Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
Too Little Economics, Too Much Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 28, 2013
Summary: The terms of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) have been made public. They clearly favor the Taiwan side. It is yet another old-fashioned cross-Strait economic and trade agreement. It is obviously not a truly complementary, mutually beneficial trade agreement. It does not help Taipei become part of the trend toward international and regional economic cooperation. The two sides must review the agreement and make improvements down the line.
Full Text below:
The terms of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) have been made public. They clearly favor the Taiwan side. It is yet another old-fashioned cross-Strait economic and trade agreement. It is obviously not a truly complementary, mutually beneficial trade agreement. It does not help Taipei become part of the trend toward international and regional economic cooperation. The two sides must review the agreement and make improvements down the line.
The agreement is old hat. The truth is, the agreement pointedly underscores the benefits the Taiwan side secured. This is the result of Taiwan's vicious partisan political battles, and Political Correctness. To this extent, it reminds one of the 2010 cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). The Ma administration underscored how the ECFA "early harvest list" granted the Taiwan side significantly higher tariff cuts than the Mainland side. This may have been what eventually quieted the uproar against ECFA. The ruling party deftly turned it into a key cross-Strait achievement. It won a series of important elections with it.
Such cross-strait economic cooperation agreements contain too much political content. The party in office obsesses over public perception. It avoids provisions that make the public feel they have been "suckered," and which may hurt the party at the polls. The substance of cross-Strait trade agreements signed with such a mentality can easily be compromised. Such agreements fail to provide a consistent template for similar future agreements with foreign governments. When foreign governments hold talks about economic matters with us, their sole concern is business, not currying favor with voters on Taiwan.
When cross-strait economic and trade cooperation began, the public on Taiwan expected and feared victimization. They deliberately demanded arrangements obviously favorable to the Taiwan side. This was understandable. It was a way of testing the waters. Today however, cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation has passed the trial period. It must be systematized and normalized. The waters have already been tested. The two sides must expand their common interests. Take the recent global financial turmoil. The two sides need an efficient cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation mechanism. Such a mechanism would substantially reduce the negative impact of such turmoil on both sides of the Strait.
The newly signed agreement on trade in services remains burdened with non-economic baggage. Our side hoped to maintain quasi-Free Trade Agreement status to underscore our status as a political entity. Therefore we were forced to accept Mainland demands to open our markets. As a result, the market segments we were forced to open to the Mainland, were food, clothing, housing, transportation, education, and entertainment oriented. These segments directly impact millions of small businesses and families.
The government made all sorts of public relations oriented political calculations. It erected all sorts of firewalls for the relevant sectors. It hoped to show that the impact on the relevant sectors was under control. It wanted the public to accept the opening without panicking. For example, the Mainland was permitted to invest in beauty parlors, but blue collar workers were not allowed to enter. For example, the Mainland is permitted to establish only three travel agencies on Taiwan, and only permitted to seek domestic tourism business.
These defensive arrangements were of course part of the TISA negotiations. They were approved by the Mainland. They became important "victories" for the Taiwan side. Before and after the agreement was signed, the government repeatedly underscored that opening the service industry to Mainland capital was entirely below the WTO (World Trade Organization) specified threshold. It underscored that we succeeded in raising the threshold for Mainland capital investment in Taiwan's service sector.
But deliberately raising the threshold cannot stem the tide of of trade and economic development. Mainland capital is permitted to invest in the hair salon and beauty parlor industry. Mainland labor is not permitted to enter the island. But the effectiveness of such provisions is short-term. The Mainland may one day produce technically proficient and sophisticated hair salon and beauty parlor experts who meet with the approval of Taiwan consumers. When that happens, people will do everything possible to introduce these experts to Taiwan. Conversely, if the level of proficiency in such sectors remains backward, the TISA restrictions will become a dead letter. Taiwan consumers will not patronize Mainland beauty salons. Such controls will be meaningless.
As we can see, cross-Strait trade and market liberalization has its own iron logic. That logic is economic. It is the iron logic of the marketplace. Wherever there is a demand, there will be a supply. WTO rules allow outsiders to operate such businesses. Therefore the two sides must open their markets to each other. It makes no difference how many sectors are opened. The degree of openness must be adequate. It must not be deliberately constrained.
We hope the two sides will review and revise the Agreement on Trade in Services. First they must reduce the political content. They must transform it into a genuine cross-strait economic link. Of course the Taiwan side is not the only side that must make changes. The Mainland side must not deliberately restrict the extent to which it opens up the Mainland. It too must make adjustments. Both sides must make an effort. Only then will the two sides find themselves on the high road to cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.28
社論－兩岸服貿協議評析 系列四 經濟帳過少、政治帳過多 開放未到位
本報訊
兩岸簽署的服務貿易協議，相關開放內容明顯向台灣一方「傾斜」，仍是兩岸經貿合作的傳統老套。但這一套顯然難以追求兩岸真正的互補互利，也不足以帶動台灣參與國際區域經濟合作的潮流。兩岸雙方應在未來，共同加以檢討及改進。
上述的傳統老套，說穿了就是刻意凸顯台灣爭取到的好處顯著較多。這在台灣政黨惡鬥的環境下，是一種「政治正確」的表現。像二○一○年簽署的兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），馬政府對社會宣導的重點，是說ＥＣＦＡ「早期收穫清單」的相互減免關稅項目，台灣得到的比大陸顯著較多。也許就憑著這一點，ＥＣＦＡ在台灣社會引發的雜音逐漸少了，而執政黨也順當地把ＥＣＦＡ列為兩岸方面的首要政績，並藉此接連贏得近年重要選舉。
如此的兩岸經貿合作協議，實是算計了太多的「政治帳」。主政者一味顧慮社會觀瞻，老是卯勁避免協議內容讓民眾有「被剝奪感」，而不利選舉拉票。這樣心態下簽出來的兩岸經貿協議，內容很容易扭曲，也難以作為未來台灣和其他國家洽簽同類協議的範本，因他國和台灣談經貿開放事項時，只會在商言商，沒這麼多的選票算計。
過去兩岸經貿合作初啟動時，台灣社會上普遍有「既期待又怕受傷害」的心理，那時刻意作一些「對台灣傾斜」的安排，是可以理解的。那也可作為一種「試點」。如今，兩岸經貿合作早已過了試驗期，應該邁進機制化與常態化的階段，以早日發揮實質效能，來擴大兩岸雙方的共同利益。像最近這波國際金融動盪中，兩岸之間如有一套高效的經貿合作機制，相信雙方所受衝擊程度應該會小很多。
可是，剛簽署的服務貿易協議，卻仍然背負著諸多的「非經濟性包袱」。首先，我方為了維持「類似FTA（自由貿易協定）」的對等形式，以表彰台灣作為「政經主體」的地位，不得不接受大陸提出的全方位開放市場要求，因而對大陸開放的行業項目，遍及食衣住行育樂等層面，且直接影響到市面上千家萬戶的小型商號。
在這種情況下，我政府為社會觀瞻計，又在各個開放項目中，作了各色各樣的「防火牆」設計，以示相關開放項目對台灣的衝擊都已受控，希望台灣社會以平常心來接受。像美容美髮業的開放，只開放陸資參股，不開放藍領工作人員；還有陸資旅行社在台灣只能成立三家，且只可經營國內旅遊業務等等。
如此一系列的防守性安排，當然都已在兩岸服務貿易協議談判中，爭取到陸方的同意，也成了我方的一項重要「戰果」。該協議簽署前後，我政府一再聲言，這次對大陸服務業的開放程度，全然低於WTO（世界貿易組織）的開放規範，其緣由就是我方成功地提高了陸資服務業入台的門檻。
但值得注意的是，被刻意提高的門檻，往往阻擋不了經貿發展潮流的衝擊。以上述美髮美容業「只要投資，不要來人」特殊限制來說，其效用可能只是短期的，因為將來如果大陸業界，出了一批技術精進的美容美髮高手，受到台灣消費者的偏愛，到時自然會有人千方百計地把這類高手引進台灣。反之，若是大陸這方面的技術水準永遠落後，那服貿協議的相關限制就成了具文，因為台灣消費者不會作興接受大陸美容美髮工作者的服務，管制不管制都沒有意義。
由此看來，兩岸經貿開放的「硬道理」其實很簡單，就是應該多算「經濟帳」，亦即更多地強調經濟規律和市場法則。凡市場上有實質需求，且按WTO規章應允許外人經營的項目，兩岸自該盡量互相開放市場。不論開放項目多少，開放程度務必到位，不要刻意打折扣。
兩岸將來如有機會共同檢討修正服務貿易協議，首應使其去除「政治水分」，轉而成為兩岸經濟真正密切合作的堅實紐帶。當然，要改正的不只台灣一方，大陸若有刻意窄化對台開放幅度之處，也要一併調整。雙方共同努力，才能使兩岸經貿合作邁向康莊大道。
Thursday, June 27, 2013
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
ECFA: Opiate or Panacea?
ECFA: Opiate or Panacea?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 27, 2013
Summary: The "Trade in Services Agreement," signed in accordance with ECFA, has provoked an uproar. Two issues are involved. One. The administration failed to communicate properly in advance. Two. some local industries whose markets have been opened up may be at risk. Will ECFA and the service industry agreement become a case of "boiling the frog?" That remains to be seen. The key is awareness. We must realize that the pot is being warmed up, either by Beijing or by ourselves.
Full Text below:
The "Trade in Services Agreement," signed in accordance with ECFA, has provoked an uproar. Two issues are involved. One. The administration failed to communicate properly in advance. Two. some local industries whose markets have been opened up may be at risk.
These two issues are real. They must be dealt with appropriately. But if we concentrate exclusively on them, we may overlook the bigger picture, and a more serious problem. If Taiwan becomes addicted to Mainland China's concessions, we may cling to them for dear life, the way infants cling to their baby bottles. We may focus all our attention on cross-Strait trade negotiations, and neglect the larger battlefield of global trade that awaits. By the time we come to our senses and attempt to catch up, it may be too late.
Frankly the crisis is already here. Twenty years ago, Taiwan businesses moved to the Mainland in droves. The NT dollar was appreciating. We successfully invested it outside the island. Within a few short years, we vastly expanded the reach of Taiwan's economy. These opportunities were created through our courage and wisdom. But consider the situation today. The GATS agreement allows beauty parlors, printing shops, herbalists, and other traditional service industries to operate on Taiwan. This has provoked a massive backlash. The opposition DPP has accused the government of "forfeiting our rights and humiliating the nation," and of "selling out Taiwan." But the DPP is pointedly ignoring other, positive aspects of the agreement. Taiwan has retreated, from offense to defense. This is cause for regret. This is precisely why Taiwan is on a path of economic stagnation.
Two indicators reveal Taiwan's stagnation. One. Compare the present to the past. We have lost our momentum. Salaries have not increased for years. This is a key indicator. Two. Compare Taiwan with the Mainland. The gap between the two is rapidly narrowing. People are apprehensive about permitting the Mainland to invest on Taiwan. This is another key indicator. These indicators leave little room for self-deception.
Taiwan's economy has stagnated in recent years. But why? Is it really, as the opposition DPP alleges, because "ECFA is poison?" Taiwan External Trade Association figures show that this is not the case. Last year Taiwan's foreign exports amounted to 300 billion US. Exports to the Mainland amounted to 130 billion US, 43% of the total. Taiwan's imports amounted to 270 billion US. Imports from the Mainland amounted to 37 billion, a mere 14%. Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus relative to the Mainland amounting to over 90 billion US.
Let us keep it simple. If Taiwan's stagnation was the consequence of opening up the Mainland market, our trade deficit would have been 60 billion US. Taiwan has long trumpeted itself "an economy built on trade." Such a figure is inconceivable. It proves that the allegation that "ECFA is poison" is nonsense. On the other hand, does this figure prove that ECFA was a magic pill that revived Taiwan's economy? Alas, the answer is also no.
Taiwan's stagnation has nothing to do with whether ECFA is good or bad, a poison or panacea. The problem lies elsewhere. Cross-strait issues dominate the thinking of ruling and opposition party politicians and even the public on Taiwan. This makes it impossible for them to see the bigger global picture. They may even reflexively perceive Taiwan's relationship to the world through the lens of cross-Strait relations. Doing so turns ECFA into a funhouse mirror. This makes it impossible for us to accurately evaluate our relationship with other trading partners. Becoming addicted to Mainland concessions is akin to becoming addicted to opiates. We mistakenly begin to think that this is a world without pain, and that everything we desire can be obtained cost free.
For years, Taiwan has harbored two contrasting perceptions of the Mainland. The first is that the Mainland market offers endless opportunities. The second is that the Mainland conceals endless threats. The perception of endless opportunities induced Taiwan businessmen to invest in the Mainland. The perception of endless threats induced Beijing to make endless strategically motivated concessions to Taiwan for the sake of reunification. But lest we forget, the endless opportunities and the endless threats are two sides of the same coin. Constant worry, fear, or complacency may lead to lost opportunities. Blind naivete without vigilance may lead to the threats coming true.
The GATS agreement has been signed. From the perspective of individual industries, trade-offs are inevitable. The government must respond. From the perspective of Taiwan's overall economic well-being, if the benefits outweigh the costs, if the opportunities outweight the threats, then the agreement is worth trying out. More importantly, we must not allow ourselves to become hooked on ECFA concessions. We must not fall into the trap of low standards for cross-Strait talks. We must not forget that the ROC must conduct bilateral negotiations with other countries. Global multilateral negotiations are proliferating. Taipei's diplomatic allies remain few, and on the fringe.
Will ECFA and the service industry agreement become a case of "boiling the frog?" That remains to be seen. The key is awareness. We must realize that the pot is being warmed up, either by Beijing or by ourselves.
ECFA是台灣的麻醉劑或還魂丹
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.27 05:14 am
兩岸根據ＥＣＦＡ架構簽署的「服務貿易協議」掀起軒然大波，主要爭議有二：一是行政部門沒有做好事前的溝通工作；二是開放項目可能使國內若干產業陷於險地。
這兩項爭議，都不是假議題，必須妥慎處理。但是，如果只把目光放在這兩處，人們可能會忽略一個更大的危機：台灣若對中國大陸的「讓利」上了癮，因而緊抱著奶瓶不放；或者大家將全副心神全放在兩岸經貿談判的錙銖計較，卻忘了全球貿易有更廣闊的戰場等待台商馳騁，屆時，等回過神來再要追趕，台灣的腳步可能已經遲了。
說真切些，這樣的危機其實已經是「現在進行式」。從廿多年前台商成群結隊地登陸，成功在新台幣升值的壓力下跨出對外投資之路，幾年間大大擴張了台灣的經濟版圖，那是憑藉勇氣和智慧創造出來的機遇。反觀今天，兩岸服貿協議要向陸資開放美容、印刷、中藥材等傳統服務產業，卻遭遇莫大的反彈；在野黨並指控政府「喪權辱國」、「出賣台灣」，而刻意漠視談判中取得的其他積極成就。觀察台灣這種由「攻」退而為「守」的變化，恰恰與台灣經濟停滯不前的軌跡相互映照，令人唏噓。
台灣的停滯不前，有兩個參考點：一，與過去的台灣相比，我們失去了進步的動能，薪資多年不曾調升是一大指標；二，與對岸的大陸相比，兩邊的落差正在急速縮小，人們對於開放陸資來台充滿憂懼是最大指標。從這兩方面看，台灣都已經沒有自欺欺人的空間。
然而，台灣經濟近年的停滯，果真應驗了在野黨一直以來指稱的「ＥＣＦＡ是毒藥」的預言嗎？只要檢視一下台灣對外貿易數字，便知實情並非如此。台灣去年對外出口額為三千億美元，其中對大陸出口達一千三百億美元，占了四成三的比重；台灣進口貿易總額為兩千七百億美元，其中自大陸進口三百七十億，僅占了不到一成四的比重。台灣對大陸享有九百多億美元的順差。
簡單地說，若不是由於大陸市場的開拓，我國對外貿易將出現五、六百億美元的逆差；這對一向自詡「貿易立國」的台灣而言，將是無法想像的事。這個數字，證明「ＥＣＦＡ是毒藥」的說法，是一項偽說。但反過來看，這個數字能說明ＥＣＦＡ是台灣經濟的「還魂丹」嗎？很抱歉，答案恐怕也是否定的。
究其原因，其實不在ＥＣＦＡ的本質是好是壞，是毒藥或是萬靈丹；問題在，一旦兩岸議題主宰了我朝野政治人物乃至整個台灣社會的思維，人們就難有餘裕去觀照更大的環球圖景，甚至可能習慣性地以看待兩岸關係的模式來看待台灣與世界的互動。如此一來，ＥＣＦＡ可能像一個扭曲的稜鏡，讓台灣看不清我們對其他貿易夥伴的真實而對等的關係為何。一旦對大陸的讓利「上癮」，就好像用慣了麻醉劑的患者，會誤以為這是個無痛的世界，對誰都可以予取予求。
多年來，台灣對大陸一直存在兩種截然不同的想像，一種認為大陸市場充滿機會，另一種則認為大陸對我充滿威脅。正是因為「機會論」，促使台商前仆後繼地投向大陸；也正是因為「威脅論」，使北京基於統戰策略不斷向台灣讓利。但別忘了，「機會論」和「威脅論」其實互為表裡：若一味擔心害怕而不思進取，勢必失去機會；若一味天真妄想而不瞻前顧後，威脅必接踵而至。
兩岸服貿協議的簽署，從個別產業看，必然有得有失，政府應該做好因應布局；但從台灣總體經濟看，若是得大於失、機會多於威脅，便值得一搏。更重要的是，我們不要對ＥＣＦＡ讓利的麻醉劑上了癮，更不可掉進兩岸談判的「低標準」陷阱，忘記台灣與其他國家的雙邊談判尚有待開展，而在全球興起的多邊談判中，邦交國不多的台灣其實還處在邊緣地帶。
ＥＣＦＡ或服貿協議會不會變成「溫水煮青蛙」，仍有待觀察。關鍵在，我們必須知道這鍋溫水是北京燒的，還是我們自己燒的。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 27, 2013
Summary: The "Trade in Services Agreement," signed in accordance with ECFA, has provoked an uproar. Two issues are involved. One. The administration failed to communicate properly in advance. Two. some local industries whose markets have been opened up may be at risk. Will ECFA and the service industry agreement become a case of "boiling the frog?" That remains to be seen. The key is awareness. We must realize that the pot is being warmed up, either by Beijing or by ourselves.
Full Text below:
The "Trade in Services Agreement," signed in accordance with ECFA, has provoked an uproar. Two issues are involved. One. The administration failed to communicate properly in advance. Two. some local industries whose markets have been opened up may be at risk.
These two issues are real. They must be dealt with appropriately. But if we concentrate exclusively on them, we may overlook the bigger picture, and a more serious problem. If Taiwan becomes addicted to Mainland China's concessions, we may cling to them for dear life, the way infants cling to their baby bottles. We may focus all our attention on cross-Strait trade negotiations, and neglect the larger battlefield of global trade that awaits. By the time we come to our senses and attempt to catch up, it may be too late.
Frankly the crisis is already here. Twenty years ago, Taiwan businesses moved to the Mainland in droves. The NT dollar was appreciating. We successfully invested it outside the island. Within a few short years, we vastly expanded the reach of Taiwan's economy. These opportunities were created through our courage and wisdom. But consider the situation today. The GATS agreement allows beauty parlors, printing shops, herbalists, and other traditional service industries to operate on Taiwan. This has provoked a massive backlash. The opposition DPP has accused the government of "forfeiting our rights and humiliating the nation," and of "selling out Taiwan." But the DPP is pointedly ignoring other, positive aspects of the agreement. Taiwan has retreated, from offense to defense. This is cause for regret. This is precisely why Taiwan is on a path of economic stagnation.
Two indicators reveal Taiwan's stagnation. One. Compare the present to the past. We have lost our momentum. Salaries have not increased for years. This is a key indicator. Two. Compare Taiwan with the Mainland. The gap between the two is rapidly narrowing. People are apprehensive about permitting the Mainland to invest on Taiwan. This is another key indicator. These indicators leave little room for self-deception.
Taiwan's economy has stagnated in recent years. But why? Is it really, as the opposition DPP alleges, because "ECFA is poison?" Taiwan External Trade Association figures show that this is not the case. Last year Taiwan's foreign exports amounted to 300 billion US. Exports to the Mainland amounted to 130 billion US, 43% of the total. Taiwan's imports amounted to 270 billion US. Imports from the Mainland amounted to 37 billion, a mere 14%. Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus relative to the Mainland amounting to over 90 billion US.
Let us keep it simple. If Taiwan's stagnation was the consequence of opening up the Mainland market, our trade deficit would have been 60 billion US. Taiwan has long trumpeted itself "an economy built on trade." Such a figure is inconceivable. It proves that the allegation that "ECFA is poison" is nonsense. On the other hand, does this figure prove that ECFA was a magic pill that revived Taiwan's economy? Alas, the answer is also no.
Taiwan's stagnation has nothing to do with whether ECFA is good or bad, a poison or panacea. The problem lies elsewhere. Cross-strait issues dominate the thinking of ruling and opposition party politicians and even the public on Taiwan. This makes it impossible for them to see the bigger global picture. They may even reflexively perceive Taiwan's relationship to the world through the lens of cross-Strait relations. Doing so turns ECFA into a funhouse mirror. This makes it impossible for us to accurately evaluate our relationship with other trading partners. Becoming addicted to Mainland concessions is akin to becoming addicted to opiates. We mistakenly begin to think that this is a world without pain, and that everything we desire can be obtained cost free.
For years, Taiwan has harbored two contrasting perceptions of the Mainland. The first is that the Mainland market offers endless opportunities. The second is that the Mainland conceals endless threats. The perception of endless opportunities induced Taiwan businessmen to invest in the Mainland. The perception of endless threats induced Beijing to make endless strategically motivated concessions to Taiwan for the sake of reunification. But lest we forget, the endless opportunities and the endless threats are two sides of the same coin. Constant worry, fear, or complacency may lead to lost opportunities. Blind naivete without vigilance may lead to the threats coming true.
The GATS agreement has been signed. From the perspective of individual industries, trade-offs are inevitable. The government must respond. From the perspective of Taiwan's overall economic well-being, if the benefits outweigh the costs, if the opportunities outweight the threats, then the agreement is worth trying out. More importantly, we must not allow ourselves to become hooked on ECFA concessions. We must not fall into the trap of low standards for cross-Strait talks. We must not forget that the ROC must conduct bilateral negotiations with other countries. Global multilateral negotiations are proliferating. Taipei's diplomatic allies remain few, and on the fringe.
Will ECFA and the service industry agreement become a case of "boiling the frog?" That remains to be seen. The key is awareness. We must realize that the pot is being warmed up, either by Beijing or by ourselves.
ECFA是台灣的麻醉劑或還魂丹
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.27 05:14 am
兩岸根據ＥＣＦＡ架構簽署的「服務貿易協議」掀起軒然大波，主要爭議有二：一是行政部門沒有做好事前的溝通工作；二是開放項目可能使國內若干產業陷於險地。
這兩項爭議，都不是假議題，必須妥慎處理。但是，如果只把目光放在這兩處，人們可能會忽略一個更大的危機：台灣若對中國大陸的「讓利」上了癮，因而緊抱著奶瓶不放；或者大家將全副心神全放在兩岸經貿談判的錙銖計較，卻忘了全球貿易有更廣闊的戰場等待台商馳騁，屆時，等回過神來再要追趕，台灣的腳步可能已經遲了。
說真切些，這樣的危機其實已經是「現在進行式」。從廿多年前台商成群結隊地登陸，成功在新台幣升值的壓力下跨出對外投資之路，幾年間大大擴張了台灣的經濟版圖，那是憑藉勇氣和智慧創造出來的機遇。反觀今天，兩岸服貿協議要向陸資開放美容、印刷、中藥材等傳統服務產業，卻遭遇莫大的反彈；在野黨並指控政府「喪權辱國」、「出賣台灣」，而刻意漠視談判中取得的其他積極成就。觀察台灣這種由「攻」退而為「守」的變化，恰恰與台灣經濟停滯不前的軌跡相互映照，令人唏噓。
台灣的停滯不前，有兩個參考點：一，與過去的台灣相比，我們失去了進步的動能，薪資多年不曾調升是一大指標；二，與對岸的大陸相比，兩邊的落差正在急速縮小，人們對於開放陸資來台充滿憂懼是最大指標。從這兩方面看，台灣都已經沒有自欺欺人的空間。
然而，台灣經濟近年的停滯，果真應驗了在野黨一直以來指稱的「ＥＣＦＡ是毒藥」的預言嗎？只要檢視一下台灣對外貿易數字，便知實情並非如此。台灣去年對外出口額為三千億美元，其中對大陸出口達一千三百億美元，占了四成三的比重；台灣進口貿易總額為兩千七百億美元，其中自大陸進口三百七十億，僅占了不到一成四的比重。台灣對大陸享有九百多億美元的順差。
簡單地說，若不是由於大陸市場的開拓，我國對外貿易將出現五、六百億美元的逆差；這對一向自詡「貿易立國」的台灣而言，將是無法想像的事。這個數字，證明「ＥＣＦＡ是毒藥」的說法，是一項偽說。但反過來看，這個數字能說明ＥＣＦＡ是台灣經濟的「還魂丹」嗎？很抱歉，答案恐怕也是否定的。
究其原因，其實不在ＥＣＦＡ的本質是好是壞，是毒藥或是萬靈丹；問題在，一旦兩岸議題主宰了我朝野政治人物乃至整個台灣社會的思維，人們就難有餘裕去觀照更大的環球圖景，甚至可能習慣性地以看待兩岸關係的模式來看待台灣與世界的互動。如此一來，ＥＣＦＡ可能像一個扭曲的稜鏡，讓台灣看不清我們對其他貿易夥伴的真實而對等的關係為何。一旦對大陸的讓利「上癮」，就好像用慣了麻醉劑的患者，會誤以為這是個無痛的世界，對誰都可以予取予求。
多年來，台灣對大陸一直存在兩種截然不同的想像，一種認為大陸市場充滿機會，另一種則認為大陸對我充滿威脅。正是因為「機會論」，促使台商前仆後繼地投向大陸；也正是因為「威脅論」，使北京基於統戰策略不斷向台灣讓利。但別忘了，「機會論」和「威脅論」其實互為表裡：若一味擔心害怕而不思進取，勢必失去機會；若一味天真妄想而不瞻前顧後，威脅必接踵而至。
兩岸服貿協議的簽署，從個別產業看，必然有得有失，政府應該做好因應布局；但從台灣總體經濟看，若是得大於失、機會多於威脅，便值得一搏。更重要的是，我們不要對ＥＣＦＡ讓利的麻醉劑上了癮，更不可掉進兩岸談判的「低標準」陷阱，忘記台灣與其他國家的雙邊談判尚有待開展，而在全球興起的多邊談判中，邦交國不多的台灣其實還處在邊緣地帶。
ＥＣＦＡ或服貿協議會不會變成「溫水煮青蛙」，仍有待觀察。關鍵在，我們必須知道這鍋溫水是北京燒的，還是我們自己燒的。
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
Four-Star Connection: From 9/11 to Edward Snowden
Four-Star Connection: From 9/11 to Edward Snowden
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 26, 2013
Summary: Why speak of a connection between 9/11 and Edward Snowden? The 9/11 incident of September 11, 2001, was the most horrifying act of terrorism in history. It was the most anti-American single act in history. The current US manhunt for Edward Snowden is the most appalling human rights violation by a government in the Internet era. The U.S. government argues that it is using Internet spying to fight terrorism. This leads us back to 9/11.
Full Text below:
Why speak of a connection between 9/11 and Edward Snowden? The 9/11 incident of September 11, 2001, was the most horrifying act of terrorism in history. It was the most anti-American single act in history. The current US manhunt for Edward Snowden is the most appalling human rights violation by a government in the Internet era. The U.S. government argues that it is using Internet spying to fight terrorism. This leads us back to 9/11.
The 9/11 incident had its roots in Arab and Islamic world hostility toward "American civilization." The Snowden incident exposed the dark underside of the American system of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The 9/11 incident was an example of Samuel Huntington's international "clash of civilizations." The Snowden incident is an example of an international, Internet "clash of civilizations." The content and form may differ. But both represent landmark "clashes of civilizations."
Between 9/11 and the Snowden incident, we had the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the 2007 Wall Street financial crisis. All four events are links in a chain. All are acid tests of America's democracy and free market economy.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks earned severe global reprimands. But the United States should also ask itself why the murderers harbored such hatred for the United States. For a long time, the United States, with its powerful military, has been engaged in an unequal conflict with vastly weaker civilizations. No Arab or Islamic country can resist the power of the United States government. But terrorists have broken out of the framework of state to state military conflict. Their conflict is not part of a nation vs. nation conflict. Instead, it is a person vs. person conflict. It is asymmetrical warfare between the weak and the strong.
Bush Jr. invaded Iraq. He turned a person vs. person conflict back into a nation vs. nation conflict. This is where America has the advantage. But this also provoked intense controversy. Afterwards, facts proved that the U.S. military invasion of Iraq was an act of naked aggression, rationalized by lies about "weapons of mass destruction." Seven years later, when U.S. troops pulled out of Iraq, they left behind an Iraq in ruins, spiritually and physically. They left behind hundreds of thousands of widows and orphans. When America sent troops over there, it may not have realized it would inflict even more harm upon Iraqi than Saddam Hussein. It left behind powerful doubts about America's "civilization." One. How could America spout such lofty moral rhetoric, yet initiate on such a lose-lose war of aggression? Two. How can the United States' boast about its advanced democracy, yet countenance such flagrant abuses of power by George W. Bush and his cronies? Three. Was the invasion of Iraq really nothing more than a "misunderstanding" between civilizations?
These events were followed by yet another "civilizational misunderstanding." In 2007, the financial tsunami struck Wall Street. Too much freedom and indulgence in the financial markets aided and abetted unscrupulous Wall Street vultures. These vultures devised pyramid schemes that caused many the world over to lose everything. Families were shattered. People perished. The very foundations of the nation were shaken. This extreme form of capitalist [mercantilist] "civilization" was nothing more than a meat grinder. The US government's rule of law could not prevent this horrible disaster. American civilization could not prevent the Wall Street vultures' barbaric conduct. The financial tsunami shook many peoples' faith in "capitalism." It undermined many peoples' faith in the marketplace. Today the impact of the financial tsunami continues to be felt. The question in many people's minds is, "Is this really civilization?"
Snowden exposed the Prism Surveillance Program for what is was -- unbridled and brazen criminal conduct by the US government. Ironically, some have compared Snowden to Chen Guangcheng. In order to silence Chen Guangcheng, Beijing virtually sealed off Dongshigu Village. This led to denunciations by democracy activists, foreign and domestic. Eventually a hapless Beijing handed Chen Guangcheng over to the United States. The Beijing regime lost face. Now however, the US government's Prism Surveillance Program ordered the world's largest information technology companies to conduct "stability maintenance" programs at little political and monetary cost to itself. This enabled the US government to keep its hand clean while engaging in illegal activities.
The U.S. government granted Chen Guangchen political asylum. Meanwhile, they have done everything possible to extradite Snowden. This too invites questions about what constitutes "civilization." One. What are the America's core value? Are they the US government's "right to rule," or are they human rights? Are they freedom, democracy, and a long list of other values? Two. Can the US government violate the spirit of the US Constitution and order civil servants, including outside consultants, to violate human rights? Do whistleblowers have the right to disobey and reveal the truth? Three. Suppose state power has a "clash of civilizations" with human rights. Is a country such as the United States really more "civilized?" Will it treat Edward Snowden worse than Beijing treated Chen Guangcheng?
In recent years, the U.S. has been sliding downhill. Its military might is increasingly inadequate and unreliable. Take for example, the invasion of Iraq. Even more importantly, its ethical foundations are being called into question. Take for example, the financial crisis. The US may have the Prism Surveillance Program to prevent a recurrence of 9/11. But such programs undermine the United States' image as a model of civilization. This is not a question concerning a nation's power. This is a question concerning a nation's soul.
America is still a free and democratically ruled country worthy of respect and emulation. But somewhere between 9/11 and Edward Snowden, it arrived at a turning point. Can American civilization reform itself? Can it validate itself? This question concerns the very nature of civilization.
四星連線：從九一一到史諾登
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.26 04:34 am
為何說可將九一一與史諾登連成一線？二○○一年的九一一事件，是史上最驚悚的恐怖活動，也是史上最駭異的反美事件；現在正進行中的史諾登事件，則是網路時代最駭人聽聞的政府侵害人權事件，美國政府解釋監偵網路的理由是反恐，把根源推到九一一。
九一一事件源自阿拉伯伊斯蘭世界對「美國文明」的敵意，而史諾登事件則暴露了美國憲政法治燭台下的黑暗角落。九一一事件固然是杭廷頓所指的跨國界的「文明衝突」，而史諾登事件則是國家與網路世界的「文明衝突」；二者在內容及外觀上迥然而異，卻皆可視為具有「文明衝突」指標意義的大事件。
其實，從九一一到史諾登，其間尚有二○○三年的美國侵略伊拉克，與二○○七年揭幕的華爾街金融海嘯。四者連成一線，皆是對美國標榜的民主體制與資本主義自由經濟的嚴酷檢驗。
九一一的恐怖攻擊受到全球嚴厲譴責，但美國亦應省思為何凶手對美國仇恨至此。長期以來，在美國那種藉著武力支撐的強勢文明，和其實主要是軍力不如美國的弱勢文明之間，一直存在著力量不對稱的衝突。沒有一個阿拉伯伊斯蘭國家能夠以政府之力抵抗美國，但當恐怖分子跳脫了國家與軍隊的框架，那就不是國與國的衝突，而是人與人的衝突，也是弱者與強者的不對稱鬥爭。
小布希侵略伊拉克，將人與人的衝突又拉回到國與國的衝突；這是美國的強項，卻引發了強烈的文明爭議。事後證明，美國揮軍伊拉克，是裹著「查有大規模毀滅性武器」謊言的侵略行為。七年後，美軍從伊拉克抽腿時，留下了一個在精神及實體上皆幾近廢墟的伊拉克，及成千上萬的孤兒寡婦。美國出兵時也許不會想到，它對伊拉克造成的實質損傷恐猶逾於海珊政權。這裡又留下了一個「文明」的問號：一、為何在美國崇高的道德論述下，卻仍會出現這種損人不利己的侵略戰？二、為何美國這種自稱先進的民主，也會被小布希及其身邊的野心家所利用？三、這難道只是一場「文明」的誤會？
接下來又一場文明的誤會，是二○○七年自華爾街爆發的金融海嘯。金融市場的自由與寬縱，給了金融兀鷹肆無忌憚的空間；兀鷹們買空賣空，卻造成了全球多少人血本無歸、家破人亡，甚至國本為之動搖。在此，資本主義的「文明」極致，儼然只是刀俎魚肉；政府的法制防範不了這種慘禍，美國的「文明」更無能阻擋金融兀鷹的「野蠻」。這場金融海嘯，使人們對資本主義的信仰動搖，更使市場上人與人的信任關係受到重創。如今，海嘯仍餘波盪漾，人們心中的疑問是：難道這就是「文明」？
史諾登所舉發的「稜鏡計畫」，則是政府肆無忌憚的罪行。諷刺的是，如今有人將史諾登與陳光誠作比較。北京為了制伏陳光誠，幾乎封了東師古村，引來內外民主人士交相責罵，最後無計可施地把陳光誠交給美國，北京政權面子裡子皆失。然而，像「稜鏡計畫」這樣的政府行動，只要向大科技公司下達命令，即可進行政治成本及金錢成本皆低的「維穩」方案，政府作盡髒事，卻不留汙名。
如今，收容了陳光誠的美國政府，卻千方百計要引渡史諾登。這裡又觸發了幾個有關「文明」的疑問：一、美國的核心價值究竟是「統治權力」，抑或是「人權」（包括自由、民主等一長串概念）？二、政府可以違反憲法精神指使公務員（包括外包人員）侵犯人權，但受指使者卻不能有不服從或舉發的權利？三、當「政府權力」與「人權」發生「文明衝突」時，像美國這樣的文明國家，會不會使史諾登受到比陳光誠還不如的處遇？
近年美國國力滑坡，一方面固然是因軍事力量愈來愈不足憑恃（如出兵伊拉克事件），更重要的則是因其倫理道德受到質疑（金融海嘯）；因而，遂有稜鏡計畫以防範「九一一」的再發生，但這卻使得美國的文明典範地位更受重創。這已不是「國力」的問題，而是「國魂」的問題。
相對而言，美國依然是一個在自由民主的尺標上值得尊敬與效法的國家；但是從九一一到史諾登這些年來的轉折卻顯示，美國文明確亦面臨了如何自我改善及自圓其說的問題。這當然是一個「文明」層次的問題。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 26, 2013
Summary: Why speak of a connection between 9/11 and Edward Snowden? The 9/11 incident of September 11, 2001, was the most horrifying act of terrorism in history. It was the most anti-American single act in history. The current US manhunt for Edward Snowden is the most appalling human rights violation by a government in the Internet era. The U.S. government argues that it is using Internet spying to fight terrorism. This leads us back to 9/11.
Full Text below:
Why speak of a connection between 9/11 and Edward Snowden? The 9/11 incident of September 11, 2001, was the most horrifying act of terrorism in history. It was the most anti-American single act in history. The current US manhunt for Edward Snowden is the most appalling human rights violation by a government in the Internet era. The U.S. government argues that it is using Internet spying to fight terrorism. This leads us back to 9/11.
The 9/11 incident had its roots in Arab and Islamic world hostility toward "American civilization." The Snowden incident exposed the dark underside of the American system of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The 9/11 incident was an example of Samuel Huntington's international "clash of civilizations." The Snowden incident is an example of an international, Internet "clash of civilizations." The content and form may differ. But both represent landmark "clashes of civilizations."
Between 9/11 and the Snowden incident, we had the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the 2007 Wall Street financial crisis. All four events are links in a chain. All are acid tests of America's democracy and free market economy.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks earned severe global reprimands. But the United States should also ask itself why the murderers harbored such hatred for the United States. For a long time, the United States, with its powerful military, has been engaged in an unequal conflict with vastly weaker civilizations. No Arab or Islamic country can resist the power of the United States government. But terrorists have broken out of the framework of state to state military conflict. Their conflict is not part of a nation vs. nation conflict. Instead, it is a person vs. person conflict. It is asymmetrical warfare between the weak and the strong.
Bush Jr. invaded Iraq. He turned a person vs. person conflict back into a nation vs. nation conflict. This is where America has the advantage. But this also provoked intense controversy. Afterwards, facts proved that the U.S. military invasion of Iraq was an act of naked aggression, rationalized by lies about "weapons of mass destruction." Seven years later, when U.S. troops pulled out of Iraq, they left behind an Iraq in ruins, spiritually and physically. They left behind hundreds of thousands of widows and orphans. When America sent troops over there, it may not have realized it would inflict even more harm upon Iraqi than Saddam Hussein. It left behind powerful doubts about America's "civilization." One. How could America spout such lofty moral rhetoric, yet initiate on such a lose-lose war of aggression? Two. How can the United States' boast about its advanced democracy, yet countenance such flagrant abuses of power by George W. Bush and his cronies? Three. Was the invasion of Iraq really nothing more than a "misunderstanding" between civilizations?
These events were followed by yet another "civilizational misunderstanding." In 2007, the financial tsunami struck Wall Street. Too much freedom and indulgence in the financial markets aided and abetted unscrupulous Wall Street vultures. These vultures devised pyramid schemes that caused many the world over to lose everything. Families were shattered. People perished. The very foundations of the nation were shaken. This extreme form of capitalist [mercantilist] "civilization" was nothing more than a meat grinder. The US government's rule of law could not prevent this horrible disaster. American civilization could not prevent the Wall Street vultures' barbaric conduct. The financial tsunami shook many peoples' faith in "capitalism." It undermined many peoples' faith in the marketplace. Today the impact of the financial tsunami continues to be felt. The question in many people's minds is, "Is this really civilization?"
Snowden exposed the Prism Surveillance Program for what is was -- unbridled and brazen criminal conduct by the US government. Ironically, some have compared Snowden to Chen Guangcheng. In order to silence Chen Guangcheng, Beijing virtually sealed off Dongshigu Village. This led to denunciations by democracy activists, foreign and domestic. Eventually a hapless Beijing handed Chen Guangcheng over to the United States. The Beijing regime lost face. Now however, the US government's Prism Surveillance Program ordered the world's largest information technology companies to conduct "stability maintenance" programs at little political and monetary cost to itself. This enabled the US government to keep its hand clean while engaging in illegal activities.
The U.S. government granted Chen Guangchen political asylum. Meanwhile, they have done everything possible to extradite Snowden. This too invites questions about what constitutes "civilization." One. What are the America's core value? Are they the US government's "right to rule," or are they human rights? Are they freedom, democracy, and a long list of other values? Two. Can the US government violate the spirit of the US Constitution and order civil servants, including outside consultants, to violate human rights? Do whistleblowers have the right to disobey and reveal the truth? Three. Suppose state power has a "clash of civilizations" with human rights. Is a country such as the United States really more "civilized?" Will it treat Edward Snowden worse than Beijing treated Chen Guangcheng?
In recent years, the U.S. has been sliding downhill. Its military might is increasingly inadequate and unreliable. Take for example, the invasion of Iraq. Even more importantly, its ethical foundations are being called into question. Take for example, the financial crisis. The US may have the Prism Surveillance Program to prevent a recurrence of 9/11. But such programs undermine the United States' image as a model of civilization. This is not a question concerning a nation's power. This is a question concerning a nation's soul.
America is still a free and democratically ruled country worthy of respect and emulation. But somewhere between 9/11 and Edward Snowden, it arrived at a turning point. Can American civilization reform itself? Can it validate itself? This question concerns the very nature of civilization.
四星連線：從九一一到史諾登
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.26 04:34 am
為何說可將九一一與史諾登連成一線？二○○一年的九一一事件，是史上最驚悚的恐怖活動，也是史上最駭異的反美事件；現在正進行中的史諾登事件，則是網路時代最駭人聽聞的政府侵害人權事件，美國政府解釋監偵網路的理由是反恐，把根源推到九一一。
九一一事件源自阿拉伯伊斯蘭世界對「美國文明」的敵意，而史諾登事件則暴露了美國憲政法治燭台下的黑暗角落。九一一事件固然是杭廷頓所指的跨國界的「文明衝突」，而史諾登事件則是國家與網路世界的「文明衝突」；二者在內容及外觀上迥然而異，卻皆可視為具有「文明衝突」指標意義的大事件。
其實，從九一一到史諾登，其間尚有二○○三年的美國侵略伊拉克，與二○○七年揭幕的華爾街金融海嘯。四者連成一線，皆是對美國標榜的民主體制與資本主義自由經濟的嚴酷檢驗。
九一一的恐怖攻擊受到全球嚴厲譴責，但美國亦應省思為何凶手對美國仇恨至此。長期以來，在美國那種藉著武力支撐的強勢文明，和其實主要是軍力不如美國的弱勢文明之間，一直存在著力量不對稱的衝突。沒有一個阿拉伯伊斯蘭國家能夠以政府之力抵抗美國，但當恐怖分子跳脫了國家與軍隊的框架，那就不是國與國的衝突，而是人與人的衝突，也是弱者與強者的不對稱鬥爭。
小布希侵略伊拉克，將人與人的衝突又拉回到國與國的衝突；這是美國的強項，卻引發了強烈的文明爭議。事後證明，美國揮軍伊拉克，是裹著「查有大規模毀滅性武器」謊言的侵略行為。七年後，美軍從伊拉克抽腿時，留下了一個在精神及實體上皆幾近廢墟的伊拉克，及成千上萬的孤兒寡婦。美國出兵時也許不會想到，它對伊拉克造成的實質損傷恐猶逾於海珊政權。這裡又留下了一個「文明」的問號：一、為何在美國崇高的道德論述下，卻仍會出現這種損人不利己的侵略戰？二、為何美國這種自稱先進的民主，也會被小布希及其身邊的野心家所利用？三、這難道只是一場「文明」的誤會？
接下來又一場文明的誤會，是二○○七年自華爾街爆發的金融海嘯。金融市場的自由與寬縱，給了金融兀鷹肆無忌憚的空間；兀鷹們買空賣空，卻造成了全球多少人血本無歸、家破人亡，甚至國本為之動搖。在此，資本主義的「文明」極致，儼然只是刀俎魚肉；政府的法制防範不了這種慘禍，美國的「文明」更無能阻擋金融兀鷹的「野蠻」。這場金融海嘯，使人們對資本主義的信仰動搖，更使市場上人與人的信任關係受到重創。如今，海嘯仍餘波盪漾，人們心中的疑問是：難道這就是「文明」？
史諾登所舉發的「稜鏡計畫」，則是政府肆無忌憚的罪行。諷刺的是，如今有人將史諾登與陳光誠作比較。北京為了制伏陳光誠，幾乎封了東師古村，引來內外民主人士交相責罵，最後無計可施地把陳光誠交給美國，北京政權面子裡子皆失。然而，像「稜鏡計畫」這樣的政府行動，只要向大科技公司下達命令，即可進行政治成本及金錢成本皆低的「維穩」方案，政府作盡髒事，卻不留汙名。
如今，收容了陳光誠的美國政府，卻千方百計要引渡史諾登。這裡又觸發了幾個有關「文明」的疑問：一、美國的核心價值究竟是「統治權力」，抑或是「人權」（包括自由、民主等一長串概念）？二、政府可以違反憲法精神指使公務員（包括外包人員）侵犯人權，但受指使者卻不能有不服從或舉發的權利？三、當「政府權力」與「人權」發生「文明衝突」時，像美國這樣的文明國家，會不會使史諾登受到比陳光誠還不如的處遇？
近年美國國力滑坡，一方面固然是因軍事力量愈來愈不足憑恃（如出兵伊拉克事件），更重要的則是因其倫理道德受到質疑（金融海嘯）；因而，遂有稜鏡計畫以防範「九一一」的再發生，但這卻使得美國的文明典範地位更受重創。這已不是「國力」的問題，而是「國魂」的問題。
相對而言，美國依然是一個在自由民主的尺標上值得尊敬與效法的國家；但是從九一一到史諾登這些年來的轉折卻顯示，美國文明確亦面臨了如何自我改善及自圓其說的問題。這當然是一個「文明」層次的問題。
Monday, June 24, 2013
Can the Legislative Yuan Show Chen Guangcheng the Virtues of Democracy?
Can the Legislative Yuan Show Chen Guangcheng the Virtues of Democracy?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2013
Summary: Mainland Chinese human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng is currently visiting Taiwan. He said he wanted to experience the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan. He will deliver a speech today in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Guangcheng may witness name-calling and physical violence during the extraordinary legislative session. If he does, he must understand that these are part and parcel of the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan.
Full Text below:
Mainland Chinese human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng is currently visiting Taiwan. He said he wanted to experience the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan. He will deliver a speech today in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Guangcheng may witness name-calling and physical violence during the extraordinary legislative session. If he does, he must understand that these are part and parcel of the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan.
People arriving from a totalitarian state are envious of democratically-elected legislatures and the right to dissent. The public on Taiwan once felt the same way. But 20 years later, the public on Taiwan wants answers to a number of questions. For example, can a democratically-elected legislature ensure the rule of law that the era we inhabit requires? Will dissent prevail to the extent that society loses its ability to reach consensus? Will the nation grind to a halt as a consequence? If so, what then? Chen Guangcheng may be able to ask these questions in the legislature today. He may be able to ask why legislators cannot settle down and review bills during regular sessions. Why must they call for extraordinary sessions? Why must the legislative process be dragged out even then?
The extaordinary legislative session is about to adjourn. The ruling party initally sought passage of the capital gains tax, 12 year compulsory education, public bonds, and the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. But the opposition DPP was unhappy with the cross-Strait GATS agreement. This could impact the third reading. The bills may not be resolved until a second extraordinary session is called. The slightest dissatisfaction can impact the passage any bill. The slightest mood swing can lead to yet another round of ruling vs. opposition party confrontation, This has been commonplace for years. Anything that can be put off and delayed, will be. Nothing is ever dealt with on its own merits. In principle, democracy involves "checks and balances." But on Taiwan, all we have are checks, and no balances.
Checks differ from balances. Several examples underscore the difference. Recently the private sector expressed doubts about the GATS agreement. Before that, opposition legislators never gave the matter a second thought. They devoted all their energy to obstructing the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. They even occupied the Legislative Chamber and held a slumber party. But as soon as some in the private sector began grumbling about the GATS agreement, ruing and opposition party legislators immediately latched on to this new political football. The establishment of cross-Strait representative offices suddenly became yesterday's news. And so it was for 12 year compulsory education. The DPP initially demanded a "wealthy exclusion" clause. But once the Executive Yuan heeded outside recommendations and agreed to incorporate a wealthy exclusion clause, the opposition DPP immediately adopted precisely the opposite position. It then began accusing the Ma government of acting in bad faith.
Simply put, "checks" is nothing more than proclaiming one's opposition and engaging in irrational obstructionism. By contrast, "balances" obligates one to offer alternatives. It calls for a third way that transcends differences. If democracy involves only "checks," and no "balances," politics will inevitably proceed down a blind alley. People will lose their faith in democracy and its values.
Take the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The public has been arguing over whether to complete or to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant for years. The ruling party has a responsibility to finish building the plant. But it also faces powerful public opposition to nuclear power generation. Under the circumstances, a referendum is probably the only solution to the problem. The DPP halted then resumed construction on the plant, incurring tens of billions of dollars in additional costs. Now that the nuclear power plant has been completed, the DPP has once again adopted an anti-nuclear stance. What's even more astonishing, it now vehemently opposes any referendum on the plant. It opposes the plant, but simultaneously refuses to allow the public to express its views on the plant by means of a public referendum. Under these circumstances, how can any resolution be reached on the plant controversy?
The Legislature lacks any sense of responsibility for problem solving. The Executive, meanwhile, is inept at both communication and coordination. These are additional reasons why Taiwan's democracy has fallen and cannot get up. Take negotiations between Taipei and Manila over the fishing vessel shooting incident. Premier Chiang embarrassed Foreign Minister Lin Yong-le. This was followed by controversy over the accounting law bill. President Ma put the Executive Yuan on the spot. Controversy raged over the "wealthy exclusion" clause in the 12 year compulsory education bill. This led to the Premier giving Education Minister Chian Wei-ning a slap in the face. Every one of these events leave one flabbergasted. Policy can be changed. Policy can be modified. But the government must improve internal communications. It must coordinate with the legislature. This will prevent higher level authorities from pulling the rug out from under lower level authorities. This will prevent the executive branch from singing a different tune than the legislative branch.
Frankly, many no longer care what bill the extraordinary session of legislature passes today. People no longer expect any professionalism or sense of mission from legislators. Ruling and opposition party legislators pretend to engage in consultations. Legislative caucuses issue this or that level mobilization order. In reality, they are merely furthering their personal or partisan interests in the name of democracy. Who really believes that these legislators are actually concerned about the public on Taiwan?
If Chen Guangcheng sees only these political calculations and this sort of coarse behavior in the Legislative Yuan, he must not be too disappointed. After all, they are merely isolated facets of Taiwan's political system. The virtues of Taiwan's democracy are not imaginary. One must evaluate all of its aspects, large and small. Chen Guangchen is smart. He should have no difficulty understanding the complexities.
立院能讓陳光誠看到民主的美好？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.25 01:56 am
中國維權律師陳光誠訪台，談到他想要體驗台灣「民主的美好」，並將於今天在立法院禮堂發表演講。如果陳光誠剛好看到國會臨時會上演謾罵拉扯的大戲，很抱歉，他必須理解，那其實稱不上是台灣民主「美好」的部分。
從極權國家來的人，一定很羨慕民主選舉的國會和表達異議的自由；對台灣人而言，當年確實也有過同樣的心情。但經過廿多年，台灣人民今天更想知道的是：民主選舉的國會若訂不出合於時代需要的法制，異議氾濫到使社會失去凝聚共識的能力，當國家因此停滯，那該怎麼辦？陳光誠今天也許可以向立委提出這個問題，並問問他們：為什麼正式會期中不好好審查法案，到了臨時會也還在推拖拉？
立院臨時會已進入尾聲，執政黨原本期待通過證所稅修正、十二年國教、公債法、核四公投等案，但適逢兩岸服貿協議引發在野黨不滿，可能連帶衝擊既定法案的三讀；那麼，所有的法案恐怕只好再留待第二次臨時會去解決。任何不滿，都可以折射到每一項法案身上；任何情緒，都可以牽動朝野的對立硝煙，這是台灣多年來司空見慣的政治景象：凡事能牽拖就牽拖，絕不就事論事。亦即，就民主政治的「制衡」原理而言，台灣只學到「制」，卻從未學到「衡」。
「制」與「衡」的差異，可從最近的幾個例子看出。在民間業者對服貿協議爆出質疑之前，在野黨立委幾乎不把這項協議當一回事，而是全力放在杯葛「兩岸互設辦事處」議題上，甚至為此霸占了立院議事廳。然而，一俟聽見若干業者發出怨言，朝野立委馬上撲身跳到新的議題上面，把互設辦事處問題棄如雞肋。這和十二年國教一樣，民進黨原先也持「排富」的主張，但一旦行政院聽取外界建議同意排富之議，在野黨馬上又跳到相反的立場，開始指責馬政府言而無信。
簡單地說，「制」只是在宣示反對者的意見，且一味死守杯葛立場；而「衡」則需要進一步提出不同看法，從彼此的差異之中走出第三條路。民主如果只有「制」，而不追求「衡」，那麼政治將不免卡在死胡同，而民主也將因失去信念和價值而變得錯亂與虛無。
以核四公投為例，社會各界對核四存廢爭議多年，執政黨一方面有責任繼續興建，一方面又面臨民間強大的反核力量；在這種情況下，訴諸公投恐怕是最後解決之計。矛盾的是，民進黨執政時曾停建核四又復工，且追加數百億經費，如今核四完工在即民進黨又轉向反核；不僅如此，竟連核四公投案也大力杯葛。如此，既要反核四，又不讓民意有公投表達的機會，究竟要核四伊於胡底？
相對於立法院缺乏解決問題的責任感，行政部門的拙於溝通及怠於協調，也是台灣民主顛躓失能的另一主因。且看，在台菲為漁船射擊事件談判時，江揆給了外長林永樂一個大難堪；接著在會計法覆議爭議中，馬總統賞了行政院一個大悶鍋；最近的國教排富，則又是閣揆給了教長蔣偉寧一個耳光；凡此，無不令人瞠目結舌。這並不是說政策不能中途轉彎或進行修改，然而，如果政府內部的溝通能提前進行，與國會的協調能夠早一步到位，那麼，上級部門打下級部門耳光、立法部門唱行政部門反調的情事何致一再發生？
老實說，今天立法院臨時會要通過什麼法案或不通過什麼法案，許多人其實已不在乎。畢竟，人們對於立委專業化及使命感的期待，近幾年已逐漸降到不抱希望的地步。朝野立委還在那裡假裝煞有介事的協商，黨團還在那裡發動什麼甲級動員令，只顯示他們打著民主的招牌在那裡進行黨派或個人的利益交換，誰相信他們的心裡真惦記著台灣或人民？
若只看到立法院的算計和粗魯，陳光誠其實也不必太失望，畢竟那只是台灣政治體制的一隅。台灣民主的美好，並非傳說；只是，那得在大大小小的事情中細細尋思品嘗。以陳光誠的聰明，應不難洞燭其奧。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 25, 2013
Summary: Mainland Chinese human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng is currently visiting Taiwan. He said he wanted to experience the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan. He will deliver a speech today in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Guangcheng may witness name-calling and physical violence during the extraordinary legislative session. If he does, he must understand that these are part and parcel of the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan.
Full Text below:
Mainland Chinese human rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng is currently visiting Taiwan. He said he wanted to experience the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan. He will deliver a speech today in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Guangcheng may witness name-calling and physical violence during the extraordinary legislative session. If he does, he must understand that these are part and parcel of the "virtues of democracy" on Taiwan.
People arriving from a totalitarian state are envious of democratically-elected legislatures and the right to dissent. The public on Taiwan once felt the same way. But 20 years later, the public on Taiwan wants answers to a number of questions. For example, can a democratically-elected legislature ensure the rule of law that the era we inhabit requires? Will dissent prevail to the extent that society loses its ability to reach consensus? Will the nation grind to a halt as a consequence? If so, what then? Chen Guangcheng may be able to ask these questions in the legislature today. He may be able to ask why legislators cannot settle down and review bills during regular sessions. Why must they call for extraordinary sessions? Why must the legislative process be dragged out even then?
The extaordinary legislative session is about to adjourn. The ruling party initally sought passage of the capital gains tax, 12 year compulsory education, public bonds, and the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. But the opposition DPP was unhappy with the cross-Strait GATS agreement. This could impact the third reading. The bills may not be resolved until a second extraordinary session is called. The slightest dissatisfaction can impact the passage any bill. The slightest mood swing can lead to yet another round of ruling vs. opposition party confrontation, This has been commonplace for years. Anything that can be put off and delayed, will be. Nothing is ever dealt with on its own merits. In principle, democracy involves "checks and balances." But on Taiwan, all we have are checks, and no balances.
Checks differ from balances. Several examples underscore the difference. Recently the private sector expressed doubts about the GATS agreement. Before that, opposition legislators never gave the matter a second thought. They devoted all their energy to obstructing the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. They even occupied the Legislative Chamber and held a slumber party. But as soon as some in the private sector began grumbling about the GATS agreement, ruing and opposition party legislators immediately latched on to this new political football. The establishment of cross-Strait representative offices suddenly became yesterday's news. And so it was for 12 year compulsory education. The DPP initially demanded a "wealthy exclusion" clause. But once the Executive Yuan heeded outside recommendations and agreed to incorporate a wealthy exclusion clause, the opposition DPP immediately adopted precisely the opposite position. It then began accusing the Ma government of acting in bad faith.
Simply put, "checks" is nothing more than proclaiming one's opposition and engaging in irrational obstructionism. By contrast, "balances" obligates one to offer alternatives. It calls for a third way that transcends differences. If democracy involves only "checks," and no "balances," politics will inevitably proceed down a blind alley. People will lose their faith in democracy and its values.
Take the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The public has been arguing over whether to complete or to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant for years. The ruling party has a responsibility to finish building the plant. But it also faces powerful public opposition to nuclear power generation. Under the circumstances, a referendum is probably the only solution to the problem. The DPP halted then resumed construction on the plant, incurring tens of billions of dollars in additional costs. Now that the nuclear power plant has been completed, the DPP has once again adopted an anti-nuclear stance. What's even more astonishing, it now vehemently opposes any referendum on the plant. It opposes the plant, but simultaneously refuses to allow the public to express its views on the plant by means of a public referendum. Under these circumstances, how can any resolution be reached on the plant controversy?
The Legislature lacks any sense of responsibility for problem solving. The Executive, meanwhile, is inept at both communication and coordination. These are additional reasons why Taiwan's democracy has fallen and cannot get up. Take negotiations between Taipei and Manila over the fishing vessel shooting incident. Premier Chiang embarrassed Foreign Minister Lin Yong-le. This was followed by controversy over the accounting law bill. President Ma put the Executive Yuan on the spot. Controversy raged over the "wealthy exclusion" clause in the 12 year compulsory education bill. This led to the Premier giving Education Minister Chian Wei-ning a slap in the face. Every one of these events leave one flabbergasted. Policy can be changed. Policy can be modified. But the government must improve internal communications. It must coordinate with the legislature. This will prevent higher level authorities from pulling the rug out from under lower level authorities. This will prevent the executive branch from singing a different tune than the legislative branch.
Frankly, many no longer care what bill the extraordinary session of legislature passes today. People no longer expect any professionalism or sense of mission from legislators. Ruling and opposition party legislators pretend to engage in consultations. Legislative caucuses issue this or that level mobilization order. In reality, they are merely furthering their personal or partisan interests in the name of democracy. Who really believes that these legislators are actually concerned about the public on Taiwan?
If Chen Guangcheng sees only these political calculations and this sort of coarse behavior in the Legislative Yuan, he must not be too disappointed. After all, they are merely isolated facets of Taiwan's political system. The virtues of Taiwan's democracy are not imaginary. One must evaluate all of its aspects, large and small. Chen Guangchen is smart. He should have no difficulty understanding the complexities.
立院能讓陳光誠看到民主的美好？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.25 01:56 am
中國維權律師陳光誠訪台，談到他想要體驗台灣「民主的美好」，並將於今天在立法院禮堂發表演講。如果陳光誠剛好看到國會臨時會上演謾罵拉扯的大戲，很抱歉，他必須理解，那其實稱不上是台灣民主「美好」的部分。
從極權國家來的人，一定很羨慕民主選舉的國會和表達異議的自由；對台灣人而言，當年確實也有過同樣的心情。但經過廿多年，台灣人民今天更想知道的是：民主選舉的國會若訂不出合於時代需要的法制，異議氾濫到使社會失去凝聚共識的能力，當國家因此停滯，那該怎麼辦？陳光誠今天也許可以向立委提出這個問題，並問問他們：為什麼正式會期中不好好審查法案，到了臨時會也還在推拖拉？
立院臨時會已進入尾聲，執政黨原本期待通過證所稅修正、十二年國教、公債法、核四公投等案，但適逢兩岸服貿協議引發在野黨不滿，可能連帶衝擊既定法案的三讀；那麼，所有的法案恐怕只好再留待第二次臨時會去解決。任何不滿，都可以折射到每一項法案身上；任何情緒，都可以牽動朝野的對立硝煙，這是台灣多年來司空見慣的政治景象：凡事能牽拖就牽拖，絕不就事論事。亦即，就民主政治的「制衡」原理而言，台灣只學到「制」，卻從未學到「衡」。
「制」與「衡」的差異，可從最近的幾個例子看出。在民間業者對服貿協議爆出質疑之前，在野黨立委幾乎不把這項協議當一回事，而是全力放在杯葛「兩岸互設辦事處」議題上，甚至為此霸占了立院議事廳。然而，一俟聽見若干業者發出怨言，朝野立委馬上撲身跳到新的議題上面，把互設辦事處問題棄如雞肋。這和十二年國教一樣，民進黨原先也持「排富」的主張，但一旦行政院聽取外界建議同意排富之議，在野黨馬上又跳到相反的立場，開始指責馬政府言而無信。
簡單地說，「制」只是在宣示反對者的意見，且一味死守杯葛立場；而「衡」則需要進一步提出不同看法，從彼此的差異之中走出第三條路。民主如果只有「制」，而不追求「衡」，那麼政治將不免卡在死胡同，而民主也將因失去信念和價值而變得錯亂與虛無。
以核四公投為例，社會各界對核四存廢爭議多年，執政黨一方面有責任繼續興建，一方面又面臨民間強大的反核力量；在這種情況下，訴諸公投恐怕是最後解決之計。矛盾的是，民進黨執政時曾停建核四又復工，且追加數百億經費，如今核四完工在即民進黨又轉向反核；不僅如此，竟連核四公投案也大力杯葛。如此，既要反核四，又不讓民意有公投表達的機會，究竟要核四伊於胡底？
相對於立法院缺乏解決問題的責任感，行政部門的拙於溝通及怠於協調，也是台灣民主顛躓失能的另一主因。且看，在台菲為漁船射擊事件談判時，江揆給了外長林永樂一個大難堪；接著在會計法覆議爭議中，馬總統賞了行政院一個大悶鍋；最近的國教排富，則又是閣揆給了教長蔣偉寧一個耳光；凡此，無不令人瞠目結舌。這並不是說政策不能中途轉彎或進行修改，然而，如果政府內部的溝通能提前進行，與國會的協調能夠早一步到位，那麼，上級部門打下級部門耳光、立法部門唱行政部門反調的情事何致一再發生？
老實說，今天立法院臨時會要通過什麼法案或不通過什麼法案，許多人其實已不在乎。畢竟，人們對於立委專業化及使命感的期待，近幾年已逐漸降到不抱希望的地步。朝野立委還在那裡假裝煞有介事的協商，黨團還在那裡發動什麼甲級動員令，只顯示他們打著民主的招牌在那裡進行黨派或個人的利益交換，誰相信他們的心裡真惦記著台灣或人民？
若只看到立法院的算計和粗魯，陳光誠其實也不必太失望，畢竟那只是台灣政治體制的一隅。台灣民主的美好，並非傳說；只是，那得在大大小小的事情中細細尋思品嘗。以陳光誠的聰明，應不難洞燭其奧。
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Must President Ma Double as Party Chairman?
Must President Ma Double as Party Chairman?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2013
Summary: Does "President Ma" need "Chairman Ma" as his wingman? That is a matter of opinion. But the more desperate Chairman Ma's appeals are for party support, the more President Ma will be revealed as politically weak. For Ma Ying-jeou to be re-elected party chairman is a simple matter. The real question is whether he is able to offer the government and the ruling party a bright new future.
Full Text below:
Kao Yu-jen blasted Ma Ying-jeou, calling him incompetent. Nevertheless Ma Ying-jeou has registered as a candidate in the upcoming election for KMT chairman. In response to the charge of incompetence, he angrily declared "If one says we have not worked hard enough, and need to redouble our efforts, we humbly agree. But some are accusing us of ulterior motives. That is totally unacceptable!"
The "lame duck effect" has taken effect surprisingly soon after the president's re-election. It has taken effect even sooner than it did for Chen Shui-bian, whom the public rejected for corruption. This is something Ma Ying-jeou probably did not expect. His abysmal 18% approval rating follows him around like a black cloud. Externally the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged him to rescue a sluggish economy. Internally implacable party elders are blasting him mercilessly. Policies he promoted, such as 12 year compulsory education, the capital gains tax, cross-Strait negotiations on service industries, have all stalled. President Ma has been feeling pressure from without and within. One thing is especially puzzling, President Ma has failed to implement administration policy. Why then is he so attached to the party chairmanship? Why is he clinging to the post of party chairman?
A Chinese expression "chicken rib theory," describes how someone chewing on chicken ribs may discover that they are not worth the effort, but he may nevertheless be unwilling to spit them out because he is embarrassed. The expression may not apply to Ma Ying-jeou's situation. The "lame duck effect" is beginning to kick in. Therefore Ma Ying-jeou probably needs the party more than ever. President Ma is aggressively seeking the party chairmanship. This can be viewed from two angles. One. Consider the state of the nation. Party discipline within the KMT has long been lax. Suppose President Ma relinquishes control of the party machinery? Popularly-elected KMT officials will be more difficult to control than wild horses. The Ma administration's ability to govern will be crippled, It will find it difficult for it to get anything done. Therefore, he must remain in command of the party. He must maintain control of both the government and the party.
Two. Consider Ma Ying-jeou's political status. The KMT chairmanship has a four year term. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou is elected? He will remain party chairman for more than one year, even after stepping down as president. That is to say, after he steps down as president, in 2016, he can continue using his status as KMT Chairman to influence events, both inside and outside the party. This will extend the president's influence beyond his term as president, particularly in cross-Strait relations. High-level political exchanges may still involve many sensitive issues. If Ma Ying-jeou remains party chairman, it may help him conduct leadership-level exchanges with the other side on international issues such as APEC. The importance of his role as party chairman can clearly be imagined.
Ma Ying-jeou issued two statements before the KMT Central Standing Committee. One. He said running for the post was "not merely a responsibility, but a mission." Two. He said, "We must do much more to promote reform. We need the government and the party to work closely together." His statements sounded reasonable. But they could not overcome the doubts in many people's minds. Ma Ying-jeou assumed the KMT leadership in 2005. Subtract the two years during which he resigned over Discretionary Fund allegations. He has been party chairman for six years. At the zenith of his popularity he failed to break the deadlock within the KMT and transform the party's character. Now he is a lame duck. He may be president as well as party chairman. But has he governed any better? Has he yielded better results?
Such doubts are far from unwarrranted. Ma Ying-jeou is still holding forth on "using the party to address the government's shortcomings." This alone shows that he remains clueless about where the problem in his own governance lies. Those elected President of the Republic of China, from Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian, have exercised both governmental and party authority. They did not need to double as party chairman to exercise effective leadership. Providing one properly masters presidential power, party comrades will naturally follow one's lead. The problem with Ma Ying-jeou lies in his irresolute decision-making. This is a direct consequence of his lack of core convictions. He constantly flip-flops. He allows the enemy camp to take advantage of him. He even inspires widespread discontent inside the Blue camp. He must arrive at decisions more boldly. He must rehabilitate his image as a leader. Otherwise, even if he is re-elected party chairman, it will do nothing to bolster either his ability to govern or his approval ratings.
Party elder Kao Yu-jen blasted Ma Ying-jeou. In terms of political ethics, such criticism may have been inappropriate. But his sentiments are shared by many inside the party. President Ma may find allegations of "ulterior motives" unacceptable. But he cannot deny that the public is dissatisfied with his governance. May 20 was the anniversary of President Ma's re-election. On that day, this newspaper pointed out that President Ma's historical legacy depends upon a 2016 election victory. He must ensure continued Kuomintang rule. If yet another change in ruling parties takes place, he will forfeit his historical legacy. Consider his situation today. President Ma's approval ratings have hit rock bottom. The ruling party lacks fighting ability and solidarity. Yet Ma is seeking the party chairmanship, for the next four years. Suppose he succeeds? Without soul-searching and innovation, the administration and the party will labor in vain.
Does "President Ma" need "Chairman Ma" as his wingman? That is a matter of opinion. But the more desperate Chairman Ma's appeals are for party support, the more President Ma will be revealed as politically weak. For Ma Ying-jeou to be re-elected party chairman is a simple matter. The real question is whether he is able to offer the government and the ruling party a bright new future.
馬總統為何非要兼任黨主席？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.23 10:12 am
在高育仁砲轟「無能」的硝煙中，馬英九登記參選下屆國民黨主席。為此，他作了一番略帶怒氣的宣示：「說我們努力不夠，還需要再加強，我們虛心接受；但有人說我們有私心，這一點我們完全不能接受！」
連任總統的「跛鴨效應」來得如此之快，甚至比當年貪瀆無狀的陳水扁更早遭到民意拋棄，恐怕是馬英九始料未及。十八趴的低民意支持如影隨形，外有美國商會對經濟不振的急切敦促，內有黨內大老無法按捺的抨擊，加上十二年國教、證所稅、兩岸服務業談判等各項政策推動的困頓，應都讓馬總統感到內外交迫。而令人好奇的是，如果馬總統連「政」的這塊施政都照顧不過來，他為何仍汲汲留戀於「黨」的職位，非要兼任黨主席不可？
若用「雞肋理論」去解釋馬英九此刻的心情，未必中的；事實上，正因「跛鴨作用」發酵，馬英九此刻恐怕比以往任何時候更需要這個黨。馬總統積極競取黨主席職位，可以從兩個角度觀察。其一，從國家治理的需要看：國民黨內部本來一向紀律不彰，馬總統一旦此刻鬆手黨機器，黨內──尤其民意代表更將如脫韁野馬般難以控制；而馬政府施政也將更受掣肘，難以作為。因此，他必須將黨的指揮權握在手上，黨政雙鞭齊下。
其二，從馬英九個人的政治角色看：國民黨主席任期一屆四年，馬英九如當選，主席職權將延續到他卸任總統後的一年多。亦即，他二○一六卸下總統職務後，還可利用國民黨主席的身分繼續發揮內外影響力，這是總統影響力的延長戰。尤其，在兩岸關係上，當高層政治交流仍頗多顧忌，馬英九保有黨主席身分，可方便他在諸如ＡＰＥＣ之類的國際場合與對岸進行領袖級的會晤與交流。這點，黨主席的角色便留下莫大想像空間。
那天，馬英九在中常會上徐徐告白，一則稱繼續參選「是責任，也是使命」，二則說「我們還有許多改革要繼續推動，還需要我們政府和黨密切合作……」云云，聽起來皆言之成理。然而，這些都掩不住人們心中的一個疑問：馬英九從二○○五年領導國民黨至今，扣除其間因特別費案辭職的兩年，已長達六年之久；為何在他聲望如日中天之際，未能突破黨政的糾纏並改造國民黨的體質？而如今臨屆跛鴨，就算總統身兼主席，真的更能裨益施政、拿出作為嗎？
這樣的質疑，並非苛責。事實上，只要看馬英九還在高談「以黨輔政」，即可知他尚不明瞭自己的統御問題出在哪裡。以中華民國民選總統的領導權威，從李登輝到陳水扁看，都可以直貫黨政；總統未必需要黨政雙駕，才足以有效領導。亦即，總統若能妥善掌握執政核心，自能號令黨內同志的效力和追隨。而馬英九的問題，就在於他對執政核心決策的掌控不足，經常搖擺，不僅讓在野陣營有機可乘，更屢屢連藍軍內部都異聲四起。如果他不能強化自己的決策模式，重振自己的領導威望，就算順利連任黨主席，也無助於鞏固其施政能力與民意支持。
高育仁以大老身分對馬英九重砲批評，就政治倫理而言，或難謂恰當；但那番話，恐怕也說出了黨內不少人的心聲。馬總統可以不接受其「有私心」的指控，卻無法否認民眾對他施政滿意度偏低的事實。本報在五二○馬總統連任周年的系列社論中曾指出，馬總統的歷史定位必須奠基於二○一六大選的勝利，若他無法順利協助國民黨繼續執政，又發生政黨輪替的話，他的歷史定位也就失去憑藉。然則，以今天的情勢觀察，馬總統自己的民意評價低迷，而執政黨的整體戰力和團結又呈現失焦亂序狀態；他要爭取未來四年的黨主席職務，即使如願，若沒有一番深刻反省及嶄新作為，恐怕對政、對黨都是徒然。
「馬總統」的本尊需不需要帶著「馬主席」的影子並肩而行，見仁見智。必須提醒的是，越是要回頭訴求「黨」的支持，就越顯示馬總統「政」的角色虛弱。馬英九要連任黨主席其實易如反掌，問題在他如何帶領整個政府及執政黨幫台灣打出漂亮的新氣象
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2013
Summary: Does "President Ma" need "Chairman Ma" as his wingman? That is a matter of opinion. But the more desperate Chairman Ma's appeals are for party support, the more President Ma will be revealed as politically weak. For Ma Ying-jeou to be re-elected party chairman is a simple matter. The real question is whether he is able to offer the government and the ruling party a bright new future.
Full Text below:
Kao Yu-jen blasted Ma Ying-jeou, calling him incompetent. Nevertheless Ma Ying-jeou has registered as a candidate in the upcoming election for KMT chairman. In response to the charge of incompetence, he angrily declared "If one says we have not worked hard enough, and need to redouble our efforts, we humbly agree. But some are accusing us of ulterior motives. That is totally unacceptable!"
The "lame duck effect" has taken effect surprisingly soon after the president's re-election. It has taken effect even sooner than it did for Chen Shui-bian, whom the public rejected for corruption. This is something Ma Ying-jeou probably did not expect. His abysmal 18% approval rating follows him around like a black cloud. Externally the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged him to rescue a sluggish economy. Internally implacable party elders are blasting him mercilessly. Policies he promoted, such as 12 year compulsory education, the capital gains tax, cross-Strait negotiations on service industries, have all stalled. President Ma has been feeling pressure from without and within. One thing is especially puzzling, President Ma has failed to implement administration policy. Why then is he so attached to the party chairmanship? Why is he clinging to the post of party chairman?
A Chinese expression "chicken rib theory," describes how someone chewing on chicken ribs may discover that they are not worth the effort, but he may nevertheless be unwilling to spit them out because he is embarrassed. The expression may not apply to Ma Ying-jeou's situation. The "lame duck effect" is beginning to kick in. Therefore Ma Ying-jeou probably needs the party more than ever. President Ma is aggressively seeking the party chairmanship. This can be viewed from two angles. One. Consider the state of the nation. Party discipline within the KMT has long been lax. Suppose President Ma relinquishes control of the party machinery? Popularly-elected KMT officials will be more difficult to control than wild horses. The Ma administration's ability to govern will be crippled, It will find it difficult for it to get anything done. Therefore, he must remain in command of the party. He must maintain control of both the government and the party.
Two. Consider Ma Ying-jeou's political status. The KMT chairmanship has a four year term. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou is elected? He will remain party chairman for more than one year, even after stepping down as president. That is to say, after he steps down as president, in 2016, he can continue using his status as KMT Chairman to influence events, both inside and outside the party. This will extend the president's influence beyond his term as president, particularly in cross-Strait relations. High-level political exchanges may still involve many sensitive issues. If Ma Ying-jeou remains party chairman, it may help him conduct leadership-level exchanges with the other side on international issues such as APEC. The importance of his role as party chairman can clearly be imagined.
Ma Ying-jeou issued two statements before the KMT Central Standing Committee. One. He said running for the post was "not merely a responsibility, but a mission." Two. He said, "We must do much more to promote reform. We need the government and the party to work closely together." His statements sounded reasonable. But they could not overcome the doubts in many people's minds. Ma Ying-jeou assumed the KMT leadership in 2005. Subtract the two years during which he resigned over Discretionary Fund allegations. He has been party chairman for six years. At the zenith of his popularity he failed to break the deadlock within the KMT and transform the party's character. Now he is a lame duck. He may be president as well as party chairman. But has he governed any better? Has he yielded better results?
Such doubts are far from unwarrranted. Ma Ying-jeou is still holding forth on "using the party to address the government's shortcomings." This alone shows that he remains clueless about where the problem in his own governance lies. Those elected President of the Republic of China, from Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian, have exercised both governmental and party authority. They did not need to double as party chairman to exercise effective leadership. Providing one properly masters presidential power, party comrades will naturally follow one's lead. The problem with Ma Ying-jeou lies in his irresolute decision-making. This is a direct consequence of his lack of core convictions. He constantly flip-flops. He allows the enemy camp to take advantage of him. He even inspires widespread discontent inside the Blue camp. He must arrive at decisions more boldly. He must rehabilitate his image as a leader. Otherwise, even if he is re-elected party chairman, it will do nothing to bolster either his ability to govern or his approval ratings.
Party elder Kao Yu-jen blasted Ma Ying-jeou. In terms of political ethics, such criticism may have been inappropriate. But his sentiments are shared by many inside the party. President Ma may find allegations of "ulterior motives" unacceptable. But he cannot deny that the public is dissatisfied with his governance. May 20 was the anniversary of President Ma's re-election. On that day, this newspaper pointed out that President Ma's historical legacy depends upon a 2016 election victory. He must ensure continued Kuomintang rule. If yet another change in ruling parties takes place, he will forfeit his historical legacy. Consider his situation today. President Ma's approval ratings have hit rock bottom. The ruling party lacks fighting ability and solidarity. Yet Ma is seeking the party chairmanship, for the next four years. Suppose he succeeds? Without soul-searching and innovation, the administration and the party will labor in vain.
Does "President Ma" need "Chairman Ma" as his wingman? That is a matter of opinion. But the more desperate Chairman Ma's appeals are for party support, the more President Ma will be revealed as politically weak. For Ma Ying-jeou to be re-elected party chairman is a simple matter. The real question is whether he is able to offer the government and the ruling party a bright new future.
馬總統為何非要兼任黨主席？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.23 10:12 am
在高育仁砲轟「無能」的硝煙中，馬英九登記參選下屆國民黨主席。為此，他作了一番略帶怒氣的宣示：「說我們努力不夠，還需要再加強，我們虛心接受；但有人說我們有私心，這一點我們完全不能接受！」
連任總統的「跛鴨效應」來得如此之快，甚至比當年貪瀆無狀的陳水扁更早遭到民意拋棄，恐怕是馬英九始料未及。十八趴的低民意支持如影隨形，外有美國商會對經濟不振的急切敦促，內有黨內大老無法按捺的抨擊，加上十二年國教、證所稅、兩岸服務業談判等各項政策推動的困頓，應都讓馬總統感到內外交迫。而令人好奇的是，如果馬總統連「政」的這塊施政都照顧不過來，他為何仍汲汲留戀於「黨」的職位，非要兼任黨主席不可？
若用「雞肋理論」去解釋馬英九此刻的心情，未必中的；事實上，正因「跛鴨作用」發酵，馬英九此刻恐怕比以往任何時候更需要這個黨。馬總統積極競取黨主席職位，可以從兩個角度觀察。其一，從國家治理的需要看：國民黨內部本來一向紀律不彰，馬總統一旦此刻鬆手黨機器，黨內──尤其民意代表更將如脫韁野馬般難以控制；而馬政府施政也將更受掣肘，難以作為。因此，他必須將黨的指揮權握在手上，黨政雙鞭齊下。
其二，從馬英九個人的政治角色看：國民黨主席任期一屆四年，馬英九如當選，主席職權將延續到他卸任總統後的一年多。亦即，他二○一六卸下總統職務後，還可利用國民黨主席的身分繼續發揮內外影響力，這是總統影響力的延長戰。尤其，在兩岸關係上，當高層政治交流仍頗多顧忌，馬英九保有黨主席身分，可方便他在諸如ＡＰＥＣ之類的國際場合與對岸進行領袖級的會晤與交流。這點，黨主席的角色便留下莫大想像空間。
那天，馬英九在中常會上徐徐告白，一則稱繼續參選「是責任，也是使命」，二則說「我們還有許多改革要繼續推動，還需要我們政府和黨密切合作……」云云，聽起來皆言之成理。然而，這些都掩不住人們心中的一個疑問：馬英九從二○○五年領導國民黨至今，扣除其間因特別費案辭職的兩年，已長達六年之久；為何在他聲望如日中天之際，未能突破黨政的糾纏並改造國民黨的體質？而如今臨屆跛鴨，就算總統身兼主席，真的更能裨益施政、拿出作為嗎？
這樣的質疑，並非苛責。事實上，只要看馬英九還在高談「以黨輔政」，即可知他尚不明瞭自己的統御問題出在哪裡。以中華民國民選總統的領導權威，從李登輝到陳水扁看，都可以直貫黨政；總統未必需要黨政雙駕，才足以有效領導。亦即，總統若能妥善掌握執政核心，自能號令黨內同志的效力和追隨。而馬英九的問題，就在於他對執政核心決策的掌控不足，經常搖擺，不僅讓在野陣營有機可乘，更屢屢連藍軍內部都異聲四起。如果他不能強化自己的決策模式，重振自己的領導威望，就算順利連任黨主席，也無助於鞏固其施政能力與民意支持。
高育仁以大老身分對馬英九重砲批評，就政治倫理而言，或難謂恰當；但那番話，恐怕也說出了黨內不少人的心聲。馬總統可以不接受其「有私心」的指控，卻無法否認民眾對他施政滿意度偏低的事實。本報在五二○馬總統連任周年的系列社論中曾指出，馬總統的歷史定位必須奠基於二○一六大選的勝利，若他無法順利協助國民黨繼續執政，又發生政黨輪替的話，他的歷史定位也就失去憑藉。然則，以今天的情勢觀察，馬總統自己的民意評價低迷，而執政黨的整體戰力和團結又呈現失焦亂序狀態；他要爭取未來四年的黨主席職務，即使如願，若沒有一番深刻反省及嶄新作為，恐怕對政、對黨都是徒然。
「馬總統」的本尊需不需要帶著「馬主席」的影子並肩而行，見仁見智。必須提醒的是，越是要回頭訴求「黨」的支持，就越顯示馬總統「政」的角色虛弱。馬英九要連任黨主席其實易如反掌，問題在他如何帶領整個政府及執政黨幫台灣打出漂亮的新氣象
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Establish Sensible and Reasonable Cross-Strait Relations
Establish Sensible and Reasonable Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2013
Summary: Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
Full Text below:
Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
For starters, the Wu Xi Meeting was followed by the Obama Xi Meeting between Washington and Beijing. This means that KMT leaders have a clear understanding of the International political situation. They are well aware of the role the United States plays in cross-Strait relations, It cannot be ignored. Barack Obama and Xi Jinping addressed the "Taiwan issue." In terms of content, it was the same old tune. Both sides stuck to their guns. But Obama enthusiastically affirmed progress in cross-Strait relations, This means that cross-Strait reconciliation has a neighborhood effect. Not only can it lead to "win-win." It can even lead to "win-win-win." Looking to the future, cross-Strait relations must continue in the direction of peaceful development. There is simply no alternative.
Secondly, the Wu Xi Meeting addressed cross-Strait policy priorities. It provided ruling authorities on the two sides opportunities to refamiliarize themselves with each other. The Chinese Communist Party has completed its power transfer. Xi Jinping is the new leader of the CCP. Much speculation has emerged concerning various aspects of his policy. Take Taiwan policy. In the short-term most observers think Xi will dutifully implement Hu's policies. But new people often have new ways of doing things. Some are worried that Xi will pressure Taipei to take part in cross-Strait political negotiations. Meanwhile, President Ma is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is about to become a lame duck. This has led to numerous complaints that the Ma administration lacks a sufficiently proactive Mainland policy. President Xi Jinping admits that his talk with KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung changed some of his preconceptions about President Ma Ying-jeou. We believe the Wu Xi Meeting will at least prevent the two sides from misjudging each other, and that it will prevent misunderstandings.
Finally, the Wu Xi Meeting was rooted in strategic national interest. For example, Xi Jinping placed particular emphasis on the notion that "both sides of the Strait are members of the same family." Wu Poh-hsiung stressed "national identity." He said "one does not choose one's ancestors." We are all members of the same family. Therefore, as long as we are considering the long term interests of the nation, the two sides need not haggle over "Who made what concession to whom."
Most importantly, for cross-Strait relations to move forward, requires more than lip service. It requires seriously consideration of a wide range of practical matters. On this point, the CCP 18th National Congress proposed "sensible and reasonable" arrangements for cross-Strait relations. This was an inspired notion. It means the two sides can "seek common ground while setting aside differences." It means they can "preserve what they share in common, even as they dissolve their differences."
The term "sensible" connotes the senses. It has emotional connotations. The term "sensible" implies consistency with human nature. Take Taipei's Mainland policy. Has it taken into account the Mainland's peaceful rise? Has it taken into account the resulting nationalist sentiment and public calls for democratization? Now take the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Has it taken into account Taiwan's desire for breathing room and freedom from military threats? If the parties think only of themselves, or worse, treat each other with hostility it will only hurt the feelings of people on both sides.
The term "reasonable" connotes the rational faculties. It involves objective standards. The term "reasonable" encompasses universal values, including the underlying rules of civilization. The term "reasonable" implies certain legal norms, aka, jurisprudence. Whatever is "reasonable" must be fair. If it is unfair, then it cannot be reasonable. Reason is a universal value. Only reasonable policies can win public support. The establishment of cross-Strait representative offices will benefit the people on both sides. If the two sides become stuck over details such as "humanitarian access," that is unreasonable. President Ma has reiterated that the handling of cross-Strait relations and Mainland policy are consistent with the framework of the ROC Constitution. Therefore allegations that Wu Poh-hsiung's proposals during the Wu Xi Meeting were "unconstitutional" are unfounded.
In short, Wu Poh-hsiung was duly authorized by Ma Ying-jeou to speak on his behalf. Therefore the Wu Xi Meeting confirms that the ruling authorities on both sides have handled cross-Strait issues quite well. They have considered the future of the Chinese nation. They have realistically safeguarded the interests of people on both sides. This is the most urgent task facing the two sides. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. We look forward to concrete moves by adminstrative agencies on both sides. Cross-Strait relations should be systematized as soon as possible. This will enable the two sides and the international community to get along, and to make sensible and reasonable arrangements.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.21
社論－建構「合情合理」的兩岸關係
本報訊
自從國民黨前主席連戰於二○○五年四月，前往中國大陸從事「和平之旅」，並與中共前總書記胡錦濤發表「五項共同願景」後，國共兩黨之間即建立了高層對話的管道。國民黨於二○○八年重新取得執政地位，兩黨高層對話持續進行，對於兩岸關係的和平發展，發揮了重大的作用。日前落幕的「吳習會」，雖然只有短短幾個小時，卻有可能為今後兩岸關係的發展，開創一個全新的局面。
首先，「吳習會」緊接著美中「歐習會」登場，說明國共兩黨領導人都己清楚認識，國際環境因素，特別是美國扮演的角色，對兩岸關係起的作用，不容忽視。雖然，歐巴馬和習近平在論及「台灣問題」時，內容仍屬舊調重彈，並且是各持己見；但歐巴馬高度肯定兩岸關係的進展，顯示兩岸和解的「擴散效應」，不但可以創造「雙贏」，並且可以產生「三贏」。展望未來，兩岸關係除了繼續循和平發展的方向前進外，已無其他道路可以選擇。
其次，「吳習會」針對兩岸政策的優先秩序，提供兩岸執政當局，一次「再認識」的機會。不容諱言，在中共完成黨政權力轉移後，外界對於習近平為首的中共新領導班子，在政策上曾出現方方面面的揣測。在對台政策方面，雖然多數認為短期內「胡規習隨」的可能性居多；但「新人新作風」，也有人擔心習會加促兩岸政治談判的壓力；相形之下，在馬總統進入執政的最後任期，所謂「跛鴨」之說，也隨之甚囂塵上，認為馬政府在大陸政策上已缺乏積極有所作為的旺盛企圖心。習近平主席坦承他和國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄會談後，改變了原先對馬英九總統的一些想法。我們認為，「吳習會」至少消除了兩岸未來因錯估對方，而造成諸多誤判的可能。
最後，「吳習會」是站在民族大義的戰略高度上思考問題。例如，習近平特別強調要積極宣導「兩岸一家人」的理念；吳伯雄則強調「民族認同」，認為「祖先無從選擇」。既然都是一家人，則只要考量民族的根本利益和長遠利益，兩岸就不必斤斤計較，沒有所謂「誰讓利給誰」的問題。
最重要的是，兩岸關係要向前發展，大家不能光說不練，而必須認真思考一些屬於操作面的問題。針對這點，中共「十八大」提出兩岸「合情合理」安排雙方關係的概念，是一個具有啟發性的想法，意味著兩岸互動有可能從雙方的「求同存異」，一步登上「存同化異」的台階。
「情」字帶有感性的色彩，主觀意識很濃。「合情」指的是合乎人之常情。例如，台灣制定大陸政策時，是否曾考慮大陸和平崛起後，隨之而來的民族主義情緒和民眾對於民主化的需求；大陸在制定對台政策時，是否思考台灣要求擴大對外活動空間和免於受到武力威脅的恐懼。如果雙方一意孤行，甚至採取背道而馳的政策，結果勢必因此傷了兩岸民眾的感情。
「理」字帶有理性的色彩，有其客觀判斷的標準。「理」包含普世的價值，即文明之理。理也包含特定的法律規範，也就是所謂的法理。「合理」講求的是正不正當，即合不合乎道理。有理走遍天下，合理的政策就能得到人民的支持。兩岸互設辦事機構對兩岸民眾有利，如果雙方協商卡在「人道探視」這個節骨眼的問題上，就是沒有道理。馬總統一再重申是在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係，制定大陸政策。因此，質疑吳伯雄在「吳習會」的主張「違憲」，也是沒有道理。
總之，由於吳伯雄此行獲有馬英九的充分授權，因此這次「吳習會」己充分展現了兩岸執政當局處理兩岸問題的高度和深度。雙方的交集不僅是著眼於中華民族的未來，也實事求是地把維護兩岸人民的利益，視為眼前兩岸面臨的當務之急。「千里之行，始於足下」，我們期待雙方行政部門能採取具體行動，盡速針對兩岸關係的制度化問題和兩岸在國際社會的相處之道，進行合情合理的安排。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2013
Summary: Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
Full Text below:
Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
For starters, the Wu Xi Meeting was followed by the Obama Xi Meeting between Washington and Beijing. This means that KMT leaders have a clear understanding of the International political situation. They are well aware of the role the United States plays in cross-Strait relations, It cannot be ignored. Barack Obama and Xi Jinping addressed the "Taiwan issue." In terms of content, it was the same old tune. Both sides stuck to their guns. But Obama enthusiastically affirmed progress in cross-Strait relations, This means that cross-Strait reconciliation has a neighborhood effect. Not only can it lead to "win-win." It can even lead to "win-win-win." Looking to the future, cross-Strait relations must continue in the direction of peaceful development. There is simply no alternative.
Secondly, the Wu Xi Meeting addressed cross-Strait policy priorities. It provided ruling authorities on the two sides opportunities to refamiliarize themselves with each other. The Chinese Communist Party has completed its power transfer. Xi Jinping is the new leader of the CCP. Much speculation has emerged concerning various aspects of his policy. Take Taiwan policy. In the short-term most observers think Xi will dutifully implement Hu's policies. But new people often have new ways of doing things. Some are worried that Xi will pressure Taipei to take part in cross-Strait political negotiations. Meanwhile, President Ma is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is about to become a lame duck. This has led to numerous complaints that the Ma administration lacks a sufficiently proactive Mainland policy. President Xi Jinping admits that his talk with KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung changed some of his preconceptions about President Ma Ying-jeou. We believe the Wu Xi Meeting will at least prevent the two sides from misjudging each other, and that it will prevent misunderstandings.
Finally, the Wu Xi Meeting was rooted in strategic national interest. For example, Xi Jinping placed particular emphasis on the notion that "both sides of the Strait are members of the same family." Wu Poh-hsiung stressed "national identity." He said "one does not choose one's ancestors." We are all members of the same family. Therefore, as long as we are considering the long term interests of the nation, the two sides need not haggle over "Who made what concession to whom."
Most importantly, for cross-Strait relations to move forward, requires more than lip service. It requires seriously consideration of a wide range of practical matters. On this point, the CCP 18th National Congress proposed "sensible and reasonable" arrangements for cross-Strait relations. This was an inspired notion. It means the two sides can "seek common ground while setting aside differences." It means they can "preserve what they share in common, even as they dissolve their differences."
The term "sensible" connotes the senses. It has emotional connotations. The term "sensible" implies consistency with human nature. Take Taipei's Mainland policy. Has it taken into account the Mainland's peaceful rise? Has it taken into account the resulting nationalist sentiment and public calls for democratization? Now take the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Has it taken into account Taiwan's desire for breathing room and freedom from military threats? If the parties think only of themselves, or worse, treat each other with hostility it will only hurt the feelings of people on both sides.
The term "reasonable" connotes the rational faculties. It involves objective standards. The term "reasonable" encompasses universal values, including the underlying rules of civilization. The term "reasonable" implies certain legal norms, aka, jurisprudence. Whatever is "reasonable" must be fair. If it is unfair, then it cannot be reasonable. Reason is a universal value. Only reasonable policies can win public support. The establishment of cross-Strait representative offices will benefit the people on both sides. If the two sides become stuck over details such as "humanitarian access," that is unreasonable. President Ma has reiterated that the handling of cross-Strait relations and Mainland policy are consistent with the framework of the ROC Constitution. Therefore allegations that Wu Poh-hsiung's proposals during the Wu Xi Meeting were "unconstitutional" are unfounded.
In short, Wu Poh-hsiung was duly authorized by Ma Ying-jeou to speak on his behalf. Therefore the Wu Xi Meeting confirms that the ruling authorities on both sides have handled cross-Strait issues quite well. They have considered the future of the Chinese nation. They have realistically safeguarded the interests of people on both sides. This is the most urgent task facing the two sides. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. We look forward to concrete moves by adminstrative agencies on both sides. Cross-Strait relations should be systematized as soon as possible. This will enable the two sides and the international community to get along, and to make sensible and reasonable arrangements.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.21
社論－建構「合情合理」的兩岸關係
本報訊
自從國民黨前主席連戰於二○○五年四月，前往中國大陸從事「和平之旅」，並與中共前總書記胡錦濤發表「五項共同願景」後，國共兩黨之間即建立了高層對話的管道。國民黨於二○○八年重新取得執政地位，兩黨高層對話持續進行，對於兩岸關係的和平發展，發揮了重大的作用。日前落幕的「吳習會」，雖然只有短短幾個小時，卻有可能為今後兩岸關係的發展，開創一個全新的局面。
首先，「吳習會」緊接著美中「歐習會」登場，說明國共兩黨領導人都己清楚認識，國際環境因素，特別是美國扮演的角色，對兩岸關係起的作用，不容忽視。雖然，歐巴馬和習近平在論及「台灣問題」時，內容仍屬舊調重彈，並且是各持己見；但歐巴馬高度肯定兩岸關係的進展，顯示兩岸和解的「擴散效應」，不但可以創造「雙贏」，並且可以產生「三贏」。展望未來，兩岸關係除了繼續循和平發展的方向前進外，已無其他道路可以選擇。
其次，「吳習會」針對兩岸政策的優先秩序，提供兩岸執政當局，一次「再認識」的機會。不容諱言，在中共完成黨政權力轉移後，外界對於習近平為首的中共新領導班子，在政策上曾出現方方面面的揣測。在對台政策方面，雖然多數認為短期內「胡規習隨」的可能性居多；但「新人新作風」，也有人擔心習會加促兩岸政治談判的壓力；相形之下，在馬總統進入執政的最後任期，所謂「跛鴨」之說，也隨之甚囂塵上，認為馬政府在大陸政策上已缺乏積極有所作為的旺盛企圖心。習近平主席坦承他和國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄會談後，改變了原先對馬英九總統的一些想法。我們認為，「吳習會」至少消除了兩岸未來因錯估對方，而造成諸多誤判的可能。
最後，「吳習會」是站在民族大義的戰略高度上思考問題。例如，習近平特別強調要積極宣導「兩岸一家人」的理念；吳伯雄則強調「民族認同」，認為「祖先無從選擇」。既然都是一家人，則只要考量民族的根本利益和長遠利益，兩岸就不必斤斤計較，沒有所謂「誰讓利給誰」的問題。
最重要的是，兩岸關係要向前發展，大家不能光說不練，而必須認真思考一些屬於操作面的問題。針對這點，中共「十八大」提出兩岸「合情合理」安排雙方關係的概念，是一個具有啟發性的想法，意味著兩岸互動有可能從雙方的「求同存異」，一步登上「存同化異」的台階。
「情」字帶有感性的色彩，主觀意識很濃。「合情」指的是合乎人之常情。例如，台灣制定大陸政策時，是否曾考慮大陸和平崛起後，隨之而來的民族主義情緒和民眾對於民主化的需求；大陸在制定對台政策時，是否思考台灣要求擴大對外活動空間和免於受到武力威脅的恐懼。如果雙方一意孤行，甚至採取背道而馳的政策，結果勢必因此傷了兩岸民眾的感情。
「理」字帶有理性的色彩，有其客觀判斷的標準。「理」包含普世的價值，即文明之理。理也包含特定的法律規範，也就是所謂的法理。「合理」講求的是正不正當，即合不合乎道理。有理走遍天下，合理的政策就能得到人民的支持。兩岸互設辦事機構對兩岸民眾有利，如果雙方協商卡在「人道探視」這個節骨眼的問題上，就是沒有道理。馬總統一再重申是在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係，制定大陸政策。因此，質疑吳伯雄在「吳習會」的主張「違憲」，也是沒有道理。
總之，由於吳伯雄此行獲有馬英九的充分授權，因此這次「吳習會」己充分展現了兩岸執政當局處理兩岸問題的高度和深度。雙方的交集不僅是著眼於中華民族的未來，也實事求是地把維護兩岸人民的利益，視為眼前兩岸面臨的當務之急。「千里之行，始於足下」，我們期待雙方行政部門能採取具體行動，盡速針對兩岸關係的制度化問題和兩岸在國際社會的相處之道，進行合情合理的安排。
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated: DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated:
DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2013
Summary: What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
Full Text below:
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is convening its nine session "Huashan Conference." The theme of the first session is "Taiwan's China [sic] Policy: Core Values and Vision." The theme of the second session is "How to Deal with the 1992 Consensus."
It is not hard to imagine the form these two themes originally took. The first was probably, "Taiwan independence vs. one China, different interpretations: Which has a larger market?" The second was probably, "Should cross-Strait interaction be based on the 1992 consensus, or a constitutional consensus?" The original and final forms expose the issues at the core of DPP's cross-Strait policy. Clearly the DPP is still casting about for an alternative to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. This is abundantly clear from the DPP's response to the "one China framework" proposed during the Wu Xi Meeting
The KMT initially championed "one China, different interpretations." Wu Poh-hsiung's new formulation, at least as far as the KMT is concerned, replaces it with "one China framework, different interpretations." Both inside and outside the Wu Xi Meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the "one China framework" is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. What he said was 100% correct.
In response to the "one China framework," Su Tseng-chang insisted that Taiwan is not part of China. The DPP is absolutely unwilling to be locked into the "one China" framework. It equates "one China" with the "Peoples Republic of China." It opposes "a constitutionally-defined one China." Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said, "One country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." But oddly enough, he also said the Republic of China "should relinquish its fictitious claim to represent all of China and all its territory." Frank Hsieh's logic is flawed. After all, if "one country, two regions" is constitutional, then isn't it unconstitutional to "relinquish its claim to represent all of China and all its territory?"
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was the most bizzare of all. She said the Ma administration's advocacy of the "one China framework" is the same as accepting the "one China principle." By the same token, she said, recognizing the 1992 consensus is the same as accepting the "one China principle," without the qualifier "different interpretations." She even said. "What exactly is there left of the Republic of China? Is it still is a sovereign and independent country?" As everyone knows, opposition to the 1992 consensus is Tsai Ing-wen's calling card. Yet now she would have people believe she is coming to the rescue of the 1992 consensus. She even said "Without one China, different interpretations, what exactly is there left of the Republic of China?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "Do not turn around and promote Taiwan independence." But Su, Hsieh, and Tsai all share a common problem. Their references to the one China framework, to the Republic of China, and the Republic of China Constitution, are incomplete. They are all piecemeal constructs. Su Tseng-chang openly asserted that "One China means the People's Republic of China." This, she said, is opposed to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said "one country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." Yet he also advocated relinquishing claims of sovereignty over the Mainland Region of China. This mires him in a contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen argues that the 1992 consensus must include "one China, different interpretations." But when has she ever officially accepted the 1992 consensus?
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations can be equated with either one China, different interpretations, or the one China framework, different interpretations. Either manner of expression is rooted in the ROC Constitution. Either is consistent with the ROC's basic survival strategy. The DPP has responded in various ways to the one China framework. But the only correct way is the one Hsu Hsing-liang advocates, "a bold affirmation of one China." Hsu believes that Taiwan must find its footing inside the one China framework. It must not deny or avoid the one China framework.
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh's rhetoric expose the contradictions, the defects, and the dilemmas inherent in the DPP's cross-Strait policy proposals. These contradictions, defects, and dilemmas, all share the same root. They all attempt to use the Republic of China to engage in "backdoor listing," even as they repudiate the one China Constitution. Alas, the reality is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party still denies that "the ROC Constitution is a one China constitution," then why not simply "turn around and promote Taiwan independence?" Conversely, if the DPP accepts the Constitution of the Republic of China, then how can it oppose the one China framework?
When confronting the future of cross-Strait relations, the DPP has only one option. That option is to cease playing around with any form of backdoor listing, and reaffirm the ROC's one China Constitution, in toto. That option is to use the one China framework to fight the PRC over the right to define itself as "China." That option is to attempt to spin the meaning of the one China framework. Perhaps this is what Hsu Hsing-liang meant by the "bold advocacy of one China."
Tsai Ing-wen has blasted the Ma government for not having the courage to openly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state." She also argued that the 1992 consensus must include one China, different interpretations. We have no idea whether Tsai Ing-wen was drunk or sober when she issued these pronouncements. But we are pleased to see Tsai Ing-wen, who once alleged that the "The Republic of China is a foreign regime," loudly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country!"
Assuming the news reports were accurate, the first and second sessions of the DPP's Huashan Conference have indeed yielded answers to two questions. Question One. What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? The answer is, Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. Question Two. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The answer is, the DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
台獨幻滅 民進黨應當大膽一中
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.20 04:15 am
民進黨「華山會議」將間續舉行九場。第一場的主題是「台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景」，第二場的主題是「如何處理九二共識」。
在擬想階段，這兩個題目的原型是：「第一場／台灣獨立和一中各表，誰有市場？」，及「第二場／兩岸互動依據應為九二共識或憲法共識？」。從原型與定稿的對照可知，民進黨兩岸政策的核心議題，似仍在尋找「九二共識／一中各表」的「替代物」。這從民進黨內對「吳習會」所提「一中架構」的回應，亦可概見。
國民黨原持「一個中國／各自表述」的主張；吳伯雄此次的新提法，就國民黨而言，只是換成「一中架構／各自表述」。吳伯雄在吳習會中及會外皆稱，「一中架構」是根據中華民國憲法，此說無誤。
對於「一中架構」的回應，蘇貞昌說：台灣不是「中國」的一部分，民進黨絕不願被鎖在「一個中國」的框架中；這是將「一個中國」指為「中華人民共和國」，並反對「憲法一中」。倡議「憲法各表」的謝長廷則說，「一國兩區，難謂違憲」；但他卻也主張「（中華民國）要放棄虛構的代表中國及領土」。謝長廷的理論缺口在於：如果「一國兩區」是合憲的，則「放棄代表中國及領土」是否違憲？
蔡英文的主張最奇妙。她說，馬政府主張「一中架構」，等於接受「一中原則」，也等於承認「九二共識」就只是「一中原則」，而沒有了「各自表述」。她進而質疑：「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？還算是主權獨立的國家嗎？」然而，眾所皆知，反對「九二共識」是蔡英文的政治旗幟，但如今她的口氣卻像是在搶救「九二共識」似的，甚至稱：「如果沒有一中各表，中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？」
蘇貞昌說：「不要回過頭去搞台獨。」但是，蘇謝蔡三人共同的問題，卻在於對「一中架構」及「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」的論述皆不完整，都是七折八扣。蘇貞昌直指「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這就是反對「九二共識／一中各表」；謝長廷主張「憲法各表」，而稱「一國兩區，難謂違憲」，卻又倡議放棄對「大陸地區」的主權主張，遂陷於自相矛盾；蔡英文則主張「九二共識」應當含有「一中各表」，但她迄今卻未曾正式表示過接受「九二共識」。
其實，「九二共識／一中各表」，不論是「一個中國／各自表述」或「一中架構／各自表述」，皆是本於中華民國憲法的應然表述方式，也是中華民國的基本生存戰略。因此，在民進黨對「一中架構」的各種回應中，唯一正確的思維應是許信良所主張的「大膽一中」，認為台灣必須在「一中架構」中尋找立足點，而不是否定或逃避「一中架構」。
從蘇蔡謝的論述可以看出，民進黨的兩岸議題走到今日，充分暴露其矛盾錯亂的窘境。而這種矛盾錯亂的窘境，皆是出自同一根源，那就是：又想利用「中華民國」借殼上市，卻又欲否定「一中憲法」。現在擺明的情勢是：民進黨倘若反對「中華民國憲法為一中憲法」，何不乾脆「回過頭去搞台獨」？反之，民進黨如果接受「中華民國憲法」，又豈能反對「一中架構」？
面對兩岸未來情勢，民進黨其實只有一種選擇。那就是：不再玩弄任何形式的「借殼上市」，完完整整地回到中華民國的「一中憲法」下，根據「一中架構」，與中華人民共和國爭取「中國」的定義權，並努力節制「一中架構」的內涵與發展。這或許就是許信良所說的「大膽一中」。
蔡英文猛批馬政府不敢公開表態說「中華民國是主權獨立的國家」，更指「九二共識」不能沒有「一中各表」。我們不知這是糊塗的蔡英文或清醒的蔡英文，但十分欣慰見到曾說「中華民國是外來政府」的蔡英文高呼：「中華民國是主權獨立的國家！」
倘係如此，第一場及第二場華山會議其實已有解答。一、台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景是什麼？答案是：基於中華民國憲法的民主自由價值與願景，即是台灣的核心價值與願景。二、如何處理九二共識？答案是：堅持「一中各表」或「大屋頂中國」，否則，即如蔡英文所說「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼」？
DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2013
Summary: What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
Full Text below:
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is convening its nine session "Huashan Conference." The theme of the first session is "Taiwan's China [sic] Policy: Core Values and Vision." The theme of the second session is "How to Deal with the 1992 Consensus."
It is not hard to imagine the form these two themes originally took. The first was probably, "Taiwan independence vs. one China, different interpretations: Which has a larger market?" The second was probably, "Should cross-Strait interaction be based on the 1992 consensus, or a constitutional consensus?" The original and final forms expose the issues at the core of DPP's cross-Strait policy. Clearly the DPP is still casting about for an alternative to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. This is abundantly clear from the DPP's response to the "one China framework" proposed during the Wu Xi Meeting
The KMT initially championed "one China, different interpretations." Wu Poh-hsiung's new formulation, at least as far as the KMT is concerned, replaces it with "one China framework, different interpretations." Both inside and outside the Wu Xi Meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the "one China framework" is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. What he said was 100% correct.
In response to the "one China framework," Su Tseng-chang insisted that Taiwan is not part of China. The DPP is absolutely unwilling to be locked into the "one China" framework. It equates "one China" with the "Peoples Republic of China." It opposes "a constitutionally-defined one China." Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said, "One country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." But oddly enough, he also said the Republic of China "should relinquish its fictitious claim to represent all of China and all its territory." Frank Hsieh's logic is flawed. After all, if "one country, two regions" is constitutional, then isn't it unconstitutional to "relinquish its claim to represent all of China and all its territory?"
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was the most bizzare of all. She said the Ma administration's advocacy of the "one China framework" is the same as accepting the "one China principle." By the same token, she said, recognizing the 1992 consensus is the same as accepting the "one China principle," without the qualifier "different interpretations." She even said. "What exactly is there left of the Republic of China? Is it still is a sovereign and independent country?" As everyone knows, opposition to the 1992 consensus is Tsai Ing-wen's calling card. Yet now she would have people believe she is coming to the rescue of the 1992 consensus. She even said "Without one China, different interpretations, what exactly is there left of the Republic of China?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "Do not turn around and promote Taiwan independence." But Su, Hsieh, and Tsai all share a common problem. Their references to the one China framework, to the Republic of China, and the Republic of China Constitution, are incomplete. They are all piecemeal constructs. Su Tseng-chang openly asserted that "One China means the People's Republic of China." This, she said, is opposed to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said "one country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." Yet he also advocated relinquishing claims of sovereignty over the Mainland Region of China. This mires him in a contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen argues that the 1992 consensus must include "one China, different interpretations." But when has she ever officially accepted the 1992 consensus?
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations can be equated with either one China, different interpretations, or the one China framework, different interpretations. Either manner of expression is rooted in the ROC Constitution. Either is consistent with the ROC's basic survival strategy. The DPP has responded in various ways to the one China framework. But the only correct way is the one Hsu Hsing-liang advocates, "a bold affirmation of one China." Hsu believes that Taiwan must find its footing inside the one China framework. It must not deny or avoid the one China framework.
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh's rhetoric expose the contradictions, the defects, and the dilemmas inherent in the DPP's cross-Strait policy proposals. These contradictions, defects, and dilemmas, all share the same root. They all attempt to use the Republic of China to engage in "backdoor listing," even as they repudiate the one China Constitution. Alas, the reality is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party still denies that "the ROC Constitution is a one China constitution," then why not simply "turn around and promote Taiwan independence?" Conversely, if the DPP accepts the Constitution of the Republic of China, then how can it oppose the one China framework?
When confronting the future of cross-Strait relations, the DPP has only one option. That option is to cease playing around with any form of backdoor listing, and reaffirm the ROC's one China Constitution, in toto. That option is to use the one China framework to fight the PRC over the right to define itself as "China." That option is to attempt to spin the meaning of the one China framework. Perhaps this is what Hsu Hsing-liang meant by the "bold advocacy of one China."
Tsai Ing-wen has blasted the Ma government for not having the courage to openly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state." She also argued that the 1992 consensus must include one China, different interpretations. We have no idea whether Tsai Ing-wen was drunk or sober when she issued these pronouncements. But we are pleased to see Tsai Ing-wen, who once alleged that the "The Republic of China is a foreign regime," loudly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country!"
Assuming the news reports were accurate, the first and second sessions of the DPP's Huashan Conference have indeed yielded answers to two questions. Question One. What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? The answer is, Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. Question Two. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The answer is, the DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
台獨幻滅 民進黨應當大膽一中
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.20 04:15 am
民進黨「華山會議」將間續舉行九場。第一場的主題是「台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景」，第二場的主題是「如何處理九二共識」。
在擬想階段，這兩個題目的原型是：「第一場／台灣獨立和一中各表，誰有市場？」，及「第二場／兩岸互動依據應為九二共識或憲法共識？」。從原型與定稿的對照可知，民進黨兩岸政策的核心議題，似仍在尋找「九二共識／一中各表」的「替代物」。這從民進黨內對「吳習會」所提「一中架構」的回應，亦可概見。
國民黨原持「一個中國／各自表述」的主張；吳伯雄此次的新提法，就國民黨而言，只是換成「一中架構／各自表述」。吳伯雄在吳習會中及會外皆稱，「一中架構」是根據中華民國憲法，此說無誤。
對於「一中架構」的回應，蘇貞昌說：台灣不是「中國」的一部分，民進黨絕不願被鎖在「一個中國」的框架中；這是將「一個中國」指為「中華人民共和國」，並反對「憲法一中」。倡議「憲法各表」的謝長廷則說，「一國兩區，難謂違憲」；但他卻也主張「（中華民國）要放棄虛構的代表中國及領土」。謝長廷的理論缺口在於：如果「一國兩區」是合憲的，則「放棄代表中國及領土」是否違憲？
蔡英文的主張最奇妙。她說，馬政府主張「一中架構」，等於接受「一中原則」，也等於承認「九二共識」就只是「一中原則」，而沒有了「各自表述」。她進而質疑：「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？還算是主權獨立的國家嗎？」然而，眾所皆知，反對「九二共識」是蔡英文的政治旗幟，但如今她的口氣卻像是在搶救「九二共識」似的，甚至稱：「如果沒有一中各表，中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？」
蘇貞昌說：「不要回過頭去搞台獨。」但是，蘇謝蔡三人共同的問題，卻在於對「一中架構」及「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」的論述皆不完整，都是七折八扣。蘇貞昌直指「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這就是反對「九二共識／一中各表」；謝長廷主張「憲法各表」，而稱「一國兩區，難謂違憲」，卻又倡議放棄對「大陸地區」的主權主張，遂陷於自相矛盾；蔡英文則主張「九二共識」應當含有「一中各表」，但她迄今卻未曾正式表示過接受「九二共識」。
其實，「九二共識／一中各表」，不論是「一個中國／各自表述」或「一中架構／各自表述」，皆是本於中華民國憲法的應然表述方式，也是中華民國的基本生存戰略。因此，在民進黨對「一中架構」的各種回應中，唯一正確的思維應是許信良所主張的「大膽一中」，認為台灣必須在「一中架構」中尋找立足點，而不是否定或逃避「一中架構」。
從蘇蔡謝的論述可以看出，民進黨的兩岸議題走到今日，充分暴露其矛盾錯亂的窘境。而這種矛盾錯亂的窘境，皆是出自同一根源，那就是：又想利用「中華民國」借殼上市，卻又欲否定「一中憲法」。現在擺明的情勢是：民進黨倘若反對「中華民國憲法為一中憲法」，何不乾脆「回過頭去搞台獨」？反之，民進黨如果接受「中華民國憲法」，又豈能反對「一中架構」？
面對兩岸未來情勢，民進黨其實只有一種選擇。那就是：不再玩弄任何形式的「借殼上市」，完完整整地回到中華民國的「一中憲法」下，根據「一中架構」，與中華人民共和國爭取「中國」的定義權，並努力節制「一中架構」的內涵與發展。這或許就是許信良所說的「大膽一中」。
蔡英文猛批馬政府不敢公開表態說「中華民國是主權獨立的國家」，更指「九二共識」不能沒有「一中各表」。我們不知這是糊塗的蔡英文或清醒的蔡英文，但十分欣慰見到曾說「中華民國是外來政府」的蔡英文高呼：「中華民國是主權獨立的國家！」
倘係如此，第一場及第二場華山會議其實已有解答。一、台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景是什麼？答案是：基於中華民國憲法的民主自由價值與願景，即是台灣的核心價值與願景。二、如何處理九二共識？答案是：堅持「一中各表」或「大屋頂中國」，否則，即如蔡英文所說「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼」？
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
Facilitating Communications Industry Development: The Real Purpose
Facilitating Communications Industry Development: The Real Purpose
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 19, 2013
Summary: We welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
Full Text below:
The "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" is a textbook case of "populist law-making." In April of this year, the National Communications Commission (NCC) sought approval of this law in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan Transportation Committee and DPP version, differed from the KMT version. Preliminary review of the proposed legislation was rushed through ahead of the recess. Last week, during an emergency session called at the DPP's insistence, it was classified as priority legislation.
The proposed legislation is narrowly focused and highly controversial. The executive and legislative branches remind one of street racers playing a game of "chicken." Scholars in the relevant fields were not consulted while the legislation was being drafted. The views of media professionals in particular, were ignored. The Legislative Yuan sought only to expedite its passage. It merged different versions of the proposed legislation into a grotesque hodgepodge. Yesterday, five major media industry associations, including the China Press Institute, Taiwan Media Watch, the Republic of China Media Self Regulation Association, the Republic of China Broadcasting Association, and the Taipei Newspaper Association issued an unprecedented joint statement. They denounced certain provisions within the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act." They said these provisions were outside the NCC's legal authority. They consider them a serious violation of freedom of the press. These provisions also violate the basic spirit of Article 11 of the Constitution, which protects freedom of speech.
Let us summarize their joint declaration, which makes two points. The first point pertains to the print media, to newspapers and magazines. These are not under the jurisdiction of the NCC. Yet the draft legislation included the print media, even though it is not subject to NCC regulation. It treated them as if they were the broadcast media. It demanded that they provide information about their operations to the NCC on an annual basis. It demanded that national dailies establish newsroom conventions. It demanded that print media with a certain level of capitalization appoint outside boards of directors. It demanded that the print media "not engage in unfair competition." Otherwise the NCC would intervene and impose fines. The above demands exceed the NCC's legal authority, and may have had a chilling effect on media freedom. The second point pertains to numerous media regulations. Their definitions are vague. The media cannot understand them. They cannot tell if they are in violation of them. This has a chilling effect on media freedom. The NCC may use these to suppress freedom of the press. Therefore the media is concerned.
Allow us to sum up the concerns of these five major media industry organizations. In fact, their concerns are merely a small part of a highly controversial media anti-trust law. Think back to the initial deliberations over the proposed legislation. Consider the latest developments in Internet media. One can use to Internet to access all variety of media. One can even publish information on one's own websites. Yet Executive Yuan Political Affairs Committee Member Chang Shan-cheng publicly attacked an alleged "media monopoly" in today's multimedia era. This is clearly a phony issue. Is the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Ensurance Act" really necessary? Shouldn't the authorities consult experts, instead of dancing to the tune of mob sentiment?
The NCC is the responsible national authority. Those in the know include PFP Legislator Lee Tung-hao and other media scholars. They feel that the primary purpose of the NCC was established at the outset, in the "Basic Communications Law." The NCC's raison d'etre was to "take into account technological convergence, in order to promote the sound development of the communications industry." But ever since the NCC's inception, it has done nothing of the sort. First it launched a "no nit too small to pick" campaign of harassment against the broadcast media. Then it hopped on the media anti-trust bandwagon, all in the name of "safeguarding media diversity and professional autonomy." In reality, its interventions were motivated by the desire to expand its powers, and to clamp down on the print media. On the other hand, confronted with today's Internet technology, accelerated information convergence, and the need for international competitiveness and a voice in the communications industry, the NCC has accomplished nothing. The Control Yuan has failed to correct NCC negligence and omissions. Shouldn't the NCC improve its media management and control, as well as promote industry development?
Take a closer look at how the NCC has approached its two statutory mandates. The NCC has done too much in one area, but nothing in the other. The crux of the problem is common to all executive branch agencies. They have some idea about how to oversee an industry. But they have no idea whatsoever how to encourage an industry or to promote industrial development. The information industry on Taiwan had plentiful high-tech industry support. It should have been able to flex its muscles in the Internet era. Instead, information convergence left it in the dust. It has lagged far behind South Korea. It has even lagged behind the Chinese mainland. Its competitiveness ranking has declined. This is what the Ma government should be worrying about. How can the NCC allow itself to be distracted by other matters, and not think about how to catch up?
In sum, we welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.19
社論－促進通訊傳播產業發展 才是硬道理
本報訊
堪稱是「民粹式立法」典範的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）於今年四月間送請立法院審議後，立法院交通委員會併同民進黨版及國民黨版等不同版本，趕在臨休會前匆匆完成委員會初審，並在上周的立院臨時會中，經由民進黨團的堅持，列為臨時會的優先審議法案。
有鑒於此一極具針對性與高度爭議性的重要法案，行政和立法部門竟以近乎飆車的速度，草案研議過程既未博採周諮相關學者，特別是媒體實務界的意見看法，立法院審議階段更是一味求快，把不同版本拼裝成一個四不像的大雜燴。包括中國新聞學會、中華民國新聞媒體自律協會、中華民國廣播事業協會、中華民國廣播同業公會，和台北市報業商業同業公會等五大事業媒體社團，破天荒於昨天發表共同聲明，指陳《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》的部分條文內容，逾越ＮＣＣ法定職掌範圍，恐有嚴重侵犯新聞自由之嫌，也違反了憲法第十一條保障言論及出版自由的基本精神。
歸納此一「共同聲明」的訴求，重點其實有二。其一是質疑包括報紙和雜誌在內的紙面媒體，原非ＮＣＣ的管轄範圍，但在立法草案中卻把即使沒有參與跨媒體整合的紙媒，也比照廣電媒體，要求每年必須將營運的基本資料送給ＮＣＣ備查，要求全國性日報應訂定新聞編輯室公約，要求紙媒資本額達一定金額應設外部董事，要求紙媒不得有不公平競爭行為，否則ＮＣＣ即可干預並處以罰鍰。凡此ＮＣＣ實已構成違法擴權，並有箝制新聞之嫌。其二是草案不少對媒體規範的條文，定義十分模糊，令媒體無所適從，甚至因怕動輒得咎而將產生寒蟬效應，同時還可能引發ＮＣＣ欲藉此箝制新聞自由之疑慮。
綜觀五大新聞專業團體所關注的議題，其實只是具高度爭議性的反媒體壟斷法的一個小環節。事實上回顧此一法案在研議立法之初，針對在今天網路新興媒體發展，透過網路每個人都可以方便地「臨近」各式各樣媒體，甚至還可以透過個人網站主動發布訊息，行政院政務委員張善政即曾公開指出，所謂的「媒體壟斷」處於今天的「全媒體」時代，根本是一個假議題。準此，則所謂反媒體壟斷是否有必要立法，主管機關自應博採周諮，而非隨著民粹起舞。
尤有進者，包括親民黨立委李桐豪，以及不少傳媒學者，認為ＮＣＣ做為國家通訊傳播的主管機關，在《通訊傳播基本法》第一條開宗明義設定成立ＮＣＣ的目的，就是要「因應科技匯流，促進通訊傳播健全發展」。然而ＮＣＣ從成立迄今，先是對廣電媒體展開「無微不至」的規範與懲處，繼而又要搭反媒體壟斷的便車，以維護媒體多元和專業自主之名，行擴權干預、箝制紙面媒體之實。而唯獨在面對網路科技日新月異的今天，各國莫不加速資訊匯流的腳步，力爭通訊傳播產業的國際競爭力與話語權的當下，我們的ＮＣＣ在這個方面卻幾乎是交了白卷。我們認為，即使監察委員不提案糾正ＮＣＣ的怠忽職守與不作為，ＮＣＣ在加強管控媒體和促進產業發展之間難道不應該兼籌並顧嗎？
進一步探析ＮＣＣ何以對其前述兩大法定任務，會出現如此過度作為和近乎不作為的異象，我們認為，其中的癥結應該在於行政機關的通病，對於如何管理業者相對較為嫻熟，但對於如何輔導業者促進產業發展則相對較為陌生甚至是無能為之。結果就使得台灣的資訊傳播產業，原本被期待在既有的厚實高科技產業支撐下，可以於網路新時代大展拳腳，最後卻落得資訊匯流的進度，不只已遠遠落後南韓，甚至也被中國大陸超越。這種國家競爭力的落居下風，毋寧才是馬政府所應引以為憂，ＮＣＣ又怎能分心旁騖，不思急起直追的對策。
總結來看，我們欣見五大新聞專業團體針對內容荒腔走板偏差的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，終於不再集體失聲。業者站在第一線，痛感台灣媒體經營環境在過度規範下碎裂化為不具競爭力的中小企業，正所謂心所謂危，不能不言，至於能否對迷失方向感的馬政府，以及遭民粹綁架的立法部門，產生振聾發聵的效應，大家就拭目以待吧！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 19, 2013
Summary: We welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
Full Text below:
The "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" is a textbook case of "populist law-making." In April of this year, the National Communications Commission (NCC) sought approval of this law in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan Transportation Committee and DPP version, differed from the KMT version. Preliminary review of the proposed legislation was rushed through ahead of the recess. Last week, during an emergency session called at the DPP's insistence, it was classified as priority legislation.
The proposed legislation is narrowly focused and highly controversial. The executive and legislative branches remind one of street racers playing a game of "chicken." Scholars in the relevant fields were not consulted while the legislation was being drafted. The views of media professionals in particular, were ignored. The Legislative Yuan sought only to expedite its passage. It merged different versions of the proposed legislation into a grotesque hodgepodge. Yesterday, five major media industry associations, including the China Press Institute, Taiwan Media Watch, the Republic of China Media Self Regulation Association, the Republic of China Broadcasting Association, and the Taipei Newspaper Association issued an unprecedented joint statement. They denounced certain provisions within the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act." They said these provisions were outside the NCC's legal authority. They consider them a serious violation of freedom of the press. These provisions also violate the basic spirit of Article 11 of the Constitution, which protects freedom of speech.
Let us summarize their joint declaration, which makes two points. The first point pertains to the print media, to newspapers and magazines. These are not under the jurisdiction of the NCC. Yet the draft legislation included the print media, even though it is not subject to NCC regulation. It treated them as if they were the broadcast media. It demanded that they provide information about their operations to the NCC on an annual basis. It demanded that national dailies establish newsroom conventions. It demanded that print media with a certain level of capitalization appoint outside boards of directors. It demanded that the print media "not engage in unfair competition." Otherwise the NCC would intervene and impose fines. The above demands exceed the NCC's legal authority, and may have had a chilling effect on media freedom. The second point pertains to numerous media regulations. Their definitions are vague. The media cannot understand them. They cannot tell if they are in violation of them. This has a chilling effect on media freedom. The NCC may use these to suppress freedom of the press. Therefore the media is concerned.
Allow us to sum up the concerns of these five major media industry organizations. In fact, their concerns are merely a small part of a highly controversial media anti-trust law. Think back to the initial deliberations over the proposed legislation. Consider the latest developments in Internet media. One can use to Internet to access all variety of media. One can even publish information on one's own websites. Yet Executive Yuan Political Affairs Committee Member Chang Shan-cheng publicly attacked an alleged "media monopoly" in today's multimedia era. This is clearly a phony issue. Is the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Ensurance Act" really necessary? Shouldn't the authorities consult experts, instead of dancing to the tune of mob sentiment?
The NCC is the responsible national authority. Those in the know include PFP Legislator Lee Tung-hao and other media scholars. They feel that the primary purpose of the NCC was established at the outset, in the "Basic Communications Law." The NCC's raison d'etre was to "take into account technological convergence, in order to promote the sound development of the communications industry." But ever since the NCC's inception, it has done nothing of the sort. First it launched a "no nit too small to pick" campaign of harassment against the broadcast media. Then it hopped on the media anti-trust bandwagon, all in the name of "safeguarding media diversity and professional autonomy." In reality, its interventions were motivated by the desire to expand its powers, and to clamp down on the print media. On the other hand, confronted with today's Internet technology, accelerated information convergence, and the need for international competitiveness and a voice in the communications industry, the NCC has accomplished nothing. The Control Yuan has failed to correct NCC negligence and omissions. Shouldn't the NCC improve its media management and control, as well as promote industry development?
Take a closer look at how the NCC has approached its two statutory mandates. The NCC has done too much in one area, but nothing in the other. The crux of the problem is common to all executive branch agencies. They have some idea about how to oversee an industry. But they have no idea whatsoever how to encourage an industry or to promote industrial development. The information industry on Taiwan had plentiful high-tech industry support. It should have been able to flex its muscles in the Internet era. Instead, information convergence left it in the dust. It has lagged far behind South Korea. It has even lagged behind the Chinese mainland. Its competitiveness ranking has declined. This is what the Ma government should be worrying about. How can the NCC allow itself to be distracted by other matters, and not think about how to catch up?
In sum, we welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.19
社論－促進通訊傳播產業發展 才是硬道理
本報訊
堪稱是「民粹式立法」典範的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）於今年四月間送請立法院審議後，立法院交通委員會併同民進黨版及國民黨版等不同版本，趕在臨休會前匆匆完成委員會初審，並在上周的立院臨時會中，經由民進黨團的堅持，列為臨時會的優先審議法案。
有鑒於此一極具針對性與高度爭議性的重要法案，行政和立法部門竟以近乎飆車的速度，草案研議過程既未博採周諮相關學者，特別是媒體實務界的意見看法，立法院審議階段更是一味求快，把不同版本拼裝成一個四不像的大雜燴。包括中國新聞學會、中華民國新聞媒體自律協會、中華民國廣播事業協會、中華民國廣播同業公會，和台北市報業商業同業公會等五大事業媒體社團，破天荒於昨天發表共同聲明，指陳《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》的部分條文內容，逾越ＮＣＣ法定職掌範圍，恐有嚴重侵犯新聞自由之嫌，也違反了憲法第十一條保障言論及出版自由的基本精神。
歸納此一「共同聲明」的訴求，重點其實有二。其一是質疑包括報紙和雜誌在內的紙面媒體，原非ＮＣＣ的管轄範圍，但在立法草案中卻把即使沒有參與跨媒體整合的紙媒，也比照廣電媒體，要求每年必須將營運的基本資料送給ＮＣＣ備查，要求全國性日報應訂定新聞編輯室公約，要求紙媒資本額達一定金額應設外部董事，要求紙媒不得有不公平競爭行為，否則ＮＣＣ即可干預並處以罰鍰。凡此ＮＣＣ實已構成違法擴權，並有箝制新聞之嫌。其二是草案不少對媒體規範的條文，定義十分模糊，令媒體無所適從，甚至因怕動輒得咎而將產生寒蟬效應，同時還可能引發ＮＣＣ欲藉此箝制新聞自由之疑慮。
綜觀五大新聞專業團體所關注的議題，其實只是具高度爭議性的反媒體壟斷法的一個小環節。事實上回顧此一法案在研議立法之初，針對在今天網路新興媒體發展，透過網路每個人都可以方便地「臨近」各式各樣媒體，甚至還可以透過個人網站主動發布訊息，行政院政務委員張善政即曾公開指出，所謂的「媒體壟斷」處於今天的「全媒體」時代，根本是一個假議題。準此，則所謂反媒體壟斷是否有必要立法，主管機關自應博採周諮，而非隨著民粹起舞。
尤有進者，包括親民黨立委李桐豪，以及不少傳媒學者，認為ＮＣＣ做為國家通訊傳播的主管機關，在《通訊傳播基本法》第一條開宗明義設定成立ＮＣＣ的目的，就是要「因應科技匯流，促進通訊傳播健全發展」。然而ＮＣＣ從成立迄今，先是對廣電媒體展開「無微不至」的規範與懲處，繼而又要搭反媒體壟斷的便車，以維護媒體多元和專業自主之名，行擴權干預、箝制紙面媒體之實。而唯獨在面對網路科技日新月異的今天，各國莫不加速資訊匯流的腳步，力爭通訊傳播產業的國際競爭力與話語權的當下，我們的ＮＣＣ在這個方面卻幾乎是交了白卷。我們認為，即使監察委員不提案糾正ＮＣＣ的怠忽職守與不作為，ＮＣＣ在加強管控媒體和促進產業發展之間難道不應該兼籌並顧嗎？
進一步探析ＮＣＣ何以對其前述兩大法定任務，會出現如此過度作為和近乎不作為的異象，我們認為，其中的癥結應該在於行政機關的通病，對於如何管理業者相對較為嫻熟，但對於如何輔導業者促進產業發展則相對較為陌生甚至是無能為之。結果就使得台灣的資訊傳播產業，原本被期待在既有的厚實高科技產業支撐下，可以於網路新時代大展拳腳，最後卻落得資訊匯流的進度，不只已遠遠落後南韓，甚至也被中國大陸超越。這種國家競爭力的落居下風，毋寧才是馬政府所應引以為憂，ＮＣＣ又怎能分心旁騖，不思急起直追的對策。
總結來看，我們欣見五大新聞專業團體針對內容荒腔走板偏差的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，終於不再集體失聲。業者站在第一線，痛感台灣媒體經營環境在過度規範下碎裂化為不具競爭力的中小企業，正所謂心所謂危，不能不言，至於能否對迷失方向感的馬政府，以及遭民粹綁架的立法部門，產生振聾發聵的效應，大家就拭目以待吧！
Monday, June 17, 2013
Snowden Tugs at Hong Kongers' Heartstrings
Snowden Tugs at Hong Kongers' Heartstrings
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2013
Summary: The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
Full Text below:
Twenty-seven Hong Kong citizens' groups took to the streets yesterday. They called on the Hong Kong Government to protect Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee and whistleblower who has taken refuge in Hong Kong. They forced Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung to publicly promise that he would deal with the matter "according to the law." Is Snowden a hero or a traitor? This answers the question. He may be a fugitive wanted by the U.S. government. But in cyberspace he is a hero. Hong Kong is his hiding place the non-virtual world. Hong Kongers feel obligated to come to his defense.
According to a South China Morning Post poll, nearly half of the people in Hong Kong oppose turning Snowden over to the United States. Only 17% favor surrendering him to US authorities. A full 33% of those polled see Snowden as a hero. Only 13% consider him a traitor. About 23% consider him somehwere in between. Public passions in Hong Kong may fluctuate on certain issues, but they never dissipate entirely.
Outsider may be skeptical of Hong Kong's post-retrocession autonomy. But as far the Snowden incident is concerned, the "one country, two systems" arrangement has led to this intriguing development. On the one hand, it has forced Beijing to stand down. On the other hand, it has enabled Hong Kong to go on the attack. This amounts to a one two punch to the United States. The incident has answered another question for Beijing. Is Snowden a gift from heaven, or a hot potato? The answer is, he is clearly not the latter.
The Snowden incident has tugged at peoples' heartstrings for three reasons. One. Snowden chose to break the news when Obama and Xi Jinping were meeting to discuss cyberwarfare. This caused the U.S. government no end of embarrassment. Without even drawing his sword, Xi Jinping was promptly rendered unassailable. Two. Snowden chose Hong Kong, a free port, to make his appearance, This posed a problem for U.S. diplomacy. It also put Beijing's handling of Hong Kong to the test. Three. Netizens the world over were made aware of the United States 1984 style "Big Brother" intelligence gathering methods. They were shocked and disgusted. The US has long touted itself as the world's champion of freedom and human rights. The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality left them deeply disillusioned. Obama's image also took a hit.
It was in just such a political atmosphere that Hong Kongers came forward to support Snowden. Snowden said he chose to flee to Hong Kong because Hong Kong was so free. Some think Snowden lacked a clear understanding of Hong Kong. They said he went from the frying pan into the fire. But from another perspective, it was precisely his assertion that Hong Kong was so free that sent waves of emotion through Hong Kongers's hearts, and made them so willing to protect him, and fight the erosion of freedom in Hong Kong. The June 4th candlelight vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Incident took place a few days earlier. As a result, the organizers of the protest march praised Snowden for sacrificing his own freedom to defend others' freedom of speech and fredoom of expression.
Practically speaking, is Hong Kong really a place Snowden can pin his hopes on? Can he eventually defect to Iceland? For the moment it is hard to say. The Hong Kong Government has been placed in an awkward position. Behind the scenes, it must comply with the CCP's diplomatic strategy. On this matter, Hong Kong has no choice. On the surface, Beijing certainly has no reason to rollover for the United States. But could the situation change? Would that turn Snowden into a secret bargaining chip? It is hard to say. In fact, there are rumors that Snowden's leaks were orchestrated by the CCP. That is why the leaks were so perfectly choreographed.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been hiding in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London over the past year. Assange has suggested that Snowden seek political asylum in one of the Latin American countries. HIs implication was that Asian countries are likely to succumb to US pressure. His remark suggested a lack of trust. The British government has already forbidden airline companies to allow Snowden into the UK. Snowden's whereabouts have been a mystery for many days. Has he quietly fled to a third country? Or is he still under the protection of private individuals or the CCP? Everyone is wondering.
To be sure, the more Hong Kongers stand up for and express solidarity with Snowden, the less likely he is to be secretly extradited to the United States. More and more netizens are expressing solidarity with him. The likelihood that US security agencies will deal with Snowden illegally is diminishing. When the Prism Project came to light, the U.S. Government immediately tried to appease domestic public opinion. It insisted the plan was directed only at foreigners, rather than the American public. These words grated on the ears of foreign governments, especially those who see themselves as allies of the United States. These words were difficult for them to swallow. Snowden exposed the recklessness of U.S. security agencies, the high-handedness of the U.S. government, and the servility of major technology companies who kowtowed to their political authority.
The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
史諾登挑動了香港人的心弦
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.18 02:02 am
香港廿七個公民團體日昨上街遊行，要求港府保護目前隱身香港的前中情局洩密雇員史諾登，並迫使特首梁振英表態會「依法處理」。史諾登究竟是英雄還是叛徒，由此大致得到答案：他雖是美國政府通緝的要犯，卻是網路世界的英雄；香港作為其藏身之實體世界，港人自覺有義務要聲援他。
根據南華早報的民調，有近半數的香港人反對將史諾登交給美國，只有一成七的人贊成將他交出。三成三的受訪者把史諾登視為「英雄」，僅一成三市民認為他是「叛徒」，兩成三的人認為他介乎兩者之間。香港的民意對特定議題雖然時有起落，向來不褪流行。
儘管外界對香港回歸後的自主地位抱持懷疑，但在史諾登事件上，「一國兩制」的設計恰好在此構成一個巧妙的帷幕，一方面讓北京「退可守」，一方面是香港「進可攻」，可分進合擊因應美國。如此，也就答覆了此一事件的另一項提法：對北京而言，史諾登是天下掉下來的禮物還是燙手山芋？答案顯非後者。
史諾登事件之所以如此扣人心弦，一是他選擇在歐巴馬和習近平會晤談「網軍戰爭」時爆料，給了美國政府一個莫大的難堪，習近平刀不出鞘即立於不敗之地；二是他選擇在自由港的香港現身，既挑戰美國的外交能耐，又考驗北京對香港的操控尺度；三是對全球的網路使用者而言，得悉美國以幾近「老大哥」的手法包山包海地監聽情蒐，不僅深覺震驚與反感，也對美國標榜自由人權的表裡不一感到失望，歐巴馬的形象也因而受創。
這樣的氛圍，給了香港人挺身聲援史諾登的正當性。史諾登聲稱，他選擇避居香港，是因為香港很自由。這點，有人認為是史諾登對香港認識不清，使他「才出虎穴，又入狼窩」。但換個角度看，也正是「香港很自由」這句話，激起了香港人內心的漣漪，願意起而保護他，同時維護香港日漸消褪的自由。何況，六四的紀念燭光晚會才過了沒幾天。也因此，遊行發起人在演說中，讚許史諾登是犧牲了自己的自由，來捍衛其他人的言論和通訊自由。
務實地看，香港是否真為史諾登可以寄託希望的地方，他最後能否如願投奔冰島，目前尚難斷言。港府在曖昧表態之餘，背後還得配合中共的外交戰略行事，這是香港的不由自主。表面上，北京當然沒有理由對美國示軟；但會不會在某種情勢變化下，讓史諾登被當成暗中交易的籌碼，則很難說。事實上，已有傳言指稱史諾登洩密事件莫非是中共一手主導，才會如此天衣無縫。
目前藏身厄瓜多爾駐倫敦大使館已逾一年的維基解密創辦人亞桑傑，即建議史諾登應向拉美國家尋求政治庇護；言下，他對易於屈從美國的亞洲國家，充滿不信任。而英國政府則已下令，禁止航空公司搭載史諾登入境英國。多日來行蹤成謎的史諾登，是否已悄悄前往第三地？或者他仍在民間人士或中共的保護之下，都令人好奇。
可以確定的是，有越多香港人民站出來聲援史諾登，他被私下交易引渡回美受審的機率就越小；有越多國際網路使用者站出來聲援他，史諾登遭到美國安全機構非法對待的機會，也就越小。事實上，當「稜鏡計畫」曝光後，美國政府立刻安撫國內民眾說，這項計畫針對的只是「外國人」，而不是針對美國人民；此話，聽在外國政府──尤其是那些自視為是美國良好盟邦的外國政府耳裡，不僅格外刺耳，也備感不是滋味。史諾登暴露的，不僅是美國安全機構的妄為，也是美國政府的霸道，和那些大科技公司向權力稱臣的卑躬姿態。
對北京而言，要依西方國家所謂的人權標準來處理史諾登事件，最好的辦法就是鬆手讓香港處理，把民意當成指標。去年投奔北京美國大使館的陳光誠，最後依其意願赴美；史諾登投奔香港事件，總不能低於此一標準吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2013
Summary: The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
Full Text below:
Twenty-seven Hong Kong citizens' groups took to the streets yesterday. They called on the Hong Kong Government to protect Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee and whistleblower who has taken refuge in Hong Kong. They forced Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung to publicly promise that he would deal with the matter "according to the law." Is Snowden a hero or a traitor? This answers the question. He may be a fugitive wanted by the U.S. government. But in cyberspace he is a hero. Hong Kong is his hiding place the non-virtual world. Hong Kongers feel obligated to come to his defense.
According to a South China Morning Post poll, nearly half of the people in Hong Kong oppose turning Snowden over to the United States. Only 17% favor surrendering him to US authorities. A full 33% of those polled see Snowden as a hero. Only 13% consider him a traitor. About 23% consider him somehwere in between. Public passions in Hong Kong may fluctuate on certain issues, but they never dissipate entirely.
Outsider may be skeptical of Hong Kong's post-retrocession autonomy. But as far the Snowden incident is concerned, the "one country, two systems" arrangement has led to this intriguing development. On the one hand, it has forced Beijing to stand down. On the other hand, it has enabled Hong Kong to go on the attack. This amounts to a one two punch to the United States. The incident has answered another question for Beijing. Is Snowden a gift from heaven, or a hot potato? The answer is, he is clearly not the latter.
The Snowden incident has tugged at peoples' heartstrings for three reasons. One. Snowden chose to break the news when Obama and Xi Jinping were meeting to discuss cyberwarfare. This caused the U.S. government no end of embarrassment. Without even drawing his sword, Xi Jinping was promptly rendered unassailable. Two. Snowden chose Hong Kong, a free port, to make his appearance, This posed a problem for U.S. diplomacy. It also put Beijing's handling of Hong Kong to the test. Three. Netizens the world over were made aware of the United States 1984 style "Big Brother" intelligence gathering methods. They were shocked and disgusted. The US has long touted itself as the world's champion of freedom and human rights. The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality left them deeply disillusioned. Obama's image also took a hit.
It was in just such a political atmosphere that Hong Kongers came forward to support Snowden. Snowden said he chose to flee to Hong Kong because Hong Kong was so free. Some think Snowden lacked a clear understanding of Hong Kong. They said he went from the frying pan into the fire. But from another perspective, it was precisely his assertion that Hong Kong was so free that sent waves of emotion through Hong Kongers's hearts, and made them so willing to protect him, and fight the erosion of freedom in Hong Kong. The June 4th candlelight vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Incident took place a few days earlier. As a result, the organizers of the protest march praised Snowden for sacrificing his own freedom to defend others' freedom of speech and fredoom of expression.
Practically speaking, is Hong Kong really a place Snowden can pin his hopes on? Can he eventually defect to Iceland? For the moment it is hard to say. The Hong Kong Government has been placed in an awkward position. Behind the scenes, it must comply with the CCP's diplomatic strategy. On this matter, Hong Kong has no choice. On the surface, Beijing certainly has no reason to rollover for the United States. But could the situation change? Would that turn Snowden into a secret bargaining chip? It is hard to say. In fact, there are rumors that Snowden's leaks were orchestrated by the CCP. That is why the leaks were so perfectly choreographed.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been hiding in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London over the past year. Assange has suggested that Snowden seek political asylum in one of the Latin American countries. HIs implication was that Asian countries are likely to succumb to US pressure. His remark suggested a lack of trust. The British government has already forbidden airline companies to allow Snowden into the UK. Snowden's whereabouts have been a mystery for many days. Has he quietly fled to a third country? Or is he still under the protection of private individuals or the CCP? Everyone is wondering.
To be sure, the more Hong Kongers stand up for and express solidarity with Snowden, the less likely he is to be secretly extradited to the United States. More and more netizens are expressing solidarity with him. The likelihood that US security agencies will deal with Snowden illegally is diminishing. When the Prism Project came to light, the U.S. Government immediately tried to appease domestic public opinion. It insisted the plan was directed only at foreigners, rather than the American public. These words grated on the ears of foreign governments, especially those who see themselves as allies of the United States. These words were difficult for them to swallow. Snowden exposed the recklessness of U.S. security agencies, the high-handedness of the U.S. government, and the servility of major technology companies who kowtowed to their political authority.
The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
史諾登挑動了香港人的心弦
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.18 02:02 am
香港廿七個公民團體日昨上街遊行，要求港府保護目前隱身香港的前中情局洩密雇員史諾登，並迫使特首梁振英表態會「依法處理」。史諾登究竟是英雄還是叛徒，由此大致得到答案：他雖是美國政府通緝的要犯，卻是網路世界的英雄；香港作為其藏身之實體世界，港人自覺有義務要聲援他。
根據南華早報的民調，有近半數的香港人反對將史諾登交給美國，只有一成七的人贊成將他交出。三成三的受訪者把史諾登視為「英雄」，僅一成三市民認為他是「叛徒」，兩成三的人認為他介乎兩者之間。香港的民意對特定議題雖然時有起落，向來不褪流行。
儘管外界對香港回歸後的自主地位抱持懷疑，但在史諾登事件上，「一國兩制」的設計恰好在此構成一個巧妙的帷幕，一方面讓北京「退可守」，一方面是香港「進可攻」，可分進合擊因應美國。如此，也就答覆了此一事件的另一項提法：對北京而言，史諾登是天下掉下來的禮物還是燙手山芋？答案顯非後者。
史諾登事件之所以如此扣人心弦，一是他選擇在歐巴馬和習近平會晤談「網軍戰爭」時爆料，給了美國政府一個莫大的難堪，習近平刀不出鞘即立於不敗之地；二是他選擇在自由港的香港現身，既挑戰美國的外交能耐，又考驗北京對香港的操控尺度；三是對全球的網路使用者而言，得悉美國以幾近「老大哥」的手法包山包海地監聽情蒐，不僅深覺震驚與反感，也對美國標榜自由人權的表裡不一感到失望，歐巴馬的形象也因而受創。
這樣的氛圍，給了香港人挺身聲援史諾登的正當性。史諾登聲稱，他選擇避居香港，是因為香港很自由。這點，有人認為是史諾登對香港認識不清，使他「才出虎穴，又入狼窩」。但換個角度看，也正是「香港很自由」這句話，激起了香港人內心的漣漪，願意起而保護他，同時維護香港日漸消褪的自由。何況，六四的紀念燭光晚會才過了沒幾天。也因此，遊行發起人在演說中，讚許史諾登是犧牲了自己的自由，來捍衛其他人的言論和通訊自由。
務實地看，香港是否真為史諾登可以寄託希望的地方，他最後能否如願投奔冰島，目前尚難斷言。港府在曖昧表態之餘，背後還得配合中共的外交戰略行事，這是香港的不由自主。表面上，北京當然沒有理由對美國示軟；但會不會在某種情勢變化下，讓史諾登被當成暗中交易的籌碼，則很難說。事實上，已有傳言指稱史諾登洩密事件莫非是中共一手主導，才會如此天衣無縫。
目前藏身厄瓜多爾駐倫敦大使館已逾一年的維基解密創辦人亞桑傑，即建議史諾登應向拉美國家尋求政治庇護；言下，他對易於屈從美國的亞洲國家，充滿不信任。而英國政府則已下令，禁止航空公司搭載史諾登入境英國。多日來行蹤成謎的史諾登，是否已悄悄前往第三地？或者他仍在民間人士或中共的保護之下，都令人好奇。
可以確定的是，有越多香港人民站出來聲援史諾登，他被私下交易引渡回美受審的機率就越小；有越多國際網路使用者站出來聲援他，史諾登遭到美國安全機構非法對待的機會，也就越小。事實上，當「稜鏡計畫」曝光後，美國政府立刻安撫國內民眾說，這項計畫針對的只是「外國人」，而不是針對美國人民；此話，聽在外國政府──尤其是那些自視為是美國良好盟邦的外國政府耳裡，不僅格外刺耳，也備感不是滋味。史諾登暴露的，不僅是美國安全機構的妄為，也是美國政府的霸道，和那些大科技公司向權力稱臣的卑躬姿態。
對北京而言，要依西方國家所謂的人權標準來處理史諾登事件，最好的辦法就是鬆手讓香港處理，把民意當成指標。去年投奔北京美國大使館的陳光誠，最後依其意願赴美；史諾登投奔香港事件，總不能低於此一標準吧！
Sunday, June 16, 2013
Cross-Strait Relations Worth Looking Forward To
Cross-Strait Relations Worth Looking Forward To
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2013
Summary: According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
Full Text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping recently met with U.S. President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They discussed the establishment of a new superpower relationship. General Secretary Xi Jinping later met in Beijing with Honorary Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Wu said the talks between the two sides will eliminate many misunderstandings. Xi said they helped him better understand Ma Ying-jeou's position. The talks were cordial. Both sides held their ground, but also demonstrated their goodwill. They agreed on gradual, peaceful development. They agreed to expand relations. Does this mean that both sides are attempting to establish a new cross-Strait relationship? If it does, we approve.
Questions continue to haunt the recent Wu Xi talks. Which side initiated the talks? Which side agreed to them? How were the time, location, and attendees determined? Was the meeting duly authorized? What issues were discussed? Why did President Ma make so many public statements before the meeting? What about the content of his speech, and its emphasis? Whom exactly was he addressing? The public on Taiwan? The Mainland authorities? Or the international community? Why did President Ma give Wu Poh-hsiung's trip his special blessing? Why, by contrast, did he disassociate himself from the earlier trip by Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan? Were there political calculations outsiders are not privy to? .
Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the Wu Xi meeting sent the world a powerful political message. Both sides place a high value on the relationship. Peaceful development will continue, based on the one China framework. Cross-Strait relations may expand. Indirect cross-Strait political dialogue has already begun. Neither side wants outsiders to misunderstand. Wu Poh-hsiung and Xi Jinping repeated President Ma Ying-jeou and the CCP Central Committee's words verbatim.
During the talks, Xi Jinping set forth four views on cross-Strait relations. He began with the nation as a whole, and a strategy for national development. He reaffirmed the nature of cross-Strait relations. He reaffirmed national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He reaffirmed the goal of national reinvigoration. He reiterated opposition to Taiwan independence, and to separatist ideas and activities. He called for greater mutual trust, greater efforts to seek common ground, for greater pragmatism and a more positive attitude. This reflects how we, the Chinese people, value essentials over details, and principles over particulars. This underscores the importance we place on consistency in our thinking. During bilateral negotiations, the two sides must first clarify the fundamentals. Only then can they address the specifics.
Consider the specifics. The Taiwan side raised the matter of participation in international activities. Xi Jinping said the two sides agreed in principle to reduce internal friction on foreign issues. He said both sides should meet as equals. The Taiwan side can be specific about its actual needs. Xi Jinping was precise in his wording. He did not use the word "diplomacy," which implies that the two parties are sovereign countries. He spoke only of international events, not organizations. He implied that Taipei should not attempt to introduce outside forces into the equation, or make unilateral demands, even as it refused to consult with the Mainland. The CCP believes the following. One. The two sides must not give the outside world the impression that there are "two Chinas" or that there is an independent Taiwan. Two. The two sides must not tolerate foreign intervention or foreign pressure. Three. The two sides must comply with the statutes of international organizations. The CCP still insists on dealing with cases on an individual basis for the forseeable future.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung issued seven views. These were things that President Ma Ying-jeou should do, must do, and can do. Under the current system, we in the Republic of China, champion a one China framework. Wu affirmed that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Wu addressed the expansion of relations at all levels under ECFA, Taiwan's participation in regional economic organizations, and the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. These reflect both public opinion on Taiwan and the government's current direction. We applaud their resolute posture.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu said Taiwan wants meaningful participation in international activities, and the promotion of a cross-Strait educational protocol. In the past, Taiwan demanded participation in international organizations rather than international activities. The Government often sent different signals on cross-Strait educational and cultural agreements. This left people confused. Wu Poh-hsiung's statements however, were authorized by President Ma. We know they are offiical government policy. Taiwan may have learned from past experience. Perhaps it knows that participation in international activities is more important than participation in international organizations. Perhaps it has learned that cultural and educational activities may be the best way to foster a shared perspective and to resolve cross-Strait alienation. Over the next three years, we will be regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the government's policies.
Finally, this newspaper would like to reiterate its past conclusions. Beijing probably has many expectations. But it has already concluded that no solution is possible in the short term. It hopes to create the conditions required for the eventual resolution of the divided China problem. According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.17
社論－建構新型兩岸關係值得期待
本報訊
繼日前大陸國家主席習近平與美國總統歐巴馬於加州舉行莊園峰會，暢談建立新型大國關係之後，習近平總書記隨即又在北京會見到訪的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄。吳伯雄說此次會談消除了雙方很多的誤解，習近平也說增加了對馬英九的理解。會談氣氛融洽、雙方都堅守立場，但也展現了善意，同意本著和平發展的主軸，用漸進的方式，進一步深化、廣化彼此之間的關係。如果這意味著雙方正在努力構建新型的兩岸關係，我們對此持積極、鼓勵的態度。
這次吳、習會談是由何方主動、誰是被動、會面時機、地點的選擇、隨行團員的安排、是否經過充分授權、討論的議題，馬總統為何在行前特別予以接見，並且公開發表談話，談話的內容與用字遣詞的強弱、發言的對象到底是台灣民眾、大陸當局或國際社會，馬總統又為何會對吳伯雄此行特別給予加持，卻對稍早連戰榮譽主席的大陸之行強力切割，其中確實有太多值得探究的問題，或許還有一些不足為外人道的精密算計與政治考量，其實都可以成為各界觀察研究的課題。
不論如何，這次吳、習會的本身就給外界一個強烈的政治訊息：兩岸雙方都極度重視彼此之間的關係，在一中框架（台灣用語為一中架構）的基礎上，和平發展的政策將會持續下去，兩岸關係的發展有進一步深化的各種可能，兩岸的間接政治對話已然啟動，但雙方也都不希望給外界任何錯誤解讀的空間，這可由吳伯雄與習近平兩人，分別拿出經由馬英九主席及中共中央的定稿逐字照念，字斟句酌的謹慎動作得到證實。
在這次會談中，習近平提出兩岸關係四點意見，基本上都是先從民族整體利益及國家發展的戰略格局出發，比如說先確定兩岸的關係與定位，堅持維護國家領土主權的完整，追求民族的偉大復興，反對、遏制台獨分裂的主張和活動，然後再進一步要求雙方增進互信、求同存異、務實進取、良性互動。這反映出我們中國人認為綱舉而目張，原則重於枝節、講概念重於講方法的一貫思維。兩岸在談判的過程中，雙方都有先確立基本原則，再談具體事務的情形。
在具體事務上，在回應台灣方面所提有關參與國際活動問題時，習近平原則同意雙方在涉外事物上要減少內耗，提到兩岸應該平等協商，台灣可以具體表明自己的實際需求。習近平用字精準，並未使用隱涵主權國家意味的外交二字，只談國際活動未談組織，暗示台北不宜引進外力、片面提出要求，但又拒絕與大陸協商解決。中共的立場是，一不要給外界造成兩個中國或台灣獨立的印象，二不接受外國的干預和壓力，三要合乎各該國際組織的章程。中共今後仍是個案、逐年處理，仍有所堅持。
再談到吳伯雄榮譽主席提出的七點意見，這同樣也就是馬英九總統今後應做、要做、能做的事情，其中先提到了在中華民國現行體制下，我們對一中架構的自我堅持，確定兩岸絕非國與國的關係之後，然後再觸及後ECFA時期如何深化、廣化兩岸各個層面的交流，台灣參與區域經濟組織，雙方互設辦事處等等問題。這些基本上都反映了台灣的民意及政府當前努力的方向，我們對此有為有守的立場抱持肯定、支持的態度。
於此，我們要特別一提的是，吳榮譽主席提到，台灣希望有意義的參與國際活動，推動兩岸教育協議。過去，台灣慣常主張的是參與國際組織，而非國際活動，而政府對於兩岸簽署教育及文化協議也常釋出不同的訊息，讓人莫衷一是。如今吳伯雄的談話既然經過馬主席的授權，我們就認定這是政府的既定政策，台灣或許由過去的經驗學到了教訓，或許知道參與國際活動重於參加組織，而透過文化及教育來建構兩岸同胞命運共同體的認知，更是解決兩岸疏離的最佳之道。未來三年，我們將不時以此來做為檢驗政府施政的成效與誠信。
最後，我們要重申本報過去的判斷，北京雖然在主觀上有很多的期望，但已能理性面對兩岸暫時無解的困境，希望在可控制範圍內，先行創造條件，為將來解決問題尋找破解之道。據與會人士轉述習總書記的講話，「兩岸形式的統一更要心靈的契合」，大陸會耐心的等待，大陸有信心隨著兩岸的交流，人民會更了解和平發展是兩岸最大的利益。大陸如此，台灣亦當如是。多做實事，少說大話，尤其不要釋出前後矛盾的訊息，兩岸問題終有和平解決的一天。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2013
Summary: According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
Full Text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping recently met with U.S. President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They discussed the establishment of a new superpower relationship. General Secretary Xi Jinping later met in Beijing with Honorary Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Wu said the talks between the two sides will eliminate many misunderstandings. Xi said they helped him better understand Ma Ying-jeou's position. The talks were cordial. Both sides held their ground, but also demonstrated their goodwill. They agreed on gradual, peaceful development. They agreed to expand relations. Does this mean that both sides are attempting to establish a new cross-Strait relationship? If it does, we approve.
Questions continue to haunt the recent Wu Xi talks. Which side initiated the talks? Which side agreed to them? How were the time, location, and attendees determined? Was the meeting duly authorized? What issues were discussed? Why did President Ma make so many public statements before the meeting? What about the content of his speech, and its emphasis? Whom exactly was he addressing? The public on Taiwan? The Mainland authorities? Or the international community? Why did President Ma give Wu Poh-hsiung's trip his special blessing? Why, by contrast, did he disassociate himself from the earlier trip by Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan? Were there political calculations outsiders are not privy to? .
Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the Wu Xi meeting sent the world a powerful political message. Both sides place a high value on the relationship. Peaceful development will continue, based on the one China framework. Cross-Strait relations may expand. Indirect cross-Strait political dialogue has already begun. Neither side wants outsiders to misunderstand. Wu Poh-hsiung and Xi Jinping repeated President Ma Ying-jeou and the CCP Central Committee's words verbatim.
During the talks, Xi Jinping set forth four views on cross-Strait relations. He began with the nation as a whole, and a strategy for national development. He reaffirmed the nature of cross-Strait relations. He reaffirmed national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He reaffirmed the goal of national reinvigoration. He reiterated opposition to Taiwan independence, and to separatist ideas and activities. He called for greater mutual trust, greater efforts to seek common ground, for greater pragmatism and a more positive attitude. This reflects how we, the Chinese people, value essentials over details, and principles over particulars. This underscores the importance we place on consistency in our thinking. During bilateral negotiations, the two sides must first clarify the fundamentals. Only then can they address the specifics.
Consider the specifics. The Taiwan side raised the matter of participation in international activities. Xi Jinping said the two sides agreed in principle to reduce internal friction on foreign issues. He said both sides should meet as equals. The Taiwan side can be specific about its actual needs. Xi Jinping was precise in his wording. He did not use the word "diplomacy," which implies that the two parties are sovereign countries. He spoke only of international events, not organizations. He implied that Taipei should not attempt to introduce outside forces into the equation, or make unilateral demands, even as it refused to consult with the Mainland. The CCP believes the following. One. The two sides must not give the outside world the impression that there are "two Chinas" or that there is an independent Taiwan. Two. The two sides must not tolerate foreign intervention or foreign pressure. Three. The two sides must comply with the statutes of international organizations. The CCP still insists on dealing with cases on an individual basis for the forseeable future.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung issued seven views. These were things that President Ma Ying-jeou should do, must do, and can do. Under the current system, we in the Republic of China, champion a one China framework. Wu affirmed that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Wu addressed the expansion of relations at all levels under ECFA, Taiwan's participation in regional economic organizations, and the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. These reflect both public opinion on Taiwan and the government's current direction. We applaud their resolute posture.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu said Taiwan wants meaningful participation in international activities, and the promotion of a cross-Strait educational protocol. In the past, Taiwan demanded participation in international organizations rather than international activities. The Government often sent different signals on cross-Strait educational and cultural agreements. This left people confused. Wu Poh-hsiung's statements however, were authorized by President Ma. We know they are offiical government policy. Taiwan may have learned from past experience. Perhaps it knows that participation in international activities is more important than participation in international organizations. Perhaps it has learned that cultural and educational activities may be the best way to foster a shared perspective and to resolve cross-Strait alienation. Over the next three years, we will be regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the government's policies.
Finally, this newspaper would like to reiterate its past conclusions. Beijing probably has many expectations. But it has already concluded that no solution is possible in the short term. It hopes to create the conditions required for the eventual resolution of the divided China problem. According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.17
社論－建構新型兩岸關係值得期待
本報訊
繼日前大陸國家主席習近平與美國總統歐巴馬於加州舉行莊園峰會，暢談建立新型大國關係之後，習近平總書記隨即又在北京會見到訪的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄。吳伯雄說此次會談消除了雙方很多的誤解，習近平也說增加了對馬英九的理解。會談氣氛融洽、雙方都堅守立場，但也展現了善意，同意本著和平發展的主軸，用漸進的方式，進一步深化、廣化彼此之間的關係。如果這意味著雙方正在努力構建新型的兩岸關係，我們對此持積極、鼓勵的態度。
這次吳、習會談是由何方主動、誰是被動、會面時機、地點的選擇、隨行團員的安排、是否經過充分授權、討論的議題，馬總統為何在行前特別予以接見，並且公開發表談話，談話的內容與用字遣詞的強弱、發言的對象到底是台灣民眾、大陸當局或國際社會，馬總統又為何會對吳伯雄此行特別給予加持，卻對稍早連戰榮譽主席的大陸之行強力切割，其中確實有太多值得探究的問題，或許還有一些不足為外人道的精密算計與政治考量，其實都可以成為各界觀察研究的課題。
不論如何，這次吳、習會的本身就給外界一個強烈的政治訊息：兩岸雙方都極度重視彼此之間的關係，在一中框架（台灣用語為一中架構）的基礎上，和平發展的政策將會持續下去，兩岸關係的發展有進一步深化的各種可能，兩岸的間接政治對話已然啟動，但雙方也都不希望給外界任何錯誤解讀的空間，這可由吳伯雄與習近平兩人，分別拿出經由馬英九主席及中共中央的定稿逐字照念，字斟句酌的謹慎動作得到證實。
在這次會談中，習近平提出兩岸關係四點意見，基本上都是先從民族整體利益及國家發展的戰略格局出發，比如說先確定兩岸的關係與定位，堅持維護國家領土主權的完整，追求民族的偉大復興，反對、遏制台獨分裂的主張和活動，然後再進一步要求雙方增進互信、求同存異、務實進取、良性互動。這反映出我們中國人認為綱舉而目張，原則重於枝節、講概念重於講方法的一貫思維。兩岸在談判的過程中，雙方都有先確立基本原則，再談具體事務的情形。
在具體事務上，在回應台灣方面所提有關參與國際活動問題時，習近平原則同意雙方在涉外事物上要減少內耗，提到兩岸應該平等協商，台灣可以具體表明自己的實際需求。習近平用字精準，並未使用隱涵主權國家意味的外交二字，只談國際活動未談組織，暗示台北不宜引進外力、片面提出要求，但又拒絕與大陸協商解決。中共的立場是，一不要給外界造成兩個中國或台灣獨立的印象，二不接受外國的干預和壓力，三要合乎各該國際組織的章程。中共今後仍是個案、逐年處理，仍有所堅持。
再談到吳伯雄榮譽主席提出的七點意見，這同樣也就是馬英九總統今後應做、要做、能做的事情，其中先提到了在中華民國現行體制下，我們對一中架構的自我堅持，確定兩岸絕非國與國的關係之後，然後再觸及後ECFA時期如何深化、廣化兩岸各個層面的交流，台灣參與區域經濟組織，雙方互設辦事處等等問題。這些基本上都反映了台灣的民意及政府當前努力的方向，我們對此有為有守的立場抱持肯定、支持的態度。
於此，我們要特別一提的是，吳榮譽主席提到，台灣希望有意義的參與國際活動，推動兩岸教育協議。過去，台灣慣常主張的是參與國際組織，而非國際活動，而政府對於兩岸簽署教育及文化協議也常釋出不同的訊息，讓人莫衷一是。如今吳伯雄的談話既然經過馬主席的授權，我們就認定這是政府的既定政策，台灣或許由過去的經驗學到了教訓，或許知道參與國際活動重於參加組織，而透過文化及教育來建構兩岸同胞命運共同體的認知，更是解決兩岸疏離的最佳之道。未來三年，我們將不時以此來做為檢驗政府施政的成效與誠信。
最後，我們要重申本報過去的判斷，北京雖然在主觀上有很多的期望，但已能理性面對兩岸暫時無解的困境，希望在可控制範圍內，先行創造條件，為將來解決問題尋找破解之道。據與會人士轉述習總書記的講話，「兩岸形式的統一更要心靈的契合」，大陸會耐心的等待，大陸有信心隨著兩岸的交流，人民會更了解和平發展是兩岸最大的利益。大陸如此，台灣亦當如是。多做實事，少說大話，尤其不要釋出前後矛盾的訊息，兩岸問題終有和平解決的一天。
Thursday, June 13, 2013
Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?
Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2013
Summary: Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
Full Text below:
Just before the Wu Xi Meeting, most speculation was directed at Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy. Would it harsher than President Hu Jintao's? Some even predicted that Xi would resort to threatening rhetoric.
But the general impression following the meeting was that although Xi Jinping upholds the "one China framework," his cross-Strait policy is no harsher than his predecessor's. In fact, it may even be more liberal, and offer greater maneuveuring room.
Compare this meeting with other meetings over the past five years. The recent Wu Xi Meeting included a political proclamation that upheld the "one China framework" and stressed that cross-Strait relations were "not relations between different countries." This may be regarded as old rhetoric. But the recent meeting achieved greater concrete results than ever before. For example, the KMT expressed a desire to participate in the RCEP (regional comprehensive economic partnership). The CCP expressed the desire to sign cultural agreements. The hallmark of the Wu Xi Meeting was its plain language, realism, and pragmatism.
The meeting zeroed in on several issues. Wu Poh-hsiung was the KMT's authorized representative to the CCP leadership. Wu proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Before Wu Poh-hsiung's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou expressed this same position many times. But this was the very first time the KMT issued such a proclamation right in front of the CCP.
What Wu Poh-hsiung said was that according to the two sides' laws, both sides should uphold the one-China principle. Both use the one-China framework when defining cross-Strait relations. Both define the relationship as non-state to state relations.
Wu Poh-hsiung's reasoning can be expanded as follows: Under the ROC's "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," cross-Strait relations are of course not "state to state relations," since they are both part of "one China."
The two sides talk about "cross-Strait relations" every day. But what precisely is the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland? In fact, we have a ready-made answer. It is "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." As Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the CPPCC observed, it is a relationship "in progress."
In order to establish cross-Strait representative offices, President Ma repeatedly proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Beijing has stressed that they are emphatically "not diplomatic in nature," and are "not embassies or consulates." In other words, neither side defines cross-Strait relations as "the relationship between the ROC and the PRC." Such a definition smacks of "state to state relations." But the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China obviously exist. It is merely that neither recognizes the other. But a flower is a flower all the same. Merely because one refuses to recognize it, does not mean it is not a flower.
The relationship between the PRC and the ROC is not the same as the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Both the PRC and Vietname see the other as foreign countries. But neither is the relationship between the PRC and the ROC like the relationship betwen the PRC and Fujian Province. After all, Beijing would never establish a "Fujianese Compatriates Office" in Fuzhou. The cross-Strait relationship is rooted in the two sides' constitutional frameworks and legal systems. It is not a relationship between foreign states. But in practice both sides see the relationship as a "non-foreign state to state relationship." This is what is meant by "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
The phrase "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," means that although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides are attempting to establish "one China" linkage points. The phrase "yet to be reunified" means that the People's Republic of China and the the Republic of China have yet to be reunified. Neither side recognizes the other as a "state." But this deprives "one China" of a linkage point. Therefore, although neither side recognizes the other as a "foreign state," that does not mean they cannot recognize each other as a "non-foreign state." They can use the "big roof concept of China" as a "one-China" linkage point. This may enable them to establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
As Wu Poh-hsiung noted, each sides upholds its own constitution, thereby upholding the cross-Strait "one China framework." The ROC and the PRC coexist, side by side, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is hardly "relations between one foreign country and another." This is the pillar of the "one China framework."
Therefore, the two sides should not endlessly bicker over whether cross-Strait relations are state to state relations. Cross-Strait relations are "political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China under special circumstances." The circumstances are special because neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China can eliminate each other. This has led to "special circumstances," and "a yet to be reunified" state of affairs. The two sides may refuse to recognize each other. But they cannot eliminate each other either. Doing so would not aid reunification. It would merely eliminate a linkage point for the "one China framework." It would merely weaken Taiwanese emotional identification with the "one China framework."
Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
吳習會：台灣與大陸是什麼關係？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.14 04:19 am
吳習會之前，最大的猜疑與懸念是：習近平的兩岸政策，會不會比胡錦濤嚴苛與緊縮？甚至有人預期，從習的口中，可能會聽到咄咄逼人的言語。
但會後的一般印象是：習近平在「一中框架」的堅持下，其兩岸政策觀點未見較前任嚴苛緊縮，且有更形寬闊與開明的可能性。
若與五年來多次叫得出「某某會」的場景相較，此次吳習會雖亦見政治宣示，如「一個中國的架構」及「不是國與國的關係」，卻皆可視為舊論的延伸。相對而言，此會在實際工作上則較過去著墨更多，例如國民黨方面表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ（區域性全面經濟夥伴關係）的意願，而中共則期望議簽文化協議等，此種文采簡樸、實事求是的務實風格，可視為此次吳習會的特色。
會談的焦點是，國民黨的授權代表吳伯雄在中共領導人面前，首次使用了「兩岸非國與國關係」一詞；雖然，在吳伯雄啟程前，馬英九總統已表達了多次。吳伯雄的論述是：兩岸各自的法律、體制都主張一個中國原則，都用一個中國架構來定位兩岸關係，而非國與國的關係。
吳伯雄的這個說法可以引申為：依據中華民國「一中憲法」的「一中各表」，兩岸自然不是「國與國的關係」，因為有「一中」的連結點。
然而，兩岸每天都在談「兩岸關係」，難道迄仍不知「台灣與大陸究竟是什麼關係」？其實，已有現成的答案，即是：「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。大陸政協主席俞正聲說，此一關係是「進行式」。
為了互設辦事處，馬總統屢申「兩岸不是國與國的關係」，北京則強調絕非「外交領事機構」。也就是說，兩岸目前皆不主張「兩岸關係」是「中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係」，好像這樣就會變成「國與國的關係」。然而，「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」卻皆是明明存在之事實，只是「互不承認」而已。不過，一朵花終究是一朵花，不因外人不承認即不是花。
其實，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，雖不類於「中華人民共和國與越南社會主義共和國的關係」（互為外國的關係）；但是，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，終究亦不類於「中華人民共和國與福建省的關係」，北京畢竟不會在福州市設置一個簽發「閩胞證」的辦事處。這樣的「關係」，就兩岸憲政法理言，固然不是「互視為外國」的關係，卻實際上蘊有「互視為非外國的國家」的關係，這也就是「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。
所謂「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，就是：雖然「尚未統一」，但希望能建構起「一個中國」的連結點。而「尚未統一的關係」，即是「未統一於中華人民共和國／亦未統一於中華民國」的「關係」；然而，如今相互否認對方為「國家」，卻也使得「一個中國」失去了「連結點」。於是，兩岸雖然「互不視為外國」，卻未必不可「互視為非外國的國家」，而以「大屋頂中國」為「一個中國」的「連結點」；如此始可能建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
如吳伯雄所言，倘以各自的憲法來維繫鞏固兩岸的「一中架構」；則中華民國與中華人民共和國在「尚未統一特殊情況下」的並立共存，非但不是「外國與外國的關係」，而且其實正是「一中架構」的主要支撐。
因此，不應再在「是不是國與國關係」的死胡同裡糾纏，兩岸的「關係」，其實就是「尚未統一（於中華人民共和國或中華民國的）特殊情況下的政治關係」，這種「特殊情況」，正是因為兩岸皆不能使「中華民國與中華人民共和國」消滅，始成為「特殊情況」，而「尚未統一」；畢竟，相互「否認」，其實不能使彼此「消滅」，也無助「統一」，只會使「一個中國」失去了「連結點」，更弱化了台灣人民在感情上對「一中架構」的想像。
習近平在昨日會中表達了有感的善意，且又提兩岸議簽《軍事互信機制》與《和平協議》；不過，如果不能對「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，做出合情合理的安排」，這些心願將如何實現？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2013
Summary: Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
Full Text below:
Just before the Wu Xi Meeting, most speculation was directed at Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy. Would it harsher than President Hu Jintao's? Some even predicted that Xi would resort to threatening rhetoric.
But the general impression following the meeting was that although Xi Jinping upholds the "one China framework," his cross-Strait policy is no harsher than his predecessor's. In fact, it may even be more liberal, and offer greater maneuveuring room.
Compare this meeting with other meetings over the past five years. The recent Wu Xi Meeting included a political proclamation that upheld the "one China framework" and stressed that cross-Strait relations were "not relations between different countries." This may be regarded as old rhetoric. But the recent meeting achieved greater concrete results than ever before. For example, the KMT expressed a desire to participate in the RCEP (regional comprehensive economic partnership). The CCP expressed the desire to sign cultural agreements. The hallmark of the Wu Xi Meeting was its plain language, realism, and pragmatism.
The meeting zeroed in on several issues. Wu Poh-hsiung was the KMT's authorized representative to the CCP leadership. Wu proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Before Wu Poh-hsiung's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou expressed this same position many times. But this was the very first time the KMT issued such a proclamation right in front of the CCP.
What Wu Poh-hsiung said was that according to the two sides' laws, both sides should uphold the one-China principle. Both use the one-China framework when defining cross-Strait relations. Both define the relationship as non-state to state relations.
Wu Poh-hsiung's reasoning can be expanded as follows: Under the ROC's "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," cross-Strait relations are of course not "state to state relations," since they are both part of "one China."
The two sides talk about "cross-Strait relations" every day. But what precisely is the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland? In fact, we have a ready-made answer. It is "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." As Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the CPPCC observed, it is a relationship "in progress."
In order to establish cross-Strait representative offices, President Ma repeatedly proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Beijing has stressed that they are emphatically "not diplomatic in nature," and are "not embassies or consulates." In other words, neither side defines cross-Strait relations as "the relationship between the ROC and the PRC." Such a definition smacks of "state to state relations." But the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China obviously exist. It is merely that neither recognizes the other. But a flower is a flower all the same. Merely because one refuses to recognize it, does not mean it is not a flower.
The relationship between the PRC and the ROC is not the same as the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Both the PRC and Vietname see the other as foreign countries. But neither is the relationship between the PRC and the ROC like the relationship betwen the PRC and Fujian Province. After all, Beijing would never establish a "Fujianese Compatriates Office" in Fuzhou. The cross-Strait relationship is rooted in the two sides' constitutional frameworks and legal systems. It is not a relationship between foreign states. But in practice both sides see the relationship as a "non-foreign state to state relationship." This is what is meant by "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
The phrase "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," means that although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides are attempting to establish "one China" linkage points. The phrase "yet to be reunified" means that the People's Republic of China and the the Republic of China have yet to be reunified. Neither side recognizes the other as a "state." But this deprives "one China" of a linkage point. Therefore, although neither side recognizes the other as a "foreign state," that does not mean they cannot recognize each other as a "non-foreign state." They can use the "big roof concept of China" as a "one-China" linkage point. This may enable them to establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
As Wu Poh-hsiung noted, each sides upholds its own constitution, thereby upholding the cross-Strait "one China framework." The ROC and the PRC coexist, side by side, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is hardly "relations between one foreign country and another." This is the pillar of the "one China framework."
Therefore, the two sides should not endlessly bicker over whether cross-Strait relations are state to state relations. Cross-Strait relations are "political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China under special circumstances." The circumstances are special because neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China can eliminate each other. This has led to "special circumstances," and "a yet to be reunified" state of affairs. The two sides may refuse to recognize each other. But they cannot eliminate each other either. Doing so would not aid reunification. It would merely eliminate a linkage point for the "one China framework." It would merely weaken Taiwanese emotional identification with the "one China framework."
Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
吳習會：台灣與大陸是什麼關係？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.14 04:19 am
吳習會之前，最大的猜疑與懸念是：習近平的兩岸政策，會不會比胡錦濤嚴苛與緊縮？甚至有人預期，從習的口中，可能會聽到咄咄逼人的言語。
但會後的一般印象是：習近平在「一中框架」的堅持下，其兩岸政策觀點未見較前任嚴苛緊縮，且有更形寬闊與開明的可能性。
若與五年來多次叫得出「某某會」的場景相較，此次吳習會雖亦見政治宣示，如「一個中國的架構」及「不是國與國的關係」，卻皆可視為舊論的延伸。相對而言，此會在實際工作上則較過去著墨更多，例如國民黨方面表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ（區域性全面經濟夥伴關係）的意願，而中共則期望議簽文化協議等，此種文采簡樸、實事求是的務實風格，可視為此次吳習會的特色。
會談的焦點是，國民黨的授權代表吳伯雄在中共領導人面前，首次使用了「兩岸非國與國關係」一詞；雖然，在吳伯雄啟程前，馬英九總統已表達了多次。吳伯雄的論述是：兩岸各自的法律、體制都主張一個中國原則，都用一個中國架構來定位兩岸關係，而非國與國的關係。
吳伯雄的這個說法可以引申為：依據中華民國「一中憲法」的「一中各表」，兩岸自然不是「國與國的關係」，因為有「一中」的連結點。
然而，兩岸每天都在談「兩岸關係」，難道迄仍不知「台灣與大陸究竟是什麼關係」？其實，已有現成的答案，即是：「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。大陸政協主席俞正聲說，此一關係是「進行式」。
為了互設辦事處，馬總統屢申「兩岸不是國與國的關係」，北京則強調絕非「外交領事機構」。也就是說，兩岸目前皆不主張「兩岸關係」是「中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係」，好像這樣就會變成「國與國的關係」。然而，「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」卻皆是明明存在之事實，只是「互不承認」而已。不過，一朵花終究是一朵花，不因外人不承認即不是花。
其實，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，雖不類於「中華人民共和國與越南社會主義共和國的關係」（互為外國的關係）；但是，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，終究亦不類於「中華人民共和國與福建省的關係」，北京畢竟不會在福州市設置一個簽發「閩胞證」的辦事處。這樣的「關係」，就兩岸憲政法理言，固然不是「互視為外國」的關係，卻實際上蘊有「互視為非外國的國家」的關係，這也就是「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。
所謂「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，就是：雖然「尚未統一」，但希望能建構起「一個中國」的連結點。而「尚未統一的關係」，即是「未統一於中華人民共和國／亦未統一於中華民國」的「關係」；然而，如今相互否認對方為「國家」，卻也使得「一個中國」失去了「連結點」。於是，兩岸雖然「互不視為外國」，卻未必不可「互視為非外國的國家」，而以「大屋頂中國」為「一個中國」的「連結點」；如此始可能建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
如吳伯雄所言，倘以各自的憲法來維繫鞏固兩岸的「一中架構」；則中華民國與中華人民共和國在「尚未統一特殊情況下」的並立共存，非但不是「外國與外國的關係」，而且其實正是「一中架構」的主要支撐。
因此，不應再在「是不是國與國關係」的死胡同裡糾纏，兩岸的「關係」，其實就是「尚未統一（於中華人民共和國或中華民國的）特殊情況下的政治關係」，這種「特殊情況」，正是因為兩岸皆不能使「中華民國與中華人民共和國」消滅，始成為「特殊情況」，而「尚未統一」；畢竟，相互「否認」，其實不能使彼此「消滅」，也無助「統一」，只會使「一個中國」失去了「連結點」，更弱化了台灣人民在感情上對「一中架構」的想像。
習近平在昨日會中表達了有感的善意，且又提兩岸議簽《軍事互信機制》與《和平協議》；不過，如果不能對「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，做出合情合理的安排」，這些心願將如何實現？
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
Wu Poh-hsiung's Critical Mission: Initiate KMT-CCP Political Dialogue
Wu Poh-hsiung's Critical Mission: Initiate KMT-CCP Political Dialogue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
Full Text below:
On April 21, reporters asked President Ma Ying-jeou about the possibility of cross-Strait political dialogue. Ma said Beijing "sought progress amidst stability," and would not pressure Taipei. Ma said for Taipei to engage in political dialogue with Beijing was premature. "There is still no consensus. Therefore why the rush?" He said "While negotiating the past 18 agreements, we invariably encountered political problems. But we resolved every one of them. If we made a special effort to engage in political dialogue, what would we talk about?"
With these remarks still ringing in our ears, Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. The meeting was deliberately held at the Presidential Palace. News of the meeting was deliberately supplied to the media. Ma said he hoped the mission would be successful and achieve its purpose. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Therefore Wu Poh-hsiung's visit should be considered the first ever political contact between Taipei and Beijing. Wu Poh-hsiung's dialogue with Beijing's top officials, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, should be considered the first ever official and public political dialogue. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
According to media reports, the scope of the dialogue will include cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait exchanges, follow-up negotiations on ECFA, and the ARATS-SEF establishment of representative offices. The two sides are expected to discuss whether the KMT and CCP should address politically-related issues in the latter half of the year. Closer scrutiny reveaks that some of these reports are true, while some are false. Leave aside the false reports for the moment. The reports of "future cross-Strait relations," and the reports that the KMT and CCP will discuss "politically-related issues during the latter half of the year" are true. We know this because the Mainland Affairs Council only deals with practical matters. Issues such as "future cross-Strait relations," and "KMT-CCP cross-Strait political dialogue" are issues under the Presidential Office's purvue. The real issue Ma Ying-jeou is addressing, is how the two sides can bridge the gap across the Strait, and how the two parties can establish political contacts and begin political dialogue. That is why when President Ma Ying-jeou met with Wu Poh-hsiung, he thrice stressed that, "Cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations."
Take the "cross-Strait establishment of representative offices" as an example. Ma feels this has "very real political implications," that are important to cross-Strait relations. As Ma reiterated, "The relationship between the two sides is not a state to state relationship," because under the framework of the ROC Constitution, "The Mainland cannot be characterized as a state." Therefore, the representative offices the two sides establish will not be "embassies." This is an extremely sensitive issue on Taiwan. The wording is critical in any cross-Strait political statement. The political opposition must also base any such statements on the ROC Constitution. This reaffirms our own constitution. This also reassures the other side. Upholding our own constitution responds to a statement by the CCP late last July. The CCP spoke of a "one China framework." It said "The core issue is that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same country. Cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. The two sides should begin by reaffirming their existing legal provisions. They should reaffirm these as objective facts. They should establish a shared perception. On this basis, they should uphold and reaffirm the framework of one China." Therefore when Wu Poh-hsiung dialogues with Beijing regarding "future cross-Strait relations," the terms of the dialogue will be even clearer.
Ma Ying-jeou also recalled the events of 2008. Five years ago Wu Poh-hsiung led a delegation to the Mainland. a mere 10 days after his inauguration. He met with top CCP leaders and established a future direction for cross-Strait relations. This was a major contribution to cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou wished Wu Poh-hsiung a successful mission. He hoped Wu would bring back good news.
All this underscores the importance of Wu Poh-hsiung's mission. It is kick-starting cross-Strait ruling party political dialogue. A member of the delegation, former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi, said it was only natural that political dialogue would begin with the private sector. This was the case with negotiations over direct cross-Strait flights. "First let people to people talks yield results. Then when the time is ripe, let the government take over."
Let us evaluate the larger international picture. Let us predict the impact on the rest of Asia. Ma Ying-jeou's decision is correct. He summoned up the courage and finally took this step, one clearly crucial to the healthy and rational development of cross-Strait relations. We would like to offer the following reminders.
One. Is Ma Ying-jeou serious about cross-Strait political dialogue? If he is, political negotiations demand mental clarity. Is a policy conducive to Taiwan's development? If it is, then he must demonstrate the same courage he had when promoting ECFA. He must mobilize the government and community leaders to influence public opinion. He must focus his energy and resources to promote its implementation, to reassure the public, and to reduce opposition. He must not give up halfway. That would both destroy public support, and undermine cross-Strait relations.
Two. Ma must not use "political dialogue between the two parties" as bait, as a bargaining chip to benefit special interests. Genuine political dialogue to promote cross-Strait relations is essential. Otherwise, one may invoke public opinion on Taiwan. But if one returns to the same old populist demagoguery, then one will forfeit the moral high ground, and doom Taiwan to isolation.
Three. When promoting change, pressure and criticism are inevitable. Reducing such pressure requires honest communication, openness, and transparency. It requires making a distinction between President Ma and Chairman Ma. It requires reanimating the spirit of the Kuomintang. It requires offering Taiwan and the Chinese nation a strategic plan. Doing so will provide Beijing with a clear response, and demonstrate the government's tactical aptitude. It will reaffirm Taiwan's value and ensure the people's well-being. It will ensure that the public and the party back the government's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.13
社論－吳伯雄任重道遠 開啟兩黨政治對話
本報訊
今年四月廿一日馬英九總統接受本報專訪時，被詢「兩岸是否可能開展政治對話」時還表示大陸對此已表示應「穩中求進步」，不會給任何壓力…台灣與對岸的政治對話時機仍不成熟，「大家都沒有一致的意見，那又何必急？」他又說「過去談判了十八項協議，多少會碰到政治問題，但都解決了；若特別要進行政治對話，那要談什麼？」
上述說法言猶在耳，日前馬英九刻意在「總統府」會見吳伯雄等國民黨代表團一行，而且主動向媒體公布，期許此行能順利達成交付任務，凸顯了吳伯雄榮譽主席此行所具的正式代表性。此一動作，自然有正式告訴北京，此團訪是經過中華民國政府授權的中國國民黨訪問團，因此，這次吳伯雄的訪問應該可以被定位為兩岸首次的政治接觸，而吳伯雄與北京高層，以及與習近平總書記的對話，就是一次不折不扣的兩岸首次正式公開的政治對話，不論其內容為何，都具有里程碑的意義。
按媒體披露此次對話範圍，包括：未來兩岸關係開展、兩岸交流、兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判、兩岸兩會互設辦事處等；另外，雙方可望交換意見，討論「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題。」詳細分析起來，這裡有實有虛，虛且不論，「未來兩岸關係開展」以及「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題」，是「實」的部分，因為「陸委會」只處理現實問題，而「未來兩岸關係開展」及「國共論壇列入兩岸政治對話」這一部分是總統府規畫，由此觀之，此次馬英九總統委託的真正議題，就是兩岸如何經由兩黨搭橋開啟兩岸初期的政治接觸與政治對話。所以馬英九總統才必須在會見吳伯雄等人時三度強調「兩岸不是國與國關係」。
借「現在推動兩岸互設辦事處」為例，他認為這是「具有高度政治涵義」的兩岸關係的重大措施，「但兩岸之間不是國與國的關係」，因為在「憲法」架構下，「不可能把大陸看做是一個國家」。因此，不會把雙方設立的辦事機構當做「外交使領館」。這是在台灣極敏感、在兩岸極關鍵的政治表態，是以憲法將在野黨一軍，也是以憲法表自己的態，安對岸的心，因為提出自己的憲法，正是回應了中共去年七月底，提出的「一中框架」中所說：「核心是大陸和台灣同屬一個國家，兩岸關係不是國與國的關係。兩岸從各自現行規定出發，確認這一客觀事實，形成共同認知，就確立、維護和鞏固了一個中國框架」，以便吳伯雄在與北京對話「未來兩岸關係開展」時，可以擁有更清楚的空間。
馬英九同時回顧了二○○八年的往事：五年前吳伯雄率團去大陸，就在他就職十幾天後，有機會與當時的中共最高領導人見面，確立未來兩岸關係發展方向，這點對兩岸關係有非常大的貢獻。馬英九預祝吳伯雄任務成功，帶回雙方關係往前邁進的好消息。
這裡就暗示了吳伯雄此團的重大意義，開啟兩岸執政黨的政治對話，同一團的前國安會祕書長蘇起表示，政治對話由民間開始最自然，就像當初兩岸協商直航，「讓民間先談出成果，等水到渠成再由政府來接手」。
盱衡整體國際形勢，前瞻亞洲的變化，馬英九的決定是正確的，鼓足勇氣，終於踏出了這一步，對未來兩岸關係的發展顯然是健康而理性的關鍵作為。我們在此要提醒的有：
第一、如果馬英九真正對兩岸的政治對話、政治談判的必要性想清楚，認定此一政策是對台灣發展有利，那就必須以推動ＥＣＦＡ的勇氣，動員政府，發動精英去引導民意，影響民意，專注精力和資源，促其實現，以安民心，以化對立。萬萬不可半途而廢，既失民心，又傷兩岸。
第二、切忌以「兩黨政治對話」為餌，換取某些政治利益，而沒有真誠推動兩岸關係政治對話的後續行動，甚至再以台灣民意、社會民調為藉口，走回民粹老路，則陷伯公於不義，陷台灣於孤立。
第三、推動變化，各種壓力在所難免，責難在所難免，化解壓力之道，除了誠心誠意的溝通，適時地公開透明之外，區別馬總統與馬主席，真正調動中國國民黨的精神資產，為台灣，為中華民族提出戰略規畫，以之因應北京；以中華民國政府的戰術作為，確保台灣的價值，台灣人民的幸福，則全民、全黨都會成為調整兩岸關係的後盾。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
Full Text below:
On April 21, reporters asked President Ma Ying-jeou about the possibility of cross-Strait political dialogue. Ma said Beijing "sought progress amidst stability," and would not pressure Taipei. Ma said for Taipei to engage in political dialogue with Beijing was premature. "There is still no consensus. Therefore why the rush?" He said "While negotiating the past 18 agreements, we invariably encountered political problems. But we resolved every one of them. If we made a special effort to engage in political dialogue, what would we talk about?"
With these remarks still ringing in our ears, Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. The meeting was deliberately held at the Presidential Palace. News of the meeting was deliberately supplied to the media. Ma said he hoped the mission would be successful and achieve its purpose. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Therefore Wu Poh-hsiung's visit should be considered the first ever political contact between Taipei and Beijing. Wu Poh-hsiung's dialogue with Beijing's top officials, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, should be considered the first ever official and public political dialogue. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
According to media reports, the scope of the dialogue will include cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait exchanges, follow-up negotiations on ECFA, and the ARATS-SEF establishment of representative offices. The two sides are expected to discuss whether the KMT and CCP should address politically-related issues in the latter half of the year. Closer scrutiny reveaks that some of these reports are true, while some are false. Leave aside the false reports for the moment. The reports of "future cross-Strait relations," and the reports that the KMT and CCP will discuss "politically-related issues during the latter half of the year" are true. We know this because the Mainland Affairs Council only deals with practical matters. Issues such as "future cross-Strait relations," and "KMT-CCP cross-Strait political dialogue" are issues under the Presidential Office's purvue. The real issue Ma Ying-jeou is addressing, is how the two sides can bridge the gap across the Strait, and how the two parties can establish political contacts and begin political dialogue. That is why when President Ma Ying-jeou met with Wu Poh-hsiung, he thrice stressed that, "Cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations."
Take the "cross-Strait establishment of representative offices" as an example. Ma feels this has "very real political implications," that are important to cross-Strait relations. As Ma reiterated, "The relationship between the two sides is not a state to state relationship," because under the framework of the ROC Constitution, "The Mainland cannot be characterized as a state." Therefore, the representative offices the two sides establish will not be "embassies." This is an extremely sensitive issue on Taiwan. The wording is critical in any cross-Strait political statement. The political opposition must also base any such statements on the ROC Constitution. This reaffirms our own constitution. This also reassures the other side. Upholding our own constitution responds to a statement by the CCP late last July. The CCP spoke of a "one China framework." It said "The core issue is that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same country. Cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. The two sides should begin by reaffirming their existing legal provisions. They should reaffirm these as objective facts. They should establish a shared perception. On this basis, they should uphold and reaffirm the framework of one China." Therefore when Wu Poh-hsiung dialogues with Beijing regarding "future cross-Strait relations," the terms of the dialogue will be even clearer.
Ma Ying-jeou also recalled the events of 2008. Five years ago Wu Poh-hsiung led a delegation to the Mainland. a mere 10 days after his inauguration. He met with top CCP leaders and established a future direction for cross-Strait relations. This was a major contribution to cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou wished Wu Poh-hsiung a successful mission. He hoped Wu would bring back good news.
All this underscores the importance of Wu Poh-hsiung's mission. It is kick-starting cross-Strait ruling party political dialogue. A member of the delegation, former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi, said it was only natural that political dialogue would begin with the private sector. This was the case with negotiations over direct cross-Strait flights. "First let people to people talks yield results. Then when the time is ripe, let the government take over."
Let us evaluate the larger international picture. Let us predict the impact on the rest of Asia. Ma Ying-jeou's decision is correct. He summoned up the courage and finally took this step, one clearly crucial to the healthy and rational development of cross-Strait relations. We would like to offer the following reminders.
One. Is Ma Ying-jeou serious about cross-Strait political dialogue? If he is, political negotiations demand mental clarity. Is a policy conducive to Taiwan's development? If it is, then he must demonstrate the same courage he had when promoting ECFA. He must mobilize the government and community leaders to influence public opinion. He must focus his energy and resources to promote its implementation, to reassure the public, and to reduce opposition. He must not give up halfway. That would both destroy public support, and undermine cross-Strait relations.
Two. Ma must not use "political dialogue between the two parties" as bait, as a bargaining chip to benefit special interests. Genuine political dialogue to promote cross-Strait relations is essential. Otherwise, one may invoke public opinion on Taiwan. But if one returns to the same old populist demagoguery, then one will forfeit the moral high ground, and doom Taiwan to isolation.
Three. When promoting change, pressure and criticism are inevitable. Reducing such pressure requires honest communication, openness, and transparency. It requires making a distinction between President Ma and Chairman Ma. It requires reanimating the spirit of the Kuomintang. It requires offering Taiwan and the Chinese nation a strategic plan. Doing so will provide Beijing with a clear response, and demonstrate the government's tactical aptitude. It will reaffirm Taiwan's value and ensure the people's well-being. It will ensure that the public and the party back the government's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.13
社論－吳伯雄任重道遠 開啟兩黨政治對話
本報訊
今年四月廿一日馬英九總統接受本報專訪時，被詢「兩岸是否可能開展政治對話」時還表示大陸對此已表示應「穩中求進步」，不會給任何壓力…台灣與對岸的政治對話時機仍不成熟，「大家都沒有一致的意見，那又何必急？」他又說「過去談判了十八項協議，多少會碰到政治問題，但都解決了；若特別要進行政治對話，那要談什麼？」
上述說法言猶在耳，日前馬英九刻意在「總統府」會見吳伯雄等國民黨代表團一行，而且主動向媒體公布，期許此行能順利達成交付任務，凸顯了吳伯雄榮譽主席此行所具的正式代表性。此一動作，自然有正式告訴北京，此團訪是經過中華民國政府授權的中國國民黨訪問團，因此，這次吳伯雄的訪問應該可以被定位為兩岸首次的政治接觸，而吳伯雄與北京高層，以及與習近平總書記的對話，就是一次不折不扣的兩岸首次正式公開的政治對話，不論其內容為何，都具有里程碑的意義。
按媒體披露此次對話範圍，包括：未來兩岸關係開展、兩岸交流、兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判、兩岸兩會互設辦事處等；另外，雙方可望交換意見，討論「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題。」詳細分析起來，這裡有實有虛，虛且不論，「未來兩岸關係開展」以及「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題」，是「實」的部分，因為「陸委會」只處理現實問題，而「未來兩岸關係開展」及「國共論壇列入兩岸政治對話」這一部分是總統府規畫，由此觀之，此次馬英九總統委託的真正議題，就是兩岸如何經由兩黨搭橋開啟兩岸初期的政治接觸與政治對話。所以馬英九總統才必須在會見吳伯雄等人時三度強調「兩岸不是國與國關係」。
借「現在推動兩岸互設辦事處」為例，他認為這是「具有高度政治涵義」的兩岸關係的重大措施，「但兩岸之間不是國與國的關係」，因為在「憲法」架構下，「不可能把大陸看做是一個國家」。因此，不會把雙方設立的辦事機構當做「外交使領館」。這是在台灣極敏感、在兩岸極關鍵的政治表態，是以憲法將在野黨一軍，也是以憲法表自己的態，安對岸的心，因為提出自己的憲法，正是回應了中共去年七月底，提出的「一中框架」中所說：「核心是大陸和台灣同屬一個國家，兩岸關係不是國與國的關係。兩岸從各自現行規定出發，確認這一客觀事實，形成共同認知，就確立、維護和鞏固了一個中國框架」，以便吳伯雄在與北京對話「未來兩岸關係開展」時，可以擁有更清楚的空間。
馬英九同時回顧了二○○八年的往事：五年前吳伯雄率團去大陸，就在他就職十幾天後，有機會與當時的中共最高領導人見面，確立未來兩岸關係發展方向，這點對兩岸關係有非常大的貢獻。馬英九預祝吳伯雄任務成功，帶回雙方關係往前邁進的好消息。
這裡就暗示了吳伯雄此團的重大意義，開啟兩岸執政黨的政治對話，同一團的前國安會祕書長蘇起表示，政治對話由民間開始最自然，就像當初兩岸協商直航，「讓民間先談出成果，等水到渠成再由政府來接手」。
盱衡整體國際形勢，前瞻亞洲的變化，馬英九的決定是正確的，鼓足勇氣，終於踏出了這一步，對未來兩岸關係的發展顯然是健康而理性的關鍵作為。我們在此要提醒的有：
第一、如果馬英九真正對兩岸的政治對話、政治談判的必要性想清楚，認定此一政策是對台灣發展有利，那就必須以推動ＥＣＦＡ的勇氣，動員政府，發動精英去引導民意，影響民意，專注精力和資源，促其實現，以安民心，以化對立。萬萬不可半途而廢，既失民心，又傷兩岸。
第二、切忌以「兩黨政治對話」為餌，換取某些政治利益，而沒有真誠推動兩岸關係政治對話的後續行動，甚至再以台灣民意、社會民調為藉口，走回民粹老路，則陷伯公於不義，陷台灣於孤立。
第三、推動變化，各種壓力在所難免，責難在所難免，化解壓力之道，除了誠心誠意的溝通，適時地公開透明之外，區別馬總統與馬主席，真正調動中國國民黨的精神資產，為台灣，為中華民族提出戰略規畫，以之因應北京；以中華民國政府的戰術作為，確保台灣的價值，台灣人民的幸福，則全民、全黨都會成為調整兩岸關係的後盾。
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