The Bridge and the Road: The Party and the Government

The Bridge and the Road: The Party and the Government
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2008

The cross-strait spectacle continues to unfold. The Hu Siew Meeting on April 12. The Lien Hu on April 29. The Wu Hu Meeting on May 28. The Chiang Chen Meeting on June 12, the day after tomorrow. The cross-strait express train has now been shunted from the "second track" to the "first track."

Ever since the Hu Siew Meeting at the Boao Forum, cross-strait relations have improved at a rate inconceivable during the eight years of the Chen Shui-bian regime. When the KMT was in the opposition, it established a "KMT/CCP Platform." After years of cultivation, it is now time for the harvest. Nevertheless, since the Ma administration took office, the KMT/CCP Platform for cross-strait contacts has been retired to the second track. Under such circumstances, how should the first track, involving the the SEF and ARATS, divide the labor with the second track, in order to promote the ROC's best interests? A basic understanding must be established as soon as possible. The Chiang Chen Meeting the day after tomorrow should be a new beginning.

The role of the KMT/CCP Platform must be clarified, mainly because of cross-strait political differences. Mainland China has a one party system. The party leaders' decisions are final. Taiwan has a multiparty democracy. Government decision-making is subject to constitutional procedures. These are not always identical to the preferences of the ruling party. Even though the KMT controls both the executive and legislative branches, it may not exceed its legal authority. This is why the SEF/ARATS Consultations are referred to as the first track, and the KMT/CCP Platform is merely the second track.

Compared to the mainland's one-track system, Taiwan's two-track system may seem constrained. But actually it has a kind of flexibility. If the first track is blocked, the second track may still be passable. if the the first track threatens to derail, the second track provides stability. For example, if Beijing lacks confidence in Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Lai Hsing-yuan, the problem can be resolved smoothly via the second track. As we can see the two-track system allows us to bypass bureaucratic constraints.

Put simply, the second track helps establish the proper atmosphere. It builds bridges over barriers. It is less constrained in what it may do. The first track, on the other hand, engages in constitutionally authorized road building. It is necessarily subject to severe constraints. If the SEF and ARATs are intermediaries, then the KMT/CCP Platform is "an intermediary for the intermediaries." The two complement each other. If the relationship between the two tracks is clearly defined, the two will not interfere with each other, but will instead complement each other.

We must remind the KMT, that the recent rapid melting of cross-strait ice is the result of a wide range of factors. It was not entirely due to the glow of the KMT/CCP Platform. For Taipei, the change in political parties ensured popular support for the unfreezing of eight years of cross-strait ice. Taiwan's economic development has become dependent upon Taiwan's re-integration with the mainland. The melting of ice will also enable Taipei to participate in the activities of the international community. For Beijing, the upcoming Olympic Games give Beijing a chance to show off its Peaceful Rise. An olive branch extended to Taipei may help Beijing shift attention away from the situation in Lhasa. How long will the honeymoon last? How much more negotiation is required? Until substantive consultations between the SEF and ARATS have taken place, it is too early for wishful thinking.

The current situation appears favorable. But if we compare the responses of the governments on the two sides of the strait, Beijing clearly has its act together, and knows where it is headed. By contrast, Taipei, from its March 22 Election Day victory onward, has alternately surged ahead and pulled back. It has been uncertain in its handling of contacts, causing the other side problems and creating internal confusion, adding to cross-strait uncertainty. Last month Wu Po-hsiung visited the mainland. Ma and Wu reached a number of agreements that would enable the party and the government to smoothly integrate the two tracks. How successful was this process? It enabled the KMT, with its diverse composition, to avoid any violent confrontations. It prevented any usurpation of government authority by the second track. All of this requires careful planning and trial runs.

Recently the DPP launched a major assault against the Wu Hu Meeting. It claimed the meeting would inflict "Five Major Harms to Taiwan's sovereignty and safety." Such criticisms are gross exaggerations. They merely confirm that the Chen Shui-bian regime has nothing to show for eight years in office. The Chen regime not only prevented first track consultations between the SEF and ARATS, it prevented people to people contacts. It even left the United States apoplectic. The DPP had the temerity to refer to cross-strait relations during its eight years in office as a "Cold Peace." Where the "peace" is to be found is anybody's guess.

The South Korean media has been watching the Wu Hu Meeting. It is alert to the rapid evolution of cross-strait relations. It has suggested that relations between the ROK and the ROC evolve correspondingly. Obviously the KMT/CCP Platform has attracted international attention. The curtain is about to go up on the Chiang Chen Meeting. Cross-strait interaction will probably switch from the second track to the first. As previously noted, a bridge has been erected. Now it time for road building. The bridge merely provides the connection. The road provides the direction.

「橋」與「路」：黨政二軌的分進合擊
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.10 03:01 am

兩岸互動，大戲連台。四月十二日胡蕭會，四月二十九日連胡會，五月二十八日吳胡會，後天六月十二日江陳會又將登場；兩岸會商的歷史列車，也漸漸從「第二軌道」，開進了「第一軌道」。

自胡蕭博鰲會後，兩岸關係改善的速度，是扁政府八年冰封時所難想像。國民黨在野時搭建的「國共平台」，經過幾年經營，也到了收割的季節。然而，在馬政府上台後，「國共平台」勢須退為兩岸接觸的「第二軌道」；如此一來，關於它應與「第一軌道」的「兩會協商」維持什麼樣的分工與合作，始能體現台灣的最大利益，必須儘快建立基本的默契。後天的江陳會應是新的開端。

「國共平台」的角色之所以必須釐清，主要在兩岸政治體制的差異。中國大陸是「黨政一體」，黨領導人拍板就算定案；但台灣是民主體制，政府決策需經過一定的憲政程序，與執政黨的見解有一定距離。就算國民黨目前在行政和立法部門雙贏，黨仍不能超越政的界線；「兩會協商」被稱為第一軌道，而「國共平台」只是第二軌道，原因在此。

比起大陸的「一軌制」，台灣的「二軌制」表面上雖是一種限制，現實上卻也有其靈活性：一軌窒礙難行之處，二軌可以先行搭橋；一軌步履失控之時，二軌可以從旁平衡。例如，北京對賴幸媛出任陸委會主委的不信任，能順利化解，即是得力二軌的居間溝通。可見，行政上的僵硬，可經二軌的軟性運作予以舒緩。

簡單地說，二軌做的是氣氛營造、跨越障礙的「搭橋」工作，行事較無拘礙；一軌從事的則是憲政認可的「鋪路」工程，需有嚴謹的規範；若說兩會是兩岸「白手套」，國共平台則是「白手套的白手套」，兩者互為表裡、相輔相成。若雙方對彼此的關係有這樣的主從識別，就不至於自相扞格，而可望相輔相成。

必須提醒國民黨的是，兩岸關係近來快速融冰，是多種主客觀因素推促所致，並非完全緣於「國共平台」的魅力奏功。在我方，一是政黨再輪替為兩岸八年冰封提供了開閘的民意基礎，二是台灣經濟發展有賴與大陸重新接軌，並藉此活絡在國際社會的參與。在對岸，一是因奧運開幕在即，北京欲藉兩岸融冰向世界展示它的「和平」崛起，二是北京正為西藏問題所困，可藉台灣的橄欖枝轉移焦點。兩岸的蜜月期能維持多久，還需視雙方的實際互動而定；在兩會進行實質協商前，沒有一廂情願樂觀的餘地。

目前情勢看來雖一片大好，但比較兩岸政府的因應，北京方面攻守有序，層次井然，顯然胸有丘壑。反觀台灣，從三二二勝選至今，新政府時或進取，時或退卻，對接觸的層級和進程的拿捏有時失卻準頭，造成對手困擾，也使內部自亂陣腳，都平添了兩岸互動的不確定性。上月吳伯雄登陸，馬、吳間預先取得不錯的默契，使黨政兩軌得以順利整合。至於如何提煉這次的成功經驗，讓人馬沓雜的國民黨內不會出現「暴衝」現象，甚至脫逸「二軌」的位置而貿然僭越政府的角色，都需要縝密規畫，再加磨合。

民進黨近日對「吳胡會」大加撻伐，指其對台灣的主權和安全造成「五大傷害」；此種批評似乎言過其實，只是反證了扁政府八年在兩岸互動的一事無成。試想，扁政府不僅封死兩會協商的第一軌道，更將民間軌道完全切斷，又將美國惹得氣急敗壞；民進黨居然還稱是「冷和」，不知「和」在哪裡？

南韓媒體觀察吳胡會，驚覺兩岸關係的快速演變，因而提出了「韓台關係也應轉變」的反省。可見，「國共平台」也受到了國際矚目。然而，隨著江陳會登場，兩岸互動亦應自二軌換至一軌。如前所言，橋已搭起，現在輪到開路的工作了；橋只是接駁，路才是方向。