Su Tseng-chang's Semantic Dilemma

Su Tseng-chang's Semantic Dilemma
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2012

Summary: The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.

Full Text below:

The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.

Yang Yi was blunt. He said the Mainland resolutely opposes any Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship involves "one country on each side."

The Democratic Progressive Party is one of the major political parties on Taiwan. Yet it actually dissolved its Department of China Affairs. This was truly incomprehensible. Now it is considering reinstating it. But opinion is divided on what to name it. Some DPP leaders think it should be called the "Mainland Affairs Committee." Others think it should be called the "Cross-Strait Policy Committee."

The debate reflects a struggle within the Democratic Progressive Party over the party line. Democratic Progressive Party ideology dictates the name "Department of China Affairs." It reflects the DPP's "one country on each side" thinking. Names such as the "Department of Mainland Affairs" or "Cross-Strait Policy Committee" imply "one country, two regions" or "one China, different interpretations." That is why Taiwan independence hardliners lean toward "Department of Chinese Affairs" and revisionists lean toward terms such as "Mainland" or "cross-Strait."

The media asked Su Tseng-chang why the reinstated Department of China Affairs is not being referred to as the "Department of Mainland Affairs." He said "Because China is a neutral term." He said the entire world uses the term "China." He said even [Mainland] China refers to itself as "China."

When Chen Shui-bian was party chairman, he dissolved the "Department of China Affairs" as part of the "one country on each side" premise. He merged it into the "Department for International Affairs." This was a deliberate attempt to cast Mainland China as a foreign nation. Su Tseng-chang now wants to extract cross-Strait affairs from the "Department of International Affairs." Yet he remains trapped within "Department of China Affairs" thinking. So has he really "transcended" anything?

The DPP says the whole world says "China means the People's Republic of China." Therefore adopting this stance represents the adoption of an "international perspective." But Taiwan and the Mainland are engaged in coopetition. Taiwan must not accept the notion that "China is the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must not accept the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must take into account the cross-Strait situation, the strategic situation, and the constitutional framework.

By contrast, the Ma administration's 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. rejects the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Instead, it champions "one China, different interpretations." These strategic and constitutional considerations are why President Ma insisted that official documents must never use the term "China" but instead "Mainland China" or "the Mainland."

The DPP's traditional view is that "one China means the People's Republic of China," or "one country on each side." But the Ma administration's view is that one China has different interpretations, based on constitutional and strategic considerations.

So how will the DPP name the new body? Naturally it will involve strategic concerns about national and constitutional allegiance. . Will the DPP support the view that "one China means the People's Republic of China?" Will it argue that this is the "international perspective?" Will it leave the definition of "China" in the hands of Beijing? Or will it adopt a "one China, different interpretations" cross-Strait perspective, one that takes into account constitutional and strategic concerns? Will it engage in a dialogue with the Republic of China's democracy, with 1.3 billion people on the Mainland, and with supporters of democratic institutions the world over?

Su Tseng-chang said that referring to the Mainland as "China" is neutral, and has no political implications. Beijing replied that the Mainland resolutely opposes Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship is "one country on each side." Earlier, Tsai Ing-wen expressed opposition to "one country, two regions." Beijing cited this as an example of "one country on each side," and "mulish Taiwan independence." Beijing has clearly laid out its position in its upcoming struggle with the DPP. The naming of the new DPP body may seem insignificant. Will the DPP use the term "China," or "the Mainland," or "cross-Strait?" This will become a problem for Su Tseng-chang and the DPP as they attempt to arrive policy positions that involve strategic and constitutional implications.

During his party chairman inaugural speech, Su Tseng-chang proposed "three guarantees." Namely, "Taiwan is the Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is all Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is every generation's Taiwan." This tongue twister may appeal to Taiwan independence hardliners. But it can never serve as cross-Strait or Mainland policy. The DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric cannot even deliver the votes during election season. The DPP must ask itself how it can win an absolute majority during the presidential election. It must ask itself how it can ensure peace and prosperity on Taiwan, across the Strait, and internationally, in the event it is elected to office, Tsai Ing-wen accumulated enormous momentum during the presidential election. But at the last moment, the voters applied the brakes. Shouldn't Su Tseng-chang consider Tsai Ing-wen an object lesson? 

A few days ago this newspaper published an editorial, saying Beijing has changed tack. It is now using the Republic of China Constitution as its bottom line. Beijing's move is directed at the DPP. The DPP opposes "one country, two regions." That is one reason Beijing believes the Ma administration's formulation "one Republic of China, two regions" is no obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. Whatever the Democratic Progressive Party opposes, may well become the very thing Beijing accepts. The DPP is now fulfilling the role of "bad cop" in cross-Strait relations.

But is the DPP content to forever be the bad cop? If not, it should think twice about what it intends to call the new body it is forming.

蘇貞昌對新機構命名的困窘
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.02

記者問北京國台辦發言人楊毅：民進黨擬恢復設置中國事務部，並視「中國」為中性名詞，大陸是否認為這是民進黨釋出的善意？

楊毅回答：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。

民進黨做為台灣的主要政黨，居然撤銷了「中國事務部」，誠是不可思議。如今，研議「恢復設置」，但對於如何命名卻是見仁見智；有人認為可名為「大陸事務委員會」，有人則主張稱作「兩岸政策委員會」。

此一議論，見微知著地反映了民進黨內的路線鬥爭。因為，在民進黨的意識形態中，命名為「中國事務部」，基本上是主張「一邊一國」的架構；但「大陸事務委員會」或「兩岸政策委員會」，則是默認「一國兩區」或「一中各表」的架構。因而，獨派傾向「中國事務部」，修正派則主張冠以「大陸」或「兩岸」。

關於恢復「中國事務部」，媒體問蘇貞昌，何以不用「大陸」？他回答：「中國是中性名詞」，因為世界上都用「中國」來指稱，中國方面也用「中國」來稱呼自己。

陳水扁在黨主席任內，撤銷了反映「一邊一國」的「中國事務部」，而將業務併入「國際事務部」，這是刻意再進一步地將「中國」視為「國際概念」。如今，蘇貞昌若想將兩岸業務從「國際事務部」移出，倘仍陷於「中國事務為國際事務」的思維架構中，則豈有「超越」可言？

民進黨說，世界上皆指「中國就是中華人民共和國」，這是支持贊同「國際觀點」；但在台灣與對岸的競合關係中，台灣應不應當也承認及接受「中國就是中華人民共和國」，或「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這卻必須建立在「兩岸思維」的憲法戰略架構上。

相對而言，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，即是不同意「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而主張「一個中國／各自表述」。正因此種憲法戰略觀，馬總統曾指示，官文書上不可逕稱「中國」，而應稱「中國大陸」或「大陸」。

換句話說，民進黨的傳統觀點是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，也就是「一邊一國」；而馬政府的兩岸憲法戰略則是「一中各表」。

正因如此，民進黨將如何為新機構命名，當然會牽涉到基本的國憲認同戰略。究竟是要支持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的「國際觀點」，將「中國」的定義權交給北京？抑或採行「一中各表」的兩岸憲法戰略，以中華民國的民主體制，與十三億大陸人民，及全世界的民主體制支持者對話？

蘇貞昌說，「中國」是中性名詞；北京方面顧左右而言他地答稱：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。稍早，蔡英文反對「一國兩區」，亦被北京指為「一邊一國」的「頑固台獨」。北京顯然已經將未來與民進黨的鬥爭架構確立下來；因而，看似無關緊要的民進黨新機構命名，究竟是名以「中國」或「大陸」、「兩岸」，即成為蘇貞昌及民進黨的憲法戰略表態及抉擇問題。

蘇貞昌在黨主席「就職演說」中，雲山霧罩地提出了「三個保證」，即「台灣是台灣人的台灣／台灣是所有台灣人的台灣／台灣是世世代代人的台灣」；這類繞口令的言語，或許可藉以向獨派表態，但絕不是可以操作的「兩岸政策」或「中國政策」。其實，民進黨的台獨語言並非不能帶動選舉激情，而是必須考慮在總統大選中有否獲得過半選票的可能性；及倘若當選而執政，將如何維持台灣內部、兩岸及對外關係的和平發展？蔡英文在總統大選中聲勢如此凌厲，但選民在最後關頭卻踩了煞車。蔡英文是否蘇貞昌的前車之鑒？

本報日前社論說，北京改採「以中華民國憲法為底線」的戰略；其實，北京的動作相當程度地是針對民進黨而來。而民進黨反對「一國兩區」，亦正是北京認為馬政府「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的主張無礙兩岸和平發展的原因之一。由此可見，民進黨所反對的，就可能成為北京不反對的；在此，民進黨似乎又為兩岸「一中各表」的這次推進，扮演了有力的「黑臉」角色。