Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?

Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2013

Summary: Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?

Full Text below:

Just before the Wu Xi Meeting, most speculation was directed at Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy. Would it harsher than President Hu Jintao's? Some even predicted that Xi would resort to threatening rhetoric.

But the general impression following the meeting was that although Xi Jinping upholds the "one China framework," his cross-Strait policy is no harsher than his predecessor's. In fact, it may even be more liberal, and offer greater maneuveuring room.

Compare this meeting with other meetings over the past five years. The recent Wu Xi Meeting included a political proclamation that upheld the "one China framework" and stressed that cross-Strait relations were "not relations between different countries." This may be regarded as old rhetoric. But the recent meeting achieved greater concrete results than ever before. For example, the KMT expressed a desire to participate in the RCEP (regional comprehensive economic partnership). The CCP expressed the desire to sign cultural agreements. The hallmark of the Wu Xi Meeting was its plain language, realism, and pragmatism.

The meeting zeroed in on several issues. Wu Poh-hsiung was the KMT's authorized representative to the CCP leadership. Wu proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Before Wu Poh-hsiung's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou expressed this same position many times. But this was the very first time the KMT issued such a proclamation right in front of the CCP.

What Wu Poh-hsiung said was that according to the two sides' laws, both sides should uphold the one-China principle. Both use the one-China framework when defining cross-Strait relations. Both define the relationship as non-state to state relations.

Wu Poh-hsiung's reasoning can be expanded as follows: Under the ROC's "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," cross-Strait relations are of course not "state to state relations," since they are both part of "one China."

The two sides talk about "cross-Strait relations" every day. But what precisely is the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland? In fact, we have a ready-made answer. It is "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." As Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the CPPCC observed, it is a relationship "in progress."

In order to establish cross-Strait representative offices, President Ma repeatedly proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Beijing has stressed that they are emphatically "not diplomatic in nature," and are "not embassies or consulates." In other words, neither side defines cross-Strait relations as "the relationship between the ROC and the PRC." Such a definition smacks of "state to state relations." But the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China obviously exist. It is merely that neither recognizes the other. But a flower is a flower all the same. Merely because one refuses to recognize it, does not mean it is not a flower.

The relationship between the PRC and the ROC is not the same as the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Both the PRC and Vietname see the other as foreign countries. But neither is the relationship between the PRC and the ROC like the relationship betwen the PRC and Fujian Province. After all, Beijing would never establish a "Fujianese Compatriates Office" in Fuzhou. The cross-Strait relationship is rooted in the two sides' constitutional frameworks and legal systems. It is not a relationship between foreign states. But in practice both sides see the relationship as a "non-foreign state to state relationship." This is what is meant by "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."

The phrase "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," means that although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides are attempting to establish "one China" linkage points. The phrase "yet to be reunified" means that the People's Republic of China and the the Republic of China have yet to be reunified. Neither side recognizes the other as a "state." But this deprives "one China" of a linkage point. Therefore, although neither side recognizes the other as a "foreign state," that does not mean they cannot recognize each other as a "non-foreign state." They can use the "big roof concept of China" as a "one-China" linkage point. This may enable them to establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."

As Wu Poh-hsiung noted, each sides upholds its own constitution, thereby upholding the cross-Strait "one China framework." The ROC and the PRC coexist, side by side, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is hardly "relations between one foreign country and another." This is the pillar of the "one China framework."

Therefore, the two sides should not endlessly bicker over whether cross-Strait relations are state to state relations. Cross-Strait relations are "political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China under special circumstances." The circumstances are special because neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China can eliminate each other. This has led to "special circumstances," and "a yet to be reunified" state of affairs. The two sides may refuse to recognize each other. But they cannot eliminate each other either. Doing so would not aid reunification. It would merely eliminate a linkage point for the "one China framework." It would merely weaken Taiwanese emotional identification with the "one China framework."

Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?

吳習會：台灣與大陸是什麼關係？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.14 04:19 am

吳習會之前，最大的猜疑與懸念是：習近平的兩岸政策，會不會比胡錦濤嚴苛與緊縮？甚至有人預期，從習的口中，可能會聽到咄咄逼人的言語。

但會後的一般印象是：習近平在「一中框架」的堅持下，其兩岸政策觀點未見較前任嚴苛緊縮，且有更形寬闊與開明的可能性。

若與五年來多次叫得出「某某會」的場景相較，此次吳習會雖亦見政治宣示，如「一個中國的架構」及「不是國與國的關係」，卻皆可視為舊論的延伸。相對而言，此會在實際工作上則較過去著墨更多，例如國民黨方面表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ（區域性全面經濟夥伴關係）的意願，而中共則期望議簽文化協議等，此種文采簡樸、實事求是的務實風格，可視為此次吳習會的特色。

會談的焦點是，國民黨的授權代表吳伯雄在中共領導人面前，首次使用了「兩岸非國與國關係」一詞；雖然，在吳伯雄啟程前，馬英九總統已表達了多次。吳伯雄的論述是：兩岸各自的法律、體制都主張一個中國原則，都用一個中國架構來定位兩岸關係，而非國與國的關係。

吳伯雄的這個說法可以引申為：依據中華民國「一中憲法」的「一中各表」，兩岸自然不是「國與國的關係」，因為有「一中」的連結點。

然而，兩岸每天都在談「兩岸關係」，難道迄仍不知「台灣與大陸究竟是什麼關係」？其實，已有現成的答案，即是：「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。大陸政協主席俞正聲說，此一關係是「進行式」。

為了互設辦事處，馬總統屢申「兩岸不是國與國的關係」，北京則強調絕非「外交領事機構」。也就是說，兩岸目前皆不主張「兩岸關係」是「中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係」，好像這樣就會變成「國與國的關係」。然而，「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」卻皆是明明存在之事實，只是「互不承認」而已。不過，一朵花終究是一朵花，不因外人不承認即不是花。

其實，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，雖不類於「中華人民共和國與越南社會主義共和國的關係」（互為外國的關係）；但是，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，終究亦不類於「中華人民共和國與福建省的關係」，北京畢竟不會在福州市設置一個簽發「閩胞證」的辦事處。這樣的「關係」，就兩岸憲政法理言，固然不是「互視為外國」的關係，卻實際上蘊有「互視為非外國的國家」的關係，這也就是「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。

所謂「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，就是：雖然「尚未統一」，但希望能建構起「一個中國」的連結點。而「尚未統一的關係」，即是「未統一於中華人民共和國／亦未統一於中華民國」的「關係」；然而，如今相互否認對方為「國家」，卻也使得「一個中國」失去了「連結點」。於是，兩岸雖然「互不視為外國」，卻未必不可「互視為非外國的國家」，而以「大屋頂中國」為「一個中國」的「連結點」；如此始可能建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。

如吳伯雄所言，倘以各自的憲法來維繫鞏固兩岸的「一中架構」；則中華民國與中華人民共和國在「尚未統一特殊情況下」的並立共存，非但不是「外國與外國的關係」，而且其實正是「一中架構」的主要支撐。

因此，不應再在「是不是國與國關係」的死胡同裡糾纏，兩岸的「關係」，其實就是「尚未統一（於中華人民共和國或中華民國的）特殊情況下的政治關係」，這種「特殊情況」，正是因為兩岸皆不能使「中華民國與中華人民共和國」消滅，始成為「特殊情況」，而「尚未統一」；畢竟，相互「否認」，其實不能使彼此「消滅」，也無助「統一」，只會使「一個中國」失去了「連結點」，更弱化了台灣人民在感情上對「一中架構」的想像。

習近平在昨日會中表達了有感的善意，且又提兩岸議簽《軍事互信機制》與《和平協議》；不過，如果不能對「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，做出合情合理的安排」，這些心願將如何實現？