Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation

Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2012

Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty?

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APEC member states gathered on a large Russian island south of Haishengwei ("Vladivostok"). They discussed the establishment of closer economic cooperation between Asian-Pacific nations. The disputes between East Asian countries over the sovereignty of several islands continue to rage. The toxic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea even cast a shadow over this year's APEC summit.

Summit host Russia is attempting to become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific region and to create a "New Asia." But international attention focused on Japan, which is attempting to assert leadership over East Asia. International attention focused on Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his interaction with Mainland Chinese and South Korean leaders. These will indicate whether relations between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are running hot or cold. They will also indicate whether the disputes over islands in the East China Sea can be resolved peacefully.

Following the war, Japan periodically clashed with its neighbors. In the past, the main factor affecting Japan's relations with its neighbors was Japan's interpretation of history. But in recent years, sovereignty over numerous islands has replaced Japan's interpretation of history as the raw nerve undermining international relations in Northeast Asia. Issues of territorial sovereignty affect these nations' substantive interests. Disputes over maritime rights and geopolitical security have become the most significant variables affecting relations between Bejing, Tokyo, and Seoul.

In fact, during the Koizumi cabinet, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. Official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not really the issue. As President Bush noted, Sino-Japanese relations are much more complex than the Yasukuni Shrine issue. American Japanologist Michael Green spoke bluntly. He said that even if the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it would make no difference. The United States knows that disputes over maritime interests stand in the way of trust and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. .

But the disputes over East Asian islands are not limited to Beijing and Tokyo. Tokyo is an ally of Washington. But so are Taipei, Seoul, and Manila. Even Hanoi has attempted to improve relations with Washington. The disputes over the sovereignty of these islands are complex. To Washington's embarrassment, its "return to Asia" has precipitated these problems. The US wants to ensure unity among the first Pacific island chain that is "containing" Mainland China. Instead it finds itself robbing Peter to pay Paul. All it can do is offer platitudes. All it can do is call on the parties to sit down and talk, and to resolve disputes through dialogue. Beijing appears to be playing a waiting game. It appears to be waiting for someone else to make a mistake. It calmly sits on the sidelines, watching Washington play Big Brother in East Asia. It uses the opportunity to appeal to Taipei. It hopes cross-Strait cooperation over the Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands") and Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty conflicts.

Once President Ma came to office, ECFA gradually normalized cross-Strait economic exchanges. But this normalization has not extended to the political realm. It has not reduced the historical grievances between the KMT and CCP. In the international arena, Beijing has not changed its "One China=PRC" attitude. It continues to restrict Taipei's diplomatic space. This makes cross-Strait cooperation on sovereignty impossible. This makes it impossible for Taipei to shed its Cold War mentality vis a vis national security. Beijing wants to Taipei to rally to the larger issue of national sovereignty in the islands disputes. It wants the two sides to join in the defense of Chinese territory. But if the illusion of cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be maintained, such efforts will be futile.

Taipei still views itself as the defender of "one China," as per the Republic of China Constitution. The Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands disputes have left it trapped between international diplomacy and cross-Strait relations. It finds itself fighting a thankless battle on both fronts, Recently Taipei began live-fire exercises on Taiping Island. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet overlooking the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically Taipei finds itself in a tight spot. It is attempting to practice "balanced diplomacy." It seeks to avoid undermining security relations with Washington. It is implicitly asserting the sovereignty of the Republic of China through international diplomatic initiatives. Needless to say this attracted far less attention than South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's impassioned landing on Dokdo.

On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps hold conflicting ideological views regarding Japan. These are clearly reflected in the ruling and opposition parties' positions on the Diaoyutai Islands. There should be unity on Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement. Instead the Diaoyutai Islands conflict has become part of the ongoing internecine Blue vs. Green conflict. This has encouraged the Japanese government to cast covetous eyes on the Diaoyutai Islands.

DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty? DPP officials have equated the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement with Chinese reunification and Taiwan independence, and with "cozying up to [Mainland] China." Perhaps Chairman Su will cease abetting their disinformation activities? Perhaps he will cease his attempts to confuse the public and shake their confidence in ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?

It is not easy for Taipei to cooperate with Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea islands conflicts. But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should be able to launch a coordinated attack regarding the Diaoyutai Islands. They should be able to join hands to defend our territorial sovereignty. The ruling and opposition parties must form a united front. Only then can they make their position on the East China Sea clearly heard within the international community. Amidst the dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, they must reunify the Republic of China. Only then can they win the respect of the international community.

島嶼爭端捍衛主權 期待朝野分進合擊
    2012-09-06
    中國時報

APEC會員國齊聚俄國海參威南方的大俄羅斯島，討論亞太國家建立更緊密的經濟合作關係時，東亞國家間的島嶼爭端仍未見平歇，而中日韓間的詭譎氣氛更令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影。

　國際注目的焦點似乎不在此次峰會的東道主俄國如何展現其融入亞太地區，實現「新亞洲」（New Asia）的決心，而是喧賓奪主的日本。國際將關注首腦會談中，野田首相如何與中、韓領袖互動，此不僅為中、日、韓關係的冷熱指標，亦可窺見東海「島嶼爭端」能否軟著陸的端倪。

　戰後，日本與鄰國齟齬時有所聞，過去多屬「歷史認識問題」牽動日本與鄰國關係的良窳，但近年來，「島嶼爭端」取代「歷史認識問題」，挑動東北亞國際政治的敏感神經。因此，「歷史認識問題」對東北亞國際關係的影響將弱化，取而代之，攸關各國現實利益的領土主權問題、海洋權益之爭與地緣政治上的安保利益，將成為左右中、日、韓關係走向的主要變數。

　其實，小泉內閣時期，中日關係陷入一九七二年雙方外交正常化以來的最低潮，「靖國神社參拜」問題並非主因，誠如布希總統所言，中日關係比單純的靖國神社參拜問題複雜許多。美國日本研究學者葛林（Michael Green）亦直言，「即使首相不參拜靖國神社，也無濟於事」。美國應已意識到來自於海洋利益中的糾葛所形成的不信任感始為中、日雙方溝通的障礙。

　然而，東亞的「島嶼爭端」，非僅存在於中、日之間，在與日本同屬美國盟邦的台灣、韓國、菲律賓，甚至美國近年極力改善關係中的越南間，亦存有錯綜複雜的島嶼主權爭議，此為美國帶來「重返亞洲」時的尷尬。在美國欲重整太平洋第一島鏈的團結之際，美國在東亞的「島嶼爭端」中，左支右絀、顧此失彼，只能無力的喊話，呼籲各方坐下來談，透過對話解決爭議；過程中，北京似乎以逸待勞，除冷眼旁觀美國如何扮演東亞的老大哥，更伺機向台灣招手，期待兩岸在南沙群島與釣魚台列嶼主權上合作。

　雖說馬總統主政後，ECFA逐步將兩岸的經濟交流制度化，但卻無法迅速向政治領域滲透，鬆動國共間的「歷史正朔」之爭。北京不改在國際間打壓台北外交空間的「一中」思維，使兩岸在主權議題上合作成為不切實際的主張，亦使台灣在安全上仍無法擺脫冷戰格局。因此，北京想在「島嶼爭端」中，對台灣曉以民族大義，爭取兩岸共同捍衛中華領土，或若有似無地製造兩岸在南海及東海問題中合作的假象，恐怕徒勞無功。

　惟在憲法中，將自身定位為「一中」之正朔的台北仍須守土有責，在南沙群島及釣魚台列嶼爭議中，命定陷入外交與兩岸關係的狹縫間，兩面作戰，吃力難討好。近日，台灣實施太平島實彈演習及馬總統決定赴彭佳嶼遠眺釣魚台，皆為台北在艱困的外交空間下，嘗試以「平衡外交」的思維，在避免損及與美國間的安保關係考量中，含蓄地向國際宣示中華民國主權的外交舉措，此與韓國總統李明博「登獨島」的激情演出相較，自然在票房上冷熱有別。

　此外，台灣內部帶有深淺不同之藍綠意識形態對立的「日本觀」更直接投射在朝野不同的「保釣」主張中，使本應一致對外的「保釣運動」意外成為藍綠內政戰線的延長，助長日本朝野染指釣魚台列嶼之野心。

　因此，民進黨蘇貞昌主席不應一味對馬總統的「保釣」政策冷嘲熱諷。蘇主席若認為登彭佳嶼與「保釣」無關，只是「自我阿Ｑ」，那麼，蘇主席能否在釣魚台列嶼問題上更清楚的政策表態，或從黨中央的立場，支持擁有釣魚台列嶼行政管轄權的宜蘭縣長林聰賢登島宣示主權，而非放任其該黨公職人員或支持者隱諱地將「保釣」與「統獨」、「親中」掛鉤，模糊國人對釣魚台列嶼主權的認識，動搖社會的「保釣」信心。

　台灣在「保釣」與「南海問題」上不容易與大陸合作，但朝野應可在台灣所處的「島嶼爭端」中分進合擊，共謀捍衛領土主權之策。相信只有朝野一致對外，始能讓國際社會清楚聽見台灣對東海、南海島嶼的主權論述，並在此「島嶼爭端」中，重新找回團結的中華民國，贏得國際的尊重。