Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) Too Little Economics, Too Much Politics

Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
Too Little Economics, Too Much Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 28, 2013

Summary: The terms of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) have been made public. They clearly favor the Taiwan side. It is yet another old-fashioned cross-Strait economic and trade agreement. It is obviously not a truly complementary, mutually beneficial trade agreement. It does not help Taipei become part of the trend toward international and regional economic cooperation. The two sides must review the agreement and make improvements down the line.

Full Text below:

The terms of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) have been made public. They clearly favor the Taiwan side. It is yet another old-fashioned cross-Strait economic and trade agreement. It is obviously not a truly complementary, mutually beneficial trade agreement. It does not help Taipei become part of the trend toward international and regional economic cooperation. The two sides must review the agreement and make improvements down the line.

The agreement is old hat. The truth is, the agreement pointedly underscores the benefits the Taiwan side secured. This is the result of Taiwan's vicious partisan political battles, and Political Correctness. To this extent, it reminds one of the 2010 cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). The Ma administration underscored how the ECFA "early harvest list" granted the Taiwan side significantly higher tariff cuts than the Mainland side. This may have been what eventually quieted the uproar against ECFA. The ruling party deftly turned it into a key cross-Strait achievement. It won a series of important elections with it.

Such cross-strait economic cooperation agreements contain too much political content. The party in office obsesses over public perception. It avoids provisions that make the public feel they have been "suckered," and which may hurt the party at the polls. The substance of cross-Strait trade agreements signed with such a mentality can easily be compromised. Such agreements fail to provide a consistent template for similar future agreements with foreign governments. When foreign governments hold talks about economic matters with us, their sole concern is business, not currying favor with voters on Taiwan.

When cross-strait economic and trade cooperation began, the public on Taiwan expected and feared victimization. They deliberately demanded arrangements obviously favorable to the Taiwan side. This was understandable. It was a way of testing the waters. Today however, cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation has passed the trial period. It must be systematized and normalized. The waters have already been tested. The two sides must expand their common interests. Take the recent global financial turmoil. The two sides need an efficient cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation mechanism. Such a mechanism would substantially reduce the negative impact of such turmoil on both sides of the Strait.

The newly signed agreement on trade in services remains burdened with non-economic baggage. Our side hoped to maintain quasi-Free Trade Agreement status to underscore our status as a political entity. Therefore we were forced to accept Mainland demands to open our markets. As a result, the market segments we were forced to open to the Mainland, were food, clothing, housing, transportation, education, and entertainment oriented. These segments directly impact millions of small businesses and families.

The government made all sorts of public relations oriented political calculations. It erected all sorts of firewalls for the relevant sectors. It hoped to show that the impact on the relevant sectors was under control. It wanted the public to accept the opening without panicking. For example, the Mainland was permitted to invest in beauty parlors, but blue collar workers were not allowed to enter. For example, the Mainland is permitted to establish only three travel agencies on Taiwan, and only permitted to seek domestic tourism business.

These defensive arrangements were of course part of the TISA negotiations. They were approved by the Mainland. They became important "victories" for the Taiwan side. Before and after the agreement was signed, the government repeatedly underscored that opening the service industry to Mainland capital was entirely below the WTO (World Trade Organization) specified threshold. It underscored that we succeeded in raising the threshold for Mainland capital investment in Taiwan's service sector.

But deliberately raising the threshold cannot stem the tide of of trade and economic development. Mainland capital is permitted to invest in the hair salon and beauty parlor industry. Mainland labor is not permitted to enter the island. But the effectiveness of such provisions is short-term. The Mainland may one day produce technically proficient and sophisticated hair salon and beauty parlor experts who meet with the approval of Taiwan consumers. When that happens, people will do everything possible to introduce these experts to Taiwan. Conversely, if the level of proficiency in such sectors remains backward, the TISA restrictions will become a dead letter. Taiwan consumers will not patronize Mainland beauty salons. Such controls will be meaningless.

As we can see, cross-Strait trade and market liberalization has its own iron logic. That logic is economic. It is the iron logic of the marketplace. Wherever there is a demand, there will be a supply. WTO rules allow outsiders to operate such businesses. Therefore the two sides must open their markets to each other. It makes no difference how many sectors are opened. The degree of openness must be adequate. It must not be deliberately constrained.

We hope the two sides will review and revise the Agreement on Trade in Services. First they must reduce the political content. They must transform it into a genuine cross-strait economic link. Of course the Taiwan side is not the only side that must make changes. The Mainland side must not deliberately restrict the extent to which it opens up the Mainland. It too must make adjustments. Both sides must make an effort. Only then will the two sides find themselves on the high road to cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2013.06.28
社論－兩岸服貿協議評析 系列四 經濟帳過少、政治帳過多 開放未到位
本報訊

    　兩岸簽署的服務貿易協議，相關開放內容明顯向台灣一方「傾斜」，仍是兩岸經貿合作的傳統老套。但這一套顯然難以追求兩岸真正的互補互利，也不足以帶動台灣參與國際區域經濟合作的潮流。兩岸雙方應在未來，共同加以檢討及改進。

    　上述的傳統老套，說穿了就是刻意凸顯台灣爭取到的好處顯著較多。這在台灣政黨惡鬥的環境下，是一種「政治正確」的表現。像二○一○年簽署的兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），馬政府對社會宣導的重點，是說ＥＣＦＡ「早期收穫清單」的相互減免關稅項目，台灣得到的比大陸顯著較多。也許就憑著這一點，ＥＣＦＡ在台灣社會引發的雜音逐漸少了，而執政黨也順當地把ＥＣＦＡ列為兩岸方面的首要政績，並藉此接連贏得近年重要選舉。

    　如此的兩岸經貿合作協議，實是算計了太多的「政治帳」。主政者一味顧慮社會觀瞻，老是卯勁避免協議內容讓民眾有「被剝奪感」，而不利選舉拉票。這樣心態下簽出來的兩岸經貿協議，內容很容易扭曲，也難以作為未來台灣和其他國家洽簽同類協議的範本，因他國和台灣談經貿開放事項時，只會在商言商，沒這麼多的選票算計。

    　過去兩岸經貿合作初啟動時，台灣社會上普遍有「既期待又怕受傷害」的心理，那時刻意作一些「對台灣傾斜」的安排，是可以理解的。那也可作為一種「試點」。如今，兩岸經貿合作早已過了試驗期，應該邁進機制化與常態化的階段，以早日發揮實質效能，來擴大兩岸雙方的共同利益。像最近這波國際金融動盪中，兩岸之間如有一套高效的經貿合作機制，相信雙方所受衝擊程度應該會小很多。

    　可是，剛簽署的服務貿易協議，卻仍然背負著諸多的「非經濟性包袱」。首先，我方為了維持「類似FTA（自由貿易協定）」的對等形式，以表彰台灣作為「政經主體」的地位，不得不接受大陸提出的全方位開放市場要求，因而對大陸開放的行業項目，遍及食衣住行育樂等層面，且直接影響到市面上千家萬戶的小型商號。

    　在這種情況下，我政府為社會觀瞻計，又在各個開放項目中，作了各色各樣的「防火牆」設計，以示相關開放項目對台灣的衝擊都已受控，希望台灣社會以平常心來接受。像美容美髮業的開放，只開放陸資參股，不開放藍領工作人員；還有陸資旅行社在台灣只能成立三家，且只可經營國內旅遊業務等等。

    　如此一系列的防守性安排，當然都已在兩岸服務貿易協議談判中，爭取到陸方的同意，也成了我方的一項重要「戰果」。該協議簽署前後，我政府一再聲言，這次對大陸服務業的開放程度，全然低於WTO（世界貿易組織）的開放規範，其緣由就是我方成功地提高了陸資服務業入台的門檻。

    　但值得注意的是，被刻意提高的門檻，往往阻擋不了經貿發展潮流的衝擊。以上述美髮美容業「只要投資，不要來人」特殊限制來說，其效用可能只是短期的，因為將來如果大陸業界，出了一批技術精進的美容美髮高手，受到台灣消費者的偏愛，到時自然會有人千方百計地把這類高手引進台灣。反之，若是大陸這方面的技術水準永遠落後，那服貿協議的相關限制就成了具文，因為台灣消費者不會作興接受大陸美容美髮工作者的服務，管制不管制都沒有意義。

    　由此看來，兩岸經貿開放的「硬道理」其實很簡單，就是應該多算「經濟帳」，亦即更多地強調經濟規律和市場法則。凡市場上有實質需求，且按WTO規章應允許外人經營的項目，兩岸自該盡量互相開放市場。不論開放項目多少，開放程度務必到位，不要刻意打折扣。

    　兩岸將來如有機會共同檢討修正服務貿易協議，首應使其去除「政治水分」，轉而成為兩岸經濟真正密切合作的堅實紐帶。當然，要改正的不只台灣一方，大陸若有刻意窄化對台開放幅度之處，也要一併調整。雙方共同努力，才能使兩岸經貿合作邁向康莊大道。