Joint Governance: Redefine the "Dual-Leadership System"

Joint Governance: Redefine the "Dual-Leadership System"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2008

Ma Ying-jeou will not be participating in the Dragon Boat races due to the floods in southern Taiwan. The Presidential Office spokesman's statement was amusing. Wang Yu-chi said: "President Ma, respects the constitutionally designated Head of State... The Premier is the highest ranking member of the Executive Yuan... Disaster relief and flood control is the authority of the Executive Yuan... President Ma and the Executive Yuan have taken all necessary steps, and will keep a close watch on the situation." But then Wang Yu-chi added: "If the disaster worsens, President Ma does not rule out visiting the countryside to survey the disaster."

Flooding from a tropical storm seems to have turned President Ma into a advocate and practitioner of the "semi-presidential, dual-leadership system." Ma Ying-jeou seems to think that disaster relief is part of the the Executive Yuan's flood control functions, and that the President must respect this fact. He seems to think that if the president interferes with Executive Yuan disaster relief, or even expresses concern for disaster victims, he will be perceived as trying to hog the media spotlight.

This may be a manifestation of President Ma's promise to "retreat to the second line after inauguration." It could be a manifestation of what he advocated in his inaugural address -- "a constitutional system in which authority corresponds with responsibility." But is this really the spirit of the so-called "dual-leadership system?" Apparently this "dual-leadership system" can't even survive a heavy rainfall.

Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian utterly destroyed the "Dual-leadership system" during their terms of office. During the Lee Teng-hui era even Liu Tai-ying could humiliate Premier Vincent Siew. During the Chen Shui-bian era, Chen fired six consecutive Premiers. Chen abused every one of them, leaving them dishonored and in disgrace. Lee and Chen encroached upon the Executive Yuan's authority even as they evaded the attendant responsibility. Lee and Chen meddled in the Executive Yuan's authority and demeaned the Premier's dignity. Ma Ying-jeou, conscious of this negative precedent, has "retreated to the second-line," and the premise that "powers and responsibilities must correspond." His intent is to respect the Premier and the Executive Yuan, to avoid stealing their thunder, and to avoid interfering with the Premier's leadership.

But if the "dual-leadership system" imprisons the Premier within the Legislative Yuan, if it prevents the President from offering his condolences to disaster victims for fear of exceeding his authority, this is a misunderstanding of the spirit and letter of the law.

Is our current constitution really akin to France's dual-leadership system," in which "executive power changes track?" According to the Republic of China Constitution, the President's powers and responsibilities are indeterminate. If the President's powers are narrowly defined, then he has the authority to determine only the overall direction of national defense, foreign affairs, and cross-strait policy. He lacks the authority even to nominate the Chairperson for the Mainland Affairs Council. If, on the other hand, the President's powers are broadly defined, then the Premier is nothing more than a Presidential appointee. For over a decade, in actual practice, the Head of the Executive Yuan has effectively become the President's chief executive. In any event, a "Dual-leadership system" must not lead us to the absurd conclusion that "the president may not comfort disaster victims."

The existing "dual-leadership system" lacks clear lines of demarcation. But if on the one hand it allows Chen Shui-bian to undermine six consecutive Premiers, and if on the other hand it makes Ma Ying-jeou hesitant to even inquire about the well-being of disaster victims, this hardly represents the original intent of the constitution. President Ma and Premier Liu must find a way to complement each other and administer jointly. Otherwise they will endlessly reenact the Chinese "Parable of the Father and Son Riding a Donkey." No matter who rides the donkey on the way to the market, someone is bound to criticize.

With direct presidential elections, the public has certain expectations of the president. This, coupled with unclear demarcations within the "dual-leadership system," make it difficult to distinguish between a front line and a second line. Suppose that during his election campaign, the President's views include a whole range of views on politics, education, and economics? Suppose he strongly supports "big tenant farmers, small landowners," a "negative income tax system," or "Twelve i-Taiwan Projects?" Now suppose that upon assuming office he suddenly announces that he is "retreating to the second-line?" and that "disaster relief is part of the Executive Yuan's flood control responsibilities?" What kind of self-contradictory form of "dual-leadership system" is that? If President Ma believes that upon taking office he has only the "three powers delegated to the President," then why not the allow Frank Hsieh to be president, and allow the "three powers" to limit the Executive Yuan? If President Ma feels the President should not interfere with the Executive Yuan, then why does he want the Executive Yuan to encroach on the President's "three powers," as expressed in his political platform? Furthermore, if disaster relief and flood prevention is "merely" part of the Executive Yuan's authority, then why did President Ma phone the Premier and the Chairman of the the Council of Agriculture expressing "concern" over the disaster? Such a "dual-leadership system" is self-contradictory, indefensible, and unsustainable.

Given the gap between the public's expectations and the system's defects, Ma Ying-jeou and Liu Chao-hsuan must re-define the "dual-leadership system." Predicated on mutual trust and the division of labor, they must complement each other and govern jointly. For example, in the event of a flood, if the Premier is preoccupied with other matters, the President should act as a buffer and console the public. It cannot be the the way it is now, where the Premier has no time to visit the countryside and the President declares that he does not dare interfere with the Executive Yuan. The solution is joint governance, with the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan both aware of the bigger picture and adopting a policy of "comprehensive governance, full responsibility." Therefore the President need not micromanage Executive Yuan policy via his political platform, and conversely Executive Yuan policy need not be constrained by the President's political platform.

The "dual-leadership system" is broken. It is the source of current constitutional chaos. Ma Ying-jeou and Liu Chao-hsuan must respect the rule of law. But they must also repair the holes in the legal system. They must dedicate themselves to mending the constitution. Only then can they properly promote the public welfare.

The "dual-leadership system" must not be misinterpreted. The "dual-leadership system" must not be a means of evading responsibility. The spirit and the letter of the law must not be misunderstood.

互補共治：重新詮釋「雙首長制」
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.09 03:07 am

馬英九總統因南部雨災取消了參與端午龍舟競賽。總統府發言人的一段陳述，頗堪玩味，王郁琦說：「馬總統是尊重憲政體制的國家元首……行政院長是最高行政首長，勘災防洪是行政院職權……馬總統知行政院已採必要措施，將保持相關的觀察。」但王郁琦又說：「未來若災情嚴重，馬總統也不排除下鄉勘災。」

一場雨災，似乎成了馬總統對「雙首長制」之認知與實踐的例證。馬英九似乎認為：勘災防洪是行政院的職權，總統必須加以尊重；勘災應由行政院主持，總統若出面，恐有藉慰問災民搶鏡頭的譏評。

這也許就是馬總統所說「就任後退到第二線」的實踐，也是他在就職演說所宣示的「權責相副的憲政體制」之體現。然而，這是否即是所謂「雙首長制」的精義？何況，這樣的「雙首長制」，如今看來竟連一場豪雨的考驗都經受不起。

在李登輝及陳水扁任內，「雙首長制」徹底破敗。李登輝時代，連劉泰英亦可羞辱閣揆蕭萬長；陳水扁時代，則六易閣揆，無一不是被陳水扁折磨得身敗名裂。李扁二人皆以對行政院爭功諉過為能事，不但干政亂政，也完全侵害了閣揆應有的尊嚴及光彩。馬英九面對前車之鑑，因而有「退到第二線」及「權責相副」的思考；其用意應是在尊重閣揆及行政院，小則勿搶了閣揆的光芒，大則勿干擾了閣揆執政的風格與節奏。

但是，現行的「雙首長制」如果竟然變成了把閣揆綁在立法院，而總統連慰問災民也恐有所踰越的制度；這種思維，已不僅是「法匠」心態，簡直更已形同「法奴」。

其實現行憲法豈是如法國那種「行政權換軌制」的「雙首長制」？根據我國憲法，總統權責迄今不明。若謂總統權小，則連「國防、外交、兩岸」皆只是決定「大政方針」而已，總統甚至對陸委會主委人選的建議權都於法無據；若謂總統權大，則行政院長既由總統任命，在十餘年來的實際憲政運作中，行政院長已經成為總統的執行長。但無論如何，「雙首長制」皆不可能演成「總統不宜勘災慰民」的結論。

現行「雙首長制」並無明確的法制界際，但若操作到如陳水扁毀了六任閣揆的地步，或如馬英九連勘災慰問亦表猶豫的地步，恐怕皆非憲政義理之體現。馬總統及劉揆必須設法探尋出一套「互補共治」之道，否則不時皆會演出父子騎驢的尷尬局面。

總統直選，民意對總統自有寄望；再加上「雙首長制」的法制界際不明，亦使總統與閣揆不易有「一線／二線」的區隔。試想：總統在競選時發表的政見，教育、經濟，無所不包，並大力主張「大佃農，小地主」、「負所得稅制」或「十二項愛台建設」等等；但就任後卻忽又宣布「退到第二線」、「勘災防洪是行政院職權」，這是何其矛盾錯亂的「雙首長制」？倘若馬總統認為，他就任後的職權僅在「總統三權」，則當初何妨選謝長廷當總統，以「三權」節制行政院即可；又倘若馬總統認為，總統不宜干預行政院，卻何以又要行政院執行其超越「總統三權」的競選政見？何況，倘若勘災防洪「只是」行政院的職權，馬總統又為何以電話向閣揆及農委會主委「關心」災情？這樣的「雙首長制」，根本自相矛盾，亦根本不能自圓其說，因此不可能行諸久遠。

在「民意期待」及「制度缺損」的憲政弔詭中，馬英九與劉兆玄應當重新詮釋「雙首長制」，在「相互信任」及「角色分工」的前提下，設法實現「互補共治」的效益。互補，例如水災，閣揆若被綁住，總統其實正可扮演安慰民情及吸收民怨的緩衝角色；而不可像現在這樣，閣揆無暇下鄉，總統宣稱不干預行政。共治，則是府院以全國大局著眼，不爭功諉過，共同承當起「完全執政，完全負責」的重責大任；因而，總統不必以「政見」綑綁行政院的「政策」，行政院亦不能讓「政策」被「政見」拘束。

現行憲法中殘破的「雙首長制」，原本即是憲政亂源。馬英九與劉兆玄除了關注法制的界際外，更應在殘破的法制中，以精誠合作來彌縫補罅，全力實現福國利民的執政職志。

不可曲解「雙首長制」，不可藉「雙首長制」來迴避責任；不可淪為「法匠」，尤其不可變成「法奴」。