DPP Unable to See Itself in the Mirror

DPP Unable to See Itself in the Mirror
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2012

Summary: The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.

Full Text below:

The DPP has long boasted that it is a political party able to reflect on its own shortcomings. But this is a virtue it has moved farther and farther away from. Consider the DPP review of the reasons for its defeat in the recent election. On the surface, it brims over with eloquence, But on the inside, it is shot through with evasions, It acknowledged committing venial sins, but denied committing any mortal sins. It pointed fingers left and right at others for its plight. It avoided zeroing in its worst defects, the ones that desperately demand self-reflection.

Outsiders said the draft of the DPP post-election review read like a technical paper. A Green Camp Central Standing Committee Member criticized Tsai's "Platform for the Coming Decade" as "too hard to understand." The same was true of the DPP's post-election review. It was written in typical "Tsai Ing-wen style." Tsai Ing-wen is the outgoing party chairman. Perhaps she did not want to paint too grim a picture of the DPP's plight, Perhaps she did not want to make it too difficult for the DPP to face its problems. Perhaps she wanted to retain her "guest host" status. Perhaps she was polite to a fault, because she wanted to let her comrades feel better about themselves. Unfortunately what ails the DPP can be cured only by shock therapy.

Tsai Ing-wen's review bobbed and weaved. It failed to come right out and name the problem. Swing voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern, the report claimed, during the final two weeks of the campaign. The DPP refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Its cross-Strait policy left voters unsettled. A number of Green Camp legislators were in complete accord. They said the DPP lost the general election on cross-Strait issues. Alas, the review blamed the KMT. It accused the KMT of misusing administrative resources. It blamed difficulties encountered by voters returning home to vote. It blamed the Song/Yu Effect, saying it failed to kick in. It blamed numerous other technical issues. It blamed everything but the real reason.

Voters lost confidence in the DPP's governing ability. The Green Camp opposed the 1992 Consensus. But several other factors played a part too. One. The DPP's vision was too narrow. It remained a captive of its own "Nativist" mentality. In an era of globalization, such a mentality will not do. It cannot help Taiwan cope with international competition. Two. The DPP was too ideologically oriented. It was too stubborn. It sometimes stonewalled. It refused to make pragmatic adjustments in response to changes in the environment. Three. It could talk the talk, but it couldn't walk the walk. Its reach was beyond its grasp. It engaged in obstructionism out of sheer spite, even though it was unable to offer any solutions. Four. It was intolerant of other groups within the community. It incited hatred of other groups, or turned a blind eye to others who did. Five. It was adept at political mobilization, but inept at economic development. Its record while in office failed to meet with the approval of the economic pillars of the community.

These are character traits and ingrained habits the DPP accumulated over time. Some in the Green Camp actually consider these character traits and ingrained habits "extraordinary strengths." As you can imagine, these problems were not included in the report. They were not cited as reasons for the DPP's defeat. Take the most obvious example, DPP rhetoric on cross-Strait relations. The global political and economic situation has changed. As a result, the DPP is seriously out of touch with reality. This prevents the DPP from broadening its democratic appeas. Within the party, leaders still kowtow before the party's holy icons. Therefore, its election defeat can be chalked up as a failure to deal with the 1992 Consensus. Closing one's eyes to a problem may be easy. But does it work?

The fact is, Chen Shui-bian's eight years of misrule brought disaster upon Taiwan. Yet the DPP has never seriously reflected upon it. The DPP longs to return to power at the central government level. But as long as this specter is not exorcised, it will remain a psychological barrier for voters. The DPP review said voters lost confidence in the DPP's ability to govern. This was correct. But the review then said this loss of confidence occurred only in the last two weeks. This is self-delusion. The DPP taught supporters how to mislead pollsters by giving them phony answers, The DPP invented this trick. Does the DPP actually believe Tsai Ing-wen led Ma Ying-jeou in the polls until the last two weeks? Assume that she does. Perhaps bleak memories of eight years of Green Government reawakened voters and brought them back to reality?

During its early years as a rising opposition party, the DPP boasted a relatively clean image. It had a sharp eye, and used it to check the ruling KMT. It gained the voters' trust. But following the second change in ruling parties, the Blue Camp outshone the DPP with its ability to govern and its dependable nature. The DPP's old image as an uncorrupt political party with a concern for justice, no longer exists. The review made absolutely no mention of the TaiMed corruption scandal or the luxury "farmhouse" scandal. These scandals clearly contributed to the public's loss of confidence in the Tsai/Su ticket. The DPP refuses to adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach to governance. This is especially true with national issues that require the long view, The DPP habitually adopts an obstructionist attitude, merely to frustrate the ruling administration's efforts to get things done, Given its attitude, how can it win voter confidence?

Every failure is an opportunity for self-reflection, a chance to better one's self. But not if one approaches the matter convinced that one is already perfect. Then when one looks in the mirror, all one sees are other peoples faults, never one's own. If one is determined not to see one's own faults, then it matters not how thick the review is. It will remain pointless. The DPP longs to cross the 50% threshold. To do so, it must engage in more than technical analysis. It must not pander to its core supporters. It must not count on Blue Camp supporters being divided. They will not always enable the DPP to win by default. Based on what we have seen, it would appear that , over half the draft should be deleted.

民進黨在鏡子裡看不到自己
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.02.17 02:13 am

民進黨曾號稱是個「有反省能力」的政黨，但這項美德已日漸離它遠去。看這次民進黨的敗選檢討，表面上洋洋灑灑，內容卻避重就輕、顧左右而言他，始終避免把焦點對準自己最脆弱、最該反省的環節。

這份檢討報告初稿，被外界形容寫得「像學術報告」；就如綠營中常委批十年政綱「太難懂」一樣，都具有典型的「蔡式風格」。蔡英文即將卸任黨主席，或許她不願丟下一個太沉重、太尖銳的局面，讓民進黨難以面對；或許她仍想保持自己一直以來客卿般的優雅，所以她面面俱到，讓同志們好過一些。問題是，此刻民進黨面對的情勢，恐怕非要「休克療法」才能解決。

蔡英文隱隱掩掩寫在檢討報告、卻未直接明言的重點是：中間選民在最後兩週失去了對民進黨「執政的信賴感」；其中，包括了民進黨不承認九二共識，導致選民對其兩岸走向的不確定感。這點，和若干綠委直指此次大選就敗在兩岸問題上，若合符節。遺憾的是，檢討報告卻故意另列舉國民黨運用行政資源、返鄉投票不便、及宋瑜效應未發酵等諸多技術性問題，把這個核心因素稀釋掉了。

選民失去對民進黨的執政信賴，除了綠營反對「九二共識」外，確實還有更多元的因素。茲列舉數例：一，視野過度褊狹，走不出本土化的框架，這在全球化年代顯不足以帶領台灣迎接國際競爭。二，意識形態取向太強，常流於執拗、乃至硬拗，無法面對環境務實調整。三，論述能力高於實踐能力，眼高手低，為反對而反對，卻無能找出解決方案。四，對不同族群及不同意見缺乏包容，有時更煽動或縱容仇視。五，長於政治動員卻拙於經濟發展，治理成績難以獲得經濟支柱型選民的認同。

這些，都是民進黨長期發展累積下來的性格和積習，其中有些甚至還是綠營自認不凡的「長處」；可以想見，這些問題絕不會在敗選報告中提及。最明顯的例子是，民進黨的兩岸關係論述，隨著世界政經局勢的演變，已嚴重與現實脫節，甚至妨礙了民進黨整體民主論述的擴充；然而在黨內，這卻仍是其供桌上必須遵古法膜拜的神主牌，也因此這次敗選也只能含混簡化為「九二共識」的提法失當。鋸箭法雖好用，但問題真有這麼簡單嗎？

事實是，陳水扁執政八年帶給台灣的災難，從來沒有被好好反省過；只要這個陰影不消除，民進黨要重回中央執政，它就會成為選民的心理障礙。檢討報告說，選民失去對民進黨的「執政信賴」，這是正確的解讀；但報告說這發生在「最後兩週」，卻是自欺欺人。別忘了，教導民眾提供假意見來誤導民調，不正是民進黨發明的伎倆嗎？那麼，它真的相信蔡英文的民調一路領先馬英九，直到「最後兩週」才急轉直下的嗎？就算是吧，那麼，不是綠執政八年的慘澹記憶驚醒選民回到現實嗎？

早年在野崛起時，民進黨以銳利的監督眼光及相對清純的形象，取得了選民信賴。但在兩度政黨輪替後，它執政的能力和穩定度已被藍軍比了下去，而它的清廉、公正形象也已東耗西損。就如檢討報告避談的宇昌案和豪華農舍案，絕對是「蔡蘇配」失去民眾信賴的因素。尤其對於全國性及前瞻性的議題，民進黨不僅不願表現它具有完整而平衡的執政視野，反而不時以唱反調的方式來杯葛中央，這種態度如何獲得選民的信賴？

每一次的失敗經驗，都可以作為反省的借鏡，以求自我提升。但如果堅信自己完美無瑕，面對鏡子只看到別人的錯，而無意看清自己的缺失，那檢討報告寫得再厚也沒用。民進黨要跨過百分之五十的門檻，不能只作技術性分析，不能只滿足於基本盤，不能期待藍軍分裂以獲漁翁之利。這樣看的話，這份檢討報告初稿該刪掉一半以上了。