The Door is Locked from the Inside: Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP

The Door is Locked from the Inside:
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2012

Summary: The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.

Full Text below:

Beginning today, the DPP will hold a four week long forum on Mainland issues. It has invited "all parties" to discuss cross-Strait issues. Rumors are today's topic will be "A Focus on the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress."

The DPP has been clamoring for months about a "Great [Mainland] China Policy Debate." If all that hoopla has come down to this, then it was a colossal joke.

The DPP boasted that the policy debate would be thoroughgoing. Outsiders expected such a debate. Yet suddenly we were told this ostensibly thoroughgoing debate would focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress? The DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. The DPP says it wants to resolve its Mainland China policy. But how does having "all parties" banging on the DPP's door from outside do any good? The DPP has fastened a lock to the door and injected superglue into the keyhole. We hope the DPP can somehow manage to open the lock. Su Tseng-chang admits he cannot unlock the door from the inside. He does not even have the guts to call for a Mainland China policy debate inside the party. Instead he went through the motions of "seeking out different parties to focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress." This was simply staggering. One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.

Every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows that the DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. Su Tseng-chang knows this as well. Su Tseng-chang may be afraid to launch either an open or closed-door policy debate on Mainland China policy within the DPP. But he should at least coordinate with Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. The trio should be able to offer a cross-Strait policy that is confident, open, and well thought out. The trio could coordinate their rhetoric and their action. They could spearhead the transformation of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They could open the door that has been locked from the inside.

The current situation is clear. Su and Tsai intend to run for president in 2016. Frank Hsieh on the other hand, wants to be the chief engineer of cross-Strait policy transition. As a result Su, Tsai, and Hsieh all want to transform the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Each of the three is a key figure who can influence the situation. But Su and Tsai will be political rivals in 2016. The two hope to benefit from the transformation. But neither wishes to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Each may want the other to take the lead in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. That way when the other offends the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, he or she can benefit from the other's troubles. As a result, these two may be reluctant to lead the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. After all, opposition from Taiwan independence fundamentalists caused Frank Hsieh's "Cross-Strait Affairs Committee" to run aground.

This is the fundamental reason for the DPP's current predicament. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh are key figures in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. They are irreplaceable. But each has a hidden agenda. They cannot work together. The door is locked from the inside. Who is going to open it?

Consider current political developments. On the one hand, the prospects for the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016 are improving. On the other hand, the DPP must establish better relations with Beijing. Voter anxiety over this matter cannot be ignored. Suppose the current situation persists. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins the presidential election in 2016. Suppose it is unable to transform its cross-Strait policy before the election. Once the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will immediately become Beijing's hostage. Beijing will demand that the DPP explicitly renounce Taiwan independence, and reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP refuses, Beijing will make life impossible for the DPP. It need only lure away one of Taipei's diplomatic allies, cut Mainland tourists to Taiwan by 20%, reduce orders for Taiwan's agricultural products, or refuse to sign an FTA. The ruling DPP regime would soon be in total chaos.

The Ma administration's record since its re-election in 2012 has been less than stellar. Fortunately the Ma administration has been able to stabilize cross-Strait relations. Otherwise the chaos would be unimagineable. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen had been elected in 2012. The DPP would still be wrangling over a "Cross-Strait Dialogue Working Group." Imagine the chaos that would have ensued.

The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more it must change is cross-Strait policy. The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more concerned voters will be about its cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012. The main reason was swing voters' deep rooted suspicions about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. The DPP will continue to face these problems in 2016. Neither Su nor Tsai can avoid them.

Su and Tsai may not like each other. But the two must work together to transform of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must not attempt to use the transformation to take political advantage of each other. If the transformation is successful, it will be beneficial to both of them during the 2016 election. It will also be beneficial to one of them in the event one or the other is elected. The two can refuse to work together. The two can watch each other from the sidelines. Each can hope that the other becomes trapped in a quagmire. But if they refuse to work together, the hoped for DPP transformation will evaporate into thin air. The result will be unfavorable to the presidential ambitions of both candidates. It will be especially unfavorable to the DPP in the event it returns to power. It may even become one of Taiwan's greatest political and economic disasters.

Frank Hsieh is a DPP insider. He is the one closest to this locked door. He holds the keys that can open the door. He says Taiwan independence is impossible. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China. His rhetoric may require closer scrutiny. But he already has three of the four numbers to a four digit combination lock. Su and Tsai may find it difficult to unlock the door on their own. But they can arrive at a tacit agreement and allow Frank Hsieh to enter the final number to the combination.

The situation is clear. Beijing intends to force the DPP to abandon Taiwan independence. Until it does, it has no intention of letting up. DPP leaders such as Frank Hsieh know that Taiwan independence is impossible. This is the last number in the combination. This is the number that every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows by heart. The problem is the DPP's door is locked from the inside. Can Su, Tsai, and Hsieh work together to open the door? If the door cannot be opened, then the DPP cannot get out. Su and Tsai of course, cannot either.

The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.

門是從裡面鎖死：籲蘇蔡謝共赴民黨轉型工程
【聯合報╱社論】

2012.09.11

民進黨今起連續四周在周二舉辦中國問題座談會，邀約「各方人士」討論兩岸議題，據謂今日首場的主題將「聚焦中共十八大」。

這若就是民進黨喧嚷了幾個月的「中國政策大辯論」，直可令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非。

首先，民進黨內原本宣示的，及外界原本期待的，應是一場穿骨入髓的「中國政策大辯論」，怎會突然抽樑換柱成了「聚焦中共十八大」？再者，民進黨兩岸政策的大門其實是從裡面鎖死的，若要解決其中國政策的困局，找來「各方人士」從門外敲敲打打有何用？只能寄望民進黨人從門裡設法打開被三秒膠堵死的大鎖。如今，蘇貞昌擺明了沒有能力從裡面開鎖，甚至連在黨內進行中國政策大辯論的膽識都沒有，居然以「找各方人士聚焦中共十八大」來敷衍形勢，豈不令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非？

每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知，民進黨兩岸政策的大門是從裡面鎖死的，當然蘇貞昌亦不會不知。蘇貞昌如果不敢在民進黨內發動公開的或閉門的中國政策大辯論，他至少亦應設法與蔡英文及謝長廷共三人，一同就兩岸政策進行推心置腹、開誠佈公的深刻研議，然後在三人協調的論述及三人協調的行動下，共同帶動民進黨兩岸政策的大轉型，從裡面打開那扇鎖死的大門。

當下的情勢很清楚，蘇蔡皆有意競逐二○一六總統，謝長廷則以兩岸政策轉型總工程師自許；因而，蘇蔡謝三人皆願見民進黨的兩岸政策轉型，且皆是影響情勢的關鍵人物。但是，由於蘇蔡的二○一六之爭，兩人雖皆期待轉型之利，卻又不希望得罪獨派，甚至皆希望對方因主導轉型而開罪獨派以收漁翁之利，以致兩人在轉型工程上均有所顧忌，又因獨派反對而使謝長廷出掌「兩岸事務委員會」亦告觸礁。

這正是民進黨今日困局的根本原由：因為蘇蔡謝三人皆是在轉型工程上不可取代的關鍵人物，如今三人卻各懷鬼胎，不能同心協力，這扇從裡頭鎖死的大門還能盼誰來打開？

就政局發展來看，一方面民進黨在二○一六總統選舉的情勢漸趨看好，另一方面民進黨對於不能改善與北京關係的焦慮更已無法掩飾。此一局勢發展下去，民進黨倘在二○一六贏得選舉，而在選前不能做好兩岸政策的轉型工程；一旦民進黨執政，即勢將立即落入北京的挾持之中。屆時，民進黨若不接受「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」的立場，北京只消拿掉台灣一個邦交國，或減少二十％陸客來台，或抽掉幾張台灣農特產訂單，或杯葛一下ＦＴＡ，就可讓民進黨政權鬧得內外難以收拾。

國民黨馬政府贏得二○一二年連任以來的表現欠佳，但平實而言，幸好馬政府尚能穩住兩岸這一塊，否則國家亂局必更難以想像。倘若二○一二是由民進黨的蔡英文當選，現在兩岸恐怕仍在因「兩岸對話工作小組」而鬧得不可開交，那種亂局豈能想像？

民進黨愈有趨近重新執政的可能性，愈應及早調整其兩岸政策；而愈接近民進黨有執政可能之時，選民對其兩岸政策必愈加關切。蔡英文在二○一二敗選的主因，正是緣於中間選民對民進黨的兩岸政策深具疑懼。這是民進黨在二○一六總統大選時仍將面對的問題，無論蘇蔡皆無以逃避。

所以，無論蘇蔡如何不喜歡對方，二人仍應同心協力帶動民進黨兩岸政策的轉型工程；而切切不應以轉型工程來相互牽制。因為，轉型若成功，對二人之競選二○一六總統必有利，亦對倘若當選後之執政也有利；倘若不此之圖，二人相互觀望，甚至希望對方能陷溺於轉型的泥淖中，如此必終導致轉型成為泡影，這對兩人的競選之路不利，尤對倘若當選後執政大不利，甚至必會演成為台灣的政經大災禍。

謝長廷是民進黨內最接近從裡面鎖死的大門者，他手中所持鑰匙也是最有開鎖可能者。他說，台獨不可行，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到中華民國；這些論述，雖然尚多可以細究之處，但如果是要開號碼鎖的話，四個數碼可謂大概已對中了三個。蘇蔡二人皆有不能自己打一把鑰匙去開鎖的難處，但只要能形成挺謝的默契，就讓謝長廷去轉動那開鎖的最後一字密碼吧。

情勢很清楚。北京不將民進黨逼到放棄台獨的地步，不會鬆手；而民進黨人如謝長廷者亦皆知，台獨不可行。這就是開鎖的最後一字密碼，這也是每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知的密碼；只是民進黨的大門是從裡面鎖死的，但看蘇蔡謝三人能否在這一次的機遇中合力共同打開。門打不開，民進黨就走不出去，蘇蔡當然亦走不出去。

北京的兩岸政策三元素是：「反對台獨／九二共識／一中框架」；台灣的對策則應是：「一中憲法／一中各表（一個中國是中華民國）／大屋頂中國（中華民國是民主中國）」。民進黨若想迎對二○一六的新局，必須先打開從裡面鎖死的大門。