Prudence and Patience to Reestablish Cross-strait Dialogue

Prudence and Patience to Reestablish Cross-strait Dialogue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 31, 2008

The Republic of China Presidential Election has attracted the attention of the international media. Without exception, they have focused on cross-strait relations. Post-election indicators suggest fresh new prospects for cross-strait relations. First, George W. Bush and Hu Jintao declared, for the very first time, a shared commitment to the 1992 Consensus, entailing One China, Different Expressions. During an exclusive interview, Ma Ying-jeou followed suit, stressing that the common denominator between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei is "One China, Different Expressions." These post-election pronouncements tell us that the future of cross-strait relations will be quite different from the stagnation and recession of the past eight years.

Most intriguing of all is the 1992 consensus. The DPP originally dismissed it as "non-existent." Yet today Taipei, Beijing, and Washington all accept its language. The reason the 1992 consensus has roared back to life is quite simple. We have endured eight years of confrontation and deadlock. If that isn't enough to teach people the advantages of pragmatism, what is? Is the One China Principle a "prerequisite for discussions," or merely a possible "topic of discussion?" Are cross-strait relations "domestic relations," or "international relations?" If the two sides continue going back and forth on this issue and refuse to move on, then the only alternative is "perpetual confrontation." But the confrontation has already gone on for eight years. Does anyone really want this stalemate to continue?

After being abandoned by the DPP for eight years, the 1992 consensus and One China, Different Expressions have resurfaced. This amounts to a recognition of reality, to a pragmatic recognition of the status quo. Whoever wants insoluble issues of sovereignty to prevent the solution of other problems, basically has no desire to solve the problem of cross-strait relations. If the "Different Expressions" provision allows us to shelve the dispute over sovereignty, won't that allow everyone to breath a tremendous sigh of relief? Next up are direct flights, currency exchanges, investment protection, and tourism. As long as the underlying principle remains the same, and both sides use their heads, there should be no insoluble problems.

Of course there are also hidden concerns. Cross-strait relations cannot ignore international constraints. It also strikes a sensitive nerve in the island's politics. There is no denying that eight years under Democratic Progressive Party rule has led to irreversible changes. It is impossible to return entirely to a pre-2008 scenario. Even after Ma Ying-jeou is augurated and adopts a more pragmatic and flexible stance, it will not be possible to ignore opposition Green Camp pressure. Therefore Beijing's attitude will be crucial. If Beijing reintroduces the issue of sovereignty and subjects Taipei to humiliations, then Ma Ying-jeou may be forced to adopt a hard-line.

Beijing must understand that under Ma Ying-jeou the ROC government will no longer resort to provocations for political advantage in cross-strait issues. In other words, for the next four years at least, the ROC government will not exploit issues such as "Authoring a New Constitution," "Rectification of Names," or "Plebiscites on Joining the UN" to make trouble for Beijing. The ROC government will not deliberately raise regional tensions. But even a more pragmatic Ma Ying-jeou cannot turn a blind eye to the hundreds of missiles the mainland has aimed at Taiwan. Nor can he do nothing about the ROC's long-term exclusion from international organizations. And of course he cannot remain silent about the mainland's human rights policies.

If Beijing hopes for a breakthrough in cross-strait relations, it cannot offer merely pro forma expressions of goodwill during talks between leaders. If the mainland military insists on increasing the number of missiles targeting Taiwan, if it continues conducting military exercises directed against the ROC, if it continues undermining Tapei's diplomatic relations, if it continues obstructing Taipei's membership in the international community, it will be impossible for Ma Ying-jeou to throw open the doors of cross-strait policy.

Of course, June 20 is still a ways off. Although the DPP has already begun making pragmatic concessions in its cross-strait economic and trade policies, the two sides have been mired in a standoff for eight long years. During the past eight years significant changes have occurred. The parties who participated in the original cross-strait dialogue are long gone. Wang Daohan and Koo Cheng-fu are no longer among us. Their cross-strait dialogue and consultation framework may be difficult to reconstruct. Rebuilding a platform for cross-strait talks will require adjustments. To successfully negotiate this transition we will need not just goodwill, but patience, patience, and more patience.

Eight years of painful memories should have taught the KMT an important lesson. The smooth handling of cross-strait affairs will require the participation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. A cross-strait policy that excludes the DPP will be a source of ruling vs. opposition party conflict. By the same token, the DPP must modify its posture. It must awaken as soon as possible from its ideological stupor. It must actively participate in cross-strait affairs. It must accumulate practical experience. It cannot forever cling to its Closed Door Policies.

People on both sides of the strait hold high hopes for the future. Therefore the initial steps towards dialogue and consultation require even greater prudence and patience, even greater good will and wisdom.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.03.31
以審慎與耐心重啟兩岸對話
中時社論

　全球輿論面對台灣大選的結果，無例外都是集中於兩岸關係，而大選後的若干跡象也確實顯示，一個全新的兩岸風貌似乎真的在成形。先是布胡熱線首度觸及「九二共識、一中各表」，而馬英九隨後在接受媒體專訪時也強調，能夠將美中台結合起來的黏著劑就是一中各表。這一系列在選後陸續釋出的訊息，也確實預示著未來的兩岸關係，將迥異於過去八年的停滯與低迷。

　挺耐人尋味的是，原本被民進黨一路斥為「根本不存在」的九二共識，如今竟可能成為未來台美中三方都願意接受的表述語言。「九二共識」會由黑翻紅的理由其實也很簡單，經歷了八年的對立與僵持，難道還不夠讓人學習到「務實」？兩岸如果還要持續擺盪在「一中原則是前提還是議題」、「兩岸關係是國內關係還是國際關係」等循環糾纏中不願意走出來的話，兩岸就只能選擇「永續對立」一個答案，問題是都已經對立八年了，還有興致繼續僵持下去嗎？

　如今，在被民進黨棄置八年後，「九二共識」與「一中各表」再度出土，所彰顯的最大意義其實就是務實的「承認現狀」。誰要再讓無解的主權議題橫在一切問題之前，誰就是表明了根本不想讓兩岸關係解套。如果可以循「各自表述」的方式擱置主權爭議，豈不是讓各方都鬆一口氣？接下來一連串包括直航、通匯、投資保障、觀光……等課題，只要開放的大原則不變，以雙方的智慧，有什麼難題會是解決不了的！

　當然，樂觀之外，也不是沒有隱憂的。兩岸關係擺脫不了國際制約，也同樣時時刻刻牽動著島內政治的敏感神經。不諱言，經歷民進黨八年的執政，許多狀況已經改變，不可能再完全倒回八年前的情境。就職後的馬英九就算立場再務實靈活，也不可能不顧慮在野綠營的制衡。因而北京當局未來的態度也就變得很關鍵，如果北京當局未來在操作兩岸議題上，不經意間又祭出主權問題讓台灣「穿小鞋」，恐怕屆時馬英九也只能選擇「強硬」了。

　北京當局應該清楚，馬英九主政後的台灣，不會再以挑釁式的手法去操作兩岸議題，換言之，至少未來四年台灣都不會再動輒以制憲、正名、公投綁大選……等操作去「製造麻煩」，故意挑起區域間的緊張關係。但即使再「務實」的馬英九，也不可能對大陸數百枚瞄準台灣的飛彈「視若無睹」，也不可能對長期被國際組織排除在外的處境「無所作為」，當然也不可能對大陸的人權措施完全「一語不發」。

　也可以說，北京當局若是期待兩岸關係能在未來有所突破，不能只在領導人的談話中四平八穩的表達善意。如果軍方部門依舊堅持增加瞄準台灣飛彈的數目，持續舉行武力攻台的軍事演習；外交部門則依舊持續挖空台灣邦交的牆腳，持續打壓台灣對國際社會的參與，則期待馬英九能在未來的兩岸政策上做到大開大闔，其實是不可能的。

　當然，距離五二○還有一段時間，儘管民進黨已經開始在兩岸經貿政策上做了務實的調整，但雙方畢竟是停滯了八年，這八年不僅是主客觀的情境大幅變化，八年前曾經參與對話的當事人也泰半物換星移、人事全非，昔日的辜汪兩老俱皆不在，昔日的對話模式也很難再拷貝，因而要重啟兩岸對話，要重建兩岸協商的平台，絕對還需要一段磨合期，要順利走過這個過渡期，需要的不僅只是善意，還絕對需要耐心，持續的耐心。

　有了八年不堪回首的記憶，國民黨應該已經學習到一項最重要的教訓，未來要順利處理好兩岸事務，絕對要納入民進黨的參與，一個排除民進黨的兩岸政策，勢必將是未來朝野衝突的主要來源。同樣的民進黨也該調整其在野身段，盡早從意識形態的泥淖中覺醒過來，藉積極務實參與兩岸事務中累積經驗，總不能永遠都得頂著「鎖國」的大帽子吧！

　許多人都對兩岸未來抱持著樂觀預期，正因為這樣，踏出對話協商的第一步反而需要更多的審慎，更多的耐心，更多的善意與更多的智慧。