Tsai Ing-wen's Seeking Common Ground and Shelving Differences is not a Blank Check

Tsai Ing-wen's Seeking Common Ground and Shelving Differences is not a Blank Check
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2016

Executive Summary: Beijing has just rejected Tsai Ing-wen's “novel take” on the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said, "I do not deny the historical fact that the two sides held talks in 1992". But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office says Tsai must admit that these talks resulted in the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said she endorsed “That year's spirit of seeking of common ground and shevling differences”. But the Taiwan Affairs Office responded, saying that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is "opposition to Taiwan independence, affirmation that both sides belong to one China, and affirmation that cross-Strait relations are not international relations".

Full Text Below:

Beijing has just rejected Tsai Ing-wen's “novel take” on the 1992 Consensus.

Tsai Ing-wen said, "I do not deny the historical fact that the two sides held talks in 1992". But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office says Tsai must admit that these talks resulted in the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said she endorsed “That year's spirit of seeking of common ground and shevling differences”. But the Taiwan Affairs Office responded, saying that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is "opposition to Taiwan independence, affirmation that both sides belong to one China, and affirmation that cross-Strait relations are not international relations".

Since 1992, the government and public on Taiwan have taken the 1992 Consensus to mean "one China, different interpretations". Back then Lee Teng-hui was still president. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou became president. During an exchange with George W. Bush on the hotline, Hu Jintao invoked the term, "one China, different interpretations". The Ma government continue to advocate "one China, different interpretations". But Beijing switched to the phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences". For example, Hu Jintao spoke of "adhering to the 1992 Consensus, meaning that the two sides can seek common ground on the basis of one China". During the Ma Xi summit, the phrase "meet in their capacity as leaders of the two sides, and address each other as Mister", was an expression of “one China, different interpretations”. Therefore the phrases "seeking common ground while shelving differences", and "one China, different interpretations" are interchangeable.

Tsai Ing-wen mentioned Beijing's phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences". She did so to imply convergence. She meant "I agree we should seek common ground while shelving differences. So let us proceed to seek common ground while shelving differences!" But "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is hardly a blank check.

Beijing speaks of "opposing Taiwan independence”. It insists that “both sides are part of one China”, and “cross-Strait relations are not international relations". On points such as these, there is no room for “shelving differences”. The Ma government stressed that the ROC Constitution does not allow "one China, one Taiwan”, or “one nation on each side”, or Taiwan independence. On points such as these, there is also no room for "shelving differences". The only point on which the two sides may shelve differences, is the meaning of "one China, different interpretations". But this is precisely what Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept. She refuses to accept any "one China", including “one China, different interpretations”.

What does Tsai Ing-wen mean when she speaks of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”? Does she reject Beijing's "opposition to Taiwan independence" or the Ma government's "one China, different interpretations”?  Does she think that "seeking common ground while shelving differences" will provide cover for the Taiwan independence party platform? If so, she needs to recall Chen Shui-bian's lament: "Impossible means impossible".

The Ma government speaks of “one China, different interpretations”. This is the clearest example of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. If Tsai Ing-wen wins the election and becomes President of the Republic of China, the "one China, different interpretations" aspect of the 1992 Consensus will be even more important than “opposition to Taiwan independence". More importantly, this must become the way the phrase “seeking common ground while shelving differences” is understood after 2016.

As far as Beijing is concerned, Tsai Ing-wen can no longer advocate de jure Taiwan independence. Therefore "opposition to Taiwan independence" is superfluous. The  issue then becomes whether Tsai Ing-wen endorses "one China, different interpretations". If Tsai refuses to endorse “one China, different interpretations”, how can Beijing possibly “seek common ground” with her? As far as the blue camp is concerned, will it implode following the election? That too depends on the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations”. Will they survive? Without "one China, different interpretations”, blue camp opposition to Taiwan independence will lose support. The blue camp will no longer have its reason for being. As far as the DPP is concerned, advocacy of Taiwan independence after 2016 will be utterly impossible. If the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” is cast aside, the DPP will immediately be confronted with the "one China principle” and “opposition to Taiwan independence”. It will then find itself unable to advance or retreat, unable to attack or defend.

Under the 1992 consensus, “one China, different interpretations” means “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. It is the Republic of China's sole lifeline. Tsai Ing-wen's “seeking common ground while shelving differences” cannot replace "one China, different interpretations”. Still leass can it provide political cover for "one China, one Taiwan, one nation on each side, and Taiwan independence”. It is not a blank check. Everyone on Taiwan must realize the strategic importance of "one China, different interpretations” and “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. Once there are no longer any differences to shelve, we will find ourselves faced with the premise that "One China is the People's Republic of China".

Tsai Ing-wen must beware. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus will not eliminate Beijing's opposition to Taiwan independence. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus will, however, eliminate "one China, different interpretations”. What will happen to the nation then?

Tsai Ing-wen  speaks of maintaining the status quo. For the public on Taiwan, maintaining the status quo is the greatest common denominator. In fact, the 1992 consensus is the political foundation for the status quo. Tsai Ing-wen declared her support for "maintaining the status quo". As a result many mistakenly assume she can cope with the controversy over the 1992 Consensus. But Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus may make the status quo impossible to maintain. Yet Tsai refuses to tell voters her reasons for rejecting it. Are voters willing to reaffirm the role of the 1992 Consensus in "maintaining the status quo"? Tsai Ing-wen must think things through. Do most voters support her approach to maintaining the status quo? Do they support her rejection of the 1992 Consensus? If she misjudges the consequences, voters may react badly.

The 1992 Consensus is not a game of chance. Tsai Ing-wen may insist that “the 1992 Consensus is not the only option". But if Beijing insists that “the 1992 Consensus is the only option", it is doubtful she can do anything about it.

Tsai Ing-wen must think twice. One China, different interpretations is the clearest example of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. In order to seek common ground, she cannot dispense with “one China, different interpretations”.

蔡英文的求同存異不是空白支票

2016-01-06 聯合報

蔡英文的「九二共識」新解，已被北京否定。

蔡英文說，「不否認一九九二年兩岸會談的歷史事實」，但國台辦指必須承認一九九二年建立了「九二共識」的歷史事實；蔡英文說，認同當年「求同存異的精神」，國台辦則說，九二共識的核心內涵是「反對台獨／兩岸同屬一中／兩岸不是國與國的關係」。

自一九九二年起，台灣當局與台灣輿論就以「一個中國／各自表述」來闡釋九二共識，當時尚在李登輝執政時期。二○○八年，馬英九當選總統後，胡錦濤在與小布希的熱線電話中，亦完整表述了「一中各表」。後來，馬政府繼續標舉「一中各表」，但北京則轉為經常使用「求同存異」一詞。例如，胡錦濤曾說：「堅持九二共識，意味雙方可以在一個中國的基礎上求同存異。」至馬習會，「以兩岸領導人的身分與名義舉行，見面互稱先生」，亦可視為「一中各表」的體現。所以，在兩岸之間，「求同存異」與「一中各表」二詞，可謂有心照不宣的代換作用。

蔡英文提出「求同存異」，是使用了北京的詞彙，以示趨同的姿態；意謂：「我同意你的求同存異，那麼我們就求同存異吧！」但是，求同存異不是一張空白支票。

北京說，「反對台獨／兩岸一中／兩岸不是國與國關係」，這些皆似無「存異」的空間；馬政府指出「一中一台／一邊一國／台灣獨立」皆為中華民國憲法所不許，這也無可「存異」之處。唯一的存異空間，就是「一中各表」之「各表」的內涵，但這似乎正是蔡英文所拒絕接受的。她不接受任何「一中」，包括一中各表。

蔡英文所謂的求同存異，若是一方面想要甩掉北京「反對台獨」的糾纏，另一方面想要拋棄馬政府的「一中各表」，而藉「求同存異」來包裹《台獨黨綱》，這恐將如陳水扁所說的「做不到就是做不到」。

馬政府強調一中各表，就是最鮮明的求同存異。蔡英文若勝選出任中華民國總統，九二共識中的「一中各表」將比「反對台獨」更重要，這應當就是後二○一六的「求同存異」。

就北京言，蔡英文不可能再主張法理台獨，所以「反對台獨」即是無的放矢；屆時，蔡英文的政治立場，就要看她是否表態「一中各表」。蔡若是不說一中各表，北京如何與她求同存異？對藍營言，選後藍營是否大解體，也要看「九二共識／一中各表」的論述能否存活；若無「一中各表」，藍營的「反對台獨」必將失去支撐，則藍營更無存續的條件。對民進黨言，後二○一六將絕無可能再存「台獨」之異，且丟棄了「九二共識／一中各表」的槓桿，一旦直接面對「一中原則／反對台獨」的衝擊，恐陷進退兩難、攻守失據之境。

在九二共識的體系下，一中各表就是求同存異，而一中各表亦是中華民國唯一可能藉以突圍的出路。但蔡英文的求同存異，不可能去「一中各表」而取代之，更不可能成為一張包裹「一中一台／一邊一國／台灣獨立」之異的空白支票。如台灣不知藉「一中各表」維持求同存異的戰略綱領，一旦自陷「無異可存」，就可能將面對「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的衝擊。

蔡英文必須警覺：即使否認九二共識，她也甩不掉北京的「反對台獨」；但若摧毀九二共識，因而失去「一中各表」的載具，國家以後的路要如何走下去？

蔡英文強調維持現狀，且謂維持現狀是台灣民意的最大公約數；其實九二共識正是維持一切現狀的政治基礎。現今的民意因蔡英文宣示「維持現狀」而支持她，並可能相信她有能力處理九二共識的爭議；但倘若有一天，蔡英文因無能處理九二共識，以致現狀傾覆不再能維持，而蔡英文又說不出她否定九二共識的理由，民意有無可能為了「維持現狀」而回過頭來思考「九二共識」的作用與利益？蔡英文要想清楚：主流民意究竟是支持她維持現狀？抑或支持她否定九二共識？如果誤判其本末輕重，可能遭民意反噬。

九二共識不是賭局。蔡英文可以說「九二共識不是唯一選項」，但萬一北京堅持「九二共識是唯一選項」，即恐非她所能左右。

蔡英文應須三思：一中各表就是最鮮明的求同存異，要求同存異，就不能丟掉一中各表。