ECFA and FTAs: What are We Missing?

ECFA and FTAs: What are We Missing?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2012

Summary: Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace. Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried.

Full Text below:

Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace on the cross-Strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), on FTAs with other countries, and on the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried. We must pick up the pace. We must consider the depth and breadth of our FTA policy. That is the key.

FTAs are agreements that signatories promote voluntarily. Only signatories to FTAs benefit from the liberalized conditions FTAs provide. There is no free rider problem. Therefore they are more open than most. For example, South Korea, the EU, and the United States have signed FTAs. Roughly 99% of all products are tariff free. Restrictions on foreign participation in the service sector have basically been eliminated. These FTAs also provide for simplified customs clearance, inspections, and quarantine procedures. They make regulations more transparent, and more consistent with international standards. State-owned enterprises compete on an equal footing. Government procurement is conducted in the open marketplace. Even health insurance and pharmaceutical products are market priced.

Over the past decade FTAs have included "goods, capital, and personnel." All three elements move across borders at all levels. Such an undertaking is daunting. International economic and trade interests often conflict. The difficulties encountered during negotiations can be imagined. Taiwan's economic structure is similar to South Korea's. Yet South Korea was able to sign an FTA with the EU and the US within two years. Mainland China and South Korea believe they will be able to sign an FTA, on schedule, within two years. That is not an empty boast. Once the FTA between Mainland China and South Korea is in place, the edge ECFA provides us will be lost. Chairman Yin's concerns are not alarmism.

What are we missing? Real world implementation of ECFA in both goods and services has been slow. Other FTAs have also gone nowhere. On the surface, we have no shortage of political resolve. Every time a South Korean FTA goes into effect, the President, the Premier, and sundry Ministers reaffirm their determination to accelerate the pace of liberalization. But as Chairman Yin noted, many of them still cling to protectionism. They still do not understand the industries they are dealing with. They are overly conservative. They are reluctant to play ball. One possibility is that high officials are merely going through the motions. They may be paying mere lip service to liberalization. They lack determination. They lack the desire to follow through. The higher the rank, the stronger the determination. The lower the rank, the weaker the determination. This is the first problem that must be solved.

Another reason for the snail's pace of FTA negotiations is the lack of negotiation resources. FTA negotiations involve complex issues. They require expertise in diverse fields. They require a division of labor. Only then can negotiations be conducted swiftly and thoroughly. South Korea's FTA negotiations involved over 100 officials. Government think tanks backed them 100%. By contrast, our own government has only 10 officials assigned to cross-Strait negotiations. Few officials have been assigned to other FTA negotiations. Think tank budgets have been cut or reallocated year after year. Innate deficiencies have led to inevitable problems. Speed has not been easy to achieve. Haste may also make for waste. This is the second bottleneck that must be eliminated.

A lack of industry understanding is another problem. Take the service sector. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for negotiations and coordination. It has little to do with the service sector. Telecommunications, finance, education, tourism, construction, transportation and other key services each have their own overseers. Each agency is responsible only for oversight. They lack industry understanding. They lacke international perspective. In the past industrial development was the responsibility of the CEPD. But since our accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the CEPD no longer participates in economic and trade negotiations. It has no role in cross-Strait negotiations. Over the past decade, it has played no part in negotiations.

In the long term, the government must re-position the CEPD as an economic and trade negotiator. The CEPD should promote liberalization. It need not sit at the negotiating table. Using external pressure from FTA negotiations to promote domestic reforms is also a worthwhile goal. FTAs are now about regulatory reform and structural change. These are matters the CEPD was adept at. These are matters it can promote. The CEPD Finance Legal Co-ordination Centre was responsible for regulatory reform when we joined the WTO. It has been quiet since. But if the need arises, it could once again play a role.

Finally, we offer this reminder to the government. The key with ECFA or FTAs is to negotiate well. South Korea seeks short-term advantages. But we should attempt to secure more favorable entry conditions. That would consitute a real victory.

ECFA與FTA，台灣缺了什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.06

中國大陸與日本和南韓即將啟動三方自由貿易協定（FTA）談判，而中、韓也同步開啟了雙邊FTA的談判，並預計在二年內完成。反觀台灣，無論是兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA），還是與各國的FTA，包括台美貿易及投資架構協議（TIFA），都還在牛步慢行，非但政府上下紛紛誓言加速，經建會尹啟銘主委更專文痛批「談太慢」。眼見韓國在FTA的布局上迅速超前，我們當然要急，也必須急，但除了速度，亦要兼顧深度及廣度，才是達成FTA政策的關鍵。

FTA是簽約各方自願推動，加上其自由化優惠僅限締約國之間才能享有，沒有「搭便車」的顧慮，因此開放程度一般都很高。以韓國與歐盟、美國簽訂的FTA為例，雙方零關稅產品比率都接近甚至超過百分之九十九，服務業部門對外資參與的限制，也都基本解除。除此之外，這些FTA中還包括通關、檢驗及檢疫措施的簡化、強化法規透明並向國際標準接軌、國營企業公平競爭、政府採購市場開放，甚至健保藥品核價等自由化項目。

簡單地說，近十年來新興FTA所涵蓋的自由化內容，幾乎包含了國際貿易中「貨品、資金及人員」三個要素在跨國移動時所可能涉及的所有層面。如此複雜的工程，加上各國經貿利益各不相同，談判的艱鉅可想而知。但是，經濟結構與台灣接近的韓國，卻能分別在二年內先後完成與歐盟、美國的FTA，所以中韓FTA預估的二年完成時程，不能視為隨便說說。一旦中韓FTA到位，我方連兩岸協議ECFA的先機也將喪失；所以尹主委的擔憂，絕非危言聳聽。

我們到底缺了什麼，非但具體實現ECFA效益的兩岸貨品及服務貿易協議進展緩慢，其他FTA也無下文？表面上看來，缺的不是政治決心；因為每次韓國的某個FTA生效，總統、院長、部長們都會堅決宣示加速加大推動的自由化決心。但尹主委文中也提到，很多部會還是抱持保護主義，而且對產業不夠瞭解、心態保守、配合度低。一個可能的原因，就是認為高層的決心是玩假的，說說就算。這個決心欠缺貫徹，「越上越強，越下越弱」的現象，是第一個要解決的問題。

欠缺談判資源，也是FTA牛步化的原因之一。FTA的談判議題複雜，所需專業領域很廣，分工必須細化，才能兼顧速度與深度。韓國FTA談判，不只投入百人以上參與，政府智庫也充分支援；反觀我國，非但負責兩岸協商者不過十人出頭，其他FTA談判人力也很吃緊，而智庫預算更是年年減少或被移為他用。先天不足，後天失調，要快不易，且求快就無法兼顧品質，這正是第二個要解決的瓶頸。

回到欠缺產業觀的問題上。以服務業為例，目前負責談判協調的經濟部，本身主管的服務業極少，電信、金融、教育、觀光、營建、運輸等重點服務業，各有所主；再者，各機關原本功能即以監管為主，欠缺產業觀及國際觀，已是老問題。過去各產業發展事項，是由經建會扮演主要推手，但經建會自從我國加入世貿組織（WTO）後，就不再參與經貿談判，在兩岸協商中也沒有角色，十年下來，早無談判能量。

長期而言，政府必須重新定位經建會在經貿談判中的角色。但是，要推動自由化，不一定要上桌談判；事實上，引FTA協商的外部壓力，推動國內改革，也是重要的目標。當代FTA的重心移轉到法規革新、結構調整，而這些都是經建會所拿手的業務，未來更可大力發揮。例如經建會財經法律協調中心在加入WTO時曾扮演過法規革新的樞紐，如今沈寂多時；但事態所需，應有再發揮的空間。

最後必須提醒政府的是，無論是ECFA還是FTA，談得好還是最重要的關鍵。與其要取得在時間上先於韓國這種短期利益，不如能夠爭取到更為優惠的進入條件，才是真正的勝利。