Sunday, January 24, 2016

Opposing Parties Can Resolve Cross-Strait Political Disputes

Opposing Parties Can Resolve Cross-Strait Political Disputes
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 25, 2016


Executive Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.

Full Text Below:

DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Beijing and Tsai Ing-wen have begun a long-distance dialogue over the 1992 Consensus. This gives cause for both optimism and pessimism. At stake is the welfare of 23 million Taiwan compatriots and a win/win cross-Strait arrangement. Tsai Ing-wen and the Beijing authorities must show sincerity, flexibility, and patience. They must communicate in order to resolve differences. They must move in the same, not opposite directions. Otherwise the gap between the two sides will only widen.

Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement on election day, then followed up with a press conference. Beijing reiterated its unwavering commitment to the 1992 Consensus. But it also made a gesture of goodwill. If refrained from criticizing either Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP by name. In Tsai Ing-wen's victory speech, press conferences, media interviews, and statements issued by her representative Joseph Wu in Washington, she reiterated her commitment to "consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-Strait relations" She said cross-Strait relations would be based on the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework, on the results of cross-Strait negotiations, as well as on democracy and public opinion. The two sides have started out on the same page, and are moving twoard resolving their differences.

This is the first round, and both sides have sent out clear signals.

Both sides have made clear their positions. Beijing has examined Tsai Ing-wen's past comments. It has concluding that she is still pussyfooting around the 1992 Consensus. It has therefore issued a warning. This is a negative development. First, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President Jin Liqun laid out Taiwan's membership requirements: "If an applicant lacks sovereignty, or is unable to conduct its own international relations, it must obtain the consent of bank members willing to be responsible for its conduct". We were originally going to join the AIIB as “Chinese Taipei”, based on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation model. We must now join as “China Taipei”, based on the Asian Development Bank model. This is unacceptable to the KMT. It is even more unacceptable to the DPP. The window for Taiwan's membership has already closed.

Internationally, some people in Britain have asked their government to recognize Taiwan. Some students from Taiwan have protested the Norwegian government, demanding that the nationality on ROC passports be changed. This has angered Beijing. Some on the Mainland have launched massive cyber attacks on Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page. When the Mainland's CCTV interviewed Tsai Ing-wen, it deliberately broadcast videos of last year's PLA live fire amphibious landing exercises in Xiamen. Since the January 16 election, many Internet users on the Mainland have expressed intense anti-Taiwan independence sentiment. Anti-Mainland sentiment on Taiwan has also intensified. The Internet has become the new cross-Strait battleground. The propaganda war has intensified. Extreme polarization has made comprise increasingly difficult.

Tsai Ing-wen attempted to pass off the "1992 Spirit" as equivalent to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing isn't buying. As Beijing sees it, Tsai continues to evade the essence of the 1992 Consensus, the premise that "the two sides of the Strait are both part of one China". Mainland State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun told US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Taiwan policy will not change as a result of Taiwan's election. Beijing will continue adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing any form of Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's attitude has become more clear. Beijing's language and countermeasures have become harsher in response. Beijing is increasingly unhappy and impatient.

Eight years later, Beijing and the DPP are once again butting heads. The two have little basis for trust. President Chen's negative precedent makes Beijing reluctant even to "listen to what Tsai says, and watch what Tsai does”. Any disagreeable rhetoric immediately provokes a strong response. This is sure to intensify anti-Mainland sentiment among deep green and young Internet users on Taiwan. This obviously will not motivate Tsai Ing-wen to resolve the impasse over the 1992 Consensus, and casts a shadow over the upcoming legislative session.

Both sides are responsible for these negative developments.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must immediately desist from issuing incendiary campaign rhetoric. It must substitute the language of responsible governance. In particular, supporters of the DPP in the media and on the Internet must exercise restraint. They must not read too much into Tsai Ing-wen's position statements. For example, Tsai repeatedly make mention of "democracy". The DPP leadership assumed she was criticizing "black box operations". The media on the other hand, assumed she was “invoking the peoples' right of self-determination" in order to provoke Beijing.

The two sides engaged in "remote communication", but found little common ground. Therefore they must avoid provoking unnecessary suspicions and frictions. For the sake of long-term cross-Strait relations, the two sides should seek a point of agreement upon which they can build trust. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" offers just such an opportunity. The DPP pledged to give priority to the regulations during the new legislative session. The bill is not being carried over to the new legislative session. Therefore all parties must propose a new version during the new session.

During the previous session, "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" versions covered the political spectrum on Taiwan, from reunification to independence. The DPP is now the majority party in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore it should propose a draft version. The regulation must be based on the premise that the two sides are not different countries. During consideration of the bill, green camp supporters must not exert undue influence on the legislature, online or outside the venue. The “one country on each side” premise must not enter the picture. The Ma government and the pan-blue political parties must not fuss over the details. They must allow the Legislative Yuan to pass the Oversight Regulations, sending a signal to the Mainland beneficial to Taiwan's larger interests.

This is a critical moment. The Beijing authorities must exercise restraint. They must not intensify red vs green confrontation. They must exercise greater patience and demonstrate sufficient goodwill. Eight years later, the two parties can start on the same page, then move forward, toward mutual benefit and a win/win scenario.

相向同行 化解兩岸政治爭議
20160125 中國時報 主筆室

民進黨主席蔡英文當選新任總統後,北京和蔡英文開始針對「九二共識」爭議展開隔空對話,有令人樂觀的信號,也有負面悲觀的發展。基於維護台灣2300萬同胞最大福祉和兩岸互利雙贏的最高價值,希望蔡英文和北京當局應繼續展現誠意、彈性和耐心,堅持以溝通化解分歧,彼此相向而行,而非掉頭反向讓爭議擴大。

國台辦在大選開票當天發表的聲明及後續記者會談話中,北京展現了堅持「九二共識」堅如磐石的意志,和始終如一的態度;但同時也表現了善意,在選舉期間乃至選後,都未直接對蔡英文個人或民進黨進行針對性的批判。蔡英文在發表當選感言、國際記者會、媒體專訪和銜命訪問華府的吳釗燮相關談話中,多次重申她會建立「具有一致性、可預測性、可持續的兩岸關係」;將以中華民國現行憲政體制、兩岸協商交流互動的成果,以及民主原則與普遍民意,作為推動兩岸關係的基礎。雙方一開始似呈現相向而行,朝化解分歧努力前進。

第一回合,雙方都發出明確的訊號。

彼此基本立場已表明,北京參照蔡英文歷次談話,判定她仍然「繞著九二共識轉圈子」,因而發出警告性訊號,開始出現負面發展。先是亞投行行長金立群對台灣加入亞投行問題明確表態:「不享有主權或無法對自身國際關係行為負責的申請方,應由對其國際關係行為負責的銀行成員同意,或代為申請」;對我申請入會的立場從之前可循亞太經合會「中華台北」模式,退到亞銀「中國‧台北」模式,這已經超出國民黨可能接受的範圍,更無法為民進黨接受,台灣入會的窗戶已經關上。

此時,在國際也出現:英國民眾發動連署呼籲英政府承認台灣、台灣學生向挪威政府抗議台灣護照的國籍欄應改填Taiwan等行動,令北京不快。大陸網民開始大量翻牆對蔡英文臉書進行攻擊,大陸央視也在媒體報導蔡英文專訪時,刻意播出去年解放軍在廈門進行實彈登陸演習的舊影像;自116選後,大陸網路充斥激烈反台獨的情緒貼文,而台灣鄉民反中的情緒也被激化。兩岸網域成為新的文攻戰場,而且更具高張力衝突與極端不妥協的兩極化對立傾向。

北京當局對蔡英文以求同存異「九二精神」為本的「九二事實說」並不接受,認為蔡仍在迴避接受「九二共識」的核心價值「兩岸同屬一中」這個政治基礎。國台辦主任張志軍明白告訴美國副國務卿布林肯,對台政策不會因台灣選舉而改變,繼續堅持「九二共識」、反對任何形式的台獨;而且隨著蔡英文態度的明朗化,北京的用語和壓制動作似有加重化的傾向,顯示北京的不滿和不耐也在上升。

事實上,北京和民進黨相隔8年再度交手,彼此互信基礎薄弱;更因為有陳前總統的前車之鑑,北京顯然對蔡英文連「聽言觀行」的空間都不願給,對不合意的談話就立即強勢回應,這勢必反過來激化深綠和青年網民反中的強度,明顯不利於蔡英文處理「九二共識」僵局的化解,也為即將開議的立法院運作,投下了陰影。

這些負面發展,兩岸都有可歸責之處。

蔡英文及民進黨方面必須立即從競選語言的辛辣刺激、轉向治國的妥適沉穩。尤其支持民進黨的媒體和網路更應克制言論,不宜對蔡英文立場過度解讀;比如蔡英文多次提到「民主」,黨中央解釋這是對應「黑箱」,卻被媒體解讀為「導入人民自決的權力」,讓北京光聽就冒火。

既然雙方初步「隔空溝通」暫時沒有交集,當下即應避免不必要的猜疑和摩擦。就兩岸關係長遠計,雙方還是應該尋求一個建立互信關係的起始點,「兩岸協議監督條例」應該是契機。民進黨已經宣示,要在新立法院優先審議本條例,基於法案過屆不延續,各黨派必須在新會期重提新版本。

上一屆會期內,「兩岸協議監督條例」各版本幾乎涵蓋台灣從獨到統的所有政治光譜,民進黨既然成為立法院的多數黨,就應負責任提出妥適的黨版草案,其認定標準即在是否體現兩岸「非一邊一國關係」。法案審議期間,綠營應約束支持者不可以在網路和議場外採取干擾立法的不當動員,只要能排除「一邊一國」疑慮,馬政府和泛藍各黨派就不要過度糾結於條文細節,應讓立法院順利通過「監督條例」,對大陸釋出符合台灣整體利益的訊號。

在此關鍵時刻,北京當局也應自我克制,不讓紅綠矛盾和對立升高;以更大的耐心、釋放足夠的善意,讓8年後雙方的再度交手,彼此能相向而行、互利雙贏。

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