Opposing Parties Can Resolve Cross-Strait Political Disputes
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2016
Executive Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.
Full Text Below:
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.
Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement on election day, then followed up with a press conference. Beijing reiterated its unwavering commitment to the 1992 Consensus. But it also made a gesture of goodwill. If refrained from criticizing either Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP by name. In Tsai Ing-wen's victory speech, press conferences, media interviews, and statements issued by her representative Joseph Wu in Washington, she reiterated her commitment to "consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-Strait relations" She said cross-Strait relations would be based on the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework, on the results of cross-Strait negotiations, as well as on democracy and public opinion. The two sides have started out on the same page, and are moving twoard resolving their differences.
This is the first round, and both sides have sent out clear signals.
Both sides have made clear their positions. Beijing has examined Tsai Ing-wen's past comments. It has concluding that she is still pussyfooting around the 1992 Consensus. It has therefore issued a warning. This is a negative development. First, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President Jin Liqun laid out Taiwan's membership requirements: "If an applicant lacks sovereignty, or is unable to conduct its own international relations, it must obtain the consent of bank members willing to be responsible for its conduct". We were originally going to join the AIIB as “Chinese Taipei”, based on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation model. We must now join as “China Taipei”, based on the Asian Development Bank model. This is unacceptable to the KMT. It is even more unacceptable to the DPP. The window for Taiwan's membership has already closed.
Internationally, some people in Britain have asked their government to recognize Taiwan. Some students from Taiwan have protested the Norwegian government, demanding that the nationality on ROC passports be changed. This has angered Beijing. Some on the Mainland have launched massive cyber attacks on Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page. When the Mainland's CCTV interviewed Tsai Ing-wen, it deliberately broadcast videos of last year's PLA live fire amphibious landing exercises in Xiamen. Since the January 16 election, many Internet users on the Mainland have expressed intense anti-Taiwan independence sentiment. Anti-Mainland sentiment on Taiwan has also intensified. The Internet has become the new cross-Strait battleground. The propaganda war has intensified. Extreme polarization has made comprise increasingly difficult.
Tsai Ing-wen attempted to pass off the "1992 Spirit" as equivalent to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing isn't buying. As Beijing sees it, Tsai continues to evade the essence of the 1992 Consensus, the premise that "the two sides of the Strait are both part of one China". Mainland State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun told US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Taiwan policy will not change as a result of Taiwan's election. Beijing will continue adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing any form of Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's attitude has become more clear. Beijing's language and countermeasures have become harsher in response. Beijing is increasingly unhappy and impatient.
Eight years later, Beijing and the DPP are once again butting heads. The two have little basis for trust. President Chen's negative precedent makes Beijing reluctant even to "listen to what Tsai says, and watch what Tsai does”. Any disagreeable rhetoric immediately provokes a strong response. This is sure to intensify anti-Mainland sentiment among deep green and young Internet users on Taiwan. This obviously will not motivate Tsai Ing-wen to resolve the impasse over the 1992 Consensus, and casts a shadow over the upcoming legislative session.
Both sides are responsible for these negative developments.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must immediately desist from issuing incendiary campaign rhetoric. It must substitute the language of responsible governance. In particular, supporters of the DPP in the media and on the Internet must exercise restraint. They must not read too much into Tsai Ing-wen's position statements. For example, Tsai repeatedly make mention of "democracy". The DPP leadership assumed she was criticizing "black box operations". The media on the other hand, assumed she was “invoking the peoples' right of self-determination" in order to provoke Beijing.
The two sides engaged in "remote communication", but found little common ground. Therefore they must avoid provoking unnecessary suspicions and frictions. For the sake of long-term cross-Strait relations, the two sides should seek a point of agreement upon which they can build trust. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" offers just such an opportunity. The DPP pledged to give priority to the regulations during the new legislative session. The bill is not being carried over to the new legislative session. Therefore all parties must propose a new version during the new session.
During the previous session, "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" versions covered the political spectrum on Taiwan, from reunification to independence. The DPP is now the majority party in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore it should propose a draft version. The regulation must be based on the premise that the two sides are not different countries. During consideration of the bill, green camp supporters must not exert undue influence on the legislature, online or outside the venue. The “one country on each side” premise must not enter the picture. The Ma government and the pan-blue political parties must not fuss over the details. They must allow the Legislative Yuan to pass the Oversight Regulations, sending a signal to the Mainland beneficial to Taiwan's larger interests.
This is a critical moment. The Beijing authorities must exercise restraint. They must not intensify red vs green confrontation. They must exercise greater patience and demonstrate sufficient goodwill. Eight years later, the two parties can start on the same page, then move forward, toward mutual benefit and a win/win scenario.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2016
Executive Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.
Full Text Below:
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.
Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement on election day, then followed up with a press conference. Beijing reiterated its unwavering commitment to the 1992 Consensus. But it also made a gesture of goodwill. If refrained from criticizing either Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP by name. In Tsai Ing-wen's victory speech, press conferences, media interviews, and statements issued by her representative Joseph Wu in Washington, she reiterated her commitment to "consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-Strait relations" She said cross-Strait relations would be based on the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework, on the results of cross-Strait negotiations, as well as on democracy and public opinion. The two sides have started out on the same page, and are moving twoard resolving their differences.
This is the first round, and both sides have sent out clear signals.
Both sides have made clear their positions. Beijing has examined Tsai Ing-wen's past comments. It has concluding that she is still pussyfooting around the 1992 Consensus. It has therefore issued a warning. This is a negative development. First, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President Jin Liqun laid out Taiwan's membership requirements: "If an applicant lacks sovereignty, or is unable to conduct its own international relations, it must obtain the consent of bank members willing to be responsible for its conduct". We were originally going to join the AIIB as “Chinese Taipei”, based on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation model. We must now join as “China Taipei”, based on the Asian Development Bank model. This is unacceptable to the KMT. It is even more unacceptable to the DPP. The window for Taiwan's membership has already closed.
Internationally, some people in Britain have asked their government to recognize Taiwan. Some students from Taiwan have protested the Norwegian government, demanding that the nationality on ROC passports be changed. This has angered Beijing. Some on the Mainland have launched massive cyber attacks on Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page. When the Mainland's CCTV interviewed Tsai Ing-wen, it deliberately broadcast videos of last year's PLA live fire amphibious landing exercises in Xiamen. Since the January 16 election, many Internet users on the Mainland have expressed intense anti-Taiwan independence sentiment. Anti-Mainland sentiment on Taiwan has also intensified. The Internet has become the new cross-Strait battleground. The propaganda war has intensified. Extreme polarization has made comprise increasingly difficult.
Tsai Ing-wen attempted to pass off the "1992 Spirit" as equivalent to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing isn't buying. As Beijing sees it, Tsai continues to evade the essence of the 1992 Consensus, the premise that "the two sides of the Strait are both part of one China". Mainland State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun told US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Taiwan policy will not change as a result of Taiwan's election. Beijing will continue adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing any form of Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's attitude has become more clear. Beijing's language and countermeasures have become harsher in response. Beijing is increasingly unhappy and impatient.
Eight years later, Beijing and the DPP are once again butting heads. The two have little basis for trust. President Chen's negative precedent makes Beijing reluctant even to "listen to what Tsai says, and watch what Tsai does”. Any disagreeable rhetoric immediately provokes a strong response. This is sure to intensify anti-Mainland sentiment among deep green and young Internet users on Taiwan. This obviously will not motivate Tsai Ing-wen to resolve the impasse over the 1992 Consensus, and casts a shadow over the upcoming legislative session.
Both sides are responsible for these negative developments.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must immediately desist from issuing incendiary campaign rhetoric. It must substitute the language of responsible governance. In particular, supporters of the DPP in the media and on the Internet must exercise restraint. They must not read too much into Tsai Ing-wen's position statements. For example, Tsai repeatedly make mention of "democracy". The DPP leadership assumed she was criticizing "black box operations". The media on the other hand, assumed she was “invoking the peoples' right of self-determination" in order to provoke Beijing.
The two sides engaged in "remote communication", but found little common ground. Therefore they must avoid provoking unnecessary suspicions and frictions. For the sake of long-term cross-Strait relations, the two sides should seek a point of agreement upon which they can build trust. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" offers just such an opportunity. The DPP pledged to give priority to the regulations during the new legislative session. The bill is not being carried over to the new legislative session. Therefore all parties must propose a new version during the new session.
During the previous session, "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" versions covered the political spectrum on Taiwan, from reunification to independence. The DPP is now the majority party in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore it should propose a draft version. The regulation must be based on the premise that the two sides are not different countries. During consideration of the bill, green camp supporters must not exert undue influence on the legislature, online or outside the venue. The “one country on each side” premise must not enter the picture. The Ma government and the pan-blue political parties must not fuss over the details. They must allow the Legislative Yuan to pass the Oversight Regulations, sending a signal to the Mainland beneficial to Taiwan's larger interests.
This is a critical moment. The Beijing authorities must exercise restraint. They must not intensify red vs green confrontation. They must exercise greater patience and demonstrate sufficient goodwill. Eight years later, the two parties can start on the same page, then move forward, toward mutual benefit and a win/win scenario.
相向同行 化解兩岸政治爭議
2016年01月25日 中國時報 主筆室
民進黨主席蔡英文當選新任總統後，北京和蔡英文開始針對「
國台辦在大選開票當天發表的聲明及後續記者會談話中，
第一回合，雙方都發出明確的訊號。
彼此基本立場已表明，北京參照蔡英文歷次談話，判定她仍然「
此時，在國際也出現：英國民眾發動連署呼籲英政府承認台灣、
北京當局對蔡英文以求同存異「九二精神」為本的「九二事實說」
事實上，北京和民進黨相隔8年再度交手，彼此互信基礎薄弱；
這些負面發展，兩岸都有可歸責之處。
蔡英文及民進黨方面必須立即從競選語言的辛辣刺激、
既然雙方初步「隔空溝通」暫時沒有交集，
上一屆會期內，「兩岸協議監督條例」
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