Will the DPP Repudiate the 1992 Consensus if It Regains Power?

Will the DPP Repudiate the 1992 Consensus if It Regains Power?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2008

DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen said: "The DPP will be an opposition party with experience in governance." Perhaps she meant that the DPP has had eight years of experience in governance. It understands the consequences of governing successfully or unsuccessfully. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party is again in the opposition, it will use its "experience in governance" to provide checks and balances against the ruling KMT. It will be a loyal opposition party that displays the statesmanship befitting a party with experience in governance.

Since assuming office, the Ma administration has provided the DPP with numerous targets to shoot at, such as the Wu Hu Meeting and gasoline prices. The shockwaves from these controversies have temporarily died down. Now would be a good time for the Ma administration to review the results of its first engagement on the battlefield. It would also be a good time for the DPP to review its reversion to the status of an opposition party.

The KMT has stepped up. The DPP has stepped down. The two have reversed roles. The two major issues that have arisen in the wake of this ruling party change have been the Wu Hu Meeting and gasoline prices. The KMT is cleaning up the mess left by the DPP. The DPP, as "an opposition party with experience in governance," ought to be displaying a sense of responsibility in the way it approaches these issues. It isn't.

Let's talk about the Wu Hu Meeting. The Hu Siew Meeting at the Boao Forum has been followed by the Lien Hu Meeting and the Wu Hu Meeting. Each of these has been an effort to repair the damage caused by eight years of Democratic Progressive Party misrule. One could even say that the DPP single-handedly provoked the historic Siew, Lien, Wu meetings with Hu Jintao that took place over the past month and half. But we have yet to see the DPP display the statesmanship befitting "an opposition party with experience in governance." One month from now, on July 4, weekend charter flights are set to bring mainland tourists to Taiwan. Yet all we hear from the DPP is "Why was Ma Ying-jeou referred to as Mr. Ma and not President Ma?" "Why did everyone refer only to the Chinese people and not the Republic of China?" Is this how the "opposition party with experience in governance" intends to conduct itself?

Let's talk about gasoline prices. The Liu Cabinet's handling of gasoline price hikes was far from satisfactory. But as an "opposition party with experience in governance" the DPP ought to remember the harm it inflicted by freezing gasoline prices while in office before it opposes current price hikes. Yet all we hear from the DPP is the simplistic accusation "Price Hike Cabinet." Is the DPP really advocating a continued freeze on gasoline prices? The former DPP government is responsible for today's gasoline prices. The Liu Cabinet has been in office only seven days. Yet the DPP is already screaming "Step down!" Have they forgotten the lengths to which they went to cover up Chen Shui-bian regime corruption so that the DPP would not have to step down?

When Tsai Ing-wen said that "the DPP will be an opposition party with experience in governance," she seemed to be implying that when the DPP reverted to opposition party status, it would no longer oppose the ruling party out of sheer contrariness. For example, Beijing is willing to give Taipei more diplomatic breathing space. It is giving priority to Taipei's participation in the WHO. Yet the DPP's first reaction is to oppose the use of the term "Chinese Taipei." If the DPP was merely playing "Bad Cop" to the KMT's "Good Cop," that would be one thing. But does the DPP really want to say no to everything? Does the DPP intend to oppose the use of the term "Chinese Taipei" while participating in the IOC, APEC and the WTO as well? The name "Taiwan Post" will be changed back to the "Republic of China Post." The DPP refers to this as "de-Taiwanization," even as it denies that it is engaged in "de-Sinicization." This led Premier Liu Chao-hsuan to respond that "the Republic of China is Taiwan." Why doesn't the DPP return to its former position that "Taiwan is the Republic of China?" It has no need to oppose the Republic of China Post. The Ma administration hopes to "increase domestic demand." The DPP said that would trigger inflation. Does that mean in order to prevent inflation one should not increase domestic demand? Does that mean preventing an increase in domestic demand will stop inflation?

Taiwan has undergone a "second change of ruling parties." Its biggest political benefit is that the ruling KMT is now a ruling party that knows what it is like to be out of power. Conversely, the opposition DPP is now an opposition party that knows what it is like to be in power. This trial by fire has enabled the KMT to make a breakthrough, to conclude that "Taiwan is the Republic of China" and the "Republic of China is Taiwan." Being out of power has motivated the KMT to aspire to clean and competent governance. These are painful lessons the KMT learned during its eight years out of office. By contrast, the DPP still insists that referring to the post office as the "Republic of China Post" amounts to "de-Taiwanization." The DPP still insists that the "Southern Front" is a state secret that may not be declassified. Is this what the DPP considers conduct befitting "an opposition party with experience in governance?"

Eight years ago, as chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, Tsai Ing-wen denied the existence of the 1992 Consensus. This set the tone for the ruling DPP's cross-strait policy. It also painted the DPP into a corner. The result? Under pressure from Washington and Beijing the DPP's cross-strait policy slammed head on into a brick wall. This was a major reason it lost power. Yet today Tsai Ing-wen is declaring that if the Democratic Progressive Party were to regain office, it would still not accept the 1992 Consensus. In effect the DPP's cross-strait position has gone from yesterday's "There never was any 1992 Consensus" to today's "Although a consensus was reached in 1992, we oppose the 1992 Consensus." Indeed, the correlation between the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations has been reinforced. Is the mission of the Democratic Progressive Party, now in the opposition, to declare that if it regains office it will not accept the 1992 Consensus?

After ten days back in the political opposition, the DPP must be alert. Given the cross-strait warming trend, if the DPP persists in rejecting and objecting to the 1992 Consensus, to participation in the WHO under the name Chinese Taipei, to missile reductions, to direct air passenger and air cargo links, the DPP may well paint itself into a corner, again. Would that really be a smart move on the part of "an opposition party with experience in governance?"

民進黨再執政後要否定九二共識？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.03 03:01 am

民進黨主席蔡英文說：「民進黨將是一個有執政經驗的反對黨。」這句話的意思也許是說：民進黨已有八年執政經驗，對於執政的成敗得失已有體悟；因此，民進黨如今再度變成反對黨，將以「過去的執政經驗」作為反對與制衡的憑藉，從而可以作一個「有執政高度」的反對黨。

馬政府上台，提供了民進黨許多可以發揮的題材，如吳胡會及汽油漲價等；如今這些議題的震盪暫已告一段落，此刻不但是馬政府應當回頭清理其執政首役戰場的時候，也是民進黨可以回頭檢討其重作馮婦「反對黨初體驗」的時刻。

國民黨上台，民進黨下野；主客易位，第一次交手的兩大議題，吳胡會及汽油漲價，卻皆在收拾民進黨留下的爛攤子。民進黨處理這類議題，正是應當表現其「有執政經驗的反對黨」的時機，但事實卻似乎不然。

先談吳胡會。自博鰲論壇胡蕭會，至連胡會，至吳胡會，可謂皆在修補民進黨執政八年所造成的兩岸創傷；甚至可說，其實是民進黨一手促成了一個半月內蕭、連、吳三人密集與胡錦濤會面的「歷史機遇」。但是，迄未見民進黨以「有執政經驗」的高度對此一變局提出解讀。接著，一個月後，七月四日，周末包機就要載著陸客來台，卻只聞民進黨說「為什麼只稱馬先生，不稱馬總統」、「為什麼只說中華民族，不說中華民國」，難道這些就是「有執政經驗的反對黨」的極致表現？

再談汽油漲價。劉內閣處理這次漲價，確實有欠周全。但是，既然是「有執政經驗的反對黨」，似乎先應想到自己「執政」時「凍漲」的遺害，再決定當如何「反對」；如今卻以一句「漲價內閣」就概括一切，難道民進黨能主張油價繼續「凍漲」？何況，民進黨前政府對油價亦有責任，在劉內閣就任僅七天之時，民進黨一下子就將口號喊到「下台」的高度，有沒有想過當年自己是如何包庇貪腐無狀的陳水扁不下台？

蔡英文點出「民進黨將是一個有執政經驗的反對黨」，似乎意指民進黨再度作為反對黨，不應再有過去那種「為反對而反對」的民粹心態。例如，據稱北京願意鬆解台灣的外交參與，而謂將首先考慮ＷＨＯ；但民進黨的第一個反應卻是，反對以「中華台北」名義加入；這若是欲與政府扮演黑白臉也就罷了，但難道真要反對到底？更是否將一併反對以「中華台北」參加奧會、ＡＰＥＣ與ＷＴＯ？又如，台灣郵政將改回中華民國郵政，民進黨竟稱這是「去台灣化」，卻不說民進黨是「去中華民國化」；閣揆劉兆玄因此在答詢時稱「中華民國就是台灣」，而民進黨何不亦回復到「台灣就是中華民國」的立場，即不必反對「中華民國郵政」。再如，馬政府欲「擴大內需」，民進黨說將引發「通貨膨脹」；但是，為了防止通貨膨脹就不應擴大內需嗎？或者停止擴大內需就能停息通貨膨脹？

台灣經歷「二次政黨輪替」，其中最大的政治效益應是：重新執政的國民黨成了「有在野經驗的執政黨」，重新下野的民進黨也成了「有執政經驗的反對黨」。國民黨經此試煉，才有「台灣在語義上就是中華民國」及「中華民國就是台灣」的突破，也才有廉能政治的自期自勉，這些應皆是得自八年在野的痛苦教訓；相對而言，民進黨如果仍將「中華民國郵政」指為「去台灣化」，又仍堅持「南線專案」為不可解密的國家機密，則怎麼可能表現出「有執政經驗的反對黨」的高度？

八年前，擔任陸委會主委的蔡英文否認有「九二共識」存在，將民進黨政府的兩岸政策定了調，也使民進黨困在牆角，終致民進黨的兩岸政策在「台／美／中」皆推車撞壁，成為其失去政權的主因之一；如今，蔡英文卻說，如果民進黨再度執政，可以不接受「九二共識」；這使得民進黨的兩岸論述，從過去的「沒有九二共識」，轉變成今日的「雖有九二共識，但仍反對九二共識」。誠然，「九二共識」與「一中各表」的聯結尚待加強；但難道民進黨現今在野的使命，就是為了宣示在執政後不接受「九二共識」嗎？

經歷這十餘日「反對黨初體驗」，民進黨須有警覺，倘若只是反對或不接受「九二共識」、「中華台北ＷＨＯ」、「飛彈撤減」、「先客後貨」，恐怕會在「兩岸熱和」中再度將民進黨困在牆角，那豈是「有執政經驗的反對黨」的明智抉擇？