From Seattle to Beijing: More Imagination Needed

From Seattle to Beijing: More Imagination Needed
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
February 17, 2014

Summary: Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.

Full text below:

When Wang and Zhang met in Shanghai they talked about the prospect of a "Ma Xi meeting." The message Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi brought back was, "A Ma Xi meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference is unlikely, and there is as yet no alternative." His words can be interpreted three ways. One. Beijing does not oppose a Ma Xi meeting. Two. APEC is not an appropriate venue. Three. A Ma Xi meeting could be held elsewhere.

A meeting between the leaders of the two sides is something the Mainland has urged for years. Growing cross-strait peace makes this an opportunity not to be missed. This is a critical opportunity to cement the legacy of Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping. But Beijing has reservations about a Ma Xi meeting at APEC. Several considerations are involved. One. Bureaucratic caution regarding rapid developments in cross-strait relations. Two. The asking price for negotiations is a factor. Cross-strait economic interaction must not be equated with unlimited concessions to Taipei. Cross-strait political interaction must not be predicated upon Taipei getting whatever it demands. Three. Political concerns remain. Beijing may wish to avoid giving the impression that there are "two Chinas" or "One China and one Taiwan," both domestically and internationally. In the event of a change in ruling parties on Taiwan, Beijing may wish to avoid making the same concessions to the new ruling party.

Which of the above problems is the most important? It may not matter. Resolution wil requires greater imagination. The official exchange of views on this issue is already an important step.

The Wang Zhang meeting was an historic event. The two men decided not to discuss a Ma Xi meeting in Nanjing. They were still probing each other's bottom line. They chose to wait two days to exchange views during a tea party in Shanghai. The arrangement was political artistry. During the tea party, Wang Yu-chi suggested that the Beijing APEC conference in autumn might be the ideal venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun however, said that Beijing considered such a venue "inappropriate." The result was no agreement. But as long as the two sides are careful to clarify the historical obstacles, the problem is not insoluble.

Taipei leaders' participation in the APEC conference informal leaders summit is limited. Beijing has long cited the provisions of the MOU as a shield. But consider its history. The "MOU" pertaining to the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong's participation in APEC, was signed in 1991. APEC was merely a ministerial level forum for the Asian-Pacific economies. Therefore the Taiwan Region was labeled "Chinese Taipei." Taipei was limited to sending ministerial level officials to participate in meetings limited to economic affairs. Sending Ministers of Foreign Affairs was forbidden.

But during the informal APEC "Leadership Summit" in 1993, held at the behest of then U.S. President Bill Clinton, leaders from Taipei were unable to attend the Seattle summit. This was the result of consultation between Beijing and Washington. Beijing asked Clinton not to invite leaders from Taipei. Since then pressure from Beijing has become standard operating procedure. In other words, the "MOU" does not actually specifiy that only economic officials may attend. Beijing has grossly exaggerated the meaning of the MOU. This, coupled with the realities of international power politics, has made this, the "Seattle model," standard operating procedure,

Actually, after President Ma took office, officials from Taipei attended an informal APEC leaders summit. The rank of the attendees was raised from the level of ministers to the level of retired vice presidents. The specialties of the attendees was broadened from the economics and trade realm, to include the political realm. In other words, the peaceful development of cross-strait relations has increased mutual trust. The "MOU" can be selectively overlooked. The restrictions imposed by the "Seattle model" have been quietly relaxed.

As we can see, this is a valuable opportunity to improve cross-strait relations. A Ma Xi meeting could materialize. As long as the two sides can establish a framework for political discourse acceptable to both, the "MOU" and the "Seattle model" are constraints that can be shrugged off. Beijing's thinking regarding Taipei, cross-strait political and economic negotiations, and the direction of cross-strait peaceful development, are problems that can be solved. The two sides have the ability to clear away any political obstacles.

Cross-strait relations are undergoing historic changes. Can they move from a Wang Zhang meeting to a Ma Xi meeting? That remains to be seen. Haste makes waste. Taipei must not be in too big a hurry to promote a Ma Xi meeting. But let us back up a moment. Is a Ma Xi meeting possible? That depends on whether the two sides can transcend the " Seattle model." That depends on whether they are innovative enough and imaginative enough to adopt a "Beijing model." That depends on the wisdom and imagination of leaders on both sides, on their ability to overcome resistance and their determination to think anew.
 
從西雅圖跨向北京，需要更多想像力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.02.17 02:44 am

王張上海會中閒聊了「馬習會」議題後，陸委會主委王郁琦帶回來的訊息是：「馬習在亞太經合會（APEC）見面的可能性不高，且尚無其他替代方案。」此話可作三層解讀：一，北京不反對馬習會；二，但場合不在APEC；三，馬習可另覓場合會面。

兩岸領導人會面是大陸多年的主張，正逢兩岸和平發展不可錯失的機遇期，更是確立馬英九與習近平歷史定位的關鍵時機；但就馬習在APEC會面議題，北京躊躇不前，主要問題在：其一，或許是官僚謹慎，對兩岸關係發展的無限可能未能放開思想；其二，可能基於談判要價，認為兩岸互動不能在經濟上一味對台灣讓利，在政治上尤不能讓台灣予取予求；其三，是因政治疑慮未除，既需避免對內對外造成「兩個中國」、「一中一台」印象，又要防範台灣萬一政黨輪替新執政黨要求比照辦理。

上述問題，不論何者是最主要的因素，都需要更多想像力來解決、穿透。事實上，兩岸官方能夠就此議題面對面交換意見，已經跨出了重要的一步。

兩岸歷史性的「王張會」，未選擇在南京的會晤中討論「馬習會」這個仍處於意向及底線試探的題目，而選擇隔兩日在上海以茶敘「閒聊」方式交換意見，這樣的安排，毋寧也是一種政治藝術。茶敘中，王郁琦談到今秋北京APEC是「馬習會」最適當場合，中共國台辦主任張志軍則說北京的立場認為「不合適」云云；雖然結論是消極的，但只要細心釐清歷史的來龍去脈和包袱糾結，這點並非無解。

對於台灣出席APEC非正式領袖峰會的限制，中共一向以APEC有關「諒解備忘錄」的規定和慣例作為擋箭牌。回溯歷史，當年為兩岸三地加入APEC而形成的「諒解備忘錄」，是在一九九一年所簽署，當時的APEC主要還是一個亞太經濟體「部長級」的對話論壇；因此，除規定台灣名稱為「Chinese Taipei」外，更限制台灣只能派經濟事務有關的部長出席部長會議，不得派外交部長與會。

然而，APEC的非正式「領袖峰會」，卻是一九九三年才在當時美國總統柯林頓的倡議下召開；台灣領導人無法出席那次西雅圖峰會，則只是源於中共與美國的磋商，要求柯林頓不邀請台灣領袖與會，此後並年年施壓形成北京所稱的「慣例」。換言之，「諒解備忘錄」其實規範不到經濟體領袖出席的問題，而是北京以雞毛當令箭擴大解釋，再加上國際權力政治的現實所致。這項慣例因循成習，被稱為「西雅圖模式」。

事實上，馬總統上任後，我代表出席APEC非正式領袖峰會，在身分位階上，已從部會首長層級提升到副總統（卸任）層級；在代表專業上，也已經跨出經貿領域而及於政治領域。換言之，隨著兩岸關係的和平發展以及兩岸互信的不斷積累，「諒解備忘錄」可以有時或忘，「西雅圖模式」也早就悄悄鬆綁了。

由此看來，在兩岸關係發展的重要機遇時刻，面對「馬習會」的可能曙光，只要兩岸能夠建立雙方都可接受的政治論述架構，「諒解備忘錄」與「西雅圖模式」的包袱和框架都能順勢解開，不僅如此，包括中共涉台思考、兩岸政經談判，到兩岸和平發展方向的確立，這些問題都能迎刃而解，而兩岸也得以廓清政治迷障。

兩岸關係發展的歷史腳步，能不能從「王張會」邁向「馬習會」，尚不得而知。不可諱言，對台灣而言，推動「馬習會」不能「呷緊弄破碗」；退一步說，「馬習會」實現的可能性，寓於兩岸超越「西雅圖模式」進而創新「北京模式」的政治想像。這點，則有賴雙方更多的智慧和想像，以及兩岸領導人克服阻力、創新局面的決心。