Seven Years of Diplomatic Humiliation

Seven Years of Diplomatic Humiliation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2007

While in Singapore, Frank Hsieh referred to the status quo that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is purportedly maintaining, as a state of independence. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile embarked on his last state visit of his second and final term. Before departure he described his visit as "humiliation in the national interest." This contrasts with Frank Hsieh's decidedly pragmatic stance regarding relations with close Asian neighbors and with Beijing. Some analysts interpret Chen Shui-bian's visit as an attempt to establish an "historical legacy" for his eight years on office.

Nobody can predict how future historians will evaluate Chen Shui-bian. But if his place in history is to be evaluated on the basis of his seven years of foreign diplomacy, we need not wait until historians pass judgement. We can give him a failing grade right now.

During his term of office President Chen has conducted a total of ten state visits, including this one. Each visit was given a long-winded, saccharine title, such as "Journey of Democracy, Diplomacy and Friendship" or "Journey of Democracy and Goodwill" or "Journey to Create Mutual Benefit and Embrace the World" or "Journey to Enhance Popularity." But no matter what names they were given, the destination of these state visits was never the point. The point was always which US cities one was transiting, both coming and going. Eventually Washington caught on to the DPP's real agenda and began playing this game too. As a result it became a barometer of the state of Washington-Taipei relations. It became an index of how much clout Chen Shui-bian had in Washington.

Let's take "Transit Diplomacy" as the measure of Chen's alleged legacy. During ten visits, Chen Shui-bian transited New York twice. Once in 2001, and once in 2003. In 2006, during his "Journey to Enhance Popularity," he was forced to detour through places such as Holland and Libya. The media labeled this fiasco the "Journey to Nowhere." After ten visits, Washington, DC, the actual destination of Chen Shui-bian's "Transit Diplomacy," has gotten farther and farther instead of closer and closer. The current visit is being touted as his "Farewell Visit," yet he is allowed to stop only briefly for refueling in Alaska, well outside the continental United States. He is not even allowed to spend the night. The level of treatment is the lowest in seven years. After seven years of diplomatic games, and ten state visits, what does Chen have to show for it except what he himself acknowledges as a "humiliation?" What other way is there to put it?

Let's take the issue of firming up relations with allied nations for example. Eight of these ten visits were to Central and South America. Obviously the region is of strategic importance to ROC diplomacy. President Chen must be present at the inaugurations of Central and South American presidents. Nor can he afford to be absent from Central American summit meetings. Yet despite all these efforts, all one hears is that "diplomatic relations with Nicaragua are in danger," or "diplomatic relations with Panama are on the verge of collapse." This forces the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to up the ante to shore up relations with these two countries behind the scenes. To everyones' surprise, Costa Rica, with which the ROC maintained friendly relations for half a century, broke off relations. Even more embarrassing was that it chose to announce the break during June this year, almost exactly one year after President Chen attended the Costa Rican president's inauguration ceremony. During Chen's "Journey of Friendship to Central and South American Allies," Saint Lucia cancelled at the last minute. Nicaragua, which was forced to receive President Chen twice in the same year, also appeared reluctant. After eight presidential visits, this last bastion of official ROC diplomacy appears ready to fall.

Regarding participation in international organizations, Not only have years of ruling DPP efforts to gain entry to the United Nations been exercises in futility, so have attempts to rejoin the WHO. Most importantly, in the past we had international support. Over the past two years, these voices of support have not been heard. The result of this year's "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has been to push Washington even farther from Taipei. This year's treatment of Chen during his transit through the US is one indicator. Chen Shui-bian wrote to the United Nations asking to join under the name of "Taiwan," only to have it summarily rejected by trhe UN Secretary General and returned, unread. On top of which the growing global consensus in recent years has been, "Taiwan is the troublemaker." Few feel any sympathy for the international isolation of the Taiwan authorities. Is this the payoff for all those years of diplomatic game playing?

Many commentators invariably bring up Chinese Communist Party pressure. This accusation is not without basis. But when formulating ROC diplomatic strategy, any "Chinese Communist Party pressure" must be considered a constant, not a variable. Since the 70s, the cross Straits diplomatic tug of war has usually resulted in stalemate. Beijing has never once relented in its diplomatic pressure on Taipei. It made no difference whether the ruling party was Blue or Green. Therefore any responsible administration must seek maximum advantage in the face of this diplomatic pressure. It can hardly point to this pressure as an excuse to wallow in self pity and demand sympathy. Still less can it use it as a excuse to shirk responsibility.

Frank Hsieh made a point of stressing his cross Straits policy while in Singapore. He demonstrated his understanding of the dynamic relationship between the ROC's foreign policy and cross Straits policy. Chen Shui-bian only has a short time left in office. We don't know how long his diplomatic strategy can continue to tie down Frank Hsieh hand and foot. We don't know whether Frank Hsieh will regard Chen Shui-bian's diplomatic legacy as an asset or a liability. But as a voice of public opinion, we earnestly urge the ruling DPP to let professional diplomats engage in diplomacy. The ROC's diplomatic strategy can no longer be "dollar diplomacy" with no upper limit. It can no longer be "transit diplomacy" to enhance the prestige of the head of state. It can no longer be "scorched earth diplomacy" that plays on populist mob sentiment. It can no longer be "victim diplomacy" that deliberately invites humiliation in order to elicit sympathy. The purpose of diplomacy is to maximize the national interest. It must not become a public relations tool by which the head of state can enhance his personal image. It cannot become the ruling party's election tool. The ROC's diplomatic plight is difficult enough as it is. Its diplomatic resources are rapidly diminishing. We truly cannot afford to squander them in an ad libbed and spendthrift manner.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.08.13
七年多的外交操作只化作一句「忍辱負重」？
中時社論

當謝長廷在新加坡指稱民進黨的「維持現狀」就是獨立之際，陳水扁也展開了他任內最後一次的元首出訪，行前他自己形容此行是為國家利益「忍辱負重」。相較於謝長廷積極向亞洲近鄰傳達他在兩岸立場上的「務實」，陳水扁的出訪則被部分論者詮釋為是在尋求他八年任期的「歷史定位」。

沒人能準確預測未來的史家會怎麼為陳水扁「定位」，但如果只是論斷這七年多來他為台灣所拚出怎樣的外交成績單，大概等不到史家的審判，現在就是個不及格的成績了。

細數陳總統任內的出訪，連這次總共十次，每回出訪都有一套辭藻華麗的稱呼，什麼「合作共榮、睦誼之旅」、「攜手同慶、欣榮之旅」、「共創雙贏、胸懷世界之旅」、「興揚之旅」…等等，而不論名稱被叫得有多好聽，出訪目的地從來就不是重點，去回程能過境美國那個城市才是重點，玩多了以後，華府也開始認真相應操作，竟使它真的成為美台關係的晴雨計，更成為陳水扁在華府究竟有多少分量的具體指標。

好吧，就拿「過境外交」的帳面成績當指標論斷吧，這十次出訪，陳水扁曾在二○○一年與○三年兩度風光地過境紐約，也曾在二○○六年的「興揚之旅」中狼狽到在空中且戰且走，繞行到荷蘭、利比亞等地，被媒體形容成是「迷航之旅」。十次出訪下來，陳水扁過境外交的定點，卻是距離華府愈來愈遠，這次號稱為畢業旅行，但只能停留美國境外的阿拉斯加，同時不准過夜，堪稱是史無前例的最低規格。七年多的經營，十次出訪經驗的積累，換來就是這般「忍辱負重」的自評，還能怎麼說呢？

再以鞏固邦誼來說吧，這十次出訪有八次是去中南美，可見這個區域是台灣外交的重鎮。陳總統不僅總統就職典禮一定參加、中美洲高峰會更是從不缺席，這般辛勤的經營，結果卻是經常聽聞「尼加拉瓜的邦交岌岌可危」、「巴拿馬的邦交搖搖欲墜」，逼得外交單位不斷幕後加碼，好不容易暫時穩住了這兩國，意外斷交的竟是與我國邦誼長達半世紀的哥斯大黎加，而更難堪的是該國選在今年六月宣布斷交，距離陳總統去年參加哥國總統的就職典禮，剛好滿一年。而這趟的「中南美友邦之旅」，不僅預定受訪的聖露西亞臨陣取消，尼加拉瓜也為了同一年要接待陳總統兩次而顯得不太情願，這塊台灣正式外交的最後堡壘，經總統八次出訪鞏固的結果，情勢竟是緊繃到令人越來越不安。

在國際組織的參與方面，這幾年在執政黨操作下的結果，不僅加入聯合國徒勞無功，重返ＷＨＯ也一樣挫折連連，重點是前幾年還有國際聲援，這兩年則幾乎已未曾再聽聞，今年操作「公投入聯」的結果，讓華府與台北的心理距離更遠，這次的過境待遇就是指標之一；而陳水扁致函聯合國要求「以台灣名義加入」，結果卻是被秘書處以極其無理的程序蠻橫退件。加之近年國際輿論多針對台灣是否為「麻煩製造者」加以著墨，鮮少對台灣的孤立處境給予同情聲援，這麼多年的經營，該是換得這樣的成果嗎？

許多論者經常提到中共的封鎖與打壓，這個指控確實道出了大部分的事實，但思考台灣外交的戰略時，「中共的打壓」本來就該視為常數，而不是變數。畢竟從一九七○年代以來，兩岸的外交攻防從來就是零和的，北京對台北外交空間的打壓從來沒手軟過，更不會看你執政者是藍是綠而有所不同，因而任何負責任的執政者，該是怎麼在這種外交封鎖與打壓中步步為營，尋求台灣最大的實質利益，而不是將這種打壓轉化到國內去生產悲情，更不能視之為卸責的藉口。

謝長廷刻意選在新加坡談他的兩岸政策，顯示他已意識到當下台灣外交政策與兩岸政策之間的動態連結性，我們不知道陳水扁的外交戰略，在他剩下的任期還能綁住謝長廷多久，我們也不知道謝長廷將陳水扁這筆外交遺產，視為是資產還是負債。站在民間輿論的立場，我們倒是很想誠懇地呼籲：讓外交回歸專業吧！讓台灣的外交經營，從彰顯元首聲望的過境外交、烽火衝撞的民粹外交、無窮加碼的金錢外交，乃至自取其辱的悲情外交中解脫出來吧！外交永遠是在追求最大的國家利益，不該是元首操作個人形象公關的工具，更不該是內部選舉動員的槓桿，台灣的外交處境已經夠艱困，外交資源更是日漸匱乏，真的禁不起一而再、再而三即興式的揮霍了！