾十年時間，將其群眾帶到造勢活動中看不到一幅國旗的場面；如今倘不能使國旗重現其群眾場合，民進黨就不可能真正回到「中華民國」。因此，若不能改變那些群眾，民進黨就回不了中華民國；倘欲回到中華民國，民進黨即可能失去它的「基本盤」。這應即是民進黨當前面臨的兩難絕境。

也就是說，民進黨當前的問題是在：必須回到中華民國，但是否回不去了？