Advance or Retreat: Xi Jinping Administration Bottlenecks

Advance or Retreat:
Xi Jinping Administration Bottlenecks
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2013

Summary: CCP General Secretary and CCP Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping took over as President and Chairman of the State Central Military Commission today. This completed the handover of military leadership on the Chinese mainland. Consider the road ahead. The current handover must not result in Xi merely carrying out what Hu laid down. If Xi fails to go beyond what Hu laid down, if he fails to break through current bottlenecks, unfavorable developments could force the Mainland to retreat instead of advance.

Full Text below:

CCP General Secretary and CCP Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping took over as President and Chairman of the State Central Military Commission today. This completed the handover of military leadership on the Chinese mainland. Consider the road ahead. The current handover must not result in Xi merely carrying out what Hu laid down. If Xi fails to go beyond what Hu laid down, if he fails to break through current bottlenecks, unfavorable developments could force the Mainland to retreat instead of advance.

The Hu Jintao administration ruled for ten years. As we have pointed out, it made remarkable achievements in all aspects of goverance, internal and external. But it also ran headlong into a number of difficult bottlenecks. The Xi Jinping administration must now deal with these bottlenecks. If it fails to break through, it runs the risk of losing previously won ground.

The Xi Jinping team is taking over. Key indicators reveal its internal and external bottlenecks. 1. In health and welfare, it must deal with "qi shui nai fang" (氣水奶房). 2. In international relations, it must deal with North Korea's nuclear test and the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. 3. In cross-Strait relations, it must deal with the Lien-Xi Summit. 4. In political reform, it must deal with the Southern Weekly incident.

Health and welfare bottlenecks include qi, or smog; shui, or water pollution; nai, or toxic milk; and fang, or skyrocketing housing prices. These four bottlenecks are health and welfare issues. They reveal government ineptitude and failure. Smog and water pollution show that the eco-system unfit for either production or habitation. Toxic milk and oil pollution show that industry no longer has a conscience. Worse, under socialism the government is the sole landowner. If housing prices are out of control, the government must ask itself who is responsible. If air and drinking water quality cannot be assured, if social mores have degenerated, if the land belongs to the government, yet people cannot find housing, then they constitute problems far more serious than economic development.

International bottlenecks include North Korea's nuclear testing program and the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. North Korea, once Beijing's ace in the hole, has become a political albatross around its neck. The Diaoyutai Islands conflict undermines the low profile defensive posture adopted by the Mainland ever since Deng Xiaoping. It currently has the world's attention. How will the United States' anti-China "return to Asia" and "rebalancing" work out? Beijing's international plight can be described as "The tree hopes to remain still, but the wind insists on blowing." It is difficult for Beijing to defend its interests without unintentionally escalating tensions. But if it fails to defend its interests, it will turn itself into a doormat. If existing conflicts escalate, they could spin out of control. Therefore Beijing must return to "economic diplomacy." Mainland China is the world's factory and the world's market. Through frameworks such as the RCEP, it can stabilize the political and diplomatic situation. This is how Beijing must break through its bottlenecks.

The Lien-Xi Summit is a key indicator for cross-Strait relations. During the late February summit, Lien Chan championed "the establishment of a (yet to be reunified) balanced, equal, and effective political structure." He said "The division between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 1949 is an objective fact." He said "On the one hand the (two sides) have divided rule and mutual respect. On the other hand, they seek improved cooperation and a win-win situation." The Xi Jinping team heard Lien Chan's words. It knows that for the public on Taiwan, this is the cross-Strait bottom line. Lien Chan used the trip to respond to the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress Political Report. The report referred to "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," and "making fair and reasonable arrangements." It spoke of "establishing a balanced, equal, and effective political framework. " It pointed out the bottlenecks in cross-Strait relations. It offered recommendations on how to address the "special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified," and how to "make fair and reasonable arrangements." This is the Xi Jinping team's unshirkable historical duty. It can hardly revert to empty rhetoric about "One Country, Two Systems," and "peaceful reunification," can it?

Finally, consider political reform. A key indicator is the New Year's Day Special Edition of the "Southern Weekly." The Bo Xilai case will go to trial during the Xi Jinping administration's term of office. But this is merely the effect, not the cause. The effect is that Bo will be subject to sanctions. But the cause was the fact that "The party has long been above the constitution, the party has long been outside the constitution." Beijing feels that "[Mainland] China cannot copy the Western democratic model." But if "socialism with Chinese characteristics" puts the party above the constitution, and the party outside the constitution, no one will dare complain. Today, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" appears to have become "capitalism with four cardinal principles." If so, how can the nation's governance be just? How can the the party and government avoid corruption?

On New Year's Day, the Southern Weekly published a special article, entitled "Chinese Dream, Constitutional Dream." Censors changed the title to, "We are Closer than Ever to Our Dream." What truth were the censors struggling to evade? Why is it forbidden to talk about constitutionalism and dreams? During the 18th National Congress, Hu Jintao said, "The party must operate within constitutional and legal limits." Censors changed this to "People must conduct their activities under the protection of the constitution and the laws." Xi Jinping said, "The constitution comes alive when it is implemented. The authority of the constitution is exercised when it is implemented." But is this constitution living? Or has the constitution encountered a serious bottleneck during its implementation?

Beijing must realize that Liu Xiaobo and other pro-democracy and human rights activists are not alone in advocating "returning to the constitution," "constitutional limits on the party," and "constitutional protections for the people." The younger generation, like the Southern Weekly intellectuals and "petty bourgeoisie," also champion the "China Dream, Constitutional Dream." If the Xi Jinping team cannot break through this bottleneck, Mainland China's governance will retreat instead of advance.

不進則退：習近平團隊面臨的瓶頸
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.14 04:07 am

中共總書記兼中共中央軍委主席習近平，今日接任國家主席及國家軍委主席，完成了中國大陸黨政軍領導團隊的全面交接。瞻望前路，此次交接若只是停留在「胡規習隨」上，而不能有所超越、突破瓶頸，恐將有逆水行舟不進則退之虞。

我們曾指出，胡錦濤團隊的十年治理，在內外各方面均取得了相當顯著的成就，但也皆面臨了難以突破的瓶頸；習近平團隊可謂正處在瓶頸地帶，不免面臨不進則退的風險。

正當習近平團隊接任之際，可從幾個指標性問題來探究其所面臨的內外瓶頸。一、民生治理：氣水奶房。二、國際情勢：朝鮮核試及釣魚台。三、兩岸關係：連習會。四、政治改革：《南方周末》事件。

民生問題的瓶頸，或許可以氣（霧霾）、水（飲水污染）、奶（毒奶粉）、房（房價飆漲不下）為指標。這四個問題，總而言之就是「安身立命」的問題，亦反映了政府治理的失能與失敗。霧霾及水污染的問題顯示，生態體系已經不能承負現在的生產及生活方式；毒奶粉及地溝油等，則反映社會道德在商業活動中已嚴重扭曲；再者，社會主義政府既是全國唯一的地主，房價失控至此，自應問誰是始作俑者。倘若空氣及飲水的安全不得保證、社會道德墮落，而土地為國家所有但百姓卻一屋難求，此時瓶頸的問題自已大於發展的問題。

國際問題可以北韓核試與釣島事件為指標。北韓已然從北京的政治籌碼變成了政治負荷，釣島問題則破壞了自鄧小平以來「韜光養晦」的守勢外交；此時此際，舉世皆在注目，美國針對中國的「重返亞洲」及「再平衡」將如何發展。此刻北京的對外情勢，可謂是樹欲靜而風不止，「鬥而不破」的分寸拿捏不易；「不鬥」，則別人會騎到頭上，但一旦「破」了，亦不可收拾。因而，回過頭來仍應走「以經濟御外交」的路線，藉大陸作為世界工廠及世界市場的地位，透過ＲＣＥＰ等架構，來穩定政治及外交的局面，這也是北京有待突破的瓶頸。

連習會則是兩岸問題的指標。二月底的連習會中，連戰提出「建立一種（尚未統一的）平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」之主張；又稱「一九四九年來的兩岸當局互不隸屬，這是客觀事實」、「（兩岸）一方面分工治理、相互尊重，一方面加強合作、謀求雙贏」。習近平團隊能從連戰口中聽到這些話，應當感知這其實已是台灣民意在兩岸問題上的「底線」。而連戰此行，反而主動回應中共十八大政治報告所指「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，並提出「建立平衡、對等、有效的政治架構」之主張，已然點出了兩岸關係的瓶頸所在。如何正視兩岸「尚未統一的特殊情況」，作出「合情合理的安排」，這是習近平團隊無可旁貸的歷史責任，否則難道仍要回過頭去再空喊十年的「一國兩制／和平統一」？

最後談政治改革，藉《南方周末》的元旦特刊事件為指標。薄熙來案將在習近平團隊任內審判，但這只是「果」，而不是「因」；「果」是薄熙來將受制裁，但「因」則是一路走來「黨高於憲法／黨外於憲法」所造成。北京即使認為「中國不能照搬西方民主那一套」，但若謂中國社會主義式的民主就是「黨高於憲／黨外於憲」，恐怕也沒有人敢開這個口。如今，「有中國特色的社會主義」，儼然已經變成了「有四個堅持的資本主義」，國家治理如何可能實現公道正義？又如何能夠避免黨政機構的腐敗？

今年元旦，南方周末特刊的題目是〈中國夢，憲政夢〉，卻被改頭換面成〈我們比任何時候都接近夢想〉。試問，審稿者在迴避什麼？為何談及憲政連夢都不准作？胡錦濤在十八大說：「黨必須在憲法和法律範圍內活動。」其相對的意思應指「人民應在憲法和法律的保障下活動」。而習近平也說：「憲法的生命在於實施，憲法的權威也在實施。」但是，這部憲法有「生命」嗎？或者，這部憲法的實施是否有了嚴重的「瓶頸」？

北京應當注意的是，不只是劉曉波等民運或維權人士才主張「回歸憲法」、「以憲治黨」、「以憲保民」；像南方周末年輕一代的知識分子及「小資」，皆亦有「中國夢，憲政夢」。習近平團隊若闖不過這個瓶頸，恐怕中國的治理就會陷於不進則退。