Will Frank Hsieh Succeed Su Tseng-chang as Party Chairman?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 1, 2013
Summary: DPP official Albert Wu says that if Su Tseng-chang clings to his "anti-China" path, he will face a severe test next year during the party chairman election. He could be replaced by Frank Hsieh, who continues to "Move Forward."
Full text below:
DPP official Albert Wu says that if Su Tseng-chang clings to his "anti-China" path, he will face a severe test next year during the party chairman election. He could be replaced by Frank Hsieh, who continues to "Move Forward."
Such reports could be true, or they could be media spin control. But they reveals a surging undercurrent. The term for DPP Chairman is two years. Su Tseng-chang was elected last year. His term will expire in May of next year. Last year during party chairman elections, the seven in one elections were approaching. Therefore some proposed that the term for the new party chairman be extended until the seven in one elections are over. But no decision has been reached. If the current situation continues, by this time next year, as Albert Wu noted, it will be time for the election of a new party chairman.
Recently Albert Wu traveled to Pingtan to participate in a "Cross-Strait Relations Seminar." Just before his departure, he said the DPP must break the KMT's cross-Strait monopoly. He said that given the currents of history, if Su Tseng-chang remains "hostile toward Mainland China," then Frank Hsieh will be elected DPP chairman. This "appears to be inevitable."
Former DPP legislator Julian J. Kuo, who also participated in the Pingtan meeting, said the DPP must achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. But Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang appears to have no desire to do so. "If the China Affairs Committee were led by Frank Hsieh, the current situation would be very different."
Julian Kuo and Albert Wu are controversial figures within the DPP. They may not reflect the thinking of the Democratic Progressive Party leadership. But they do reflect the thinking of the younger generation reformers. Albert Wu said "Su Tseng-chang sees [Mainland] China as an enemy." Julian J. Kuo said "Su Tseng-chang appears to have no desire to make a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations." These remarks had an edge to them. But given the two mens' status within the party, their remarks were not unjustified.
When Su Tseng-chang ran for party chairman. he declared that he would establish a China Affairs Committee and appoint Frank Hsieh chairman. Su Tseng-chang obviously hoped to kill two birds with one stone. One. He hoped to exploit this platform to reform cross-Strait policy. Two. He hope to use this platform to co-opt Frank Hsieh and Tsai Ing-wen, consolidate his power within the party, and his status as the "capo di tutti capi."
Frank Hsieh's response was forthright. He deliberately visited Mainland China in October of last year, and participated in a "bartending convention." Hsieh referred to the committee as a "Cross-Strait Affairs Committee" rather than a "China Affairs Committee." The perception was that Hsieh was waiting to give Su Tseng-chang a boost. The perception was that when Frank Hsieh returned to Taiwan, he would be appointed committee chairman. But as Julian J. Kuo says, "Now the situation is quite different."
Su Tseng-chang reneged on his promise. He reneged on his promise to appoint Frank Hsieh Chairman of the China Affairs Committee, Instead, on November 21 of last year, he appointed himself convener of the committee. He demoted the committee from a decision-making body to a discussion group. Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun refused to participate. The committee was stillborn. Since then it has been silent for nearly 130 days.
Does this mean Su Tseng-chang's "China Affairs Committee" is already stillborn? It was the only concrete cross-Strait policy commitment made by party chairman Su Tseng-chang. If he has reneged on this, is there any need to mention the others?
Albert Wu said that Su Tseng-chang is "hostile toward Mainland China." But we think a more realistic description would be that Su Tseng-chang has been unable to decide whether to remain "an enemy of [Mainland] China" or to "seek reconciliation with [Mainland] China." We do not believe Su Tseng-chang has the wherewithal to formulate a policy of "enmity with [Mainland] China." The real problem is that he lacks a policy of "reconciliation with [Mainland] China."
Today's domestic political situation, offers the DPP an excellent opportunity to shine. Consider the 4NPP controversy, or the pension funds controversy. Add to it the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal and the Lai Shu-ju corruption scandal. But party chairman Su Tseng-chang's poll numbers do not shine. He is not even popular within his own party. People do not feel he "represents the future of Taiwan and the future of the DPP." He lacks a cross-Strait policy that offers hope for the DPP, let alone for Taiwan. That is his most serious shortcoming.
The 4NPP controversy and the pension funds controversy mean the Democratic Progressive Party could regain power in 2016. But party chairman Su Tseng-chang could be an obstacle to DPP cross-Strait policy reform. DPP insiders could decide that Su Tseng-chang cannot shed his image as "hostile toward Mainland China." If so, the DPP could look to someone else.
Su Tseng-chang may be thinking that he will overcome the hurdle of 2014 first, then change his cross-Strait policy in 2016. But Su Tseng-chang's hesitation has led to delays. Frank Hsieh was not appointed committee chairman. Will Tsai Ing-wen and her supporters make Frank Hsieh DPP chairman this time next year?
謝長廷會否繼蘇貞昌出任黨主席
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.01 03:33 am
民進黨人吳子嘉說，蘇貞昌若繼續緊抱「反中」路線，預料明年此刻他的黨主席連任之戰將面臨嚴峻考驗；取而代之的則是持續「向前行」的謝長廷。
這個消息，無論是確有其事或只是放話而已，皆顯示暗潮洶湧。民進黨主席一任兩年，去年當選的蘇貞昌任期將在明年五月屆滿。去年黨主席選舉時，因考慮二○一四年底有「七合一」選舉，曾有人提議新任黨主席的任期是否延至「七合一」選後，但未議決。倘若目前的情勢延續下去，明年此時即如吳子嘉所說是黨主席改選之時。
吳子嘉在日前赴平潭參加「兩岸關係研討會」前夕說：在歷史洪流推演下，當蘇貞昌選擇「敵對中國大陸」，而民進黨有必要打破國民黨對兩岸情勢的壟斷時，謝長廷參選下屆民進黨主席，「似乎已成必然趨勢」。
另一位也參加了平潭會議的民進黨前立委郭正亮說：民進黨能否在兩岸關係上有所突破，黨主席蘇貞昌似無意願，「若當時中國事務委員會由謝長廷出任，現在的局面可能是另一番景象」。
郭正亮與吳子嘉皆是目前民進黨內的話語人物，他們未必能反映民進黨的權力結構，卻能顯示中生代及改革派的思路。吳子嘉說，「蘇貞昌與中國為敵」，郭正亮說「蘇貞昌在突破兩岸關係上似無意願」，這些都是十分重鹹的評語；然以兩人在黨內的資歷，這樣的評語卻皆不是無憑無據。
蘇貞昌在競選黨主席時，宣示將成立中國事務委員會，並延請謝長廷出任主任委員。當時蘇貞昌想的顯是一石二鳥：一、利用這個平台，作兩岸政策轉型；二、利用這個平台，納入謝長廷，引進蔡英文，進行黨內的權力整合，以建立蘇貞昌的「共主」地位。
對此，謝長廷積極回應，還刻意在「出任中國（謝主張稱「兩岸」）事務委員會主任委員之前」，於去年十月赴大陸進行了一場「調酒之旅」；當時予人的感覺是，彷彿只待蘇貞昌順水推舟，在謝長廷返台後宣布任命，民進黨或許即可如郭正亮所說「現在的局面就可能是另一番景象」。
但是，蘇貞昌卻食言了。他未踐諾任命謝長廷出任中國事務委員會主任委員，卻在去年十一月二十一日自任為委員會的召集人，並將委員會的決策地位降為類如談話會；接著，謝長廷、游錫?拒絕參加，委員會未上路即告熄火，至今已經無聲無息近一百三十天。
這是否宣告：蘇貞昌的「中國事務委員會」已經胎死腹中？然而，這卻儼然是蘇貞昌出任黨主席時在兩岸政策所作的唯一具體承諾。倘若這唯一承諾也跳票，遑論其他？
吳子嘉說，蘇貞昌「敵對中國大陸」；但我們認為，更真實的描述應是，蘇貞昌在「與中國為敵」及「與中國和解」上，兩方面皆是一籌莫展。我們根本不相信蘇貞昌能拿得出一套「與中國為敵」的政策，但更大的問題卻是他又拿不出一套「與中國和解」的方案。
現今的國內政局，核四案或年金案，再加上林益世案與賴素如案，皆是民進黨的極佳表演舞台，但作黨主席的蘇貞昌不但在全國民調上沒有亮眼的數字，甚至在黨內也沒有人緣，缺少人氣。主要的原因是他沒有給人一種「可以代表台灣未來及可以代表民進黨未來」的感覺，而他的最大缺陷，當然就是在兩岸政策上不能帶民進黨走出去，更不可能帶台灣走出去。
由於核四、年金等爭議，民進黨內已有一種「二○一六第三次政黨輪替」的想像，但倘若黨主席蘇貞昌成了民進黨兩岸政策轉型的實際障礙，或是民進黨內漸漸覺得蘇貞昌已經無法擺脫其「敵對中國大陸」的形象；那麼，也許民進黨內「另請高明」的想法，就會成了「必然趨勢」。
蘇貞昌心裡的盤算或許是，先過了二○一四這一關再說，到了二○一六再來調整兩岸論述；但就因蘇貞昌的這一遲疑耽誤，未得到中國事務委員會主任委員職銜的謝長廷，會不會明年此時在蔡英文等的簇擁下就成了民進黨主席？
Sunday, March 31, 2013
Thursday, March 28, 2013
What Does the Free Trade Demonstration Zone Demonstrate?
What Does the Free Trade Demonstration Zone Demonstrate?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2013
Summary: The government has a program. It may not be perfect. We hope the government will take a hard look at it, perform a total reassessment of it, and make the appropriate changes. It must avoid haste. Nearly as importantly, it must be serious. It must carry it out. It must stop promising a pie in the sky. It must stop leaving the public and the business community disappointed and disillusioned.
Full text below:
One of the key traits of the government of the Republic of China, is that once high-ranking officials issue a statement, once they sing a certain tune, it is extremely difficult to get them to budge from their original position. Even if outsiders repeatedly challenge them, their policies seldom change. For example, the Executive Yuan's reorganization charges ahead full steam. But due to electoral concerns, high-ranking officials in the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan dare not lay a finger on the Council for Indigenous Peoples, the Council for Hakka Affairs, or the Veterans Affairs Commission. This discredits its reorganization effort from the outset. The shuffling and reshuffling of these agencies leads to chaos. But the promoters of reorganization lack core convictions. During party-government deliberations, the Organic Laws for many of these ministries and commissions have been altered beyond recognition. The absurdity of the process is increasingly apparent. This newspaper has been critical of the chaos created by the government's reorganization efforts. We now feel compelled to point out the blind spots in the upcoming "Free Trade Demonstration Zones."
The first Free Trade Demonstration Zone was conceived by President Ma, as part of his "Golden Decade National Vision" campaign platform. That platform proposed a "vision." It lacked any real content. People did not pay much attention to the press releases. But now that it is being promoted, a giant "President Ma promise" label has been slapped on it. A vision has suddenly became a straitjacket. Never mind that it smacks of being jury-rigged. It is being promoted aggressively, as something that simply must be done. This is all highly regrettable.
The CEPD's Free Trade Demonstration Zone project includes smart logistics, international medical treatment, valued-added agriculture, and industrial cooperation, in four demonstration projects. According to reports, during Chairman Yin Chi-ming's term, the plan was more complex, and included over 100 pages. The new cabinet has deleted much of it. Our first question is, was President Ma's vision really so golden? Why was the vision so lacking in guiding concepts. Why could its contents be so cavalierly changed? Did former Chairman Yin of the Council for Economic Planning have major problems with his plan? Why did the problems suddenly vanish under Chairman Kuan a little more than a month later?
Look closely at the content of the aforementioned demonstration zone program. It is riddled with problems. International medical treatment is one. Originally the planning for the Ministry of Transportation Taoyuan Aerotropolis included international medical treatment. But was it successfully included? Was it successfully promoted? Was the demonstration zone still the Aerotropolis? Was the first stage medical regulations and hospital organization the same? Were the services provided, i.e., health checks, cosmetic surgery, and major illnesses, the same? If the external conditions were the same, why weren't the Department of Health and the Department of Transportation able to promote it two years ago? Why is the CEPD suddenly able to promote it now?
Consider measures to promote the Free Trade Demonstration Zone program. It was not made available to outsiders. The land was cheap. Tax breaks were provided. Two and a half years ago Wu Den-yih was premier. In one fell swoop the tax rate was reduced from 25% to 17%. Tax rates were dramatically cut. The government wanted a single rate for everyone. It did not want special tax cuts for operational headquarters, special investments, and special purposes.
But two-and-a-half years later, the Free Trade Demonstration Zone has reappeared. All sorts of tax cuts and tax exemptions have been concocted. All of them violate commitments made by former Premier Wu. All of them defy Ministry of Finance recommendations. All of them ignore the fact that the government can no longer afford tax cuts. Worse still, the tax cuts obviously benefit the rich. They will intensify class antagonisms. Are they really appropriate? They need closer consideration.
Finally, we must clarify the matter of cabinet policy continuity. When Sean Chen was premier, his economic policy stressed "Programs to Increase Economic Momentum." He stressed the importance of improving corporate economic health. Premier Chen argued against pursuing short-term prosperity. He promoted medium and long-term reform. The main promoter of his economic and political policies was today's CEPD Chairman. After Premier Jiang took office, the promotion of medium and long-term economic momentum was rarely mentioned. The Free Trade Demonstration Zone currently promoted is touted for the tens of billions it will bring in within a year or two. The cabinet reshuffle is less than a month old. Yet suddenly, medium and long term initiatives have become short-term. When major economic policy is so unpredictable, on top of the aforementioned problems, it is difficult for the public to retain confidence in the government.
Taiwan's economy and industry face many problems. The government and the private sector are seeking breakthroughs and transformation. The government has set forth its Free Trade Demonstration Zone program. The program is a response to Taiwan's economic difficulties. The government is doing something. That is better than doing nothing. But its solutions should be solutions to actual problems. We think the deregulation of capital, of investments, and of manpower are acceptable. We think there should be even more of them. But are tax incentives appropriate? We have serious reservations.
The government has a program. It may not be perfect. We hope the government will take a hard look at it, perform a total reassessment of it, and make the appropriate changes. It must avoid haste. Nearly as importantly, it must be serious. It must carry it out. It must stop promising a pie in the sky. It must stop leaving the public and the business community disappointed and disillusioned.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.29
社論－自由經濟示範區 示範了什麼？
本報訊
中華民國政府的特性之一，就是一旦高層講了什麼話、定了什麼調，就萬難翻轉；就算外界不斷提出質疑，都難以撼動政策。舉例來說，行政院組織改造說推就推了，但府院高層為了選票不敢碰原民會、客委會、退輔會，使得組改一開始就欠缺具有說服力的理念訴求，也使得二級機關之間併來併去、章法紊亂。也因為組改推動者缺乏核心理念，許多部會的組織法就在審議過程中被黨政協商修得面目全非，愈推到後來其荒謬性就愈發明顯。本報過去已對組改亂象多所批評，現在又不得不對即將上路的「自由經濟示範區」案點出問題盲點。
最早的自由經濟示範區構想出自馬總統「黃金十年國家願景」的競選企畫。那份文件其實是提出個「願景」，還未有實質規畫內容。在新聞發布時大家沒太注意，但是到了要推動時，卻是端出「馬總統宣示」的大帽子，願景描繪突然間就成了行政機關的緊箍咒，儘管拼湊堆砌的味道十足，竟也成了力道萬鈞、勢在必行，令人感慨。
這一次經建會所提的自由經濟示範區專案，內含智慧運籌、國際醫療、農產加值、產業合作四項優先示範項目。據報載，原先尹啟銘主委任內規畫的內容更為龐雜，洋洋灑灑百餘頁，但在新內閣上任後卻大幅刪修。我們的第一個問題是，如果當初馬總統的願景真如黃金一般美好，為什麼內容卻能夠如此任意變化而欠缺主軸？假如尹前主委時的經建會規畫大有問題，又為何能在管主委上任一個多月後，所有問題就煙消雲散？
細看前述優先示範內容，其中問題亦不少。以國際醫療為例，原本交通部桃園航空城規畫案就已將國際醫療涵括其中，但後來成功了沒有呢？若是當初沒有推成功，如今示範的地區未變（依舊是航空港區）、第一階段醫療法規與醫院組織也不改變、服務項目（健檢、醫美、重症）一字未改、外在環境全無差異，為什麼兩年前衛生署與交通部推不動的案子，現在換到經建會就能推動了？
再就示範區推動措施來看，也不外人員開放、土地便宜、租稅減免等舊酒。台灣在兩年半前由吳敦義做行政院長時，一舉將營所稅率由二五％降為一七％。當時如此大幅降稅的背景，就是要降到一體適用所有情境，不要再在營運總部、特殊投資來源、特殊功能支出等方面另開降稅之例外。
但是兩年半後的今天，自由經濟示範區竟然又舊事重提，弄出諸多降稅免稅的名堂，既違反吳前院長的承諾，又不顧財政部的反對，更無視台灣已無降稅空間之事實。更可議的是，這些降稅減稅的名堂明顯對富人有利，也會惡化台灣社會的階級對立，如此是否合宜，實在應該再多加深入考量。
最後，我們也要釐清內閣政策延續的問題。在陳?院長任內，其經濟政策的重頭戲是「經濟動能推升方案」，強調改善企業經濟體質的重要性。當時，陳院長說不要追逐短期利多，而要推一些中長期的改革措施；其政策的主推手經濟政委，也就是今天的經建會主委。在江院長接任之後，中長期的經濟動能推升方案就少見提示，而目前所推的自由貿易區案，強調的卻是要在一兩年之內看到幾百億的產值。內閣改組月餘，忽然就從全力拚中長期改變體質變成衝刺短期績效，重大經濟政策如此變幻莫測的情況，再加上前述一連串的質疑，實在是令人民難有信心。
台灣的經濟與產業的確面臨不少問題，政府與民間都在尋找突破與轉型的契機，這次政府端出自由經濟示範區，就是對解決台灣經濟困境的回應與藥方。坦白說，政府願意作點事，總比一籌莫展的好，但拿出的藥方，也該更能符合實際的需求。對於方案中的資金、投資、人員進出的鬆綁，我們認為是可以接受的，甚至可以說，應該作得更多；但再祭出租稅優惠，是否合宜，我們還是不得不強烈懷疑。
不過，既然有了方案─縱然是一個有問題、不完美的計畫，我們仍希望政府能再深入審視、完整評估、適切調整，切莫貪功求快；接下去更重要的，當然就是確實推動、落實執行，別再畫一個虛無的大餅，讓民眾與企業界的殷切期待又落空。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2013
Summary: The government has a program. It may not be perfect. We hope the government will take a hard look at it, perform a total reassessment of it, and make the appropriate changes. It must avoid haste. Nearly as importantly, it must be serious. It must carry it out. It must stop promising a pie in the sky. It must stop leaving the public and the business community disappointed and disillusioned.
Full text below:
One of the key traits of the government of the Republic of China, is that once high-ranking officials issue a statement, once they sing a certain tune, it is extremely difficult to get them to budge from their original position. Even if outsiders repeatedly challenge them, their policies seldom change. For example, the Executive Yuan's reorganization charges ahead full steam. But due to electoral concerns, high-ranking officials in the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan dare not lay a finger on the Council for Indigenous Peoples, the Council for Hakka Affairs, or the Veterans Affairs Commission. This discredits its reorganization effort from the outset. The shuffling and reshuffling of these agencies leads to chaos. But the promoters of reorganization lack core convictions. During party-government deliberations, the Organic Laws for many of these ministries and commissions have been altered beyond recognition. The absurdity of the process is increasingly apparent. This newspaper has been critical of the chaos created by the government's reorganization efforts. We now feel compelled to point out the blind spots in the upcoming "Free Trade Demonstration Zones."
The first Free Trade Demonstration Zone was conceived by President Ma, as part of his "Golden Decade National Vision" campaign platform. That platform proposed a "vision." It lacked any real content. People did not pay much attention to the press releases. But now that it is being promoted, a giant "President Ma promise" label has been slapped on it. A vision has suddenly became a straitjacket. Never mind that it smacks of being jury-rigged. It is being promoted aggressively, as something that simply must be done. This is all highly regrettable.
The CEPD's Free Trade Demonstration Zone project includes smart logistics, international medical treatment, valued-added agriculture, and industrial cooperation, in four demonstration projects. According to reports, during Chairman Yin Chi-ming's term, the plan was more complex, and included over 100 pages. The new cabinet has deleted much of it. Our first question is, was President Ma's vision really so golden? Why was the vision so lacking in guiding concepts. Why could its contents be so cavalierly changed? Did former Chairman Yin of the Council for Economic Planning have major problems with his plan? Why did the problems suddenly vanish under Chairman Kuan a little more than a month later?
Look closely at the content of the aforementioned demonstration zone program. It is riddled with problems. International medical treatment is one. Originally the planning for the Ministry of Transportation Taoyuan Aerotropolis included international medical treatment. But was it successfully included? Was it successfully promoted? Was the demonstration zone still the Aerotropolis? Was the first stage medical regulations and hospital organization the same? Were the services provided, i.e., health checks, cosmetic surgery, and major illnesses, the same? If the external conditions were the same, why weren't the Department of Health and the Department of Transportation able to promote it two years ago? Why is the CEPD suddenly able to promote it now?
Consider measures to promote the Free Trade Demonstration Zone program. It was not made available to outsiders. The land was cheap. Tax breaks were provided. Two and a half years ago Wu Den-yih was premier. In one fell swoop the tax rate was reduced from 25% to 17%. Tax rates were dramatically cut. The government wanted a single rate for everyone. It did not want special tax cuts for operational headquarters, special investments, and special purposes.
But two-and-a-half years later, the Free Trade Demonstration Zone has reappeared. All sorts of tax cuts and tax exemptions have been concocted. All of them violate commitments made by former Premier Wu. All of them defy Ministry of Finance recommendations. All of them ignore the fact that the government can no longer afford tax cuts. Worse still, the tax cuts obviously benefit the rich. They will intensify class antagonisms. Are they really appropriate? They need closer consideration.
Finally, we must clarify the matter of cabinet policy continuity. When Sean Chen was premier, his economic policy stressed "Programs to Increase Economic Momentum." He stressed the importance of improving corporate economic health. Premier Chen argued against pursuing short-term prosperity. He promoted medium and long-term reform. The main promoter of his economic and political policies was today's CEPD Chairman. After Premier Jiang took office, the promotion of medium and long-term economic momentum was rarely mentioned. The Free Trade Demonstration Zone currently promoted is touted for the tens of billions it will bring in within a year or two. The cabinet reshuffle is less than a month old. Yet suddenly, medium and long term initiatives have become short-term. When major economic policy is so unpredictable, on top of the aforementioned problems, it is difficult for the public to retain confidence in the government.
Taiwan's economy and industry face many problems. The government and the private sector are seeking breakthroughs and transformation. The government has set forth its Free Trade Demonstration Zone program. The program is a response to Taiwan's economic difficulties. The government is doing something. That is better than doing nothing. But its solutions should be solutions to actual problems. We think the deregulation of capital, of investments, and of manpower are acceptable. We think there should be even more of them. But are tax incentives appropriate? We have serious reservations.
The government has a program. It may not be perfect. We hope the government will take a hard look at it, perform a total reassessment of it, and make the appropriate changes. It must avoid haste. Nearly as importantly, it must be serious. It must carry it out. It must stop promising a pie in the sky. It must stop leaving the public and the business community disappointed and disillusioned.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.29
社論－自由經濟示範區 示範了什麼？
本報訊
中華民國政府的特性之一，就是一旦高層講了什麼話、定了什麼調，就萬難翻轉；就算外界不斷提出質疑，都難以撼動政策。舉例來說，行政院組織改造說推就推了，但府院高層為了選票不敢碰原民會、客委會、退輔會，使得組改一開始就欠缺具有說服力的理念訴求，也使得二級機關之間併來併去、章法紊亂。也因為組改推動者缺乏核心理念，許多部會的組織法就在審議過程中被黨政協商修得面目全非，愈推到後來其荒謬性就愈發明顯。本報過去已對組改亂象多所批評，現在又不得不對即將上路的「自由經濟示範區」案點出問題盲點。
最早的自由經濟示範區構想出自馬總統「黃金十年國家願景」的競選企畫。那份文件其實是提出個「願景」，還未有實質規畫內容。在新聞發布時大家沒太注意，但是到了要推動時，卻是端出「馬總統宣示」的大帽子，願景描繪突然間就成了行政機關的緊箍咒，儘管拼湊堆砌的味道十足，竟也成了力道萬鈞、勢在必行，令人感慨。
這一次經建會所提的自由經濟示範區專案，內含智慧運籌、國際醫療、農產加值、產業合作四項優先示範項目。據報載，原先尹啟銘主委任內規畫的內容更為龐雜，洋洋灑灑百餘頁，但在新內閣上任後卻大幅刪修。我們的第一個問題是，如果當初馬總統的願景真如黃金一般美好，為什麼內容卻能夠如此任意變化而欠缺主軸？假如尹前主委時的經建會規畫大有問題，又為何能在管主委上任一個多月後，所有問題就煙消雲散？
細看前述優先示範內容，其中問題亦不少。以國際醫療為例，原本交通部桃園航空城規畫案就已將國際醫療涵括其中，但後來成功了沒有呢？若是當初沒有推成功，如今示範的地區未變（依舊是航空港區）、第一階段醫療法規與醫院組織也不改變、服務項目（健檢、醫美、重症）一字未改、外在環境全無差異，為什麼兩年前衛生署與交通部推不動的案子，現在換到經建會就能推動了？
再就示範區推動措施來看，也不外人員開放、土地便宜、租稅減免等舊酒。台灣在兩年半前由吳敦義做行政院長時，一舉將營所稅率由二五％降為一七％。當時如此大幅降稅的背景，就是要降到一體適用所有情境，不要再在營運總部、特殊投資來源、特殊功能支出等方面另開降稅之例外。
但是兩年半後的今天，自由經濟示範區竟然又舊事重提，弄出諸多降稅免稅的名堂，既違反吳前院長的承諾，又不顧財政部的反對，更無視台灣已無降稅空間之事實。更可議的是，這些降稅減稅的名堂明顯對富人有利，也會惡化台灣社會的階級對立，如此是否合宜，實在應該再多加深入考量。
最後，我們也要釐清內閣政策延續的問題。在陳?院長任內，其經濟政策的重頭戲是「經濟動能推升方案」，強調改善企業經濟體質的重要性。當時，陳院長說不要追逐短期利多，而要推一些中長期的改革措施；其政策的主推手經濟政委，也就是今天的經建會主委。在江院長接任之後，中長期的經濟動能推升方案就少見提示，而目前所推的自由貿易區案，強調的卻是要在一兩年之內看到幾百億的產值。內閣改組月餘，忽然就從全力拚中長期改變體質變成衝刺短期績效，重大經濟政策如此變幻莫測的情況，再加上前述一連串的質疑，實在是令人民難有信心。
台灣的經濟與產業的確面臨不少問題，政府與民間都在尋找突破與轉型的契機，這次政府端出自由經濟示範區，就是對解決台灣經濟困境的回應與藥方。坦白說，政府願意作點事，總比一籌莫展的好，但拿出的藥方，也該更能符合實際的需求。對於方案中的資金、投資、人員進出的鬆綁，我們認為是可以接受的，甚至可以說，應該作得更多；但再祭出租稅優惠，是否合宜，我們還是不得不強烈懷疑。
不過，既然有了方案─縱然是一個有問題、不完美的計畫，我們仍希望政府能再深入審視、完整評估、適切調整，切莫貪功求快；接下去更重要的，當然就是確實推動、落實執行，別再畫一個虛無的大餅，讓民眾與企業界的殷切期待又落空。
Wednesday, March 27, 2013
Nuclear Referendum: Opponents are not Enemies
Nuclear Referendum: Opponents are not Enemies
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2013
Summary: The Ma administration has called for a referendum on the 4NPP, based on nuclear safety considerations. It has declared that it serious about the matter. It wants at least half of the eligible voters to participate in the referendum. Many KMT officials, unlike the Ma administration, are thinking only of 2014 and 2016. The referendum on the 4NPP will be a touchstone for democracy on Taiwan. It will be a touchstone for human values on Taiwan. .
Full text below:
As a ruling party, the KMT's ineptitude never ceases to amaze. Many KMT political appointees do not know how to play the political game. They have no tricks up their sleeves. When dealt a bad hand, they make it worse. Other KMT political appointees know how to play the political game. Even when they are dealt a bad hand, the outcome is not preordained. In general however, the KMT has a knack for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Opponents of the KMT need do nothing. For example, Premier Jiang Yi-hua played the public referendum card. This left the DPP dumbfounded. The KMT essentially killed its own members with friendly fire.
Controversy has raged over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). Supporters of the plant probably cannot explain their reasons. As Taichung Mayor Jason Hu put it, "Nuclear energy is not something one can easily persuade people to like. I too support a nuclear-free homeland. But it should be phased in gradually. It should be discussed rationally. One should not make it an emotional issue." It is true that policy debate should not become an emotional issue. But the most serious problem is the Blue Camp has no idea how to prevent policy debates from becoming emotional issues.
KMT legislators invariably make the same mistakes. They lack both the ability and the willingness to defend their policies. They even lack the discipline to attend meetings on time. That is how they allowed the DPP to prevent the Legislative Yuan Fiscal Policy Committee from passing the Taipower budget. They even failed to demand further debate. With legislators like this, to expect effective governance from the Ma administration is wishful thinking.
KMT leaders, especially Eric Chu, Hau Lung-bin, and Chang Tung-jung in the Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung evacuation zone, are subject to public pressure. Chang Tung-jung may be an exception. Chu and Hao have heavy responsibilities as younger generation, torch bearers. But the 4NPP impacts the lives of the people as a whole. If these KMT leaders harp on their reelection campaigns, seek central government level office, they will provoke popular resentment. Eric Chu expressed concerns over the safety of the 4NPP long before Premier Jiang. His views on the referendum are crystal clear. "It must be in earnest." To be fair, whether the referendum can calm the political storm remains hard to say. If fewer than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, but over half vote down nuclear power, the political repercussions will be serious. They will far exceed what Premier Jiang alone can smooth over.
The 4NPP controversy has raged for 30 years. Legislators have engaged in fisticuffs. Protestors have taken to the streets. No solution, however unsatisfactory, has been found. Never mind a consensus. Under the circumstances, the only solution is a referendum. As Jason Hu noted, "Having come to this, Taiwan must solve the problem through a referendum. Let us put it to a vote!" Elected representatives have a dilemma. A direct appeal to public opinion lets them off the hook. We must hold a referendum. We must ensure that everyone defers to the outcome. This time, we can no longer dodge the issue. The future of our children and grandchildren must not be left to the politicians. It must be our own decision.
Suppose more than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, and over half vote down nuclear power. Whether the Blue Camp or Green Camp is in power will no longer matter. They will both have to share responsibility. Suppose Jiang Yi-hua resigns out of a sense of responsibility. The sole sacrifice will be a single premier, or at most a handful of political appointees. This would be a small price to pay. Premier Jiang's declaration was clearly made after much thought. He is trading his own power for the good of the nation. Who can complain? Anyone who makes such decisions based on power considerations, is petty indeed. Conversely, suppose more than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, and more than half vote nuclear power up? Those who oppose the 4NPP would have to accept the fact that a nuclear-free homeland is still in the future. This future need not be a distant future. The government's nuclear-free homeland policy states that the 4NPP must be safe to operate. The 1NPP, 2NPP, 3NPP are older, higher risk power plants. They are scheduled to be decommissioned. The 4NPP has an operational life as well. During this time, Taiwan must find alternative sources of energy. This might be good for Taiwan's long-term development.
Overnight anti-nuclear convert Hau Lung-pin advocates deciding the fate of the 4NPP by means of an opinion poll. This proposal must be rejected out of hand. Others may support or oppose nuclear energy on the basis of irrational emotions. But Hau Lung-bin has a science and engineering background. He should understand the importance of making policy decisions based on science. He served as head of the EPA under the Chen administration. The first thing he did was to clearly inform the DPP that he supported his father Hau Pei-tsun's policy. He supported the construction of the 4NPP. Now however, he has jettisoned the scientific argument he once advanced. He may use the Fukushima nuclear disaster as an excuse. But to make such a major policy decision based on opinion polls reveals a serious misunderstanding of democracy. According to Hau Lung-bin's logic, the even more controversial Wenlin Yuan, in his jurisdiction, could not be dismantled because 60% of those who answered online opposed its demolition. According to his logic, we may as well use polls to decide which elected representatives should be allowed to remain in office, and which should required to step down, including Blue Camp representatives. Those who fail to receive an absolute majority would be required to step down. Impeachment would be unnecessary.
The Ma administration has called for a referendum on the 4NPP, based on nuclear safety considerations. It has declared that it serious about the matter. It wants at least half of the eligible voters to participate in the referendum. Many KMT officials, unlike the Ma administration, are thinking only of 2014 and 2016. The referendum on the 4NPP will be a touchstone for democracy on Taiwan. It will be a touchstone for human values on Taiwan. A democratic and pluralistic ROC must learn a lesson. When making policy decisions, your opponent is not your enemy. He is a compatriot who like you is attempting to safeguard his country and his home. Everyone loves his country. How he votes does not change that.
一起守護家園 公投沒有敵人
2013-03-27
中國時報
做為執政黨，國民黨的步調紊亂，永遠超乎想像。碰到沒有招數的政務官，無好牌可打，只能就著一手爛牌亂打一通；碰到能出招的政務官，手上就算不是順風牌，至少牌局輸贏猶在未定之天。偏偏國民黨就能把好牌給打爛，而且，完全不必等對手出招，行政院長江宜樺拋出核四公投這張讓民進黨也傻眼的牌，卻差不多快被自家人打爛，即是一例。
經過這段時間，核四的各種討論汗牛充棟，支持者大概都講不出擁核之言，至多只能如台中市長胡志強所言，「核能是很難讓人喜歡的東西，我也支持非核家園，但應該要循序漸進推動，這是應該理性討論的課題，不要情緒化。」政策討論本來就不該情緒化，但演變迄今，最嚴重的是藍營內部對如何避免情緒化都毫無頭緒。
黨籍立委犯的是一貫錯誤，缺乏辯護能力或意願之外，依舊是連準時開會的紀律都沒有，才會讓立法院經濟委員會竟通過民進黨退回台電預算的提案，甚至連復議都提不出來，有這群立委，馬政府預期效能執政，豈非天方夜譚？
黨籍地方首長特別是北北基逃命圈的朱立倫、郝龍斌、張通榮有立即、近身的民意壓力，除張通榮外，朱、郝都有中生代接班的另一重權力考量，但核四攸關全民生活價值之選項，若是反復提醒民眾自己意在連任或直取中央，只會引來更多惡感。朱立倫對核四安全顧慮發聲更早於江揆提出的公投，但面對核四公投，他的意見明確而清楚，「不要玩假的。」持平而論，公投是否真能拆解政治風暴，還很難論，但如果公投的公民數未過半而投票反核者過半，其可能造成的政治負作用，遠非江揆個人進退所能撫平。
核四爭議卅多年，國會打過架，街頭有運動，始終沒有辦法取得眾人可能未必滿意但都得接受的結論，遑論共識，在這種狀況下，唯公投能解，誠如胡志強所言，「台灣走到這一步，非公投很難解決問題，就讓他投一次！」訴諸直接民意，讓左右為難的民意代表們也不必再為難了。不但要公投，而且要讓全民體認：這一次，不能迴避，子孫的未來不必交給政客，我們自己決定。
若公投公民數過半而通過停建，藍綠未來不論誰執政政，共同承擔，即使江宜樺為此落實承諾，請辭下台，犧牲的不過是一位行政院長，或若干與之同進退的政務官，這算是最小的政治代價。江揆做此宣示，顯然已做足了心理準備，以一己之權位換國家之相對大利，誰曰不宜？任何以權力揣度其心者，其器小哉！相對的，若公投公民數過半而通過續建，反核四者就得接受非核家園還有一步之遙，這一步並非遙遙無期，因為根據政府非核家園的既定政策，核四必須確保安全才能運轉，核一、二、三風險更高的老舊電廠必須如期除役；而且核四也有其運轉年限，在這段時間中，台灣必須相應找到替代能源，相對而言，對台灣長遠發展未必不利。
至於突然反核的郝龍斌主張以民調決定核四存廢，此議最不可取！別人擁核或反核可以無視理性，唯情感用事，但郝龍斌是理工出身的人，應該理解科學依據的重要性，他在扁政府執政時期出任環保署長，開宗明義第一件事，就是明確告知民進黨，他支持父親郝柏村的政策：興建核四。此刻，他放棄了自己曾經有過的科學立論，或者可以日本福島核災為擋箭牌，但以民調決定重大且續行中的政策和建設，那就是對民主的基本認知都出了問題。照郝龍斌的邏輯，他轄下的都更重大爭議文林苑根本不能拆，因為六成網友民調反對拆；甚至藍營首長和民代，大家乾脆做個民調看看支持度能否過半，若無過半者一起請辭下台，連罷免都不必了。
馬政府決定在核安的前提下推動核四公投，並宣示不會玩假的，一定鼓勵全民投票讓參與的公民數過半，其器識遠超過腦袋裡只有二○一四與二○一六選舉的眾多國民黨人。核四公投將是台灣民主的試金石，也是台灣生活價值選擇的試金石，民主多元的台灣透過核四公投，必須學會一件事：在政策抉擇過程中，站在你對立面的人不是你的敵人，而是與你一起守護家園的同胞，我們對台灣的愛，不因投票取向之不同而有任何差別。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2013
Summary: The Ma administration has called for a referendum on the 4NPP, based on nuclear safety considerations. It has declared that it serious about the matter. It wants at least half of the eligible voters to participate in the referendum. Many KMT officials, unlike the Ma administration, are thinking only of 2014 and 2016. The referendum on the 4NPP will be a touchstone for democracy on Taiwan. It will be a touchstone for human values on Taiwan. .
Full text below:
As a ruling party, the KMT's ineptitude never ceases to amaze. Many KMT political appointees do not know how to play the political game. They have no tricks up their sleeves. When dealt a bad hand, they make it worse. Other KMT political appointees know how to play the political game. Even when they are dealt a bad hand, the outcome is not preordained. In general however, the KMT has a knack for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Opponents of the KMT need do nothing. For example, Premier Jiang Yi-hua played the public referendum card. This left the DPP dumbfounded. The KMT essentially killed its own members with friendly fire.
Controversy has raged over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). Supporters of the plant probably cannot explain their reasons. As Taichung Mayor Jason Hu put it, "Nuclear energy is not something one can easily persuade people to like. I too support a nuclear-free homeland. But it should be phased in gradually. It should be discussed rationally. One should not make it an emotional issue." It is true that policy debate should not become an emotional issue. But the most serious problem is the Blue Camp has no idea how to prevent policy debates from becoming emotional issues.
KMT legislators invariably make the same mistakes. They lack both the ability and the willingness to defend their policies. They even lack the discipline to attend meetings on time. That is how they allowed the DPP to prevent the Legislative Yuan Fiscal Policy Committee from passing the Taipower budget. They even failed to demand further debate. With legislators like this, to expect effective governance from the Ma administration is wishful thinking.
KMT leaders, especially Eric Chu, Hau Lung-bin, and Chang Tung-jung in the Taipei, Xinbei, and Keelung evacuation zone, are subject to public pressure. Chang Tung-jung may be an exception. Chu and Hao have heavy responsibilities as younger generation, torch bearers. But the 4NPP impacts the lives of the people as a whole. If these KMT leaders harp on their reelection campaigns, seek central government level office, they will provoke popular resentment. Eric Chu expressed concerns over the safety of the 4NPP long before Premier Jiang. His views on the referendum are crystal clear. "It must be in earnest." To be fair, whether the referendum can calm the political storm remains hard to say. If fewer than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, but over half vote down nuclear power, the political repercussions will be serious. They will far exceed what Premier Jiang alone can smooth over.
The 4NPP controversy has raged for 30 years. Legislators have engaged in fisticuffs. Protestors have taken to the streets. No solution, however unsatisfactory, has been found. Never mind a consensus. Under the circumstances, the only solution is a referendum. As Jason Hu noted, "Having come to this, Taiwan must solve the problem through a referendum. Let us put it to a vote!" Elected representatives have a dilemma. A direct appeal to public opinion lets them off the hook. We must hold a referendum. We must ensure that everyone defers to the outcome. This time, we can no longer dodge the issue. The future of our children and grandchildren must not be left to the politicians. It must be our own decision.
Suppose more than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, and over half vote down nuclear power. Whether the Blue Camp or Green Camp is in power will no longer matter. They will both have to share responsibility. Suppose Jiang Yi-hua resigns out of a sense of responsibility. The sole sacrifice will be a single premier, or at most a handful of political appointees. This would be a small price to pay. Premier Jiang's declaration was clearly made after much thought. He is trading his own power for the good of the nation. Who can complain? Anyone who makes such decisions based on power considerations, is petty indeed. Conversely, suppose more than half of the eligible voters participate in the referendum, and more than half vote nuclear power up? Those who oppose the 4NPP would have to accept the fact that a nuclear-free homeland is still in the future. This future need not be a distant future. The government's nuclear-free homeland policy states that the 4NPP must be safe to operate. The 1NPP, 2NPP, 3NPP are older, higher risk power plants. They are scheduled to be decommissioned. The 4NPP has an operational life as well. During this time, Taiwan must find alternative sources of energy. This might be good for Taiwan's long-term development.
Overnight anti-nuclear convert Hau Lung-pin advocates deciding the fate of the 4NPP by means of an opinion poll. This proposal must be rejected out of hand. Others may support or oppose nuclear energy on the basis of irrational emotions. But Hau Lung-bin has a science and engineering background. He should understand the importance of making policy decisions based on science. He served as head of the EPA under the Chen administration. The first thing he did was to clearly inform the DPP that he supported his father Hau Pei-tsun's policy. He supported the construction of the 4NPP. Now however, he has jettisoned the scientific argument he once advanced. He may use the Fukushima nuclear disaster as an excuse. But to make such a major policy decision based on opinion polls reveals a serious misunderstanding of democracy. According to Hau Lung-bin's logic, the even more controversial Wenlin Yuan, in his jurisdiction, could not be dismantled because 60% of those who answered online opposed its demolition. According to his logic, we may as well use polls to decide which elected representatives should be allowed to remain in office, and which should required to step down, including Blue Camp representatives. Those who fail to receive an absolute majority would be required to step down. Impeachment would be unnecessary.
The Ma administration has called for a referendum on the 4NPP, based on nuclear safety considerations. It has declared that it serious about the matter. It wants at least half of the eligible voters to participate in the referendum. Many KMT officials, unlike the Ma administration, are thinking only of 2014 and 2016. The referendum on the 4NPP will be a touchstone for democracy on Taiwan. It will be a touchstone for human values on Taiwan. A democratic and pluralistic ROC must learn a lesson. When making policy decisions, your opponent is not your enemy. He is a compatriot who like you is attempting to safeguard his country and his home. Everyone loves his country. How he votes does not change that.
一起守護家園 公投沒有敵人
2013-03-27
中國時報
做為執政黨，國民黨的步調紊亂，永遠超乎想像。碰到沒有招數的政務官，無好牌可打，只能就著一手爛牌亂打一通；碰到能出招的政務官，手上就算不是順風牌，至少牌局輸贏猶在未定之天。偏偏國民黨就能把好牌給打爛，而且，完全不必等對手出招，行政院長江宜樺拋出核四公投這張讓民進黨也傻眼的牌，卻差不多快被自家人打爛，即是一例。
經過這段時間，核四的各種討論汗牛充棟，支持者大概都講不出擁核之言，至多只能如台中市長胡志強所言，「核能是很難讓人喜歡的東西，我也支持非核家園，但應該要循序漸進推動，這是應該理性討論的課題，不要情緒化。」政策討論本來就不該情緒化，但演變迄今，最嚴重的是藍營內部對如何避免情緒化都毫無頭緒。
黨籍立委犯的是一貫錯誤，缺乏辯護能力或意願之外，依舊是連準時開會的紀律都沒有，才會讓立法院經濟委員會竟通過民進黨退回台電預算的提案，甚至連復議都提不出來，有這群立委，馬政府預期效能執政，豈非天方夜譚？
黨籍地方首長特別是北北基逃命圈的朱立倫、郝龍斌、張通榮有立即、近身的民意壓力，除張通榮外，朱、郝都有中生代接班的另一重權力考量，但核四攸關全民生活價值之選項，若是反復提醒民眾自己意在連任或直取中央，只會引來更多惡感。朱立倫對核四安全顧慮發聲更早於江揆提出的公投，但面對核四公投，他的意見明確而清楚，「不要玩假的。」持平而論，公投是否真能拆解政治風暴，還很難論，但如果公投的公民數未過半而投票反核者過半，其可能造成的政治負作用，遠非江揆個人進退所能撫平。
核四爭議卅多年，國會打過架，街頭有運動，始終沒有辦法取得眾人可能未必滿意但都得接受的結論，遑論共識，在這種狀況下，唯公投能解，誠如胡志強所言，「台灣走到這一步，非公投很難解決問題，就讓他投一次！」訴諸直接民意，讓左右為難的民意代表們也不必再為難了。不但要公投，而且要讓全民體認：這一次，不能迴避，子孫的未來不必交給政客，我們自己決定。
若公投公民數過半而通過停建，藍綠未來不論誰執政政，共同承擔，即使江宜樺為此落實承諾，請辭下台，犧牲的不過是一位行政院長，或若干與之同進退的政務官，這算是最小的政治代價。江揆做此宣示，顯然已做足了心理準備，以一己之權位換國家之相對大利，誰曰不宜？任何以權力揣度其心者，其器小哉！相對的，若公投公民數過半而通過續建，反核四者就得接受非核家園還有一步之遙，這一步並非遙遙無期，因為根據政府非核家園的既定政策，核四必須確保安全才能運轉，核一、二、三風險更高的老舊電廠必須如期除役；而且核四也有其運轉年限，在這段時間中，台灣必須相應找到替代能源，相對而言，對台灣長遠發展未必不利。
至於突然反核的郝龍斌主張以民調決定核四存廢，此議最不可取！別人擁核或反核可以無視理性，唯情感用事，但郝龍斌是理工出身的人，應該理解科學依據的重要性，他在扁政府執政時期出任環保署長，開宗明義第一件事，就是明確告知民進黨，他支持父親郝柏村的政策：興建核四。此刻，他放棄了自己曾經有過的科學立論，或者可以日本福島核災為擋箭牌，但以民調決定重大且續行中的政策和建設，那就是對民主的基本認知都出了問題。照郝龍斌的邏輯，他轄下的都更重大爭議文林苑根本不能拆，因為六成網友民調反對拆；甚至藍營首長和民代，大家乾脆做個民調看看支持度能否過半，若無過半者一起請辭下台，連罷免都不必了。
馬政府決定在核安的前提下推動核四公投，並宣示不會玩假的，一定鼓勵全民投票讓參與的公民數過半，其器識遠超過腦袋裡只有二○一四與二○一六選舉的眾多國民黨人。核四公投將是台灣民主的試金石，也是台灣生活價值選擇的試金石，民主多元的台灣透過核四公投，必須學會一件事：在政策抉擇過程中，站在你對立面的人不是你的敵人，而是與你一起守護家園的同胞，我們對台灣的愛，不因投票取向之不同而有任何差別。
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Can Xi Jinping Assume Decade Long International Role?
Can Xi Jinping Assume Decade Long International Role?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2013
Summary: The first country Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping visited upon taking office was Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is only one year older than Xi Jinping. Putin's 11 year term largely overlaps Xi Jinping's 10 year term. Both men hope they can be long-term friends, and maintain long-term relations with Taipei.
Full text below:
The first country Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping visited upon taking office was Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is only one year older than Xi Jinping. Putin's 11 year term largely overlaps Xi Jinping's 10 year term. Both men hope they can be long-term friends, and maintain long-term relations with Taipei.
This trip is the start of a decade long interaction between Xi Jinping and Putin. It is Xi Jinping's first step as the leader of Mainland China's global diplomacy.
Moscow has concluded that the United States planned the color revolutions in neighboring countries. Beijing has concluded that the United States' return to Asia" is intended to contain China. Objectively speaking, Mainland China and Russia need an alliance. But a close relationship between Mainland China and Russia does not necessarily mean that Mainland China and Russia will become allies against a third country.
Mainland China and Russia have formed alliances in the past. They have also had confrontations. Neither were ideal. As Beijing has said, it will not form alliances with other countries. It will maintain an independent foreign policy. This is probably in the nation's best interest. Outsiders have speculated about a Sino-Russian alliance. But the PRC Foreign Ministry in Beijing has repeatedly stressed that relations between Mainland China and Russia do not constitute an alliance, and are not directed against any third country.
In recent years, Mainland China and Russia have adopted similar stances in the United Nations. They have often joined forces and vetoed motions from the United States. For example, they vetoed the sending of UN troops to Iraq and military intervention in Libya and Syria. But that does not mean that Mainland China is anti-American. Before Xi Jinping became general secretary, he paid an important visit to the United States. When he took over as President, his first meeting with foreign dignitaries was with the United States' Secretary of the Treasury.
Similarly, the joint statement by Mainland China and Russia states that the two parties firmly support each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and core interests. The highly sensitive Japanese media concluded that the Northern Territories issue between Japan and Russia and the Diaoyutai Islands issue between Japan and China motivated Mainland China and Russia to join forces against Japan. But Xi Jinping appointed Japanese expert Wang Yi as foreign minister. Also, the Japanese economic and trade delegation which recently visited Beijing was met by none other than Vice Chairman Li Yuanchao. Mainland China has reportedly invited Japan's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso to visit the Mainland. This too, appears to be a goodwill gesture.
Mainland China is not preparing to form an alliance with Russia at the moment. But inner attitudes often change in response to outer circumstances. If the United States truly attempts to contain Mainland China, the latter may be forced to form an alliance with Russia in response.
Since taking office, Xi Jinping has attempted to establish a new type of relationship between the major powers. This relationship would include something new, but also something old. The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report declared that Mainland China would "Never claim hegemony, never seek hegemony," It reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping's "Maintain a low profile, remain calm, never take the lead." foreign strategy. It continued the Mainland's past foreign policy. But the new international environment requires a flexible response. It requires increased international cooperation. It requires increased responsibility. In global emissions, arms exports, and the global financial crisis, the world looks to Beijing, as a major power, to assume greater responsibility. Beijing should expect the same of itself.
Xi Jinping will visit three African countries. Reportedly they will receive a great deal of aid, including 20 billion US over the next three years. This continues Mainland China's "Third World" foreign policy. Past investments in Africa led to charges that it was plundering Africa's natural resources. But the African countries welcomed Mainland China. Mainland China's policy is clearly different from past Western colonial policy. Just how should one assist other countries? Xi Jinping discussed this issue with other BRIC leaders in South Africa. The BRIC countries have become synonymous with emerging economies. They have the same voice in the G20 that G7 members have in the G7. The theme of the current summit is "BRIC-African Partnership." A dozen leaders from African countries will participate in the dialogue. Africa has long been diplomatically important to Beijing.
Cross-Strait relations are unique. Beijing's diplomacy has an impact on Taipei. The relationship between the United States, Mainland China, and Russia was a large triangle. The relationship between Mainland China, the US, and Taiwan was a small triangle. The large triangle imposed constraints on the small triangle. The United States and Mainland China once established diplomatic relations to counter the Soviet Union. Mainland China and Russia now appear to be countering the United States. Either way, their actions indirectly affect relations between Mainland China, the US, and Taiwan.
Xi Jinping will be in power for 10 years. During these 10 years, Mainland China will "maintain a low profile." It will be a mature player on the international stage. As Xi Jinping noted on the 23rd, in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, mankind is now a "You include me, I include you" community of interests. In an era of globalization, the world hopes Mainland China will assume global responsibilities and agree that national interests can coexist.
習近平能否進入國際角色十年成熟期
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.27 04:14 am
中國大陸國家主席習近平就任後第一個出訪的國家是俄羅斯。俄羅斯總統普亭的年齡只大習近平一歲，普亭未來的十一年任期，會與習近平十年的任期幾乎完全重疊，兩人都希望做長期的朋友，並維持長期的邦誼。
此行是習近平與普亭密切重疊的十年互動之開始，也是習近平領導中國大陸邁向未來十年全球外交的第一步。
外界猜測，莫斯科既認定美國在策劃周邊國家的顏色革命，而北京認為美國之「重返亞洲」意在遏制中國，從客觀上看，中俄其實有聯盟的相互需要。但是，中俄雙方關係密切，並不意味著中國大陸與俄羅斯會結為聯盟，共同對抗第三國。
中俄兩國以往曾結過盟，也對抗過，似乎皆非最好的選擇。就北京來說，不與其他國家結盟，維持獨立自主外交，或許才是最佳的國家利益。針對外界所作中俄結盟的猜測，北京外交部也再三強調，中俄之間並非結盟的關係，不針對第三國。
近年來，在聯合國中，中俄的立場接近，往往聯手否決美國的議案，譬如出兵伊拉克，或是對利比亞與敘利亞的武力干預等等，但這並不意味著中國反美；習近平在擔任總書記前，才剛剛有過一次隆重的美國之行，而接任國家主席後，第一個接見的外國貴賓，就是美國財政部長。
同樣的，中俄兩國此次聯合聲明表示：在涉及對方主權、領土完整、安全等核心利益問題上相互堅定支持；日本媒體敏感的據此認為，日俄間存在北方領土問題，日中間存在著釣魚台問題，中俄兩國企圖合作對日本制約。可是在另一方面，習近平任命知日派的王毅為外交部長，而近日訪問北京的日本經貿代表團受到副主席李源潮的接見，接下來據說正在安排接受日本副首相兼財政大臣麻生太郎訪問大陸，則似是對日本表達善意的信號。
中國大陸現刻並未準備與俄羅斯結為同盟，不過主觀意願往往也會因客觀變化而轉變，如果美國真有遏制中國大陸的企圖，大陸也不得不與俄羅斯採取反制的合作。
習近平上任後，想要推動建立新型大國關係，其中有創新的部分，也有承繼傳統的部分；首先，中共十八大報告的「永不爭霸，永不稱霸」，是在重申鄧小平以來「韜光養晦、沉著應對、決不當頭」的外交戰略方針，延續過去中國大陸的外交路線。但是新的國際環境需要北京靈活因應，而越來越多的國際合作機制，也需要北京比以前負起更多的責任，從全球減排、軍火輸出，到金融危機，全世界都期待北京能夠進一步負起大國的責任，這也應是北京的自我期許。
習近平接下來訪問非洲三國，透露許多援助項目，包括未來三年貸助二百億美元，這是承續關於「第三世界」的外交路線。過去大陸投資非洲，曾經引發對非洲資源掠奪的批評，但是也有人觀察到，非洲國家非常歡迎大陸，認為完全不同於過去西方的殖民政策。究竟要如何協助，習近平在南非與其他金磚領袖們進行討論，金磚國家已經成為新興經濟體的代名詞，在Ｇ20中擁有與Ｇ7同樣的發言權，此次高峰會的主題是「金磚國家與非洲的夥伴關係」，有十餘位非洲國家領導人參與對話，而非洲始終是北京在外交上相當重視的地區。
由於兩岸關係特殊，北京的外交走向對台灣自有影響。過去美中俄關係是大三角，而中美台也有小三角的結構，大三角過去一直制約著小三角的關係，無論是美中建交，目的在制衡蘇聯，或是現在中俄隱隱然與美國相抗衡，都會間接影響中美台關係。
習近平將有十年任期，在外交戰略上，這個十年也將是中國大陸自「韜光養晦」至扮演國際要角的成熟期。誠如習近平二十三日在莫斯科國際關係學院演說中所指出的，人類愈來愈成為「你中有我、我中有你」的利益共同體，在全球化的時代，世人也期待中國大陸能夠體會利益共存，負起全球性的責任。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 27, 2013
Summary: The first country Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping visited upon taking office was Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is only one year older than Xi Jinping. Putin's 11 year term largely overlaps Xi Jinping's 10 year term. Both men hope they can be long-term friends, and maintain long-term relations with Taipei.
Full text below:
The first country Mainland Chinese President Xi Jinping visited upon taking office was Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is only one year older than Xi Jinping. Putin's 11 year term largely overlaps Xi Jinping's 10 year term. Both men hope they can be long-term friends, and maintain long-term relations with Taipei.
This trip is the start of a decade long interaction between Xi Jinping and Putin. It is Xi Jinping's first step as the leader of Mainland China's global diplomacy.
Moscow has concluded that the United States planned the color revolutions in neighboring countries. Beijing has concluded that the United States' return to Asia" is intended to contain China. Objectively speaking, Mainland China and Russia need an alliance. But a close relationship between Mainland China and Russia does not necessarily mean that Mainland China and Russia will become allies against a third country.
Mainland China and Russia have formed alliances in the past. They have also had confrontations. Neither were ideal. As Beijing has said, it will not form alliances with other countries. It will maintain an independent foreign policy. This is probably in the nation's best interest. Outsiders have speculated about a Sino-Russian alliance. But the PRC Foreign Ministry in Beijing has repeatedly stressed that relations between Mainland China and Russia do not constitute an alliance, and are not directed against any third country.
In recent years, Mainland China and Russia have adopted similar stances in the United Nations. They have often joined forces and vetoed motions from the United States. For example, they vetoed the sending of UN troops to Iraq and military intervention in Libya and Syria. But that does not mean that Mainland China is anti-American. Before Xi Jinping became general secretary, he paid an important visit to the United States. When he took over as President, his first meeting with foreign dignitaries was with the United States' Secretary of the Treasury.
Similarly, the joint statement by Mainland China and Russia states that the two parties firmly support each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and core interests. The highly sensitive Japanese media concluded that the Northern Territories issue between Japan and Russia and the Diaoyutai Islands issue between Japan and China motivated Mainland China and Russia to join forces against Japan. But Xi Jinping appointed Japanese expert Wang Yi as foreign minister. Also, the Japanese economic and trade delegation which recently visited Beijing was met by none other than Vice Chairman Li Yuanchao. Mainland China has reportedly invited Japan's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso to visit the Mainland. This too, appears to be a goodwill gesture.
Mainland China is not preparing to form an alliance with Russia at the moment. But inner attitudes often change in response to outer circumstances. If the United States truly attempts to contain Mainland China, the latter may be forced to form an alliance with Russia in response.
Since taking office, Xi Jinping has attempted to establish a new type of relationship between the major powers. This relationship would include something new, but also something old. The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report declared that Mainland China would "Never claim hegemony, never seek hegemony," It reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping's "Maintain a low profile, remain calm, never take the lead." foreign strategy. It continued the Mainland's past foreign policy. But the new international environment requires a flexible response. It requires increased international cooperation. It requires increased responsibility. In global emissions, arms exports, and the global financial crisis, the world looks to Beijing, as a major power, to assume greater responsibility. Beijing should expect the same of itself.
Xi Jinping will visit three African countries. Reportedly they will receive a great deal of aid, including 20 billion US over the next three years. This continues Mainland China's "Third World" foreign policy. Past investments in Africa led to charges that it was plundering Africa's natural resources. But the African countries welcomed Mainland China. Mainland China's policy is clearly different from past Western colonial policy. Just how should one assist other countries? Xi Jinping discussed this issue with other BRIC leaders in South Africa. The BRIC countries have become synonymous with emerging economies. They have the same voice in the G20 that G7 members have in the G7. The theme of the current summit is "BRIC-African Partnership." A dozen leaders from African countries will participate in the dialogue. Africa has long been diplomatically important to Beijing.
Cross-Strait relations are unique. Beijing's diplomacy has an impact on Taipei. The relationship between the United States, Mainland China, and Russia was a large triangle. The relationship between Mainland China, the US, and Taiwan was a small triangle. The large triangle imposed constraints on the small triangle. The United States and Mainland China once established diplomatic relations to counter the Soviet Union. Mainland China and Russia now appear to be countering the United States. Either way, their actions indirectly affect relations between Mainland China, the US, and Taiwan.
Xi Jinping will be in power for 10 years. During these 10 years, Mainland China will "maintain a low profile." It will be a mature player on the international stage. As Xi Jinping noted on the 23rd, in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, mankind is now a "You include me, I include you" community of interests. In an era of globalization, the world hopes Mainland China will assume global responsibilities and agree that national interests can coexist.
習近平能否進入國際角色十年成熟期
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.27 04:14 am
中國大陸國家主席習近平就任後第一個出訪的國家是俄羅斯。俄羅斯總統普亭的年齡只大習近平一歲，普亭未來的十一年任期，會與習近平十年的任期幾乎完全重疊，兩人都希望做長期的朋友，並維持長期的邦誼。
此行是習近平與普亭密切重疊的十年互動之開始，也是習近平領導中國大陸邁向未來十年全球外交的第一步。
外界猜測，莫斯科既認定美國在策劃周邊國家的顏色革命，而北京認為美國之「重返亞洲」意在遏制中國，從客觀上看，中俄其實有聯盟的相互需要。但是，中俄雙方關係密切，並不意味著中國大陸與俄羅斯會結為聯盟，共同對抗第三國。
中俄兩國以往曾結過盟，也對抗過，似乎皆非最好的選擇。就北京來說，不與其他國家結盟，維持獨立自主外交，或許才是最佳的國家利益。針對外界所作中俄結盟的猜測，北京外交部也再三強調，中俄之間並非結盟的關係，不針對第三國。
近年來，在聯合國中，中俄的立場接近，往往聯手否決美國的議案，譬如出兵伊拉克，或是對利比亞與敘利亞的武力干預等等，但這並不意味著中國反美；習近平在擔任總書記前，才剛剛有過一次隆重的美國之行，而接任國家主席後，第一個接見的外國貴賓，就是美國財政部長。
同樣的，中俄兩國此次聯合聲明表示：在涉及對方主權、領土完整、安全等核心利益問題上相互堅定支持；日本媒體敏感的據此認為，日俄間存在北方領土問題，日中間存在著釣魚台問題，中俄兩國企圖合作對日本制約。可是在另一方面，習近平任命知日派的王毅為外交部長，而近日訪問北京的日本經貿代表團受到副主席李源潮的接見，接下來據說正在安排接受日本副首相兼財政大臣麻生太郎訪問大陸，則似是對日本表達善意的信號。
中國大陸現刻並未準備與俄羅斯結為同盟，不過主觀意願往往也會因客觀變化而轉變，如果美國真有遏制中國大陸的企圖，大陸也不得不與俄羅斯採取反制的合作。
習近平上任後，想要推動建立新型大國關係，其中有創新的部分，也有承繼傳統的部分；首先，中共十八大報告的「永不爭霸，永不稱霸」，是在重申鄧小平以來「韜光養晦、沉著應對、決不當頭」的外交戰略方針，延續過去中國大陸的外交路線。但是新的國際環境需要北京靈活因應，而越來越多的國際合作機制，也需要北京比以前負起更多的責任，從全球減排、軍火輸出，到金融危機，全世界都期待北京能夠進一步負起大國的責任，這也應是北京的自我期許。
習近平接下來訪問非洲三國，透露許多援助項目，包括未來三年貸助二百億美元，這是承續關於「第三世界」的外交路線。過去大陸投資非洲，曾經引發對非洲資源掠奪的批評，但是也有人觀察到，非洲國家非常歡迎大陸，認為完全不同於過去西方的殖民政策。究竟要如何協助，習近平在南非與其他金磚領袖們進行討論，金磚國家已經成為新興經濟體的代名詞，在Ｇ20中擁有與Ｇ7同樣的發言權，此次高峰會的主題是「金磚國家與非洲的夥伴關係」，有十餘位非洲國家領導人參與對話，而非洲始終是北京在外交上相當重視的地區。
由於兩岸關係特殊，北京的外交走向對台灣自有影響。過去美中俄關係是大三角，而中美台也有小三角的結構，大三角過去一直制約著小三角的關係，無論是美中建交，目的在制衡蘇聯，或是現在中俄隱隱然與美國相抗衡，都會間接影響中美台關係。
習近平將有十年任期，在外交戰略上，這個十年也將是中國大陸自「韜光養晦」至扮演國際要角的成熟期。誠如習近平二十三日在莫斯科國際關係學院演說中所指出的，人類愈來愈成為「你中有我、我中有你」的利益共同體，在全球化的時代，世人也期待中國大陸能夠體會利益共存，負起全球性的責任。
Historic Responsibility for Referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
Historic Responsibility for Referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2013
Summary: The KMT and DPP must not be allowed to stop or continue work on the 4NPP based on 2014 or 2016 political calculations. They must make their 4NPP referendum decision based on considerations of national security and historical responsibility. The referendum must be preceded by certification that the 4NPP is safe.
Full Text below:
On February 23, this newspaper published an editorial entitled, "Professionalism and Politics: Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant." The article pointed out that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) must be professionally certified as safe. A public referendum may be politically necessary. But if professionals can certify that the 4NPP is safe, a public referendum is superfluous.
The Jiang Cabinet decided that given widespread chaos, it would halt construction on the 4NPP and call for a public referendum. It failed however to clarify whether the 4NPP was safe. Instead, it hurriedly called for a public referendum in August. Today it announced that outside experts will conduct a comprehensive review of 4NPP safety on April 2. If passes muster, they will certify it as safe. The inspection is expected to take six months. The results should be available by early October. As we can see, the previously planned August referendum failed to take this into account. The certification of the 4NPP, as well as the public referendum can be conducted according to the procedures recommended in this newspaper's Febuary 23 editorial.
the nuclear power debate involves essentially two positions. One is categorical opposition to nuclear power. Another is support for the continued use of nuclear power, predicated upon assurances of nuclear safety. In other words, no one is demanding that the 4NPP be put into operation if it is found to be unsafe. Therefore if the safety of the 4NPP cannot be confirmed, a referendum is superfluous. This appears to be the Executive Yuan's position.
Should work on the 4NPP be stopped or continued? The answer must take into account nearly 100 billion NT in investments. Will it be all for naught? It must also take into account the role of energy in our national security strategy. One must not underestimate the impact on the nation's survival. Therefore if the safety of the 4NPP has yet to be confirmed, a responsible government must not arbitrarily call for a referendum. Conversely, if experts can certify the 4NPP as safe, a responsible government must provide the public with a clear accounting. The public, after all, still supports "safe nuclear power." In other words, they support nuclear power as long as it is safe.
If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, then a referendum is superfluous. A referendum may not solve the problem even if experts certify the 4NPP as safe. One. Any expert certification will lead to a "Believers still believe, unbelievers still don't" outcome. Two. Nuclear power has become a political football. It will never find resolution.
This is why some DPP and KMT officials oppose any sort of referendum, and instead demand an immediate halt to construction. But such a demand is both anti-intellectual and un-democratic. First of all, experts have yet to determine whether the 4NPP is safe. Therefore demanding an immediate construction halt is anti-intellectual. Secondly, making a decision so critical to the nation's future without first seeking a referendum, is un-democratic.
Therefore, a referendum remains the best possible solution to an impossible problem. 4NPP problems need to be tackled in sequence. 1. First experts must certify that it is safe. 2. If it is found to be unsafe, a referendum is superfluous. 3. If experts certify it as safe, then we can hold a referendum.
If experts certify it as safe, we can then hold a referendum. The voter turnout must be as high as possible. Voter turnout must meet the one half of all eligible voters threshold. Some supporters of "safe nuclear power" feel that a low voter turnout, in which fewer than half of all eligible voters turn out, will defeat a construction halt. It will ensure that construction continues. But politically speaking this would be the worst possible result. It would hand those who oppose construction the perfect justification for continued protest. If voter turnout meets the one half threshold, and the result is a construction halt, it will at least reflect the will of the people. The people must work together for the future. Conversely, if the result is to continue construction, anti-nuclear sentiment may not die down. But supporters of "safe nuclear power" will at least have been heard, and will at least have had their wishes realized.
Therefore we oppose KMT and DPP officials who oppose a public referendum and demand an immediate construction halt. 1. A referendum has a precondition. Experts musf first certify the 4NPP as safe. 2. Stopping or continuing work on the 4NPP is a national security issue of unparalleled importance. The KMT and the DPP cannot arbitrarily decide whether to stop or continue work on it. They must allow the public to vote.
So-called "safe nuclear power" exists. The 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP are concrete examples. If experts certify the 4NPP as safe, the next step is to clarify where the KMT and DPP stand on whether to stop or continue work on the 4NPP. Stopping or continuing work on the 4NPP is a national security issue that bears on Taiwan's future. Historical responsibility for this policy decision must be made clear. Following a public referendum, "members of the public" will disappear into the crowd. Therefore the political parties must be held responsible. In other words, we must first hold a pre-referendum policy debate. The political parties must put their policy positions on record.
The KMT and DPP must not be allowed to stop or continue work on the 4NPP based on 2014 or 2016 political calculations. They must make their 4NPP referendum decision based on considerations of national security and historical responsibility. The referendum must be preceded by certification that the 4NPP is safe.
核四的公民投票與歷史責任
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.26 03:03 am
本報二月二十三日社論，題為〈專業與政治：核四問題的兩個面向〉。文中指出：
應先在專業上確認核四的安全無虞，始有循政治途徑舉行公投的必要；但倘若在專業上不能確認核四的安全，也就沒有接續公投的問題了。
當時，江內閣在兵荒馬亂中決定核四停續訴諸公投，但未交代應否對核四安全先作確認，因此遽而發表在八月舉行公投；如今則宣示，將在四月二日由外部專家對核四的安全問題進行全面體檢並作出確認，預計需時半年，也就是至少到十月始有結果，可徵先前所稱八月公投，並未計入此確認計劃。現在，核四之專業確認與政治公投，已可回到本報二月二十三日社論所建議的程序。
核電的辯論，大致可分兩種立場。一是無論如何皆反核電；二是在核安的前提上，支持維持核電。也就是說，關於核四的辯論，不會出現「即使確認不安全，仍要核四上路」的第三種立場。因此，若不能先確認核四的安全性，即無訴諸公投的基礎。這似已是行政院如今所持立場。
核四的停續，非但涉及近四千億的投資是否空擲，更牽涉能源轉型的國安策略抉擇，對國家命脈影響之重大不容低估。因而，核四的安全若未經確認，負責任的政府當然不可率爾訴諸公投；反之，倘核四的安全在專業上能夠確認，負責任的政府亦不可不盡其努力，對社會作出明確交代。畢竟，社會上仍有支持「核安電」的民意，亦即「在核安前提下，支持核電」。
倘若核四的安全性得不到專業上的確認，即無舉辦公投的理由。不過，現今的問題卻是，即使獲得專業上的確認而訴諸公投，但有人認為公投亦未必能解決問題。因為：一、專業確認的結果，必仍是「信者恆信，不信者恆不信」；二、核四已成政治問題，也已成了沒完沒了的問題。
因此，在民進黨內及國民黨內皆出現「反對公投／立即停建」的聲音。但這樣的主張，卻是反智且反民主的。一、尚未確認核四安全與否，即主張停建，這是反智；二、如此牽涉國家命脈的重大議題而不訴諸公投，這是反民主。
所以，我們認為，公投仍是沒有辦法中的辦法，核四問題的處理程序仍應是：一、先在專業上作出安全確認。二、如果確認不安全，即不必舉行公投。三、如果確認安全，再舉行公投。
假設確認安全而舉行公投，即應全力衝高投票率，使之跨越「投票率必須過半」的門檻。因為，有些「核安電」的支持者認為，降低投票率，使投票率不過半，即可否決停建之議，而達成續建目的；但這在政治上可能是最壞的結果，也給了主張停建者升高抗爭的理由。接下來，倘投票率過半，而得到停建的答案，這畢竟是民意的抉擇，也是全民必須共同面對的未來；反之，倘若得到續建的答案，雖不可能使反核者就此偃旗息鼓，但畢竟亦使主張「核安電」的民意得到伸張。
因而，我們對於國民黨與民進黨內「反對公投／立即停建」的主張不以為然。因為：一、公投是以在專業上確認核四安全為前提；二、核四無論停續存廢皆是重大無比的國安議題，除了交給公投決定，國民黨及民進黨皆不能擅自使之續，也不能擅自使之廢。
倘經確認核四安全（畢竟天下仍有「核安電」，核一二三即是），接下來就要辨明國民黨及民進黨在核四停續上的政策立場。因為，核四停續可謂是影響台灣未來榮枯興衰的無比重大的國安議題，這是一個必須辨明歷史責任的政策抉擇；但在「公民投票」後，「公民」即消失在人群之中，未來若要追究歷史責任，只能責問應當承負責任的政黨。也就是必須經由公投的辯論過程，讓各政黨的政策立場留下紀錄。
國民黨與民進黨不能只站在二○一四及二○一六的選舉算計上看核四停續，必須站在國安抉擇與歷史責任的高度來看核四公投；而公投，應以確認核四安全為前提。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2013
Summary: The KMT and DPP must not be allowed to stop or continue work on the 4NPP based on 2014 or 2016 political calculations. They must make their 4NPP referendum decision based on considerations of national security and historical responsibility. The referendum must be preceded by certification that the 4NPP is safe.
Full Text below:
On February 23, this newspaper published an editorial entitled, "Professionalism and Politics: Two Facets of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant." The article pointed out that the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) must be professionally certified as safe. A public referendum may be politically necessary. But if professionals can certify that the 4NPP is safe, a public referendum is superfluous.
The Jiang Cabinet decided that given widespread chaos, it would halt construction on the 4NPP and call for a public referendum. It failed however to clarify whether the 4NPP was safe. Instead, it hurriedly called for a public referendum in August. Today it announced that outside experts will conduct a comprehensive review of 4NPP safety on April 2. If passes muster, they will certify it as safe. The inspection is expected to take six months. The results should be available by early October. As we can see, the previously planned August referendum failed to take this into account. The certification of the 4NPP, as well as the public referendum can be conducted according to the procedures recommended in this newspaper's Febuary 23 editorial.
the nuclear power debate involves essentially two positions. One is categorical opposition to nuclear power. Another is support for the continued use of nuclear power, predicated upon assurances of nuclear safety. In other words, no one is demanding that the 4NPP be put into operation if it is found to be unsafe. Therefore if the safety of the 4NPP cannot be confirmed, a referendum is superfluous. This appears to be the Executive Yuan's position.
Should work on the 4NPP be stopped or continued? The answer must take into account nearly 100 billion NT in investments. Will it be all for naught? It must also take into account the role of energy in our national security strategy. One must not underestimate the impact on the nation's survival. Therefore if the safety of the 4NPP has yet to be confirmed, a responsible government must not arbitrarily call for a referendum. Conversely, if experts can certify the 4NPP as safe, a responsible government must provide the public with a clear accounting. The public, after all, still supports "safe nuclear power." In other words, they support nuclear power as long as it is safe.
If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, then a referendum is superfluous. A referendum may not solve the problem even if experts certify the 4NPP as safe. One. Any expert certification will lead to a "Believers still believe, unbelievers still don't" outcome. Two. Nuclear power has become a political football. It will never find resolution.
This is why some DPP and KMT officials oppose any sort of referendum, and instead demand an immediate halt to construction. But such a demand is both anti-intellectual and un-democratic. First of all, experts have yet to determine whether the 4NPP is safe. Therefore demanding an immediate construction halt is anti-intellectual. Secondly, making a decision so critical to the nation's future without first seeking a referendum, is un-democratic.
Therefore, a referendum remains the best possible solution to an impossible problem. 4NPP problems need to be tackled in sequence. 1. First experts must certify that it is safe. 2. If it is found to be unsafe, a referendum is superfluous. 3. If experts certify it as safe, then we can hold a referendum.
If experts certify it as safe, we can then hold a referendum. The voter turnout must be as high as possible. Voter turnout must meet the one half of all eligible voters threshold. Some supporters of "safe nuclear power" feel that a low voter turnout, in which fewer than half of all eligible voters turn out, will defeat a construction halt. It will ensure that construction continues. But politically speaking this would be the worst possible result. It would hand those who oppose construction the perfect justification for continued protest. If voter turnout meets the one half threshold, and the result is a construction halt, it will at least reflect the will of the people. The people must work together for the future. Conversely, if the result is to continue construction, anti-nuclear sentiment may not die down. But supporters of "safe nuclear power" will at least have been heard, and will at least have had their wishes realized.
Therefore we oppose KMT and DPP officials who oppose a public referendum and demand an immediate construction halt. 1. A referendum has a precondition. Experts musf first certify the 4NPP as safe. 2. Stopping or continuing work on the 4NPP is a national security issue of unparalleled importance. The KMT and the DPP cannot arbitrarily decide whether to stop or continue work on it. They must allow the public to vote.
So-called "safe nuclear power" exists. The 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP are concrete examples. If experts certify the 4NPP as safe, the next step is to clarify where the KMT and DPP stand on whether to stop or continue work on the 4NPP. Stopping or continuing work on the 4NPP is a national security issue that bears on Taiwan's future. Historical responsibility for this policy decision must be made clear. Following a public referendum, "members of the public" will disappear into the crowd. Therefore the political parties must be held responsible. In other words, we must first hold a pre-referendum policy debate. The political parties must put their policy positions on record.
The KMT and DPP must not be allowed to stop or continue work on the 4NPP based on 2014 or 2016 political calculations. They must make their 4NPP referendum decision based on considerations of national security and historical responsibility. The referendum must be preceded by certification that the 4NPP is safe.
核四的公民投票與歷史責任
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.26 03:03 am
本報二月二十三日社論，題為〈專業與政治：核四問題的兩個面向〉。文中指出：
應先在專業上確認核四的安全無虞，始有循政治途徑舉行公投的必要；但倘若在專業上不能確認核四的安全，也就沒有接續公投的問題了。
當時，江內閣在兵荒馬亂中決定核四停續訴諸公投，但未交代應否對核四安全先作確認，因此遽而發表在八月舉行公投；如今則宣示，將在四月二日由外部專家對核四的安全問題進行全面體檢並作出確認，預計需時半年，也就是至少到十月始有結果，可徵先前所稱八月公投，並未計入此確認計劃。現在，核四之專業確認與政治公投，已可回到本報二月二十三日社論所建議的程序。
核電的辯論，大致可分兩種立場。一是無論如何皆反核電；二是在核安的前提上，支持維持核電。也就是說，關於核四的辯論，不會出現「即使確認不安全，仍要核四上路」的第三種立場。因此，若不能先確認核四的安全性，即無訴諸公投的基礎。這似已是行政院如今所持立場。
核四的停續，非但涉及近四千億的投資是否空擲，更牽涉能源轉型的國安策略抉擇，對國家命脈影響之重大不容低估。因而，核四的安全若未經確認，負責任的政府當然不可率爾訴諸公投；反之，倘核四的安全在專業上能夠確認，負責任的政府亦不可不盡其努力，對社會作出明確交代。畢竟，社會上仍有支持「核安電」的民意，亦即「在核安前提下，支持核電」。
倘若核四的安全性得不到專業上的確認，即無舉辦公投的理由。不過，現今的問題卻是，即使獲得專業上的確認而訴諸公投，但有人認為公投亦未必能解決問題。因為：一、專業確認的結果，必仍是「信者恆信，不信者恆不信」；二、核四已成政治問題，也已成了沒完沒了的問題。
因此，在民進黨內及國民黨內皆出現「反對公投／立即停建」的聲音。但這樣的主張，卻是反智且反民主的。一、尚未確認核四安全與否，即主張停建，這是反智；二、如此牽涉國家命脈的重大議題而不訴諸公投，這是反民主。
所以，我們認為，公投仍是沒有辦法中的辦法，核四問題的處理程序仍應是：一、先在專業上作出安全確認。二、如果確認不安全，即不必舉行公投。三、如果確認安全，再舉行公投。
假設確認安全而舉行公投，即應全力衝高投票率，使之跨越「投票率必須過半」的門檻。因為，有些「核安電」的支持者認為，降低投票率，使投票率不過半，即可否決停建之議，而達成續建目的；但這在政治上可能是最壞的結果，也給了主張停建者升高抗爭的理由。接下來，倘投票率過半，而得到停建的答案，這畢竟是民意的抉擇，也是全民必須共同面對的未來；反之，倘若得到續建的答案，雖不可能使反核者就此偃旗息鼓，但畢竟亦使主張「核安電」的民意得到伸張。
因而，我們對於國民黨與民進黨內「反對公投／立即停建」的主張不以為然。因為：一、公投是以在專業上確認核四安全為前提；二、核四無論停續存廢皆是重大無比的國安議題，除了交給公投決定，國民黨及民進黨皆不能擅自使之續，也不能擅自使之廢。
倘經確認核四安全（畢竟天下仍有「核安電」，核一二三即是），接下來就要辨明國民黨及民進黨在核四停續上的政策立場。因為，核四停續可謂是影響台灣未來榮枯興衰的無比重大的國安議題，這是一個必須辨明歷史責任的政策抉擇；但在「公民投票」後，「公民」即消失在人群之中，未來若要追究歷史責任，只能責問應當承負責任的政黨。也就是必須經由公投的辯論過程，讓各政黨的政策立場留下紀錄。
國民黨與民進黨不能只站在二○一四及二○一六的選舉算計上看核四停續，必須站在國安抉擇與歷史責任的高度來看核四公投；而公投，應以確認核四安全為前提。
Sunday, March 24, 2013
Taiwan's Worst Problem: Laws are mere Formalities
Taiwan's Worst Problem:
Laws are mere Formalities
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's legal system is nominally comprehensive. But it is a far cry from any mature rule of law. Public awareness has been awakened. But a considerable gap remains between public expectations and government accomplishments. Taiwan has no shortage of social movements. But social movements do not fully represent society as a whole. Most troublesome of all, government policy is often held hostage by social movements. Dialogue with society as a whole is ignored. One example is the long controversial 4NPP. No resolution has been reached after 32 years.
Full text below:
Three years ago, when Vice President Wu Den-yih was Premier, he said everyone says laws on Taiwan are as numerous as hairs on an ox. But when it comes time to enforce them, "The sky may rain gold bullion, but one cannot grab even a single one." His words struck a chord for many people. At the time, social groups were expressing extreme dissatisfaction with the sensationalistic news stories published by "Action News." Eventually public indignation forced the Taipei City Government to enforce the law and impose fines. Wu Den-yih's remarks still apply to many aspects of life on Taiwan. The government fails to govern fairly and decisively in accordance with the law. This leads to public clashes over social values. Opposite poles of society remain locked in an endless tug of war. Major policy decisions become difficult, if not impossible. This has become a key impediment to progress on Taiwan.
For several consecutive days, the China News has tackled difficult topics. They include the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) controversy, as well as wrangling over EIAs, media monopolies, urban renewal, and the abolition of the death penalty. It has conducted in-depth investigations. Taiwan trumpets its democracy and rule of law. But the truth is, it is a lawless society. Its laws are mere formalities. This has become Taiwan's most serious problem.
The rule of law is the basis of constitutional rule. It subjects the government to constitutional constraints, ensuring that the law represents the will of the people. Laws are passed by elected legislators. Such a framework limits both the government and citizens. Neither can exceed these limits. The constitution defines government power and prevents its abuse. The law defines people's rights, and the bounds beyond which they cannot go without detriment to the rights of others. In other words, the rule of law is binding on both the government and the people.
Taiwan's legal system is nominally comprehensive. But it is a far cry from any mature rule of law. Public awareness has been awakened. But a considerable gap remains between public expectations and government accomplishments. Taiwan has no shortage of social movements. But social movements do not fully represent society as a whole. Most troublesome of all, government policy is often held hostage by social movements. Dialogue with society as a whole is ignored. One example is the long controversial 4NPP. No resolution has been reached after 32 years. The Legislative Yuan fought over the budget under Lee Teng-hui. The Chen Shui-bian administration restarted then stopped construction. Controversy over whether construction should be continued or halted rages on even under the Ma administration. Years ago, pro-nuclear sentiment outweighed anti-nuclear sentiment. Today anti-nuclear sentiment outweighs pro-nuclear sentiment. But whether a politically diverse Taiwan continues or halts construction on the 4NPP is irrelevant. How we arrive at the final decision is irrelevant. Controversy over whether the project should be continued or halted will persist. Therefore the only relevant issue is what procedure can implement the wishes of the majority while mollifying the feelings of the minority, and enable society to reduce controversy to a minimum.
The Chen Shui-bian administration unilaterally halted construction on the 4NPP, generating a political storm. The 4NPP policy and budget were passed by the legislature after three readings. They represented the will of the majority under a democracy. But Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster led to a global re-examination of energy policy. The government unilaterally and unconstitutionally halted construction on the 4NPP. According to the law, the government has only two alternatives. One. A majority in the legislature resolves to halt construction, backed by the will of the majority. Two. If the legislature finds it difficult to make a decision on behalf of the people and for posterity, it can appeal directly to the public, by seeking a public referendum. But either way, pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear views will not be silenced. This is the hallmark of a democratic and pluralistic society. One will always have minority dissent. One will always have differing opinions. Given this diversity of opinion, good government will identify the will of the majority and implement it. A government must not fear making decisions merely because there is dissent.
Anti-nuclear sentiment is increasing. The Ma administration has chosen to seek a public referendum. To some extent this will alleviate pressure on the legislature. It will spare the legislature intense conflict. It will avoid the need to mobilize party legislators over the 4NPP controversy. But it cannot avoid increased political pressure pro and con. This pressure will build as we approach the 2014 seven in one election, and even the 2016 presidential election. Actually, such political predictions are superfluous. Even if the legislature arrives at a decision without resorting to a referendum, the political backlash will persist through the next two elections.
A responsible government must make bold decisions. It must not overlook the need for communication and dialogue before and after implementing its decisions. Construction on the 4NPP was first halted, then resumed. During the last few years, neither Blue or Green administrations have dialogued with the public. Even anti-nuclear groups have been ignored. Resumption of work on the 4NPP involved hundreds of omissions. The Control Yuan corrected these omissions and impeached those responsible for them. But Taipower and the agencies in charge have yet to improve their operating procedures. Omissions such as these led to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. They significantly increase public concerns over the 4NPP. Whether the controversy is resolved via a public referendum or a legislative ballot, a construction halt on the 4NPP is an energy policy dilemma that either a Blue or Green administration will have to face. Continued work on the 4NPP will requires assurances of nuclear safety. One cannot relax, not even for even a day. One must realize that despite disagreements, everyone is a citizen. A democratic Taiwan must be a rational Taiwan. The consequences must be borne by everyone.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.25
社論－「有法無天、正本清源」系列二之一 法規形同具文 已成台灣最大危機
本報訊
三年前，副總統吳敦義擔任行政院長時期，曾經說了一段話：平常大家都說台灣的法令多如牛毛，但真正要用的時候，卻是「滿天全金（法）條，要抓沒半條」，打動了許多人的心。當時，為的是「動新聞」內容羶色腥遭致社運團體嚴重抗議，最後，在民情激憤下，由台北市政府依法裁罰。說來諷刺，吳敦義引用的諺語依舊適用於台灣各個領域，政府不能公正果斷地依法行政，甚至放任人民價值對立，在民情好惡兩極分明的拉鋸中，導致重大政策懸而難決，已經成為阻礙台灣進步的關鍵病因。
《中國時報》連續數天，就核四爭議、環評角力、媒體壟斷、都更難題、死刑存廢等五大議題，深入檢視，號稱民主法治健全的台灣，其實是一個「有法無天」的社會，法律規範形同具文，其嚴重程度已經成為台灣最大危機。
法治是憲政的基礎，其理念係要求政府所有權力的行使都要受憲法制約，確保法律源於人民的意志，經過代表民意的國會通過，在此框架下，政府和公民的行為都是有邊界的，不能互相僭越；憲法在於規範並防止政府權力的濫用，法律同樣要規範人民權力越界而損及他人權利。換言之，法治原則不論對政府或人民，都有其拘束力。
台灣的法制堪稱完整，但成熟的法治卻還有段距離，特別在公民意識覺醒後，效能政府與公民社會之間，彷彿存在相當落差；台灣不缺社會運動，但社會運動未必能完全代表公民社會，最麻煩的是，政府施政受困於社會運動，卻疏忽與真正公民社會對話的可能。以爭議經年的核四為例，歷卅二年而無解，除了前總統李登輝任內，立法院大打幾架通過核四預算，從扁政府的停建再復建，乃至馬政府續建而停建聲浪再起，不論是當年的擁核民意遠超反核，或者今日反核氛圍似乎超過擁核，只反映一個事實：多元台灣不論最終核四是續建或停建，不論經過何種程序，都會持續有反對者與贊成者，那麼我們唯一要找尋的答案只有一個：什麼程序才能讓多數意見落實，少數意見放棄超過比例的抗爭，讓社會因此可能形成的對立降到最低？
扁政府片面停建核四造成的政治風暴殷鑑未遠，基於核四政策與預算均係經過國會三讀程序，即代表民主的多數民意，即使日本發生福島核災，全球重新檢視能源政策，但政府片面宣布核四停建涉及違憲違法的客觀現實依舊存在。政府依法行政只能循兩條路：第一，國會多數議決停建，以多數民意為後盾；第二，國會若自認難以替全民、後代子孫做出價值抉擇，那麼只有訴諸直接民意，交付公民投票。但不論何者，都不可能讓擁核或反核任何一方的意見消弭於無形，這就是民主多元社會的表徵：永遠有少數意見、永遠有不同意見，效能政府能做的就是在各種意見中，找出確定多數意見並據以執行的方法，但不能因為意見紛紜雜沓而不敢有所決斷。
在反核四民意集結的風潮下，馬政府選擇以交付公民投票，某種程度紓緩了國會壓力，省卻國會激烈衝突的成本，也避免黨籍立委在黨的動員護航核四下的左右為難；但還是不免後續正負難料的政治壓力，會不會累積到二○一四年的七合一選舉，乃至二○一六年的總統大選。其實類似政治算計已經不必再算，即使不公投而逕由國會決定，其政治後座力依舊會延續到未來兩次大選。
做為負責任的執政政府，唯一要做的就是勇於決斷，同時在執行過程前後，都不能輕忽溝通對話的必要，核四自從停建再復建後這幾年，不論是藍執政或綠執政，不要說完全未與公民社會對話，甚至連反核團體都被政府打入冷宮。核四廠復建過程中疏漏百出，幾經監察院糾正彈劾，亦未見主管機關和台電拿出有效改善辦法，導致福島核災後，社會對核四廠安全性疑慮大增。不論是經過公投或國會議決，核四若停建，未來不論藍綠政府都要面對重議能源政策的挑戰；核四若續建，核安的說服與保證依舊無一日能放鬆；對所有民眾而言，則不能不了解，即使意見不同者都是公民之一，民主台灣也必須是理性台灣，對其結果都要共同承擔。
Laws are mere Formalities
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's legal system is nominally comprehensive. But it is a far cry from any mature rule of law. Public awareness has been awakened. But a considerable gap remains between public expectations and government accomplishments. Taiwan has no shortage of social movements. But social movements do not fully represent society as a whole. Most troublesome of all, government policy is often held hostage by social movements. Dialogue with society as a whole is ignored. One example is the long controversial 4NPP. No resolution has been reached after 32 years.
Full text below:
Three years ago, when Vice President Wu Den-yih was Premier, he said everyone says laws on Taiwan are as numerous as hairs on an ox. But when it comes time to enforce them, "The sky may rain gold bullion, but one cannot grab even a single one." His words struck a chord for many people. At the time, social groups were expressing extreme dissatisfaction with the sensationalistic news stories published by "Action News." Eventually public indignation forced the Taipei City Government to enforce the law and impose fines. Wu Den-yih's remarks still apply to many aspects of life on Taiwan. The government fails to govern fairly and decisively in accordance with the law. This leads to public clashes over social values. Opposite poles of society remain locked in an endless tug of war. Major policy decisions become difficult, if not impossible. This has become a key impediment to progress on Taiwan.
For several consecutive days, the China News has tackled difficult topics. They include the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) controversy, as well as wrangling over EIAs, media monopolies, urban renewal, and the abolition of the death penalty. It has conducted in-depth investigations. Taiwan trumpets its democracy and rule of law. But the truth is, it is a lawless society. Its laws are mere formalities. This has become Taiwan's most serious problem.
The rule of law is the basis of constitutional rule. It subjects the government to constitutional constraints, ensuring that the law represents the will of the people. Laws are passed by elected legislators. Such a framework limits both the government and citizens. Neither can exceed these limits. The constitution defines government power and prevents its abuse. The law defines people's rights, and the bounds beyond which they cannot go without detriment to the rights of others. In other words, the rule of law is binding on both the government and the people.
Taiwan's legal system is nominally comprehensive. But it is a far cry from any mature rule of law. Public awareness has been awakened. But a considerable gap remains between public expectations and government accomplishments. Taiwan has no shortage of social movements. But social movements do not fully represent society as a whole. Most troublesome of all, government policy is often held hostage by social movements. Dialogue with society as a whole is ignored. One example is the long controversial 4NPP. No resolution has been reached after 32 years. The Legislative Yuan fought over the budget under Lee Teng-hui. The Chen Shui-bian administration restarted then stopped construction. Controversy over whether construction should be continued or halted rages on even under the Ma administration. Years ago, pro-nuclear sentiment outweighed anti-nuclear sentiment. Today anti-nuclear sentiment outweighs pro-nuclear sentiment. But whether a politically diverse Taiwan continues or halts construction on the 4NPP is irrelevant. How we arrive at the final decision is irrelevant. Controversy over whether the project should be continued or halted will persist. Therefore the only relevant issue is what procedure can implement the wishes of the majority while mollifying the feelings of the minority, and enable society to reduce controversy to a minimum.
The Chen Shui-bian administration unilaterally halted construction on the 4NPP, generating a political storm. The 4NPP policy and budget were passed by the legislature after three readings. They represented the will of the majority under a democracy. But Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster led to a global re-examination of energy policy. The government unilaterally and unconstitutionally halted construction on the 4NPP. According to the law, the government has only two alternatives. One. A majority in the legislature resolves to halt construction, backed by the will of the majority. Two. If the legislature finds it difficult to make a decision on behalf of the people and for posterity, it can appeal directly to the public, by seeking a public referendum. But either way, pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear views will not be silenced. This is the hallmark of a democratic and pluralistic society. One will always have minority dissent. One will always have differing opinions. Given this diversity of opinion, good government will identify the will of the majority and implement it. A government must not fear making decisions merely because there is dissent.
Anti-nuclear sentiment is increasing. The Ma administration has chosen to seek a public referendum. To some extent this will alleviate pressure on the legislature. It will spare the legislature intense conflict. It will avoid the need to mobilize party legislators over the 4NPP controversy. But it cannot avoid increased political pressure pro and con. This pressure will build as we approach the 2014 seven in one election, and even the 2016 presidential election. Actually, such political predictions are superfluous. Even if the legislature arrives at a decision without resorting to a referendum, the political backlash will persist through the next two elections.
A responsible government must make bold decisions. It must not overlook the need for communication and dialogue before and after implementing its decisions. Construction on the 4NPP was first halted, then resumed. During the last few years, neither Blue or Green administrations have dialogued with the public. Even anti-nuclear groups have been ignored. Resumption of work on the 4NPP involved hundreds of omissions. The Control Yuan corrected these omissions and impeached those responsible for them. But Taipower and the agencies in charge have yet to improve their operating procedures. Omissions such as these led to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. They significantly increase public concerns over the 4NPP. Whether the controversy is resolved via a public referendum or a legislative ballot, a construction halt on the 4NPP is an energy policy dilemma that either a Blue or Green administration will have to face. Continued work on the 4NPP will requires assurances of nuclear safety. One cannot relax, not even for even a day. One must realize that despite disagreements, everyone is a citizen. A democratic Taiwan must be a rational Taiwan. The consequences must be borne by everyone.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.25
社論－「有法無天、正本清源」系列二之一 法規形同具文 已成台灣最大危機
本報訊
三年前，副總統吳敦義擔任行政院長時期，曾經說了一段話：平常大家都說台灣的法令多如牛毛，但真正要用的時候，卻是「滿天全金（法）條，要抓沒半條」，打動了許多人的心。當時，為的是「動新聞」內容羶色腥遭致社運團體嚴重抗議，最後，在民情激憤下，由台北市政府依法裁罰。說來諷刺，吳敦義引用的諺語依舊適用於台灣各個領域，政府不能公正果斷地依法行政，甚至放任人民價值對立，在民情好惡兩極分明的拉鋸中，導致重大政策懸而難決，已經成為阻礙台灣進步的關鍵病因。
《中國時報》連續數天，就核四爭議、環評角力、媒體壟斷、都更難題、死刑存廢等五大議題，深入檢視，號稱民主法治健全的台灣，其實是一個「有法無天」的社會，法律規範形同具文，其嚴重程度已經成為台灣最大危機。
法治是憲政的基礎，其理念係要求政府所有權力的行使都要受憲法制約，確保法律源於人民的意志，經過代表民意的國會通過，在此框架下，政府和公民的行為都是有邊界的，不能互相僭越；憲法在於規範並防止政府權力的濫用，法律同樣要規範人民權力越界而損及他人權利。換言之，法治原則不論對政府或人民，都有其拘束力。
台灣的法制堪稱完整，但成熟的法治卻還有段距離，特別在公民意識覺醒後，效能政府與公民社會之間，彷彿存在相當落差；台灣不缺社會運動，但社會運動未必能完全代表公民社會，最麻煩的是，政府施政受困於社會運動，卻疏忽與真正公民社會對話的可能。以爭議經年的核四為例，歷卅二年而無解，除了前總統李登輝任內，立法院大打幾架通過核四預算，從扁政府的停建再復建，乃至馬政府續建而停建聲浪再起，不論是當年的擁核民意遠超反核，或者今日反核氛圍似乎超過擁核，只反映一個事實：多元台灣不論最終核四是續建或停建，不論經過何種程序，都會持續有反對者與贊成者，那麼我們唯一要找尋的答案只有一個：什麼程序才能讓多數意見落實，少數意見放棄超過比例的抗爭，讓社會因此可能形成的對立降到最低？
扁政府片面停建核四造成的政治風暴殷鑑未遠，基於核四政策與預算均係經過國會三讀程序，即代表民主的多數民意，即使日本發生福島核災，全球重新檢視能源政策，但政府片面宣布核四停建涉及違憲違法的客觀現實依舊存在。政府依法行政只能循兩條路：第一，國會多數議決停建，以多數民意為後盾；第二，國會若自認難以替全民、後代子孫做出價值抉擇，那麼只有訴諸直接民意，交付公民投票。但不論何者，都不可能讓擁核或反核任何一方的意見消弭於無形，這就是民主多元社會的表徵：永遠有少數意見、永遠有不同意見，效能政府能做的就是在各種意見中，找出確定多數意見並據以執行的方法，但不能因為意見紛紜雜沓而不敢有所決斷。
在反核四民意集結的風潮下，馬政府選擇以交付公民投票，某種程度紓緩了國會壓力，省卻國會激烈衝突的成本，也避免黨籍立委在黨的動員護航核四下的左右為難；但還是不免後續正負難料的政治壓力，會不會累積到二○一四年的七合一選舉，乃至二○一六年的總統大選。其實類似政治算計已經不必再算，即使不公投而逕由國會決定，其政治後座力依舊會延續到未來兩次大選。
做為負責任的執政政府，唯一要做的就是勇於決斷，同時在執行過程前後，都不能輕忽溝通對話的必要，核四自從停建再復建後這幾年，不論是藍執政或綠執政，不要說完全未與公民社會對話，甚至連反核團體都被政府打入冷宮。核四廠復建過程中疏漏百出，幾經監察院糾正彈劾，亦未見主管機關和台電拿出有效改善辦法，導致福島核災後，社會對核四廠安全性疑慮大增。不論是經過公投或國會議決，核四若停建，未來不論藍綠政府都要面對重議能源政策的挑戰；核四若續建，核安的說服與保證依舊無一日能放鬆；對所有民眾而言，則不能不了解，即使意見不同者都是公民之一，民主台灣也必須是理性台灣，對其結果都要共同承擔。
Thursday, March 21, 2013
PhD hawks Fried Chicken, Wu Bao-chun Refused an EMBA
PhD hawks Fried Chicken, Wu Bao-chun Refused an EMBA
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 22, 2013
Summary: Not a single university on Taiwan has been willing to admit Wu Bao-chun into an EMBA program. Meanwhile Singapore universities are aggressively recruiting students from Taiwan. This has provoked more "If Singapore can, why can't Taiwan?" arguments. The Ministry of Education is reportedly considering modifying the rules for EMBA enrollment. If this was the result of the Wu Bao-chun controversy, that may not be a bad thing. But such improvements remain piecemeal.
Full Text below:
Not a single university on Taiwan has been willing to admit Wu Bao-chun into an EMBA program. Meanwhile Singapore universities are aggressively recruiting students from Taiwan. This has provoked more "If Singapore can, why can't Taiwan?" arguments. The Ministry of Education is reportedly considering modifying the rules for EMBA enrollment. If this was the result of the Wu Bao-chun controversy, that may not be a bad thing. But such improvements remain piecemeal.
Having graduated from junior high, Wu Bao-chun now hopes to obtain an EMBA degree. Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we find contrary examples. Recently a PhD opening up a hawkers stand and selling fried chicken made the news. Some people blasted this development. Others praised it. Terry Gou said the PhD should be taxed for "wasting educational resources." But reportedly his fried chicken is "selling like hotcakes." Presumably many people are only too happy to patronize this PhD's hawker stand.
Wu Bao-chun lacks academic credentials. But he won a world competition. Others have doctoral degrees, but have set up hawker stands selling fried chicken. These represent polar opposites. But both seem to suggest that academic credentials are worthless. Wu Bao-chun nevertheless wants to return to the "ivied halls of learning" to acquire more knowledge. He heads up a 200 million NT per year enterprise. He constantly encourages his staff to pursue their studies and to learn foreign languages. He is afraid people will cite his example to argue that academic credentials are worthless. He would prefer that people cite his example as evidence that one never knows when book learning will pay off.
Actually the moral of today's story is not that academic credentials are worthless, but that the value of the knowledge should be commensurate with the price tag for academic credentials. The educational system on Taiwan values form over substance. The traditional notion that "through books one attains wealth" needs reevaluation.
PhDs are undervalued. Either that, or academic credentials are overvalued. This is true all over. One need not single out Taiwan. A PhD setting up a hawker stand to sell fried chicken is of course an extreme case. But people with advanced degrees holding down odd jobs, teaching remedial classes, and job-shopping, is a widespread phenomenon. From one perspective, having everyone acquire more book learning, is hardly a bad thing. But from another perspective, its is hardly the most efficient use of the nation's resources. The government spends immense sums of money subsidizing public universities. It provides graduate students with all sorts of allowances. It even provides a minimum salary of 22,000 NT. If university graduates cannot apply what they have learned, it is indeed a waste. Therefore economists should urge the government to reduce such ineffective subsidies.
In the final analysis, parents and students who insist that book learning is an investment, need to reassess the distinction between the price they paid for a diploma, and the value they can expect to receive from it. The Information Age involves rapid change. It values innovation. It considers book learning less valuable than common sense. Its heroes often lack academic credentials. Tsai Pei-ran is able to study at Harvard while working as a male model. Univerity students seek to become disciples of Wu Bao-chun. As we can see, having some sort of skill, is better than having diplomas good only as wallpaper.
The world is rapidly changing. Social values must change in accord. Changes to the existing framework are also long overdue. In recent years, Wu Bao-chun, Jason Wu, and a string of "shining lights of Taiwan" in sports show that young peoples' values are changing. Many of them are learning baking, interior design, carpentry, catering, and auto repair. They are finding their own route to success. The old saw that "All else is beneath contempt, only book learning is exalted." must be amended. Many older generation parents and teachers must learn to respect young people who are pursuing their own dreams. They need to realize that people can excel in any field.
Ensuring that people excel in any field however, is not merely a matter of personal confidence. The system must also offer flexibility. It must encourage people to break out of the mold. It must provide an environment that enables people to excel in any field. In recent years, Yen Chang-shou and other high tech leaders have called for increased technical and vocational training and certification. Rapid growth has resulted in over 150 universities. But this has led to a shortage in technical and vocational education that must be met.
This surfeit of universities was ironically accompanied by the example of Wu Bao-chun unable to gain entry to a single EMBA program. The Ministry of Education should attempt to restore the universities' status as "temples of learning" and not mere diploma mills. Many technical and vocational school trained masters have become university professors. But a master baker who wanted to become a student was turned down. Wu Bao-chun is not the only one who wants to go back to college. Retired Honorary Chairman Bruce Cheng of Delta Electronics confessed that he wanted to return to college to learn astronomy. But under the current system, that is easier said than done. Relying on community colleges to impart systematic knowledge is not enough. The Ministry of Education must encourage existing universities to offer continuing education. They must be flexible and willing to reform. Wu Bao-chun will not be the only one who benefits.
博士賣雞排vs.吳寶春念不成EMBA
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.22 03:56 am
吳寶春被台灣的大學拒於ＥＭＢＡ學程之外，同時傳出新加坡大學積極跨海搶人，這下子又炒熱了「新加坡能，為什麼台灣不能？」的題目。據說教育部考慮修改有關ＥＭＢＡ的入學規則，如果真的從此多一個「吳寶春條款」，未嘗不好，但這仍是頭痛醫頭。
國中畢業的吳寶春想念ＥＭＢＡ，但另一端也有迥然相反的例子。最近有一則博士賣雞排的新聞，有人罵有人誇，郭台銘說應課「浪費教育資源稅」，但據說近來此攤的雞排大賣，想必不少民眾願意給這個「博士老闆」加油打氣。
吳寶春不靠學歷而拿了世界冠軍，但也有人頂著博士學歷擺攤賣雞排。這兩個例子以極端的對照，好像同在演繹「學歷無用論」。但吳寶春終究想回到知識的殿堂多學一點，他掌管著年營業額兩億的事業，時時鼓勵員工進修、學外語，還說過最怕外界拿他的例子去強調「學歷無用」，看來他寧可用自身事例示範「書到用時方恨少」。
其實，今天這些故事的核心，不是學歷有沒有用，而是「學歷的價碼」與「知識的價值」的比較；而在此思辨之間，也正凸顯了台灣教育體制的形式主義，對於「書中自有黃金屋」的傳統概念也該有一番檢驗。
博士貶值，或曰學歷的「通貨膨脹」，全球皆然，不必獨責台灣。博士去擺攤賣雞排，當然是極端的例子；但高學歷者只能打零工、教補習班、兼差賺鐘點費，則比比皆是。從某個角度看，全民多念點書，總不會是壞事。但從國家資源使用效率的角度評量，政府花大錢補貼公立大學，還要補貼研究生的種種津貼，甚至照顧就業的二十二Ｋ，卻如果畢業生不能學以致用，確實是極大的浪費。所以經濟學家多會主張政府減少這種無效益的補貼。
歸根究柢，家長和學生如果堅持要把念書當成一種「投資」，則應該認清楚文憑的「價錢」和「價值」，重新審慎估量。資訊快速變遷的時代，講究創新的時代，「有知識不如有常識」，且各路英雄不怕學歷低。蔡沛然固然可以一面讀哈佛一面當男模，而大學生搶著拜吳寶春為師的亦不乏其人，可見一技在身，確實強過「文憑當壁紙」太多了！
而在當今這種快速變遷的背景下，一方面社會的價值觀應跟著變化，另方面制度的框架更是早該調整了。近年來隨著吳寶春、吳季剛，乃至於體育領域的各個「台灣之光」的示範，年輕人的價值觀確實已在慢慢改變之中，學烘焙，學設計，學木工，學餐飲管理，學汽車修理當黑手……，各有「路是無限的寬廣」的出路。這種氣氛下，需要修正「萬般皆下品，唯有讀書高」的陳腐觀念者，反而多是父母師長那一輩，應該重新學習尊重年輕人如繁星般的各種夢想追求，也要對「行行出狀元」有一點信心。
不過，要使行行出狀元，也不全是個人的信心問題，而要從制度上給予彈性，鼓勵突破，製造「條條大路通羅馬」的有利環境。近年從嚴長壽到科技界領袖，都一再呼籲應強化技職訓練和證照專業的機制，讓台灣快速擴張出一百五十多所大學反而造成技職教育的斷層能補足起來。
但是，既有這些「超額大學」存在，卻又並排出現了吳寶春想念ＥＭＢＡ卻不得其門而入的例子；可見，教育部從制度面應規畫如何使大學回歸「知識的殿堂」，而不只是「文憑販賣所」。許多無文憑的技職達人能到大學當老師，但麵包達人想作學生卻被拒。想回大學念書的不是只有吳寶春；已退休的台達電榮譽董事長鄭崇華日前表白，最想回大學去念天文，但在目前體制下談何容易？傳授系統性知識的任務，光靠目前的「社區大學」是不夠的。教育部如果能在「推動現有大學施行終身教育」的目標上作出彈性設計和改革，則受惠者即不只吳寶春一人！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 22, 2013
Summary: Not a single university on Taiwan has been willing to admit Wu Bao-chun into an EMBA program. Meanwhile Singapore universities are aggressively recruiting students from Taiwan. This has provoked more "If Singapore can, why can't Taiwan?" arguments. The Ministry of Education is reportedly considering modifying the rules for EMBA enrollment. If this was the result of the Wu Bao-chun controversy, that may not be a bad thing. But such improvements remain piecemeal.
Full Text below:
Not a single university on Taiwan has been willing to admit Wu Bao-chun into an EMBA program. Meanwhile Singapore universities are aggressively recruiting students from Taiwan. This has provoked more "If Singapore can, why can't Taiwan?" arguments. The Ministry of Education is reportedly considering modifying the rules for EMBA enrollment. If this was the result of the Wu Bao-chun controversy, that may not be a bad thing. But such improvements remain piecemeal.
Having graduated from junior high, Wu Bao-chun now hopes to obtain an EMBA degree. Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we find contrary examples. Recently a PhD opening up a hawkers stand and selling fried chicken made the news. Some people blasted this development. Others praised it. Terry Gou said the PhD should be taxed for "wasting educational resources." But reportedly his fried chicken is "selling like hotcakes." Presumably many people are only too happy to patronize this PhD's hawker stand.
Wu Bao-chun lacks academic credentials. But he won a world competition. Others have doctoral degrees, but have set up hawker stands selling fried chicken. These represent polar opposites. But both seem to suggest that academic credentials are worthless. Wu Bao-chun nevertheless wants to return to the "ivied halls of learning" to acquire more knowledge. He heads up a 200 million NT per year enterprise. He constantly encourages his staff to pursue their studies and to learn foreign languages. He is afraid people will cite his example to argue that academic credentials are worthless. He would prefer that people cite his example as evidence that one never knows when book learning will pay off.
Actually the moral of today's story is not that academic credentials are worthless, but that the value of the knowledge should be commensurate with the price tag for academic credentials. The educational system on Taiwan values form over substance. The traditional notion that "through books one attains wealth" needs reevaluation.
PhDs are undervalued. Either that, or academic credentials are overvalued. This is true all over. One need not single out Taiwan. A PhD setting up a hawker stand to sell fried chicken is of course an extreme case. But people with advanced degrees holding down odd jobs, teaching remedial classes, and job-shopping, is a widespread phenomenon. From one perspective, having everyone acquire more book learning, is hardly a bad thing. But from another perspective, its is hardly the most efficient use of the nation's resources. The government spends immense sums of money subsidizing public universities. It provides graduate students with all sorts of allowances. It even provides a minimum salary of 22,000 NT. If university graduates cannot apply what they have learned, it is indeed a waste. Therefore economists should urge the government to reduce such ineffective subsidies.
In the final analysis, parents and students who insist that book learning is an investment, need to reassess the distinction between the price they paid for a diploma, and the value they can expect to receive from it. The Information Age involves rapid change. It values innovation. It considers book learning less valuable than common sense. Its heroes often lack academic credentials. Tsai Pei-ran is able to study at Harvard while working as a male model. Univerity students seek to become disciples of Wu Bao-chun. As we can see, having some sort of skill, is better than having diplomas good only as wallpaper.
The world is rapidly changing. Social values must change in accord. Changes to the existing framework are also long overdue. In recent years, Wu Bao-chun, Jason Wu, and a string of "shining lights of Taiwan" in sports show that young peoples' values are changing. Many of them are learning baking, interior design, carpentry, catering, and auto repair. They are finding their own route to success. The old saw that "All else is beneath contempt, only book learning is exalted." must be amended. Many older generation parents and teachers must learn to respect young people who are pursuing their own dreams. They need to realize that people can excel in any field.
Ensuring that people excel in any field however, is not merely a matter of personal confidence. The system must also offer flexibility. It must encourage people to break out of the mold. It must provide an environment that enables people to excel in any field. In recent years, Yen Chang-shou and other high tech leaders have called for increased technical and vocational training and certification. Rapid growth has resulted in over 150 universities. But this has led to a shortage in technical and vocational education that must be met.
This surfeit of universities was ironically accompanied by the example of Wu Bao-chun unable to gain entry to a single EMBA program. The Ministry of Education should attempt to restore the universities' status as "temples of learning" and not mere diploma mills. Many technical and vocational school trained masters have become university professors. But a master baker who wanted to become a student was turned down. Wu Bao-chun is not the only one who wants to go back to college. Retired Honorary Chairman Bruce Cheng of Delta Electronics confessed that he wanted to return to college to learn astronomy. But under the current system, that is easier said than done. Relying on community colleges to impart systematic knowledge is not enough. The Ministry of Education must encourage existing universities to offer continuing education. They must be flexible and willing to reform. Wu Bao-chun will not be the only one who benefits.
博士賣雞排vs.吳寶春念不成EMBA
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.22 03:56 am
吳寶春被台灣的大學拒於ＥＭＢＡ學程之外，同時傳出新加坡大學積極跨海搶人，這下子又炒熱了「新加坡能，為什麼台灣不能？」的題目。據說教育部考慮修改有關ＥＭＢＡ的入學規則，如果真的從此多一個「吳寶春條款」，未嘗不好，但這仍是頭痛醫頭。
國中畢業的吳寶春想念ＥＭＢＡ，但另一端也有迥然相反的例子。最近有一則博士賣雞排的新聞，有人罵有人誇，郭台銘說應課「浪費教育資源稅」，但據說近來此攤的雞排大賣，想必不少民眾願意給這個「博士老闆」加油打氣。
吳寶春不靠學歷而拿了世界冠軍，但也有人頂著博士學歷擺攤賣雞排。這兩個例子以極端的對照，好像同在演繹「學歷無用論」。但吳寶春終究想回到知識的殿堂多學一點，他掌管著年營業額兩億的事業，時時鼓勵員工進修、學外語，還說過最怕外界拿他的例子去強調「學歷無用」，看來他寧可用自身事例示範「書到用時方恨少」。
其實，今天這些故事的核心，不是學歷有沒有用，而是「學歷的價碼」與「知識的價值」的比較；而在此思辨之間，也正凸顯了台灣教育體制的形式主義，對於「書中自有黃金屋」的傳統概念也該有一番檢驗。
博士貶值，或曰學歷的「通貨膨脹」，全球皆然，不必獨責台灣。博士去擺攤賣雞排，當然是極端的例子；但高學歷者只能打零工、教補習班、兼差賺鐘點費，則比比皆是。從某個角度看，全民多念點書，總不會是壞事。但從國家資源使用效率的角度評量，政府花大錢補貼公立大學，還要補貼研究生的種種津貼，甚至照顧就業的二十二Ｋ，卻如果畢業生不能學以致用，確實是極大的浪費。所以經濟學家多會主張政府減少這種無效益的補貼。
歸根究柢，家長和學生如果堅持要把念書當成一種「投資」，則應該認清楚文憑的「價錢」和「價值」，重新審慎估量。資訊快速變遷的時代，講究創新的時代，「有知識不如有常識」，且各路英雄不怕學歷低。蔡沛然固然可以一面讀哈佛一面當男模，而大學生搶著拜吳寶春為師的亦不乏其人，可見一技在身，確實強過「文憑當壁紙」太多了！
而在當今這種快速變遷的背景下，一方面社會的價值觀應跟著變化，另方面制度的框架更是早該調整了。近年來隨著吳寶春、吳季剛，乃至於體育領域的各個「台灣之光」的示範，年輕人的價值觀確實已在慢慢改變之中，學烘焙，學設計，學木工，學餐飲管理，學汽車修理當黑手……，各有「路是無限的寬廣」的出路。這種氣氛下，需要修正「萬般皆下品，唯有讀書高」的陳腐觀念者，反而多是父母師長那一輩，應該重新學習尊重年輕人如繁星般的各種夢想追求，也要對「行行出狀元」有一點信心。
不過，要使行行出狀元，也不全是個人的信心問題，而要從制度上給予彈性，鼓勵突破，製造「條條大路通羅馬」的有利環境。近年從嚴長壽到科技界領袖，都一再呼籲應強化技職訓練和證照專業的機制，讓台灣快速擴張出一百五十多所大學反而造成技職教育的斷層能補足起來。
但是，既有這些「超額大學」存在，卻又並排出現了吳寶春想念ＥＭＢＡ卻不得其門而入的例子；可見，教育部從制度面應規畫如何使大學回歸「知識的殿堂」，而不只是「文憑販賣所」。許多無文憑的技職達人能到大學當老師，但麵包達人想作學生卻被拒。想回大學念書的不是只有吳寶春；已退休的台達電榮譽董事長鄭崇華日前表白，最想回大學去念天文，但在目前體制下談何容易？傳授系統性知識的任務，光靠目前的「社區大學」是不夠的。教育部如果能在「推動現有大學施行終身教育」的目標上作出彈性設計和改革，則受惠者即不只吳寶春一人！
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
Why the US, Russia, and Japan Remain Nuclear Despite Disasters
Why the US, Russia, and Japan Remain Nuclear Despite Disasters
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 21, 2013
Summary: Nuclear power generation has been around for over 50 years. Antinuclear sentiment has been around nearly as long. But despite the rise in antinuclear sentiment the world over, the status of nuclear power generation has not actually changed. This suggests that the decision to continue or discontinue nuclear power generation is no easy matter. The nuclear power controversy on Taiwan is the result of "argumentum ad populum." This newspaper believes the people have the right to make the final decision. It merely wants to remind them that just saying no to nuclear power may not be as easy as it looks.
Full Text below:
Nuclear power generation has been around for over 50 years. Antinuclear sentiment has been around nearly as long. But despite the rise in antinuclear sentiment the world over, the status of nuclear power generation has not actually changed. This suggests that the decision to continue or discontinue nuclear power generation is no easy matter.
In 1979, the United States fell victim to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident. In 1986, the former Soviet Union fell victim to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. In 2011, Japan fell victim to the Fukushima "composite style" nuclear power plant disaster. These three nations all fell victim to nuclear power plant catastrophes. Nevertheless they continue to use nuclear power. The United States and Russia have engaged in heated debates over the issue and arrived at their decisions.
These three countries debated every conceivable aspect of nuclear power generation in detail. Did they consider renewable energy? Yes they did. Did they consider wind, solar, hydro, and biomass energy? Yes they did. Did they consider natural gas and geothermal energy? Yes they did. Did they consider consumer electricity rates and international economic competitiveness? Yes they did. Did they consider carbon emissions? Yes they did. Did they consider nuclear safety issues? Of course they did. These countries endured nuclear disasters, first hand. Yet after considering all the factors, all three nations, all victims of nuclear disasters, decided to continue using nuclear power.
Today's Russia is a major user of nuclear power and nuclear technology. By 2030, it intends to build over 38 nuclear power plants, and help other countries build 28. The Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan occurred two years ago. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with the support of a new public consensus, rejected a "no nukes" policy. He championed the restoration of nuclear power plant operations. He called for an optimum mix of nuclear and other forms of energy. He did not call for a public referendum. U.S. President Barack Obama's newly appointed Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz is a supporter of nuclear power. He said, "It would be a mistake, however, to let Fukushima cause governments to abandon nuclear power and its benefits." He said, "If the country doesn't invest in nuclear technology now, Americans will look back with regret."
In other words, the United States, Russia, and Fukushima catastrophe victim Japan, have chosen to continue the use of nuclear power. despite the Fukushima incident. These three nations are major users of nuclear power technology. They are also major political and economic powers. They have not neglected consideration of the pros and cons of nuclear power. They do not lack domestic anti-nuke opposition. Yet despite the Fukushima incident, they remain firmly committed to nuclear power generation. The United States, even after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, approved nine nuclear power plants. It postponed the decommissioning of power plants, and began the construction of two nuclear power plants. [Translator's note: This passage is ambiguous and difficult to interpret. I was forced to guess.]
Ernest Moniz said "It would be a mistake, however, to let Fukushima cause governments to abandon nuclear power and its benefits." To decision-makers in the United States, Russia, and Japan, the lesson of the Fukushima incident will merely enhance nuclear safety. To them it is no reason to abolish nuclear power generation.
People on Taiwan are debating whether to retain or abolish nuclear power. There is not a single argument that has not been addressed during nuclear power debates in the United States and Russia. Consider these nations' political and economic strength, and their ability to fall back on alternative energy technology. The ROC is clearly less able to fall back on non-nuclear power technology than the United States, Japan, and Russia. Never mind that the next step would be "no-nukes." A construction halt on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) would be followed by the decommissioning of the 1NPP. Taiwan's nuclear safety concerns are greater than those of the US, Japan, and Russia. A nuclear power plant catastrophe would only impact part of their territory. But Taiwan is smaller. It cannot afford any nuclear power plant catastrophe. But this remains a technical issue. It is not necessarily a decisive factor that necessitates the abolition of nuclear energy.
AIT Taipei Office Director William Stanton commented on the 4NPP controversy. He said it is easy to say no to nuclear energy. But it is extremely difficult to find alternative energy sources. Don Shapiro, Senior Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei noted that If Taiwan abandons nuclear power generation, it may eliminate the risk of nuclear disaster. But it would face other risks, including severe power shortages, the rising cost of electricity, and reduced competitiveness.
Shapiro said that if Taiwan relies on gas-fired power generation, the annual cost of electricity would increase by 100 billion NT. If it relies on coal-fired power generation, the cost would increase by 50 billion NT. Either would severely undermine Taiwan's international competitiveness and lead to reduced foreign investment. Substituting gas-fired power generation for nuclear power generation would increase carbon dioxide emissions by 18 million tons per year. Substituting coal-fired power generation for nuclear power generation would increase them by 36 million tons per year. Unless one is prepared to purchase carbon credits at exorbitant prices, how will Taiwan achieve its carbon reduction targets?
Stanton said it is easy to say no to nuclear energy. Recent polls indicate that even if electricity prices increase after going non-nuclear, 70% of the public still wants construction on the 4NPP halted. It may be easy to say no. But the consequences may be unbearable. The United States, Russia, and Japan are victims of nuclear disasters. Their economic and political strength is greater than Taiwan's. If saying no to nuclear energy is so easy, why haven't they said no?
The nuclear power controversy on Taiwan is the result of "argumentum ad populum." This newspaper believes the people have the right to make the final decision. It merely wants to remind them that just saying no to nuclear power may not be as easy as it looks.
美俄日三大核災國何以仍維持核電
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.21 04:00 am
核電在世界上存在了五十餘年，反核的議論也持續了逾半世紀。即使在今日世界各國反核民意上升之際，核電的地位其實並未動搖。由此可見，核電存廢的辯論與抉擇，皆非易為之事。
一九七九年美國發生三哩島核電廠變故，一九八六年前蘇聯發生車諾比核電廠災難，二○一一年日本發生福島電廠的複合式核災。但是，美俄日這三個曾受核電廠災變巨創的國家，現在卻均維持核電政策；美俄日不是未經辯論，亦非未經抉擇，而是皆經過激烈辯論所採的政策抉擇。
在這三個國家，一切有關核能存廢的辯論皆已十分透徹。沒考慮過再生能源？有。沒考慮過風力、太陽能、水力、生質能源？有。沒考慮過天然氣、火力發電？有。沒考慮過民生電價及國際經濟競爭力？有。沒考慮過排碳？有。沒考慮過核安？當然有，其本國即親受核災重創。但是，經過考慮了這所有的一切，三個「核災大國」的抉擇仍是：維持核電。
今日的俄羅斯已是核電大國及核電技術大國，在二○三○年前，其國內將增建三十八座核電機組，並協助外國建設二十八座。日本福島核災甫過兩周年，安倍晉三首相挾著「新民意」否定了「零核電」政策，而主張恢復核電運作，謂將與其他能源搭配成「最佳混合比例」，且未訴諸公投。美國總統歐巴馬新任命的能源部長莫尼茲為核電支持者，他說：「若因福島核災就終結核能，是一錯誤；如果美國現在不投資核電技術，民眾會後悔。」
也就是說，美、俄及包括身受福島巨災重創的日本，均在福島事件後，仍然選擇了維持核電的政策。這三國皆是核電技術及實務上的大國，且也是世界上的政治與經濟大國，亦不是沒有比較過核電存廢的利與害，更非在國內沒有反核的「民意」；但是，他們皆在福島事件後仍然維持核電，美國更在福島核災後，核准了九個核電機組延後除役及兩座核電機組的興建。
主要的原因，可能就在莫尼茲的那一句話：「若因福島核災就終結核能，是一錯誤。」在美俄日三國的決策者眼中，福島事件的教訓只會成為促進提升核電安全的動力，而不逕視之為停廢核電的理由。
台灣目前關於核電存廢的辯論，可說沒有一個觀點不曾出現在美俄日的核電辯論中。而就各國的政治與經濟及替代能源的技術條件論，台灣顯然較美日俄三國更不具非核廢核的條件，遑論是一步就走上非核（核四停建，二○一八核一除役）；台灣在核電風險上較三國不同的考量是，三國幅員較大，核電廠災變只是「局部」影響，但台灣較小的幅員承受不起任一核電廠的災變。不過，這仍然是一個核安的技術問題，未必能成為廢核非核政策的決定性因素。
美國在台協會前台北辦事處處長司徒文就當前的核四爭議說：對核能說「不」很容易，但要如何找到替代能源很困難。繼之，台北美國商會資深總監沙蕩亦撰文指出：台灣若放棄核電，固然沒有核災的風險，但卻必須面臨其他風險，例如嚴重缺電、電費上漲、國家競爭力減弱等。
沙蕩說：台灣未來若以燃氣發電，每年成本增加一千億元；若以燃煤發電，則增加五百億元。無論如何，皆對台灣的國際競爭力產生極嚴重的影響，並將導致外國投資不前。至於以燃氣代核電，每年將增加二氧化碳排放一千八百萬噸，以燃煤代核電則增加三千六百萬噸；如此，除非以大手筆購買碳權，將如何達到減碳目標？
司徒文說，對核能說「不」很容易。近日相關民調更顯示，即使非核後電價上漲，亦有七成民意主張停建核四；這恐怕也是說來容易，但後果未必承受得起。如果對核能說「不」真是那麼容易，則美俄日「三大核災國」，在國際政治、經濟上的條件均有優於台灣處，他們為什麼不說「不」？
台灣的核電存廢問題逼到今日這個地步，只剩訴諸民意一途，本報也持尊重民意最後抉擇的立場。只是想提醒國人：對核電說「不」，其實並不那麼容易！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 21, 2013
Summary: Nuclear power generation has been around for over 50 years. Antinuclear sentiment has been around nearly as long. But despite the rise in antinuclear sentiment the world over, the status of nuclear power generation has not actually changed. This suggests that the decision to continue or discontinue nuclear power generation is no easy matter. The nuclear power controversy on Taiwan is the result of "argumentum ad populum." This newspaper believes the people have the right to make the final decision. It merely wants to remind them that just saying no to nuclear power may not be as easy as it looks.
Full Text below:
Nuclear power generation has been around for over 50 years. Antinuclear sentiment has been around nearly as long. But despite the rise in antinuclear sentiment the world over, the status of nuclear power generation has not actually changed. This suggests that the decision to continue or discontinue nuclear power generation is no easy matter.
In 1979, the United States fell victim to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident. In 1986, the former Soviet Union fell victim to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. In 2011, Japan fell victim to the Fukushima "composite style" nuclear power plant disaster. These three nations all fell victim to nuclear power plant catastrophes. Nevertheless they continue to use nuclear power. The United States and Russia have engaged in heated debates over the issue and arrived at their decisions.
These three countries debated every conceivable aspect of nuclear power generation in detail. Did they consider renewable energy? Yes they did. Did they consider wind, solar, hydro, and biomass energy? Yes they did. Did they consider natural gas and geothermal energy? Yes they did. Did they consider consumer electricity rates and international economic competitiveness? Yes they did. Did they consider carbon emissions? Yes they did. Did they consider nuclear safety issues? Of course they did. These countries endured nuclear disasters, first hand. Yet after considering all the factors, all three nations, all victims of nuclear disasters, decided to continue using nuclear power.
Today's Russia is a major user of nuclear power and nuclear technology. By 2030, it intends to build over 38 nuclear power plants, and help other countries build 28. The Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan occurred two years ago. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with the support of a new public consensus, rejected a "no nukes" policy. He championed the restoration of nuclear power plant operations. He called for an optimum mix of nuclear and other forms of energy. He did not call for a public referendum. U.S. President Barack Obama's newly appointed Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz is a supporter of nuclear power. He said, "It would be a mistake, however, to let Fukushima cause governments to abandon nuclear power and its benefits." He said, "If the country doesn't invest in nuclear technology now, Americans will look back with regret."
In other words, the United States, Russia, and Fukushima catastrophe victim Japan, have chosen to continue the use of nuclear power. despite the Fukushima incident. These three nations are major users of nuclear power technology. They are also major political and economic powers. They have not neglected consideration of the pros and cons of nuclear power. They do not lack domestic anti-nuke opposition. Yet despite the Fukushima incident, they remain firmly committed to nuclear power generation. The United States, even after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, approved nine nuclear power plants. It postponed the decommissioning of power plants, and began the construction of two nuclear power plants. [Translator's note: This passage is ambiguous and difficult to interpret. I was forced to guess.]
Ernest Moniz said "It would be a mistake, however, to let Fukushima cause governments to abandon nuclear power and its benefits." To decision-makers in the United States, Russia, and Japan, the lesson of the Fukushima incident will merely enhance nuclear safety. To them it is no reason to abolish nuclear power generation.
People on Taiwan are debating whether to retain or abolish nuclear power. There is not a single argument that has not been addressed during nuclear power debates in the United States and Russia. Consider these nations' political and economic strength, and their ability to fall back on alternative energy technology. The ROC is clearly less able to fall back on non-nuclear power technology than the United States, Japan, and Russia. Never mind that the next step would be "no-nukes." A construction halt on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) would be followed by the decommissioning of the 1NPP. Taiwan's nuclear safety concerns are greater than those of the US, Japan, and Russia. A nuclear power plant catastrophe would only impact part of their territory. But Taiwan is smaller. It cannot afford any nuclear power plant catastrophe. But this remains a technical issue. It is not necessarily a decisive factor that necessitates the abolition of nuclear energy.
AIT Taipei Office Director William Stanton commented on the 4NPP controversy. He said it is easy to say no to nuclear energy. But it is extremely difficult to find alternative energy sources. Don Shapiro, Senior Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei noted that If Taiwan abandons nuclear power generation, it may eliminate the risk of nuclear disaster. But it would face other risks, including severe power shortages, the rising cost of electricity, and reduced competitiveness.
Shapiro said that if Taiwan relies on gas-fired power generation, the annual cost of electricity would increase by 100 billion NT. If it relies on coal-fired power generation, the cost would increase by 50 billion NT. Either would severely undermine Taiwan's international competitiveness and lead to reduced foreign investment. Substituting gas-fired power generation for nuclear power generation would increase carbon dioxide emissions by 18 million tons per year. Substituting coal-fired power generation for nuclear power generation would increase them by 36 million tons per year. Unless one is prepared to purchase carbon credits at exorbitant prices, how will Taiwan achieve its carbon reduction targets?
Stanton said it is easy to say no to nuclear energy. Recent polls indicate that even if electricity prices increase after going non-nuclear, 70% of the public still wants construction on the 4NPP halted. It may be easy to say no. But the consequences may be unbearable. The United States, Russia, and Japan are victims of nuclear disasters. Their economic and political strength is greater than Taiwan's. If saying no to nuclear energy is so easy, why haven't they said no?
The nuclear power controversy on Taiwan is the result of "argumentum ad populum." This newspaper believes the people have the right to make the final decision. It merely wants to remind them that just saying no to nuclear power may not be as easy as it looks.
美俄日三大核災國何以仍維持核電
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.21 04:00 am
核電在世界上存在了五十餘年，反核的議論也持續了逾半世紀。即使在今日世界各國反核民意上升之際，核電的地位其實並未動搖。由此可見，核電存廢的辯論與抉擇，皆非易為之事。
一九七九年美國發生三哩島核電廠變故，一九八六年前蘇聯發生車諾比核電廠災難，二○一一年日本發生福島電廠的複合式核災。但是，美俄日這三個曾受核電廠災變巨創的國家，現在卻均維持核電政策；美俄日不是未經辯論，亦非未經抉擇，而是皆經過激烈辯論所採的政策抉擇。
在這三個國家，一切有關核能存廢的辯論皆已十分透徹。沒考慮過再生能源？有。沒考慮過風力、太陽能、水力、生質能源？有。沒考慮過天然氣、火力發電？有。沒考慮過民生電價及國際經濟競爭力？有。沒考慮過排碳？有。沒考慮過核安？當然有，其本國即親受核災重創。但是，經過考慮了這所有的一切，三個「核災大國」的抉擇仍是：維持核電。
今日的俄羅斯已是核電大國及核電技術大國，在二○三○年前，其國內將增建三十八座核電機組，並協助外國建設二十八座。日本福島核災甫過兩周年，安倍晉三首相挾著「新民意」否定了「零核電」政策，而主張恢復核電運作，謂將與其他能源搭配成「最佳混合比例」，且未訴諸公投。美國總統歐巴馬新任命的能源部長莫尼茲為核電支持者，他說：「若因福島核災就終結核能，是一錯誤；如果美國現在不投資核電技術，民眾會後悔。」
也就是說，美、俄及包括身受福島巨災重創的日本，均在福島事件後，仍然選擇了維持核電的政策。這三國皆是核電技術及實務上的大國，且也是世界上的政治與經濟大國，亦不是沒有比較過核電存廢的利與害，更非在國內沒有反核的「民意」；但是，他們皆在福島事件後仍然維持核電，美國更在福島核災後，核准了九個核電機組延後除役及兩座核電機組的興建。
主要的原因，可能就在莫尼茲的那一句話：「若因福島核災就終結核能，是一錯誤。」在美俄日三國的決策者眼中，福島事件的教訓只會成為促進提升核電安全的動力，而不逕視之為停廢核電的理由。
台灣目前關於核電存廢的辯論，可說沒有一個觀點不曾出現在美俄日的核電辯論中。而就各國的政治與經濟及替代能源的技術條件論，台灣顯然較美日俄三國更不具非核廢核的條件，遑論是一步就走上非核（核四停建，二○一八核一除役）；台灣在核電風險上較三國不同的考量是，三國幅員較大，核電廠災變只是「局部」影響，但台灣較小的幅員承受不起任一核電廠的災變。不過，這仍然是一個核安的技術問題，未必能成為廢核非核政策的決定性因素。
美國在台協會前台北辦事處處長司徒文就當前的核四爭議說：對核能說「不」很容易，但要如何找到替代能源很困難。繼之，台北美國商會資深總監沙蕩亦撰文指出：台灣若放棄核電，固然沒有核災的風險，但卻必須面臨其他風險，例如嚴重缺電、電費上漲、國家競爭力減弱等。
沙蕩說：台灣未來若以燃氣發電，每年成本增加一千億元；若以燃煤發電，則增加五百億元。無論如何，皆對台灣的國際競爭力產生極嚴重的影響，並將導致外國投資不前。至於以燃氣代核電，每年將增加二氧化碳排放一千八百萬噸，以燃煤代核電則增加三千六百萬噸；如此，除非以大手筆購買碳權，將如何達到減碳目標？
司徒文說，對核能說「不」很容易。近日相關民調更顯示，即使非核後電價上漲，亦有七成民意主張停建核四；這恐怕也是說來容易，但後果未必承受得起。如果對核能說「不」真是那麼容易，則美俄日「三大核災國」，在國際政治、經濟上的條件均有優於台灣處，他們為什麼不說「不」？
台灣的核電存廢問題逼到今日這個地步，只剩訴諸民意一途，本報也持尊重民意最後抉擇的立場。只是想提醒國人：對核電說「不」，其實並不那麼容易！
Mutual Trust Essential to Cross-Strait Peace
Mutual Trust Essential to Cross-Strait Peace
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2013
Summary: We are pleased to see the Mainland successfully complete its generational power transfer. We are optimistic about the vision set forth by the new leaders. Can the two sides establish a new and improved relationship? The establishment of a long-lasting framework for cross-Strait relations is a common dream for people on both sides.
Full Text below:
In November of last year, the CCP held its 18th National Congress. A new generation of Mainland leaders assumed power. This was a vast intergenerational political undertaking. The 12th National People's Congress recently adjourned. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were elected President and Premier. The fifth generation leadership system was officially launched.
Overall, the transfer of power proceeded smoothly. The personnel arrangements for the highest positions reflect increased institutionalization. This includes Liu Yunshan, who was twice elected senior member of the seventh session of the Politburo, as well as Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli, who were successfully promoted to the Standing Committee. Junior members such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang were assigned to important positions in state organs. They may assume greater responsibility in the future.
Consider policy. Most of the system reforms have left people wanting more. Mainland reforms have now reached the deep end of the pool. Resistance from all manner of special interests, for power or money, will only increase. The new Premier Li Keqiang told reporters that finance, banking, consumer prices, budget reform, and social justice are the most serious grievances. They are the most pressing problems. They are the ones in most urgent need of reform. They will sson test the new leaders' wisdom and determination.
Consider major policies related to cross-strait relations. Li Keqiang declared that the new government would fulfill all the commitments made by the previous one. It would seek new ways to promote cooperation. It would clarify the current status of cross-strait relations. The two sides have finalized their official appointments. Can they consolidate their gains and carry on from here? This is surely what the ruling and opposition parties hope to do.
Xi Jinping spoke during the closing session of the NPC. Nine times he mentioned reform and innovation in order to realize the Chinese dream. Regarding cross-Strait relations, Xi Jinping called on compatriots on both sides to work to support maintain, and promote cross-Strait peace. He gave voice to what most people are feeling. Peace, prosperity, and dignity must be the highest values in cross-Strait exchanges. People on both sides should work together toward this dream.
Li Keqiang stressed the importance of a common cross-Strait homeland. The MAC responded, saying that the Republic of China is our country, and Taiwan is our home. This more specific formulation addressed the issue of legal sovereignty. The two sides share culture and kinship. But some people on Taiwan have reservations about the term "common homeland." The reason is a lack of mutual trust. Therefore increasing mutual trust is imperative for new leaders on both sides of the Strait.
The two sides once differed in their values and belief systems. The two sides had profound doubts about reunification and independence, as well about the use of force. An imbalance in military might and diplomatic influence alienated the two sides from each other. It made mutual trust difficult. But since 2008 exchanges substantially increased. Dialogue not confrontation has enhanced mutual trust. But new structural imbalances and a crisis in confidence have led to new doubts. These have obstructed progress in bilateral relations.
Mainland China has emerged as a political and economic powerhouse. Taiwan investment in Mainland China and market dependence has increased. The discrepancy in military might and economic strength has widened. Taiwan is increasingly isolated from international economic activity and trade. It faces marginalization. These factors have all contributed to a cross-Strait structural imbalance. Consider the loss of self-confidence. The institutionalization of cross-strait exchanges has enhanced mutual trust. But doubts have increased over the Mainland's use of economic and trade factors to promote reunification.
Curren relations across the Strait are relatively stable. The progress made has been encouraging. The next two sessions will complete the signing of ECFA and the establishment of ECFA offices. Increased institutionalization will increase mutual trust. It will balance cross-Strait exchanges. For example, the influx of Mainland capital is increasing. Mainland tourist numbers are increasing. These may establish a more secure foundation for mutual trust. Terms such as "lu sheng" (Mainland students) and "lu pei" (Mainland spouses) have negative connotations. Eliminating such negative connotations can ensure their rights and improve their treatment. Trust between the two sides will provide a new impetus.
The structural imbalance and crisis in confidence have occured just as expectations for cross-Strait exchanges were rising. This has made the problem more difficult. This newspaper addressed the problem in its March 1 editorial. It said high-level dialogue between the two sides should focus on the East Asian regional situation. The editorial recalled KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland. Lien addressed such issues as balance, equality, and a workable political framework. These can aid cooperation in international trade.
We reiterate our previous recommendations. Taiwan has not been able to take part in the new regional economic liberalization and regionalization. As a result, this has become the main obstacle to increased trust. The fundamental contradiction must be satisfactorily resolved. Until then, other political issues will be difficult to promote. The government must broaden channels of communication. It must help people understand that cross-Strait political agreements do not necessarily mean reunification. They are merely conducive to stability in the Strait.
We are pleased to see the Mainland successfully complete its generational power transfer. We are optimistic about the vision set forth by the new leaders. Can the two sides establish a new and improved relationship? The establishment of a long-lasting framework for cross-Strait relations is a common dream for people on both sides.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.20
社論－構築兩岸和平夢想 提升互信當務之急
本報訊
去年十一月召開的中共十八大，開啟了中國大陸新一代領導人的權力承傳，此一跨世代的巨大政治工程，在日前第十二屆全國人大會議閉幕後宣告完成，習近平和李克強順利當選國家主席和國務院總理，第五代領導體制正式啟動。
總體而言，這次的權力承傳相當順利，最高權力機關的人事安排，體現了更多的制度化趨勢，包括十七屆政治局中曾任兩屆的資深委員如劉雲山、王岐山、張高麗順利晉升常委，而資歷較淺的委員如李源潮和汪洋，則擔任國家機關重要職位，未來有可能肩負更大的責任。
在政策方面，大部制的改革雖讓人有意猶未盡之感，顯示當前大陸的改革已進入深水區，權錢糾結的各式利益集團抗改的阻力只會愈來愈大。新任總理李克強在記者會上提出財政、金融、價格、預算制度以及社會公正方面的改革，都是大陸民怨最深也最急需改革的迫切問題，如何啟動變革，勢將考驗新領導人的智慧及決心。
至於事關兩岸的大政方針，李克強聲稱新政府將履行上屆政府的承諾，並努力尋求新的合作推動支點，道出當前兩岸關係的現況。在兩岸高層人士底定後，如何總結成果進而開展新局，無疑是朝野最大的期待。
習近平在人大閉幕會發表演說，九次提到改革創新構築中國夢。就兩岸部分，習近平呼籲兩岸同胞攜手支持、維護、推動兩岸和平，無疑說出了多數人心聲。我們以為，和平、繁榮、尊嚴應該是兩岸交流的最高價值，也是兩岸人民應該共同構築的夢想。
李克強在記者會上，再度強調兩岸共同家園的概念，陸委會第一時間的反應，是中華民國是我們的國家，台灣是我們的家園，這種較有針對性的提法，應該是出自法律主權的考慮。實際上，兩岸在文化和血緣方面，有許多的共同點，雖然如此，台灣人對「共同家園」一詞卻語多保留，究其因，還得歸結於互信不足。因此，如何提升互信，應是兩岸新領導人的當務之急。
過去由於兩岸價值信仰體系分歧，雙方對統獨以及是否使用武力的問題疑慮甚深，加上軍事安全和外交場域的結構失衡及相互隔絕，使得互信無以建立。但自二○○八年以來，交流大幅增加，以對話代替對抗使得互信大為提升，但新的結構失衡和信仰危機，又增添了新的疑慮，阻撓雙邊關係的進展。
中國大陸躍升為國際政經強權，台灣對中國大陸投資及市場依賴加深，兩岸在軍事安全和經濟實力的落差加大，台灣國際經貿地位日漸孤立，出現邊緣化的危機，這些因素都是造成兩岸關係結構失衡的新因素。自信仰體系而言，兩岸交流的制度化確實提升了雙方的信任感，但國人對中國大陸經貿促統的疑慮卻也同步上升。
當前台海關係的結構相對穩定，毋寧是一可喜的進展，未來兩會互設辦事處和ＥＣＦＡ的完成簽訂，更可以自制度層面強化互信。兩岸之間更多元平衡的交流，例如陸資進一步擴大來台、陸客人數的增加，也可以為雙方的互信打造更為堅實的基礎，而對現有交流模式消除不合理的內涵，例如陸生、陸配權益的改善等，也將對雙方的信任提供新的動力。
然而，新的結構失衡和信任危機，恰恰出現在兩岸對交往的期望攀升之際，使得問題更加棘手。面對此一新局，本報三月一日社論，提出兩岸之間的高層對話，可以在東亞區域環境的分合競逐間，找到切入的著力點，該文進一步指出國民黨榮譽主席連戰先生訪陸所提的平衡、對等、有效的政治框架，可以優先適用於國際經貿領域，作為新的合作推動支點。
我們願意再度重申前文所提的建言，乃是因為台灣未能參加新的區域經濟自由化和區域化的問題，已經成為兩岸之間難以提升信任的主因，在此一基本矛盾獲得妥善解決前，其他的政治議題都難以累積足夠動能。就此，政府亦應加強疏通，讓人民瞭解，有些兩岸間的政治性協議不但不等於統一，反而有利台海穩定。
我們喜見大陸順利完成權力的世代交替，對新領導人提出的願景也願意樂觀以對。兩岸之間能否再創新局，共同搭建可長可久的關係架構，正是兩岸人民共同的夢想。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 20, 2013
Summary: We are pleased to see the Mainland successfully complete its generational power transfer. We are optimistic about the vision set forth by the new leaders. Can the two sides establish a new and improved relationship? The establishment of a long-lasting framework for cross-Strait relations is a common dream for people on both sides.
Full Text below:
In November of last year, the CCP held its 18th National Congress. A new generation of Mainland leaders assumed power. This was a vast intergenerational political undertaking. The 12th National People's Congress recently adjourned. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were elected President and Premier. The fifth generation leadership system was officially launched.
Overall, the transfer of power proceeded smoothly. The personnel arrangements for the highest positions reflect increased institutionalization. This includes Liu Yunshan, who was twice elected senior member of the seventh session of the Politburo, as well as Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli, who were successfully promoted to the Standing Committee. Junior members such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang were assigned to important positions in state organs. They may assume greater responsibility in the future.
Consider policy. Most of the system reforms have left people wanting more. Mainland reforms have now reached the deep end of the pool. Resistance from all manner of special interests, for power or money, will only increase. The new Premier Li Keqiang told reporters that finance, banking, consumer prices, budget reform, and social justice are the most serious grievances. They are the most pressing problems. They are the ones in most urgent need of reform. They will sson test the new leaders' wisdom and determination.
Consider major policies related to cross-strait relations. Li Keqiang declared that the new government would fulfill all the commitments made by the previous one. It would seek new ways to promote cooperation. It would clarify the current status of cross-strait relations. The two sides have finalized their official appointments. Can they consolidate their gains and carry on from here? This is surely what the ruling and opposition parties hope to do.
Xi Jinping spoke during the closing session of the NPC. Nine times he mentioned reform and innovation in order to realize the Chinese dream. Regarding cross-Strait relations, Xi Jinping called on compatriots on both sides to work to support maintain, and promote cross-Strait peace. He gave voice to what most people are feeling. Peace, prosperity, and dignity must be the highest values in cross-Strait exchanges. People on both sides should work together toward this dream.
Li Keqiang stressed the importance of a common cross-Strait homeland. The MAC responded, saying that the Republic of China is our country, and Taiwan is our home. This more specific formulation addressed the issue of legal sovereignty. The two sides share culture and kinship. But some people on Taiwan have reservations about the term "common homeland." The reason is a lack of mutual trust. Therefore increasing mutual trust is imperative for new leaders on both sides of the Strait.
The two sides once differed in their values and belief systems. The two sides had profound doubts about reunification and independence, as well about the use of force. An imbalance in military might and diplomatic influence alienated the two sides from each other. It made mutual trust difficult. But since 2008 exchanges substantially increased. Dialogue not confrontation has enhanced mutual trust. But new structural imbalances and a crisis in confidence have led to new doubts. These have obstructed progress in bilateral relations.
Mainland China has emerged as a political and economic powerhouse. Taiwan investment in Mainland China and market dependence has increased. The discrepancy in military might and economic strength has widened. Taiwan is increasingly isolated from international economic activity and trade. It faces marginalization. These factors have all contributed to a cross-Strait structural imbalance. Consider the loss of self-confidence. The institutionalization of cross-strait exchanges has enhanced mutual trust. But doubts have increased over the Mainland's use of economic and trade factors to promote reunification.
Curren relations across the Strait are relatively stable. The progress made has been encouraging. The next two sessions will complete the signing of ECFA and the establishment of ECFA offices. Increased institutionalization will increase mutual trust. It will balance cross-Strait exchanges. For example, the influx of Mainland capital is increasing. Mainland tourist numbers are increasing. These may establish a more secure foundation for mutual trust. Terms such as "lu sheng" (Mainland students) and "lu pei" (Mainland spouses) have negative connotations. Eliminating such negative connotations can ensure their rights and improve their treatment. Trust between the two sides will provide a new impetus.
The structural imbalance and crisis in confidence have occured just as expectations for cross-Strait exchanges were rising. This has made the problem more difficult. This newspaper addressed the problem in its March 1 editorial. It said high-level dialogue between the two sides should focus on the East Asian regional situation. The editorial recalled KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland. Lien addressed such issues as balance, equality, and a workable political framework. These can aid cooperation in international trade.
We reiterate our previous recommendations. Taiwan has not been able to take part in the new regional economic liberalization and regionalization. As a result, this has become the main obstacle to increased trust. The fundamental contradiction must be satisfactorily resolved. Until then, other political issues will be difficult to promote. The government must broaden channels of communication. It must help people understand that cross-Strait political agreements do not necessarily mean reunification. They are merely conducive to stability in the Strait.
We are pleased to see the Mainland successfully complete its generational power transfer. We are optimistic about the vision set forth by the new leaders. Can the two sides establish a new and improved relationship? The establishment of a long-lasting framework for cross-Strait relations is a common dream for people on both sides.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.03.20
社論－構築兩岸和平夢想 提升互信當務之急
本報訊
去年十一月召開的中共十八大，開啟了中國大陸新一代領導人的權力承傳，此一跨世代的巨大政治工程，在日前第十二屆全國人大會議閉幕後宣告完成，習近平和李克強順利當選國家主席和國務院總理，第五代領導體制正式啟動。
總體而言，這次的權力承傳相當順利，最高權力機關的人事安排，體現了更多的制度化趨勢，包括十七屆政治局中曾任兩屆的資深委員如劉雲山、王岐山、張高麗順利晉升常委，而資歷較淺的委員如李源潮和汪洋，則擔任國家機關重要職位，未來有可能肩負更大的責任。
在政策方面，大部制的改革雖讓人有意猶未盡之感，顯示當前大陸的改革已進入深水區，權錢糾結的各式利益集團抗改的阻力只會愈來愈大。新任總理李克強在記者會上提出財政、金融、價格、預算制度以及社會公正方面的改革，都是大陸民怨最深也最急需改革的迫切問題，如何啟動變革，勢將考驗新領導人的智慧及決心。
至於事關兩岸的大政方針，李克強聲稱新政府將履行上屆政府的承諾，並努力尋求新的合作推動支點，道出當前兩岸關係的現況。在兩岸高層人士底定後，如何總結成果進而開展新局，無疑是朝野最大的期待。
習近平在人大閉幕會發表演說，九次提到改革創新構築中國夢。就兩岸部分，習近平呼籲兩岸同胞攜手支持、維護、推動兩岸和平，無疑說出了多數人心聲。我們以為，和平、繁榮、尊嚴應該是兩岸交流的最高價值，也是兩岸人民應該共同構築的夢想。
李克強在記者會上，再度強調兩岸共同家園的概念，陸委會第一時間的反應，是中華民國是我們的國家，台灣是我們的家園，這種較有針對性的提法，應該是出自法律主權的考慮。實際上，兩岸在文化和血緣方面，有許多的共同點，雖然如此，台灣人對「共同家園」一詞卻語多保留，究其因，還得歸結於互信不足。因此，如何提升互信，應是兩岸新領導人的當務之急。
過去由於兩岸價值信仰體系分歧，雙方對統獨以及是否使用武力的問題疑慮甚深，加上軍事安全和外交場域的結構失衡及相互隔絕，使得互信無以建立。但自二○○八年以來，交流大幅增加，以對話代替對抗使得互信大為提升，但新的結構失衡和信仰危機，又增添了新的疑慮，阻撓雙邊關係的進展。
中國大陸躍升為國際政經強權，台灣對中國大陸投資及市場依賴加深，兩岸在軍事安全和經濟實力的落差加大，台灣國際經貿地位日漸孤立，出現邊緣化的危機，這些因素都是造成兩岸關係結構失衡的新因素。自信仰體系而言，兩岸交流的制度化確實提升了雙方的信任感，但國人對中國大陸經貿促統的疑慮卻也同步上升。
當前台海關係的結構相對穩定，毋寧是一可喜的進展，未來兩會互設辦事處和ＥＣＦＡ的完成簽訂，更可以自制度層面強化互信。兩岸之間更多元平衡的交流，例如陸資進一步擴大來台、陸客人數的增加，也可以為雙方的互信打造更為堅實的基礎，而對現有交流模式消除不合理的內涵，例如陸生、陸配權益的改善等，也將對雙方的信任提供新的動力。
然而，新的結構失衡和信任危機，恰恰出現在兩岸對交往的期望攀升之際，使得問題更加棘手。面對此一新局，本報三月一日社論，提出兩岸之間的高層對話，可以在東亞區域環境的分合競逐間，找到切入的著力點，該文進一步指出國民黨榮譽主席連戰先生訪陸所提的平衡、對等、有效的政治框架，可以優先適用於國際經貿領域，作為新的合作推動支點。
我們願意再度重申前文所提的建言，乃是因為台灣未能參加新的區域經濟自由化和區域化的問題，已經成為兩岸之間難以提升信任的主因，在此一基本矛盾獲得妥善解決前，其他的政治議題都難以累積足夠動能。就此，政府亦應加強疏通，讓人民瞭解，有些兩岸間的政治性協議不但不等於統一，反而有利台海穩定。
我們喜見大陸順利完成權力的世代交替，對新領導人提出的願景也願意樂觀以對。兩岸之間能否再創新局，共同搭建可長可久的關係架構，正是兩岸人民共同的夢想。
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Eliminate the Middleman: Promote Cross-Strait Visits by Wang Yu Qi and Zhang Zhijun
Eliminate the Middleman: Promote Cross-Strait Visits by Wang Yu Qi and Zhang Zhijun
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2013
Summary: For the past five years, Wang Yi has been Beijing's Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. He has left a good impression on the people of Taiwan. On Sunday he announced that he was retiring. He said he regretted never being able to visit Taiwan during his term in office. But if we can conduct cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China, even Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting Taiwan is conceivable.
Full Text below:
For the past five years, Wang Yi has been Beijing's Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. He has left a good impression on the people of Taiwan. On Sunday he announced that he was retiring. He said he regretted never being able to visit Taiwan during his term in office.
The Directorship of the Central Committee Taiwan Task Office is a party post. The holder of the post also serves as Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. Wang's successor Zhang Zhijun said, "The time is ripe for a visit to Taiwan." We hope that Zhang Zhijun can visit Taiwan as soon as possible.
Wang Yi is an old hand. One might say that with a single word he eliminated the bottleneck in current cross-Strait relations. The two sides still use ARATS and SEF as "white gloves," i.e., a middleman. This is the primary legal obstacle in the way of exchange visits by officials of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC. The Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC are "administrative authorities." Alas, administrative authority is rooted in sovereignty. The two parties do not recognize each other's administrative authority. Therefore they cannot recognize the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council. ARATS officials may be able to visit Mainland Affairs Council officials. MAC officials may be able to visit Taiwan Affairs Office officials. But such visits are all handled through "white gloves." Will Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council officials be able to exchange visits and have personal contacts? If they can, it means the legal obstacles have been cleared away. They will then be able to shake hands without white gloves. The white gloves will have fulfilled their purpose.
The day Wang Yi retired he said, "The time is ripe for the Director of the Taiwan Task Office to visit Taiwan." He hoped that Zhang Zhijun, his successor, could make the trip as soon as possible. This was right on the mark. The Mainland Affairs Council responded positively. It said that time, personnel, and conditions permitting, it welcomed a cross-Strait visit. Since both sides are willing, Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu Qi should visit each other as soon as possible.
Wang Yi said that over eight million cross-Strait visits are made each year. Over the past five years over 1500 provincial level delegations from the Mainland have visited Taiwan. Logically speaking, our side should be able to reciprocate. That is only reasonable. But Wang Yi knows that the most serious legal obstacle is the status quo. As Wang Yi noted, eight million people make cross-Strait visits a year. Over the past five years, over 1500 provincial level delegations have visited Taiwan. If the Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC still cannot remove their "white gloves," then they are clearly being unreasonable. They are clearly engaging in posturing and deception.
Therefore, if Beijing wants Zhang Zhijun to visit to Taiwan, it must first remove the existing cross-Strait legal obstacles. This is something the two sides' administrative authorities must clear away before visits are possible. If visits ensue, it will be a major achievement in cross-Strait legal relations. It is only reasonable.
But Wang Yi appeared to hold back. He seemed to be saying that Zhang Zhijun could visit Taiwan only as a party official, as Director of the Taiwan Task Office. He seemed to be making a distinction between it and the Taiwan Affairs Office. Such distinctions are totally unnecessary. But if such distinctions enable Zhang Zhijun to visit as soon as possible, then the two sides should seize the opportunity, and not become mired in word games.
The Ma administration should be happy to see officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office visit. It would undoubtedly be a major breakthrough in cross-Strait legal principles and cross-Strait realpolitik. If officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office can come here, then officials from the Mainland Affairs Council can of course go there.
The Ma administration's main concern is public reaction. In 2008 ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin came to Taiwan. The Taipei street scenes are still fresh in memories. But times have changed. Five years have gone by. The Democratic Progressive Party probably cannot get away with treating Zhang Zhijun the way they did Chen Yunlin. Zhang Zhijun coming here and Wang Yu Qi going there could mark a new era in cross-Strait relations. The DPP's cross-Strait policy must change with the times.
Wang Yi thinks that the time is ripe for the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, or Taiwan Task Office, as the case may be, to visit Taiwan. Zhang Zhijun is using this framework in his planning for cross-Strait offices. He is being cautious. The cross-Strait offices will be upgraded agencies of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council. The role of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council will be downgraded. In other words, he is moving to take off the white gloves.
On January 16, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Cross-Strait Offices Should Take Off the White Gloves." It addressed just this issue. We hope the authorities on both sides will reread it. Here are some excerpts.
Our recommendations are as follows. When Beijing establishes its cross-Strait offices, it should refer to the 18th National Congress Political Report. The report urged "exploring of cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." The Ma administration can refer to the Preface of the Constitution as amended. The preface includes the phrase, "in response to the nation's need prior to reunification." Therefore the establishment of the cross-Strait offices should reflect four conditions. 1. The nation has yet to be reunified. 2. Special circumstances prevail. 3. The two sides are establishing political relations. 4. They will make fair and reasonable arrangements.
In other words, Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council officials will exchange visits. The two sides will establish offices. They should "explore cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." In essence, they should remove the white gloves.
Wang Yi was a highly qualified Director for the Taiwan Affairs Office. His greatest achievement was "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." This was his policy innovation. Today he is proposing that the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office visit Taiwan. This too is part of his thinking. We hope his successor Zhang Zhijun will follow up on his initiatives.
On the evening before Wang Yi became Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing issued some critical remarks about Taiwan-related aspects of the Tokyo March 11 memorial service and the election of the new Pope. Wang Yi said that although he had left the Taiwan Affairs Office, regardless of where he went (He went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) he would always worry about the people of Taiwan and feel a sense of responsibility toward them. These words are how we choose to remember Wang Yi's five years in office.
If we can conduct cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China, even Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting Taiwan is conceivable.
甩掉白手套：促成王郁琦、張志軍跨海互訪
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.19 04:12 am
五年來，王毅是稱職勝任的北京台辦主持人，也應是留給台灣人民不錯印象的台辦主任。他在周日卸任當天說：任內略有遺憾的是沒能去台灣訪問。
他為繼任者張志軍發聲說：中台辦主任（黨職，兼國台辦主任）的「訪台時機已大體成熟」，希望張志軍能「儘快」赴台訪問。
王毅誠為箇中老手，可謂一語道破了目前兩岸關係的瓶頸。兩岸迄今仍以海協會及海基會為「白手套」，這是國台辦及陸委會的主持官員不能互訪的主要「法理障礙」。因為，國台辦及陸委會皆是「治權機關」（治權源自主權），唯兩方在「法理上」不承認對方的「治權」，所以也在「法理上」應當互不承認國台辦與陸委會；因而，即使海協會人員來訪可見陸委會官員，而海基會人員往訪也可見國台辦官員，但這皆是透過「白手套」。如果今後國台辦與陸委會的官員可以互訪並親身接觸，應即表示：兩岸的「法理障礙」已經鬆緩或轉化，肉掌與肉掌已可相握，白手套也漸已「完成階段性任務」。
王毅在卸任當日拋出「中台辦主任訪台時機已大體成熟」的說法，並希望繼任的張志軍能儘快成行，這是一個切中肯綮的政策創見。此間陸委會亦有善意回應稱：在適當時機、身分與相關條件充分情況下，歡迎主管兩岸事務的負責人互訪。我們認為：既是「你有情、我有意」，即應及早儘速促成張志軍與王郁琦互訪。
王毅說：如今兩岸一年互訪人次已逾八百萬，而五年來已有一千五百多個「省部級訪問團」訪台，「按道理我也可以去」。這話說得「合情合理」，然而王毅自亦知，現狀最主要是出自前述「法理障礙」；但既然目前兩岸已如王毅所說每年八百萬人次往返，五年一千五百多個「省部團隊」訪台，而若國台辦及陸委會卻仍脫不掉「白手套」，這當然「按道理」也說不通。若非裝模作樣，即是自欺欺人。
所以，北京若要促成張志軍訪台，首須「按道理」把兩岸現存的「法理障礙」排除；這固然是兩岸涉台治權部門得以互訪的法理前提，而果若促成互訪，則亦是兩岸關係在法理及現實上的重大成就，何況「按道理」也應如此。
然而，王毅似也語帶保留，他好像是在說，張志軍將以黨職「中台辦主任」的身分訪台，而與其治權部門「國台辦主任」的兼職有所區隔。我們雖認為「按道理」大可不必如此，但若這層曲折有利於促成張志軍儘早來訪，雙方亦當珍惜並促成，不必再陷於文字遊戲。
其實，馬政府完全沒有不樂見國台辦官員來訪的理由，因為這毫無疑問將是兩岸關係在法理及現實上的重大突破及進展。而國台辦官員若能來，陸委會官員當然也能去。
馬政府主要的顧慮應是在社會反應。二○○八年海協會長陳雲林來台的台北街景記憶猶新；但畢竟如今已歷五年於茲的物換星移，我們想像民進黨今日已無可能用對待陳雲林的手法來「接待」張志軍。而張志軍的來訪及王郁琦的往訪，當可為兩岸關係標誌一個新紀元，民進黨的兩岸政策也必須與時俱進。
再進一步說，王毅既然認為國台辦（中台辦）主任訪台的時機已成熟，則張志軍亦可在這樣的思考架構下，進行兩岸互設辦事處的規劃。斟酌的方向是：應將兩岸辦事處作為國台辦、陸委會的派出機關之實質功能升高，而將之視作「兩會」派出機構的形式作用降低。也就是說，從大方向看，應當朝往「脫掉白手套」的方向思考。
本報一月十六日社論〈兩岸辦事處應當脫掉白手套〉一文，曾對此一議題有所申論，盼兩岸當局的有心人能拾回再看一次。茲用引號摘錄該篇社論略謂：
「我們的建議是：北京在研榷兩岸辦事處時，應可從十八大政治報告所指『探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排』開始發想；而馬政府則可根據憲法增修條文序文所稱『為因應國家統一前的需要』啟動思考。於是，兩岸辦事處的設立，應當反映並滿足四個條件：一、國家尚未統一；二、特殊情況下的；三、兩岸政治關係；四、作出合情合理的安排。」
也就是說，從兩岸國台辦與陸委會官員互訪，至兩岸互設辦事處，皆應朝向「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」去設想，大方向則是「脫掉白手套！」
王毅是一位稱職勝任的國台辦主持人。他任內最大的成就，即在參與「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」之政策創新，如今他主張台辦主持人訪台，也應是出自此一思維脈絡；我們希望，繼任者張志軍在此一議題上能有承先啟後、繼往開來的表現。
就在王毅出任外交部長前夕，北京外交部突然爆出對東京三一一追悼會及教宗即位兩事涉台部分的尖銳評論。王毅說，他離開台辦，不管到什麼地方工作（他到了外交部），對台灣民眾都會多一分掛念、理解與責任；就憑這一段話，我們會記住這五年的台辦主任王毅。
其實，倘能在「大屋頂中國」下安排兩岸關係，甚至外交部長王毅來台訪問亦非不能想像。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2013
Summary: For the past five years, Wang Yi has been Beijing's Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. He has left a good impression on the people of Taiwan. On Sunday he announced that he was retiring. He said he regretted never being able to visit Taiwan during his term in office. But if we can conduct cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China, even Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting Taiwan is conceivable.
Full Text below:
For the past five years, Wang Yi has been Beijing's Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. He has left a good impression on the people of Taiwan. On Sunday he announced that he was retiring. He said he regretted never being able to visit Taiwan during his term in office.
The Directorship of the Central Committee Taiwan Task Office is a party post. The holder of the post also serves as Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. Wang's successor Zhang Zhijun said, "The time is ripe for a visit to Taiwan." We hope that Zhang Zhijun can visit Taiwan as soon as possible.
Wang Yi is an old hand. One might say that with a single word he eliminated the bottleneck in current cross-Strait relations. The two sides still use ARATS and SEF as "white gloves," i.e., a middleman. This is the primary legal obstacle in the way of exchange visits by officials of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC. The Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC are "administrative authorities." Alas, administrative authority is rooted in sovereignty. The two parties do not recognize each other's administrative authority. Therefore they cannot recognize the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council. ARATS officials may be able to visit Mainland Affairs Council officials. MAC officials may be able to visit Taiwan Affairs Office officials. But such visits are all handled through "white gloves." Will Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council officials be able to exchange visits and have personal contacts? If they can, it means the legal obstacles have been cleared away. They will then be able to shake hands without white gloves. The white gloves will have fulfilled their purpose.
The day Wang Yi retired he said, "The time is ripe for the Director of the Taiwan Task Office to visit Taiwan." He hoped that Zhang Zhijun, his successor, could make the trip as soon as possible. This was right on the mark. The Mainland Affairs Council responded positively. It said that time, personnel, and conditions permitting, it welcomed a cross-Strait visit. Since both sides are willing, Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu Qi should visit each other as soon as possible.
Wang Yi said that over eight million cross-Strait visits are made each year. Over the past five years over 1500 provincial level delegations from the Mainland have visited Taiwan. Logically speaking, our side should be able to reciprocate. That is only reasonable. But Wang Yi knows that the most serious legal obstacle is the status quo. As Wang Yi noted, eight million people make cross-Strait visits a year. Over the past five years, over 1500 provincial level delegations have visited Taiwan. If the Taiwan Affairs Office and the MAC still cannot remove their "white gloves," then they are clearly being unreasonable. They are clearly engaging in posturing and deception.
Therefore, if Beijing wants Zhang Zhijun to visit to Taiwan, it must first remove the existing cross-Strait legal obstacles. This is something the two sides' administrative authorities must clear away before visits are possible. If visits ensue, it will be a major achievement in cross-Strait legal relations. It is only reasonable.
But Wang Yi appeared to hold back. He seemed to be saying that Zhang Zhijun could visit Taiwan only as a party official, as Director of the Taiwan Task Office. He seemed to be making a distinction between it and the Taiwan Affairs Office. Such distinctions are totally unnecessary. But if such distinctions enable Zhang Zhijun to visit as soon as possible, then the two sides should seize the opportunity, and not become mired in word games.
The Ma administration should be happy to see officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office visit. It would undoubtedly be a major breakthrough in cross-Strait legal principles and cross-Strait realpolitik. If officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office can come here, then officials from the Mainland Affairs Council can of course go there.
The Ma administration's main concern is public reaction. In 2008 ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin came to Taiwan. The Taipei street scenes are still fresh in memories. But times have changed. Five years have gone by. The Democratic Progressive Party probably cannot get away with treating Zhang Zhijun the way they did Chen Yunlin. Zhang Zhijun coming here and Wang Yu Qi going there could mark a new era in cross-Strait relations. The DPP's cross-Strait policy must change with the times.
Wang Yi thinks that the time is ripe for the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, or Taiwan Task Office, as the case may be, to visit Taiwan. Zhang Zhijun is using this framework in his planning for cross-Strait offices. He is being cautious. The cross-Strait offices will be upgraded agencies of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council. The role of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council will be downgraded. In other words, he is moving to take off the white gloves.
On January 16, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Cross-Strait Offices Should Take Off the White Gloves." It addressed just this issue. We hope the authorities on both sides will reread it. Here are some excerpts.
Our recommendations are as follows. When Beijing establishes its cross-Strait offices, it should refer to the 18th National Congress Political Report. The report urged "exploring of cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." The Ma administration can refer to the Preface of the Constitution as amended. The preface includes the phrase, "in response to the nation's need prior to reunification." Therefore the establishment of the cross-Strait offices should reflect four conditions. 1. The nation has yet to be reunified. 2. Special circumstances prevail. 3. The two sides are establishing political relations. 4. They will make fair and reasonable arrangements.
In other words, Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council officials will exchange visits. The two sides will establish offices. They should "explore cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." In essence, they should remove the white gloves.
Wang Yi was a highly qualified Director for the Taiwan Affairs Office. His greatest achievement was "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." This was his policy innovation. Today he is proposing that the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office visit Taiwan. This too is part of his thinking. We hope his successor Zhang Zhijun will follow up on his initiatives.
On the evening before Wang Yi became Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing issued some critical remarks about Taiwan-related aspects of the Tokyo March 11 memorial service and the election of the new Pope. Wang Yi said that although he had left the Taiwan Affairs Office, regardless of where he went (He went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) he would always worry about the people of Taiwan and feel a sense of responsibility toward them. These words are how we choose to remember Wang Yi's five years in office.
If we can conduct cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China, even Foreign Minister Wang Yi visiting Taiwan is conceivable.
甩掉白手套：促成王郁琦、張志軍跨海互訪
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.19 04:12 am
五年來，王毅是稱職勝任的北京台辦主持人，也應是留給台灣人民不錯印象的台辦主任。他在周日卸任當天說：任內略有遺憾的是沒能去台灣訪問。
他為繼任者張志軍發聲說：中台辦主任（黨職，兼國台辦主任）的「訪台時機已大體成熟」，希望張志軍能「儘快」赴台訪問。
王毅誠為箇中老手，可謂一語道破了目前兩岸關係的瓶頸。兩岸迄今仍以海協會及海基會為「白手套」，這是國台辦及陸委會的主持官員不能互訪的主要「法理障礙」。因為，國台辦及陸委會皆是「治權機關」（治權源自主權），唯兩方在「法理上」不承認對方的「治權」，所以也在「法理上」應當互不承認國台辦與陸委會；因而，即使海協會人員來訪可見陸委會官員，而海基會人員往訪也可見國台辦官員，但這皆是透過「白手套」。如果今後國台辦與陸委會的官員可以互訪並親身接觸，應即表示：兩岸的「法理障礙」已經鬆緩或轉化，肉掌與肉掌已可相握，白手套也漸已「完成階段性任務」。
王毅在卸任當日拋出「中台辦主任訪台時機已大體成熟」的說法，並希望繼任的張志軍能儘快成行，這是一個切中肯綮的政策創見。此間陸委會亦有善意回應稱：在適當時機、身分與相關條件充分情況下，歡迎主管兩岸事務的負責人互訪。我們認為：既是「你有情、我有意」，即應及早儘速促成張志軍與王郁琦互訪。
王毅說：如今兩岸一年互訪人次已逾八百萬，而五年來已有一千五百多個「省部級訪問團」訪台，「按道理我也可以去」。這話說得「合情合理」，然而王毅自亦知，現狀最主要是出自前述「法理障礙」；但既然目前兩岸已如王毅所說每年八百萬人次往返，五年一千五百多個「省部團隊」訪台，而若國台辦及陸委會卻仍脫不掉「白手套」，這當然「按道理」也說不通。若非裝模作樣，即是自欺欺人。
所以，北京若要促成張志軍訪台，首須「按道理」把兩岸現存的「法理障礙」排除；這固然是兩岸涉台治權部門得以互訪的法理前提，而果若促成互訪，則亦是兩岸關係在法理及現實上的重大成就，何況「按道理」也應如此。
然而，王毅似也語帶保留，他好像是在說，張志軍將以黨職「中台辦主任」的身分訪台，而與其治權部門「國台辦主任」的兼職有所區隔。我們雖認為「按道理」大可不必如此，但若這層曲折有利於促成張志軍儘早來訪，雙方亦當珍惜並促成，不必再陷於文字遊戲。
其實，馬政府完全沒有不樂見國台辦官員來訪的理由，因為這毫無疑問將是兩岸關係在法理及現實上的重大突破及進展。而國台辦官員若能來，陸委會官員當然也能去。
馬政府主要的顧慮應是在社會反應。二○○八年海協會長陳雲林來台的台北街景記憶猶新；但畢竟如今已歷五年於茲的物換星移，我們想像民進黨今日已無可能用對待陳雲林的手法來「接待」張志軍。而張志軍的來訪及王郁琦的往訪，當可為兩岸關係標誌一個新紀元，民進黨的兩岸政策也必須與時俱進。
再進一步說，王毅既然認為國台辦（中台辦）主任訪台的時機已成熟，則張志軍亦可在這樣的思考架構下，進行兩岸互設辦事處的規劃。斟酌的方向是：應將兩岸辦事處作為國台辦、陸委會的派出機關之實質功能升高，而將之視作「兩會」派出機構的形式作用降低。也就是說，從大方向看，應當朝往「脫掉白手套」的方向思考。
本報一月十六日社論〈兩岸辦事處應當脫掉白手套〉一文，曾對此一議題有所申論，盼兩岸當局的有心人能拾回再看一次。茲用引號摘錄該篇社論略謂：
「我們的建議是：北京在研榷兩岸辦事處時，應可從十八大政治報告所指『探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排』開始發想；而馬政府則可根據憲法增修條文序文所稱『為因應國家統一前的需要』啟動思考。於是，兩岸辦事處的設立，應當反映並滿足四個條件：一、國家尚未統一；二、特殊情況下的；三、兩岸政治關係；四、作出合情合理的安排。」
也就是說，從兩岸國台辦與陸委會官員互訪，至兩岸互設辦事處，皆應朝向「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」去設想，大方向則是「脫掉白手套！」
王毅是一位稱職勝任的國台辦主持人。他任內最大的成就，即在參與「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」之政策創新，如今他主張台辦主持人訪台，也應是出自此一思維脈絡；我們希望，繼任者張志軍在此一議題上能有承先啟後、繼往開來的表現。
就在王毅出任外交部長前夕，北京外交部突然爆出對東京三一一追悼會及教宗即位兩事涉台部分的尖銳評論。王毅說，他離開台辦，不管到什麼地方工作（他到了外交部），對台灣民眾都會多一分掛念、理解與責任；就憑這一段話，我們會記住這五年的台辦主任王毅。
其實，倘能在「大屋頂中國」下安排兩岸關係，甚至外交部長王毅來台訪問亦非不能想像。
Monday, March 18, 2013
Cross-Strait Framework: The Big Roof Concept of China
Cross-Strait Framework: The Big Roof Concept of China
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2013
This book sums up our talking points on cross-Strait policy. It is entitled, "The Big Roof Concept of China."
The authorities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have reached an impasse on China's reunification. The authorities in Beijing want to reunify China. But they have been unable to do so because the authorities in Taipei are unwilling.
But is reunification the only cross-Strait goal? Prior to reunification, can the two sides set for ourselves another goal? Is it possible to establish a situation under which the two sides are "neither reunified, nor divided?" Is reunification the highest goal? Is there no goal higher than reunification?
Breaking Out of the Box, Seeking Intelligent Solutions
We must break out of the box. We must consider the problems. Cross-Strait relations are a peculiar development in human history. They require complex, sophisticated, and extraordinary political and economic solutions. They require solutions that satisfy both hearts and minds.
This book attempts to set forth one possible solution. More importantly, it attempts to stimulate peoples' imagination. It attempts to seek a solution for cross-Strait problems that will merit inclusion in mankind's glorious history.
Perhaps someone has a better solution. But the solution we wish to set forth is the Big Roof Concept of China.
The Big Roof Concept of China
Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong under the same Big Roof Concept of China. Both share undivided sovereignty and an undivided interest in one China.
Twenty Big Roof China Talking Points
The content and significance of the Big Roof Concept of China can be summed up in Twenty Big Roof China Talking Points.
1. The Preface of the Amended Constitution of the Republic of China states that "In response to the needs of the nation prior to reunification... the provisions of the Constitution have been amended." The Political Report of the 18th CCP Peoples Congress calls for "Exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." The two propositions, "the nation prior to reunification," and "the nation has yet to be reunified," overlap. This is where the "Big Roof Concept of China" applies.
2. So-called "fair and reasonable arrangements" are subsumed under the Big Roof Concept of China.
The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report agrees.
3. The Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress Political Report states, "Although it has yet to be reunified, it remains one China." It calls for "exploring cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." Its logic differs little from the Big Roof Concept of China. One could simply change the title.
4. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong under the same Big Roof Concept of China. This framework falls within the scope of the One China Principle. It can even be considered an upgraded version of One China, Different Interpretations.
5. The Big Roof Concept of China is the only cross-Strait solution that does not require "me swallowing up you, or you swallowing up me." Using the Big Roof Concept of China's linkage points, one can establish political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. The two sides can lighten the reunification vs. independence burden. The two sides can improve their internal and external governance. The Big Roof Concept of China ensures against leaders on either side seeking irrational, uncivilized solutions to cross-Strait problems.
For Taiwan, The Big Roof Concept of China Can Reduce Internal Friction over Taiwan Independence
6. For Taiwan, the Big Roof Concept of China can reduce internal friction over Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. Clamoring for Taiwan independence is nothing more than internal friction. The Constitution of the Republic of China allows for "responses to national unity" under "yet to be reunified cross-Strait political conditions." These constitutional provisions include the signing of a peace agreement. The Republic of China under the Big Roof Concept of China, can give the two sides greater maneuvering room, both for cross-Strait and international relations. It can enable Taiwan to upgrade its political and economic system. Taipei can provide checks and balances on Beijing. It need only maintain its party politics and electoral system. It can then use its democratic institutions to moderate Beijing's actions.
7. In fact, some DPP moderates hope the Ma administration can make a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. That way, in the event the DPP returns to power, it can more easily "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy."
The Big Roof Concept of China can Liberate Beijing from its Commitments
8. For the Mainland, the Big Roof Concept of China can provide relief from Taiwan independence pressures. Beijing can lighten its burden of preventing Taiwan independence, as well as its burden of promoting reunification. It can liberate itself from its commitments. This can significantly reduce the political risk of the Taiwan problem. This would be beneficial to both its internal and external governance.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Provide a Positive Example for 1.3 billion People on the Mainland
9. Beijing's willingness to rebuild cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China would set a positive example. It would demonstrate internal and external respect for liberal democracy. Beijing's refusal to use military or political and economic blackmail against Taipei, would mean that the CCP elites have set high standards for themselves. It would mean that the Chinese Communist Party appreciates the value of democracy. It would set a positive example for 1.3 billion Chinese on the mainland. It would correct the course of China's development. Conversely, if the Republic of China was swallowed up by the People's Republic of China before achieving a certain degree of democracy, those democratic Chinese elements could be lost forever.
The Big Roof Concept of China offers a Practicable Ultimate Solution and Interim Solution
10. The Big Roof Concept of China could be the ultimate solution. Examples include a confederation or the EU model. It could also be an interim solution. The Big Roof Concept of China does not rule out reunification. It merely stipulates that if one seeks reunification, the Big Roof Concept of China ought to be the interim solution. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the two sides can confront and cope with the problems of reunification. They can ensure that cross-Strait relations adopt a reasonable process in order to arrive at a more reasonable goal.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Encourage the Public on Taiwan to Acknowledge their Chinese Identity
11. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China. It is part of China. This will encourage the public on of Taiwan to re-identify with China, and re-acknowledge that they are Chinese. It will contribute to long term growth and development.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Provide Flexibility in International Affairs
12. The Big Roof Concept of China can provide flexibililty in international affairs, such as the Diaoyutai Islands conflict.
13. Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and allowed people to visit their Mainland relatives. This linked cross-strait exchanges with Taiwan's democratic institutions. Deng Xiaoping implemented "one country, two systems." This resolved the Hong Kong retrocession crisis. The Big Roof Concept of China has gained widespread acceptance on both sides of the Strait. All it needs is someone with the stature of a Chiang Ching-kuo or Deng Xiaoping to promote it.
The Big Roof Concept of China can help the Two Sides Jettison the Phony Issue of "Reunification vs. Independence"
14. The two sides are mired in a phony issue -- "reunification vs. independence." In fact, reunification is impracticable. Independence is impossible. Leaders must use the Big Roof Concept of China to liberate people from this dilemma. They must liberate them from this agony, this injustice, this unusual cruelty.
15. Most importantly, cross-Strait relations is an unprecedented political problem. It demands a wise and sensitive solution. The solution should honor human civilization. It should be a happy event in China's history. It must not be an event that dishonors human civilization. It must not be a tragic chapter in China's history. Only such a solution can be termed a "Renaissance of the Chinese nation."
Coercing Outsiders and Deceiving Insiders is not Genuine Nationalism
16. As matters stand, the Republic of China can accept the People's Republic of China as socialist China. The problem is the People's Republic of China is unwilling to accept the Republic of China as democratic China. The solution is for both sides to acknowledge the "special circumstances" that prevail, and see them as the Big Roof Concept of China. Over a century of catastrophes was the price paid for the blessings of history and civilization. They should be cherished. We must not attempt to swallow up each other. Alas, the People's Republic of China has used foreign nations and foreign diplomacy to blockade democratic China. It is attempting to swallow up democracratic China. It is using foreign nations to bully fellow Chinese. Bullying the weak is not true nationalism. It is the way warlords conduct themselves. This is not the face one should present to human civilization. Still less is this the face one should to present to China's history. Otherwise, one will destroy civilization and leave a stain on history.
The Definition of Sovereignty Can Change Over Time
17. The Big Roof Concept of China is an innovative concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is fundamentally a human artifice. Its meaning and shape can change over time. For example, why were East and West Germany able to see each other not as foreign countries? Why can today's EU have, on top of the member states' constitutions, the EU constitution? The Big Roof Concept of China is a creative new concept of sovereignty. Why allow outdated concepts of sovereignty to trump the Big Roof Concept of China? As long as the two sides accept in principle the Big Roof Concept of China, the legal details will not be that difficult to work out.
A Powerful China Should be Tolerant
18. The People's Republic of China is one of major powerhouses in the world. It has immense national strength. It should be tolerant toward the democratic Republic of China. It should be responsible and inclusive. It should to offer a solution worthy of human civilization and China's history. It must not commit a major blunder unworthy of civilization and history. The Big Roof Concept of China is simple. Neither side swallows the other side up. Only that is befitting of a large and civilized country. Only that shows the world what China is.
The Common Man's China, Uphold the Consensus, No One Swallows Up the Other
19. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, Taiwan should attempt to persuade Chinese the world over, especially 1.3 billion on the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao, to accept the proposition that "The Republic of China is democratic China." This "common man's understanding of China" is Taiwan's most important guarantee under the One China Principle. Democratic China can become a universal political symbol and shared political philosophy. When that happens, given concern among Chinese people the world over, who would have the heart, who would dare to swallow up this Chinese republic?
A One China in which Sovereignty is Indivisible and Shared
20. Finally, let us return to the issue first raised. "What do we do when we cannot reunify?" This is not a refusal to reunify or a rejection of reunification. But reunification cannot be rushed. It may take a long time. It may require a great deal of groundwork. It may require a platform upon which one can slowly and deliberately work out the details. This will enable symbiotic, win/win cross-Strait relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. If one does not want reunification to become synonymous with separatism, one should invoke the Big Roof Concept of China. One should invoke a One China that combines the two sides' indivisible and shared sovereignty. This will create cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. What other way is there?
兩岸大架構：大屋頂下的中國
【聯合報╱黃 年】 2013.03.01
本書是一部嘗試性的兩岸政策說帖，帖名：大屋頂中國。
兩岸卡在「統一」議題上。北京想統，統不成；台灣不想統。
統一是否兩岸唯一的目的？在統一前，能不能另有一個目的？有無可能「既未統一／又不分裂」？統一是否最好的目的？有沒有比統一更好的目的？
擺脫條條框框 找到智慧答案
應當擺脫條條框框，想一想這些問題。兩岸關係是人類歷史上僅見的奇特、複雜、精細又重大無比的政經工程，它值得爭取到一個充滿智慧與感情的答案。
本書是在嘗試提出一個可能的答案，但更重要的是在激發任何人的想像力，共同為兩岸問題尋找一個足可在人類歷史文明上輝煌不朽的解答。
那麼，也許就會有人作出更好的答案。在此我想嘗試提出的方案是：大屋頂中國。
大屋頂中國：
在大屋頂中國下，
中華民國是民主中國，
中華人民共和國是社會主義中國；
二者皆是一部分的中國，
同屬「一個（大屋頂）中國」，
亦即「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。
大屋頂中國說帖二十條
試就「大屋頂中國」的內涵與理由作一歸納整理，可稱為「大屋頂中國說帖二十條」：
一、《中華民國憲法》增修條款序文開宗明義指出，「為因應國家統一前之需要……增修本憲法條文如左」，與中共十八大政治報告所稱「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，其中，在「國家統一前」與「國家尚未統一」二者，當有交集，應是「大屋頂中國」可以發揮之處。
二、所謂「合情合理的安排」，莫過於「大屋頂中國」。
中共十八大報告 理路幾相同
三、中共十八大政治報告所總結的「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」，及「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，其理路與「大屋頂中國」幾無二致，幾乎只消換一個標題，即可順理成章。
四、在大屋頂中國下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬「一個大屋頂中國」。此一架構，本在「一個中國原則」的範圍之內，甚至也是「一中各表」或「一國兩制」的升級版。
五、大屋頂中國應是唯一不是「我吃掉你，你吃掉我」的兩岸方案。有了「大屋頂中國」的「連結點」，建立「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」，兩岸應可減輕統獨的牽絆，各自致力於內外治理的改善。「大屋頂中國」是防制兩岸主政者以非理性、反文明的方法作為兩岸解決方案的保險設計。
對台灣 可減少台獨的內耗
六、對台灣言，可以減少台獨的內耗；因台獨已無可能，內耗而已。在「為因應國家統一前需要」的中華民國憲法下，經營「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」，如簽定和平協議，乃合憲的作為。大屋頂中國下的中華民國，在兩岸間及國際上當有較大的空間，得以改善台灣的政經品質。至於台灣對北京當局的制衡，只要維持政黨政治及選舉制度，即可用民主體制以相節制。
七、其實，有些民進黨內的理智者，心中巴望馬政府在兩岸多作出一些突破，則民進黨若再執政，即可「延續前朝兩岸政策」。
北京 免陷於「承諾的陷阱」
八、對大陸言，在大屋頂中國下，應可緩解「台獨」的因素；北京既可減輕「防獨」的承當，又可減輕「促統」的負荷，更免陷於「承諾的陷阱」。如此，台灣問題成為北京政治風險的可能性應可大幅降低，有益其內外治理。
對十三億大陸人民 正向示範
九、北京願以「大屋頂中國」重建兩岸關係，對內對外皆是宣示對於自由民主體制之尊重；而北京不採軍事或政經暴力挾制台灣，將被視為中共統治階層表達了最深刻的自期自勉，顯示中共對「民主中國」的價值知所珍惜，這對十三億中國大陸人民應是正向的示範，亦可導正中國的發展方向。反之，倘若中華民國在中華人民共和國實現一定程度的民主體制前，被中華人民共和國「吃掉」，則中國即可能永遠失去「民主中國」的元素。
可做終極方案 也可中程方案
十、「大屋頂中國」可以做為終極方案（如：邦聯、歐盟模式），但也可做為「中程方案」。「大屋頂中國」並未排除統一；只是認為，若欲「統一」，應以「大屋頂中國」為「中程方案」；在「大屋頂中國」的平台上，兩岸可進一步共同面對並處理「統一」的問題。如此，始能確保兩岸關係「從合理的過程，到改善之目的」。
有助台灣人民的「中國」認同
十一、在「大屋頂中國」中，中華民國為民主中國，是一部分的中國；可使台灣人民的「中國」與「中國人」認同，得到成長與發展的憑藉。
對國際事務的肆應 更加靈動
十二、「大屋頂中國」對國際事務如釣魚台事件的肆應，當更加靈動有力。
十三、蔣經國的「解嚴／探親」政策，使兩岸交流與民主體制交纏，鄧小平的「一國兩制」化解了香港的回歸危機。「大屋頂中國」的思想早在兩岸間流傳發展，所欠只是一「蔣經國」或「鄧小平」的傑出人物而已。
兩岸跳出「統／獨」假議題
十四、兩岸陷於「統／獨」的假議題中，其實卻是統不得，獨不成；領袖人物若不能以「大屋頂中國」帶領民眾跳出此一困境，徒使人民陷於輾轉痛苦，殊是殘民以逞，不仁不義。
十五、最重要的是，兩岸關係這個亙古無二的政治難題，值得一個充滿智慧與感情的答案。應使成為人類文明的光榮，與中國歷史的喜劇；不可使之淪為人類文明的恥辱，與中國歷史的悲劇。如此，始可言「中華民族的偉大復興」。
挾外欺內 不是真正民族主義
十六、以當前的情勢，中華民國應可接受中華人民共和國為社會主義中國，問題在中華人民共和國不願接受中華民國為民主中國。化解之道，在於雙方皆應將「特殊情況」的現狀，視為在「大屋頂中國」下經歷百餘年劫難而換得的歷史及文明的恩典與機遇，該當相互珍惜，而勿「誰吃掉誰」。然而，如今在國際上，中華人民共和國挾制外國以外交圍堵封殺「民主中國」；在兩岸之內，亦欲吃掉「民主中國」。這是挾外欺內，恃強凌弱，不是真正的民族主義，而只是軍閥作風；此非面對人類文明的應有高度，更非面對中國歷史的應有器識。否則，勢將毀了文明，亦汙染了歷史。
主權內涵形貌 可因時空改變
十七、「大屋頂中國」涉及主權理念的創新發明，唯主權原本就是一個人造物，其內涵與形貌可因時空遞嬗而改變姿采。例如，過去東西德何以能互視為「不是外國的國家」？而今日歐盟又怎會在各會員國的憲法之上，另有歐盟憲法？主權理念的創新若能維繫「大屋頂中國」的完整，即何必用「主權」去分裂「大屋頂中國」？只要兩岸在原則上接納「大屋頂中國」，細節的法制規劃皆不難設想。
強大「中國」 應表現包容涵納
十八、中華人民共和國已是世界數一數二的強國大國，以如此豐厚的綜合國力，在面對民主中國中華民國時，應當表現出包容涵納的能力，並承當起包容涵納的責任；亦即應當拿出對人類文明與中國歷史皆可交代的方法，不可在文明及歷史上犯下不可交代的錯誤。由於「大屋頂中國」不是「吃掉」那麼簡單，這才是大國與文明國的應有承當與氣度，亦是「中國」可給世界文明的示範。
「庶民中國」獲共識 誰敢吃掉
十九、台灣應當在「大屋頂中國」下，努力爭取全球華人，尤其是十三億大陸及港澳人民，協助並接受「中華民國是民主中國」的立場；這樣的「庶民中國」共識，才是台灣在「一個中國原則」下最重要的支撐與保障。當「民主中國」成為一個通用的「政治符號」，與共惜的「政治理念」，在全球華人的關懷下，誰忍、誰敢「吃掉」這個「中華」的「民國」？
主權相互含蘊共同合成的一個中國
二十、最後可回到文首提出的問題：「統一不了，該怎麼辦？」不是否定統一或排除統一，但統一已是一個無法快、快不得，可能拖很久、磨很久的課題，必須有一慢工出細活的平台，以便兩岸關係在「尚未統一的特殊情況」下共生雙贏。若不欲「統一」成為「分裂」的同義詞，除了進入「大屋頂中國」，除了進入「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」，並藉以營造「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，豈有他法？
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2013
This book sums up our talking points on cross-Strait policy. It is entitled, "The Big Roof Concept of China."
The authorities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have reached an impasse on China's reunification. The authorities in Beijing want to reunify China. But they have been unable to do so because the authorities in Taipei are unwilling.
But is reunification the only cross-Strait goal? Prior to reunification, can the two sides set for ourselves another goal? Is it possible to establish a situation under which the two sides are "neither reunified, nor divided?" Is reunification the highest goal? Is there no goal higher than reunification?
Breaking Out of the Box, Seeking Intelligent Solutions
We must break out of the box. We must consider the problems. Cross-Strait relations are a peculiar development in human history. They require complex, sophisticated, and extraordinary political and economic solutions. They require solutions that satisfy both hearts and minds.
This book attempts to set forth one possible solution. More importantly, it attempts to stimulate peoples' imagination. It attempts to seek a solution for cross-Strait problems that will merit inclusion in mankind's glorious history.
Perhaps someone has a better solution. But the solution we wish to set forth is the Big Roof Concept of China.
The Big Roof Concept of China
Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong under the same Big Roof Concept of China. Both share undivided sovereignty and an undivided interest in one China.
Twenty Big Roof China Talking Points
The content and significance of the Big Roof Concept of China can be summed up in Twenty Big Roof China Talking Points.
1. The Preface of the Amended Constitution of the Republic of China states that "In response to the needs of the nation prior to reunification... the provisions of the Constitution have been amended." The Political Report of the 18th CCP Peoples Congress calls for "Exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and making fair and reasonable arrangements." The two propositions, "the nation prior to reunification," and "the nation has yet to be reunified," overlap. This is where the "Big Roof Concept of China" applies.
2. So-called "fair and reasonable arrangements" are subsumed under the Big Roof Concept of China.
The CCP 18th National Congress Political Report agrees.
3. The Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress Political Report states, "Although it has yet to be reunified, it remains one China." It calls for "exploring cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." Its logic differs little from the Big Roof Concept of China. One could simply change the title.
4. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong under the same Big Roof Concept of China. This framework falls within the scope of the One China Principle. It can even be considered an upgraded version of One China, Different Interpretations.
5. The Big Roof Concept of China is the only cross-Strait solution that does not require "me swallowing up you, or you swallowing up me." Using the Big Roof Concept of China's linkage points, one can establish political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. The two sides can lighten the reunification vs. independence burden. The two sides can improve their internal and external governance. The Big Roof Concept of China ensures against leaders on either side seeking irrational, uncivilized solutions to cross-Strait problems.
For Taiwan, The Big Roof Concept of China Can Reduce Internal Friction over Taiwan Independence
6. For Taiwan, the Big Roof Concept of China can reduce internal friction over Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. Clamoring for Taiwan independence is nothing more than internal friction. The Constitution of the Republic of China allows for "responses to national unity" under "yet to be reunified cross-Strait political conditions." These constitutional provisions include the signing of a peace agreement. The Republic of China under the Big Roof Concept of China, can give the two sides greater maneuvering room, both for cross-Strait and international relations. It can enable Taiwan to upgrade its political and economic system. Taipei can provide checks and balances on Beijing. It need only maintain its party politics and electoral system. It can then use its democratic institutions to moderate Beijing's actions.
7. In fact, some DPP moderates hope the Ma administration can make a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. That way, in the event the DPP returns to power, it can more easily "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy."
The Big Roof Concept of China can Liberate Beijing from its Commitments
8. For the Mainland, the Big Roof Concept of China can provide relief from Taiwan independence pressures. Beijing can lighten its burden of preventing Taiwan independence, as well as its burden of promoting reunification. It can liberate itself from its commitments. This can significantly reduce the political risk of the Taiwan problem. This would be beneficial to both its internal and external governance.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Provide a Positive Example for 1.3 billion People on the Mainland
9. Beijing's willingness to rebuild cross-Strait relations under the Big Roof Concept of China would set a positive example. It would demonstrate internal and external respect for liberal democracy. Beijing's refusal to use military or political and economic blackmail against Taipei, would mean that the CCP elites have set high standards for themselves. It would mean that the Chinese Communist Party appreciates the value of democracy. It would set a positive example for 1.3 billion Chinese on the mainland. It would correct the course of China's development. Conversely, if the Republic of China was swallowed up by the People's Republic of China before achieving a certain degree of democracy, those democratic Chinese elements could be lost forever.
The Big Roof Concept of China offers a Practicable Ultimate Solution and Interim Solution
10. The Big Roof Concept of China could be the ultimate solution. Examples include a confederation or the EU model. It could also be an interim solution. The Big Roof Concept of China does not rule out reunification. It merely stipulates that if one seeks reunification, the Big Roof Concept of China ought to be the interim solution. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the two sides can confront and cope with the problems of reunification. They can ensure that cross-Strait relations adopt a reasonable process in order to arrive at a more reasonable goal.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Encourage the Public on Taiwan to Acknowledge their Chinese Identity
11. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China. It is part of China. This will encourage the public on of Taiwan to re-identify with China, and re-acknowledge that they are Chinese. It will contribute to long term growth and development.
The Big Roof Concept of China can Provide Flexibility in International Affairs
12. The Big Roof Concept of China can provide flexibililty in international affairs, such as the Diaoyutai Islands conflict.
13. Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and allowed people to visit their Mainland relatives. This linked cross-strait exchanges with Taiwan's democratic institutions. Deng Xiaoping implemented "one country, two systems." This resolved the Hong Kong retrocession crisis. The Big Roof Concept of China has gained widespread acceptance on both sides of the Strait. All it needs is someone with the stature of a Chiang Ching-kuo or Deng Xiaoping to promote it.
The Big Roof Concept of China can help the Two Sides Jettison the Phony Issue of "Reunification vs. Independence"
14. The two sides are mired in a phony issue -- "reunification vs. independence." In fact, reunification is impracticable. Independence is impossible. Leaders must use the Big Roof Concept of China to liberate people from this dilemma. They must liberate them from this agony, this injustice, this unusual cruelty.
15. Most importantly, cross-Strait relations is an unprecedented political problem. It demands a wise and sensitive solution. The solution should honor human civilization. It should be a happy event in China's history. It must not be an event that dishonors human civilization. It must not be a tragic chapter in China's history. Only such a solution can be termed a "Renaissance of the Chinese nation."
Coercing Outsiders and Deceiving Insiders is not Genuine Nationalism
16. As matters stand, the Republic of China can accept the People's Republic of China as socialist China. The problem is the People's Republic of China is unwilling to accept the Republic of China as democratic China. The solution is for both sides to acknowledge the "special circumstances" that prevail, and see them as the Big Roof Concept of China. Over a century of catastrophes was the price paid for the blessings of history and civilization. They should be cherished. We must not attempt to swallow up each other. Alas, the People's Republic of China has used foreign nations and foreign diplomacy to blockade democratic China. It is attempting to swallow up democracratic China. It is using foreign nations to bully fellow Chinese. Bullying the weak is not true nationalism. It is the way warlords conduct themselves. This is not the face one should present to human civilization. Still less is this the face one should to present to China's history. Otherwise, one will destroy civilization and leave a stain on history.
The Definition of Sovereignty Can Change Over Time
17. The Big Roof Concept of China is an innovative concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is fundamentally a human artifice. Its meaning and shape can change over time. For example, why were East and West Germany able to see each other not as foreign countries? Why can today's EU have, on top of the member states' constitutions, the EU constitution? The Big Roof Concept of China is a creative new concept of sovereignty. Why allow outdated concepts of sovereignty to trump the Big Roof Concept of China? As long as the two sides accept in principle the Big Roof Concept of China, the legal details will not be that difficult to work out.
A Powerful China Should be Tolerant
18. The People's Republic of China is one of major powerhouses in the world. It has immense national strength. It should be tolerant toward the democratic Republic of China. It should be responsible and inclusive. It should to offer a solution worthy of human civilization and China's history. It must not commit a major blunder unworthy of civilization and history. The Big Roof Concept of China is simple. Neither side swallows the other side up. Only that is befitting of a large and civilized country. Only that shows the world what China is.
The Common Man's China, Uphold the Consensus, No One Swallows Up the Other
19. Under the Big Roof Concept of China, Taiwan should attempt to persuade Chinese the world over, especially 1.3 billion on the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao, to accept the proposition that "The Republic of China is democratic China." This "common man's understanding of China" is Taiwan's most important guarantee under the One China Principle. Democratic China can become a universal political symbol and shared political philosophy. When that happens, given concern among Chinese people the world over, who would have the heart, who would dare to swallow up this Chinese republic?
A One China in which Sovereignty is Indivisible and Shared
20. Finally, let us return to the issue first raised. "What do we do when we cannot reunify?" This is not a refusal to reunify or a rejection of reunification. But reunification cannot be rushed. It may take a long time. It may require a great deal of groundwork. It may require a platform upon which one can slowly and deliberately work out the details. This will enable symbiotic, win/win cross-Strait relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. If one does not want reunification to become synonymous with separatism, one should invoke the Big Roof Concept of China. One should invoke a One China that combines the two sides' indivisible and shared sovereignty. This will create cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. What other way is there?
兩岸大架構：大屋頂下的中國
【聯合報╱黃 年】 2013.03.01
本書是一部嘗試性的兩岸政策說帖，帖名：大屋頂中國。
兩岸卡在「統一」議題上。北京想統，統不成；台灣不想統。
統一是否兩岸唯一的目的？在統一前，能不能另有一個目的？有無可能「既未統一／又不分裂」？統一是否最好的目的？有沒有比統一更好的目的？
擺脫條條框框 找到智慧答案
應當擺脫條條框框，想一想這些問題。兩岸關係是人類歷史上僅見的奇特、複雜、精細又重大無比的政經工程，它值得爭取到一個充滿智慧與感情的答案。
本書是在嘗試提出一個可能的答案，但更重要的是在激發任何人的想像力，共同為兩岸問題尋找一個足可在人類歷史文明上輝煌不朽的解答。
那麼，也許就會有人作出更好的答案。在此我想嘗試提出的方案是：大屋頂中國。
大屋頂中國：
在大屋頂中國下，
中華民國是民主中國，
中華人民共和國是社會主義中國；
二者皆是一部分的中國，
同屬「一個（大屋頂）中國」，
亦即「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。
大屋頂中國說帖二十條
試就「大屋頂中國」的內涵與理由作一歸納整理，可稱為「大屋頂中國說帖二十條」：
一、《中華民國憲法》增修條款序文開宗明義指出，「為因應國家統一前之需要……增修本憲法條文如左」，與中共十八大政治報告所稱「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，其中，在「國家統一前」與「國家尚未統一」二者，當有交集，應是「大屋頂中國」可以發揮之處。
二、所謂「合情合理的安排」，莫過於「大屋頂中國」。
中共十八大報告 理路幾相同
三、中共十八大政治報告所總結的「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」，及「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，其理路與「大屋頂中國」幾無二致，幾乎只消換一個標題，即可順理成章。
四、在大屋頂中國下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬「一個大屋頂中國」。此一架構，本在「一個中國原則」的範圍之內，甚至也是「一中各表」或「一國兩制」的升級版。
五、大屋頂中國應是唯一不是「我吃掉你，你吃掉我」的兩岸方案。有了「大屋頂中國」的「連結點」，建立「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」，兩岸應可減輕統獨的牽絆，各自致力於內外治理的改善。「大屋頂中國」是防制兩岸主政者以非理性、反文明的方法作為兩岸解決方案的保險設計。
對台灣 可減少台獨的內耗
六、對台灣言，可以減少台獨的內耗；因台獨已無可能，內耗而已。在「為因應國家統一前需要」的中華民國憲法下，經營「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」，如簽定和平協議，乃合憲的作為。大屋頂中國下的中華民國，在兩岸間及國際上當有較大的空間，得以改善台灣的政經品質。至於台灣對北京當局的制衡，只要維持政黨政治及選舉制度，即可用民主體制以相節制。
七、其實，有些民進黨內的理智者，心中巴望馬政府在兩岸多作出一些突破，則民進黨若再執政，即可「延續前朝兩岸政策」。
北京 免陷於「承諾的陷阱」
八、對大陸言，在大屋頂中國下，應可緩解「台獨」的因素；北京既可減輕「防獨」的承當，又可減輕「促統」的負荷，更免陷於「承諾的陷阱」。如此，台灣問題成為北京政治風險的可能性應可大幅降低，有益其內外治理。
對十三億大陸人民 正向示範
九、北京願以「大屋頂中國」重建兩岸關係，對內對外皆是宣示對於自由民主體制之尊重；而北京不採軍事或政經暴力挾制台灣，將被視為中共統治階層表達了最深刻的自期自勉，顯示中共對「民主中國」的價值知所珍惜，這對十三億中國大陸人民應是正向的示範，亦可導正中國的發展方向。反之，倘若中華民國在中華人民共和國實現一定程度的民主體制前，被中華人民共和國「吃掉」，則中國即可能永遠失去「民主中國」的元素。
可做終極方案 也可中程方案
十、「大屋頂中國」可以做為終極方案（如：邦聯、歐盟模式），但也可做為「中程方案」。「大屋頂中國」並未排除統一；只是認為，若欲「統一」，應以「大屋頂中國」為「中程方案」；在「大屋頂中國」的平台上，兩岸可進一步共同面對並處理「統一」的問題。如此，始能確保兩岸關係「從合理的過程，到改善之目的」。
有助台灣人民的「中國」認同
十一、在「大屋頂中國」中，中華民國為民主中國，是一部分的中國；可使台灣人民的「中國」與「中國人」認同，得到成長與發展的憑藉。
對國際事務的肆應 更加靈動
十二、「大屋頂中國」對國際事務如釣魚台事件的肆應，當更加靈動有力。
十三、蔣經國的「解嚴／探親」政策，使兩岸交流與民主體制交纏，鄧小平的「一國兩制」化解了香港的回歸危機。「大屋頂中國」的思想早在兩岸間流傳發展，所欠只是一「蔣經國」或「鄧小平」的傑出人物而已。
兩岸跳出「統／獨」假議題
十四、兩岸陷於「統／獨」的假議題中，其實卻是統不得，獨不成；領袖人物若不能以「大屋頂中國」帶領民眾跳出此一困境，徒使人民陷於輾轉痛苦，殊是殘民以逞，不仁不義。
十五、最重要的是，兩岸關係這個亙古無二的政治難題，值得一個充滿智慧與感情的答案。應使成為人類文明的光榮，與中國歷史的喜劇；不可使之淪為人類文明的恥辱，與中國歷史的悲劇。如此，始可言「中華民族的偉大復興」。
挾外欺內 不是真正民族主義
十六、以當前的情勢，中華民國應可接受中華人民共和國為社會主義中國，問題在中華人民共和國不願接受中華民國為民主中國。化解之道，在於雙方皆應將「特殊情況」的現狀，視為在「大屋頂中國」下經歷百餘年劫難而換得的歷史及文明的恩典與機遇，該當相互珍惜，而勿「誰吃掉誰」。然而，如今在國際上，中華人民共和國挾制外國以外交圍堵封殺「民主中國」；在兩岸之內，亦欲吃掉「民主中國」。這是挾外欺內，恃強凌弱，不是真正的民族主義，而只是軍閥作風；此非面對人類文明的應有高度，更非面對中國歷史的應有器識。否則，勢將毀了文明，亦汙染了歷史。
主權內涵形貌 可因時空改變
十七、「大屋頂中國」涉及主權理念的創新發明，唯主權原本就是一個人造物，其內涵與形貌可因時空遞嬗而改變姿采。例如，過去東西德何以能互視為「不是外國的國家」？而今日歐盟又怎會在各會員國的憲法之上，另有歐盟憲法？主權理念的創新若能維繫「大屋頂中國」的完整，即何必用「主權」去分裂「大屋頂中國」？只要兩岸在原則上接納「大屋頂中國」，細節的法制規劃皆不難設想。
強大「中國」 應表現包容涵納
十八、中華人民共和國已是世界數一數二的強國大國，以如此豐厚的綜合國力，在面對民主中國中華民國時，應當表現出包容涵納的能力，並承當起包容涵納的責任；亦即應當拿出對人類文明與中國歷史皆可交代的方法，不可在文明及歷史上犯下不可交代的錯誤。由於「大屋頂中國」不是「吃掉」那麼簡單，這才是大國與文明國的應有承當與氣度，亦是「中國」可給世界文明的示範。
「庶民中國」獲共識 誰敢吃掉
十九、台灣應當在「大屋頂中國」下，努力爭取全球華人，尤其是十三億大陸及港澳人民，協助並接受「中華民國是民主中國」的立場；這樣的「庶民中國」共識，才是台灣在「一個中國原則」下最重要的支撐與保障。當「民主中國」成為一個通用的「政治符號」，與共惜的「政治理念」，在全球華人的關懷下，誰忍、誰敢「吃掉」這個「中華」的「民國」？
主權相互含蘊共同合成的一個中國
二十、最後可回到文首提出的問題：「統一不了，該怎麼辦？」不是否定統一或排除統一，但統一已是一個無法快、快不得，可能拖很久、磨很久的課題，必須有一慢工出細活的平台，以便兩岸關係在「尚未統一的特殊情況」下共生雙贏。若不欲「統一」成為「分裂」的同義詞，除了進入「大屋頂中國」，除了進入「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」，並藉以營造「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，豈有他法？
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