Tsai Ing-wen Rejects the 1992 Consensus

Tsai Ing-wen Rejects the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2008

Tsai Ing-wen said that when the ruling Democratic Progressive Party regains power, it may reject the 1992 Consensus.

If the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, it will not be before 2012. By then, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, the two sides will have established direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, mainland tourism to Taiwan, and even Taiwan's entry into the WHO. By then, what exactly will the DPP be rejecting? The 1992 Consensus, or direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, mainland tourism to Taiwan, and Taiwan's entry into the WHO?

If the DPP hopes to offer a convincing cross-strait policy platform, it needs to get the jump on the KMT and not allow itself to be left behind. Tsai Ing-wen says that when the Democratic Progressive Party regains power (no earlier than four years from now) it may reject the 1992 Consensus. But four years from now, an extensive superstructure erected on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus will be a fait accompli. Does the DPP really have any alternative but to accept the 1992 Consensus?

A Chinese aphorism says that "when you point at the moon, you concentrate on the moon and forget about your finger." The 1992 Consensus is merely the finger. Direct flights and other cross-strait policies are the moon. The DPP must offer its own rationale for direct flights and other cross-straits policies. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus is no longer an option. Can declaring that four or eight years from now it will reject the 1992 Consensus unscramble the omlet?

In the past, The DPP proposed "doing away with the 10,000 Year Legislature" and "lifting martial law." It ran ahead of the KMT, it welcomed the future. If today it uses "Rejecting the 1992 Consensus when it regains power" as a rallying cry, then it is falling behind the KMT, and attempting to turn back the clock.

The DPP is still piecing together a new cross-strait policy platform. So far its main themes are: 1. Reject the 1992 Consensus. 2. Reject the term "Chinese Taipei." In fact, during the Chen Shui-bian era, it never openly opposed the 1992 Consensus. It merely alleged that "There wasn't any 1992 Consensus." Today, now that there is a 1992 Consensus, the DPP has no choice but to up the ante, and demand "One China, Different Interpretations." But since Hu Jintao already spoke the words "One China, Different Interpretations" during Bush and Hu's Hotline conversation, the 1992 Consensus is merely an abbreviation for "One China, Different Interpretations." Besides, "One China, Different Interpretations" has room for growth. During the Wu Hu Meeting the two political parties recognized each other as ruling parties. Therefore the 1992 Consensus, or One China, Different Interpretations, hold out the promise of pragmatic and positive developments. This is not something the DPP can control. The DPP is in danger of becoming marginalized, even of becoming an outsider. Besides, If the DPP believes the 1992 Consensus has some other meaning other than "One China, Different Interpretations," what would it be? If the DPP rejects participation in the WHO in the name of "Chinese Taipei," does it want to wage yet another divisive campaign to "Join the UN in the Name of Taiwan?"

Tsai Ing-wen said: "If the DPP regains power it will reject 1992 Consensus." This is predicated on the assumption it will regain power. Actually, the DPP's rejection of the 1992 Consensus and the term "Chinese Taipei" may be a choice thrust upon it by its status as an opposition party. For the DPP to adopt such a stance is actually helpful to the ruling Kuomintang. Because the KMT can use DPP opposition as a reason to improve cross-strait relations. Furthermore, this is probably not the path by which the DPP will return to power. Anyone with any political sense will find it hard to imagine that four or eight years from now, the DPP will emerge victorious on the basis of the campaign slogan: Down with the 1992 Consensus!

Tsai Ing-wen said: Taiwan's sovereignty is non-negotiable. But Tsai Ing-wen has not clarified her bottom line. Is it the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?" If so, why does the DPP oppose changing the name of the postal service back to the "Republic of China Post?" Is it the "Taiwan independence Party Constitution" and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Tsai Ing-wen has not clarified what is negotiable and non-negotiable. She has merely rejected "Chinese Taipei." But how many times has the DPP used the term "Chinese Taipei" during its eight years in office? At least once every time an international baseball game was held.

If the DPP hopes to regain power, it cannot simply "reject the 1992 Consensus." It must confront the new cross-strait scenario erected on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus. It must find a way for Taiwan to seek solutions and avoid problems, to achieve a win/win cross-strait scenario. It should stop trying to push aside the finger pointing at the moon. It should confront the moon already high in the sky!

蔡英文不接受九二共識？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.06.13 03:03 am

蔡英文說：民進黨再執政時，可以不接受「九二共識」。

民進黨若再執政，那至少是四年後二○一二年的事。屆時，兩岸在「九二共識的基礎上」，早已實現了直航、陸客來台，也可能已實現了台灣加入ＷＨＯ等；到了那個時候，民進黨究竟只是「不接受」九二共識，抑或也「不接受」直航、陸客來台及台灣加入ＷＨＯ？

民進黨正在重建其兩岸論述。最重要的是：整個論述必須趕在國民黨的前頭，而不能被國民黨甩在後頭。蔡英文說，民進黨再執政（至少四年後）可以「不接受」九二共識；但是，四年後「在九二共識的基礎上」搭建的一切架構均已形成，難道還有「接不接受」九二共識的問題？

以指指月，得月忘指。九二共識只是手指，直航等等才是月亮。民進黨必須在直航等新形勢中建立其兩岸論述，已經沒有「接不接受」九二共識的餘地。若宣示將在四年後或八年後「不接受九二共識」，難道能將熟飯還原成生米？

過去，民進黨主張「打倒萬年國會」、「解除戒嚴」，這是站在國民黨的前面，也引領了「未來」；但是，如今倘以「再執政後不接受九二共識」為號召，這卻是落在國民黨的後頭，也是開歷史倒車。

民進黨的兩岸新論述仍在拼湊之中。如今所見，其主軸似在：一、不接受「九二共識」；二、不接受「中華台北」。其實，在陳水扁時代，從未正面反對「九二共識」，只說「沒有九二共識」；如今，「九二共識」已經有了，民進黨只好加碼，要求「一中各表」。然而，自胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中說出了「一中各表」，如今「九二共識」其實已是「一中各表」的「小名」或「別名」；何況，未來「一中各表」的空間亦有擴大的可能，吳胡會相互承認為執政黨即是；因而，無論「九二共識」或「一中各表」，隨時都有出現更務實的正面發展的可能性，皆非民進黨可以操之在我，極易被邊緣化，甚至淪為局外人。何況，如果民進黨以為「九二共識」對台灣而言不是「一中各表」，難道民進黨還有其他解讀？至於民進黨若不接受以「中華台北」參加ＷＨＯ，難道還要再來一次「以台灣名義加入聯合國」的內外大戰？

蔡英文說「再執政後可以不接受九二共識」，似乎是從「再執政」的假設，來思考民進黨的兩岸論述。其實，民進黨不接受「九二共識」，不接受「中華台北」，可能是身為「反對黨」不得不然的選擇；民進黨採此立場，對執政的國民黨卻頗有利，因為可以藉民進黨的反對作為改善兩岸關係的槓桿。然而，這恐怕並非民進黨通向「再執政」的道路，任何有政治常識者皆難想像，在四年後或八年後，民進黨賴以勝選而能再執政的競選口號將是：反對九二共識。

蔡英文說：台灣的主權，不能退讓。但蔡英文迄未說明其底線何在，倘若《台灣前途決議文》是她所說的底線，則為何民進黨反對改回「中華民國郵政」？又為何不廢除《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》？且蔡英文亦未說明其彈性何在，只說反對「中華台北」，但曾否計算過民進黨在八年執政期間使用「中華台北」的次數？至少每一場國際棒球賽均是。

民進黨若想「再執政」，不能只是「不接受九二共識」；而是必須面對「在九二共識的基礎上」所形成的兩岸新形勢，為台灣找到趨吉避凶、兩岸雙贏的道路。不必仍想撥開指月的手指，而要面對已經高掛天際的月亮！