Electrical Power Generation on Taiwan for the Next Fifty Years

Electrical Power Generation on Taiwan for the Next Fifty Years
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2013

Summary: Taiwan is hardly alone. Is anyone in the world really "pro-nuclear?" That has long been a huge question mark. In any public referendum on the issue, opponents of nuclear power generation will attempt to seize the environmental and safety high ground. Conversely, those who support the continued use of nuclear power generation, have a different take on nuclear safety. They should not be demonized as "pro-nuclear." The two sides must respect each others' posititions.

Full Text below:

Taiwan is hardly alone. Is anyone in the world really "pro-nuclear?" That has long been a huge question mark. In any public referendum on the issue, opponents of nuclear power generation will attempt to seize the environmental and safety high ground. Conversely, those who support the continued use of nuclear power generation, have a different take on nuclear safety. They should not be demonized as "pro-nuclear." The two sides must respect each others' posititions.

The current referendum asks voters whether they support "a construction halt on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP)," not whether they support "the abolition of nuclear power generation." The 4NPP issue involves several paradoxes worth pondering. One. The 4NPP is a new power plant featuring new equipment. In the event it is shut down, three older nuclear power plants will be forced to operate overtime. Shutting down the new plant, while continuing to use the old plants, is contrary to the stated goals of the anti-nuke crowd. If a public referendum suddenly shuts down the 4NPP, will operating the older plants overtime increase the nuclear risk? In recent days, residents adjoining the 1NPP and 2NPP have expressed intense dissatisfaction. They are demanding that these two power plants be included in the referendum. This has undermined the legitimacy of the referendum.

Two. Many people think that Taipower built the 4NPP in haste. They lack confidence in the Atomic Energy Council's oversight. But who has been in charge of 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP for the past 30 years? Who indeed, but Taipower and the Atomic Energy Council? Also, many of these same people have argued that Taiwan must be more industrially self-reliant. The 4NPP, it was decided, would not be a turnkey operation, contracted out to a foreign company. So why are these same people automatically poormouthing the 4NPP as "slapped together?" Shouldn't they be applauding it as reliance on our own local technology? Do people consider the management of the three older nuclear power plants more or less reliable? Doesn't Taipower have 30 years of accumulated experience? Would Taipower really willfully disregard the safety of the 4NPP, which is located a mere 30km from the nation's capital?

Three. Regardless of the outcome, the current referendum will push Taiwan onto a "non-nuclear" path. It is no longer possible to build any new nuclear power plants on Taiwan. Yet for the past decade or so, the ruling and opposition parties have continued to cross swords over the 4NPP. Neither side has ever proposed a serious alternative. This includes planning for alternative energy sources, comparisions with renewable energy sources, transformation of energy-consuming industries, or timetables for the phasing out of nuclear power plants. None of these have been investigated. Once construction on the 4NPP is halted, electricity rates will skyrocket. Even bigger problems will loom. They include restrictions on power usage, power failures, or power rationing by region. The political parties may unseat each other one after the other. But neither the Blue nor Green camps are prepared for what is to come. The anti-nuclear crowd, alas, has no answers whatsoever.

Assume for a moment that the public is willing to tolerate sky high electricity prices, endure the summer heat without air conditioners, and light candles at night. Once power shortages begin, they will encounter far greater inconveniences than these. For example, nearly completed articles on one's PC screen may be lost when the power goes out. Lights in the night markets or public parks may go out. This is not alarmism. If the 1NPP and 2NPP are decommissioned as scheduled, in five years, Taiwan will face a power shortage. Greater Taipei in particular has long relied on "southern electricity delivered to the north." The inevitable consequence will be power rationing by region. This is something the public had better realize in advance.

The abolition of nuclear power generation cannot be implemented overnight. Germany wants to go nonnuclear. It has established a 20 year timetable, to be implemented step by step. Some think that Taiwan can step up the construction of natural gas or coal-fired power plants, or increase reliance on wind power, solar power, and other renewable energy resources. They think that five years from now they will be able to avoid any disaster resulting from power shortages. But plant planning requires time. Taiwan is wracked by internal dissent. The construction of any sort of power plants will invite protests from local residents or environmental groups. Merely acquiring the land and meeting EIA will be hard enough. The construction process will also be dogged by unknowns. So-called stepping up the construction of alternative power plants is not really feasible. It is not something one can realistically anticipate.

The great debate over the 4NPP has yet to begin. The public need not rush to judgment. It should take five to ten years to reach a conclusion. It should examine the measures and countermeasures set forthy by the ruling and opposition parties, and by environmental groups. It should consider how their lives will be affected. Only then should it reach a decision. If this five to ten year transition period cannot be successfully negotiated, then neither can the road beyond.

It is the responsibility of the ruling party to clarify the pros and cons. It must not intimidate the public. It must not use the referendum to excuse its own mess. The DPP conversely, has a responsibility to offer a comprehensive alternative in the event the 4NPP is shut down. It must explain how it will solve the problems that would arise. Only this can prove that its advocacy of a nuclear-free homeland is not empty posturing for political advantage. Environmental groups must not blindly oppose Taipower and nuclear power generation. They must offer concrete energy-saving proposals. They must prove that the abolition of nuclear power generation will not result in a shortage of electricity.

After prolonged agitation, the ruling and opposition parties have agreed to maximize voter turnout for the referendum on the 4NPP, to ensure that the referendum truly represents public opinion. Only then can the result resolve the controversy. To achieve this goal, the ruling and opposition parties mus earnestly advance their own programs. They must allow the public to evaluate them. They may even wish to implement absentee voting. The referendum should not be linked to any election. This is one way to increase voter turnout. This is also an opportunity to test the effectiveness of absentee voting.

A public referendum on 4NPP has touched off a great debate. It has not provided a convenient escape. If the public fails to fully evaluate its choices, it could easily arrive at the wrong decision, and run headlong into a situation it never imagined.

以五至十年的跨度想像台灣電力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.06 03:25 am

不僅台灣，世界上究竟還存不存在所謂的「擁核」者，早就是個大問號。因此，未來的核四公投，主廢者站穩了高調的環保及安全的道德立場；相對的，反對停建者則是對核安風險有不同的評估，不該被指為「擁核」而妖魔化。這是正反雙方必須維持的基本尊重。

這次公投，以「停建核四」而非「廢核」為訴求，其題目本身其實存在著幾個「悖論」，值得深思。第一，核四是設備較新的電廠，一旦廢建，將迫使三個舊的核電廠必須延役運轉。且不談「廢新續舊」的矛盾，但若藉由公投一舉停廢了核四，會不會因舊廠「超限運轉」反而提高核安風險？連日來，已有核一二廠附近居民大表不滿，要求將兩電廠也納入公投，暴露了公投正當性的困窘。

第二，許多人認為，台電建核四的草率及原能會的監督讓人難以信任；但卅多年來負責核一二三廠運轉安全的，不也正是台電和原能會嗎？此外，人們常主張產業發展必須提高自主技術，為何核四建廠未採整廠方式交付外商統包，就被指為「拼裝」，而不是已建立若干自有技術？假設民眾認為前三座核電廠的管理基本可靠，台電憑其卅多年積累之經驗，難道會「故意」罔顧距離首都僅卅公里的核四安全？

第三，不論結局如何，此一公投都將把台灣推向「非核」之路，不可能再新建核電廠。但朝野十多年來為核四不斷交鋒，雙方卻從未認真提出完整的替代方案，包括替代能源的規劃、再生能源的比重、耗能產業的轉型，乃至核電廠除退役的時程，均付諸闕如。一旦核四停建，除了電價上漲的衝擊，更大的問題將是限電、斷電或分區供電。不論政黨如何輪替，藍綠陣營對此其實都沒有準備，反核團體對此恐怕也不會有答案。

亦即，就算民眾準備好要迎接高電價，準備好忍受夏季的高溫而不開冷氣，準備好點著蠟燭過夜，但一旦進入缺電階段，真實的遭遇可能比這些更不好受。例如：快寫好的文案，啪一聲消失在電腦；乃至夜市或公園的燈，再也無法明亮。這並不是危言聳聽，如果核一核二如期除役，五年內台灣就要面臨電力不足，尤其一向倚賴「南電北調」的大台北，勢必實施分區限電，這是民眾必須具備的認知。

廢核或反核，都不是一蹴可幾的事。德國要達成非核的目標，訂下廿年的期程，須一步步走完。有人認為，台灣可以加緊興建天然氣或燃煤電廠，或者增加風力、太陽能等再生能源比重，如此，五年後或可避免缺電之災。但任何電廠的規劃都需要相當時間，何況以台灣內部爭議之多端，建什麼電廠不會引起當地居民或環保團體的抗爭？光是土地取得及環評即困難重重，遑論建廠過程中還有層層變數。所謂加緊興建替代電廠，恐怕是緩不濟急，難以期待。

核四公投的大辯論還沒開始，民眾此刻不必急於選擇答案，而應以五到十年的跨度為設想，看看朝野或環保團體各能提出什麼對策，想想自己未來的生活將受到什麼影響，再作選擇。如果不能平順走過這五至十年的「過渡期」，再往前的路也會走不下去。

執政黨的責任，是把利弊得失及輕重緩急說明清楚，不可恫嚇百姓，也不能把公投當成自己收拾殘局的下台階。至於民進黨，則必須就廢核四之後的電力供需提出一套完整的對策，說明自己的解決方案為何，才能證明它主張的非核家園不是喊假的。而環保團體除了一味否定台電及核能，也該提出更具體的節能主張，說明廢核為何不會導致缺電。

經過多日激盪，朝野各方都同意應設法提高核四公投投票率，使其成為一個「有效公投」，才能收解疑定紛之效。要達到這個目標，除了朝野應切實提出各自的方案，供民眾比較參考，不妨趁此實施「不在籍投票」。在不綁選舉的情況下，這是提高投票率的有效手段，也是不在籍投票試劍的良機。

核四公投，啟動的是一個龐大的辯論，而不是提供一個便捷的出口。未經思辨的民眾，極可能走錯出口，而撞上自己不想面對的景象。