Disaster Relief: A Central Mission of the Military

Disaster Relief: A Central Mission of the Military
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2009

The 8/8 Floods battered southern Taiwan. The reaction of the military was inadequate. On top of which, it made excuses for itself. Although it made a genuine effort to engage in disaster relief following the flood, its image had already been tarnished. If the military wishes to restore public confidence, it must enhance its non-military capabilities. There is simply no alternative. It must begin by rethinking its overall mission, its standards and commands, its disaster drills and training. It must conduct comprehensive redeployment. If the military cannot respond effectively to natural disasters during times of peace, how can the public expect it to defend the nation and protect the people during times of war?
Non-military operations are something the U.S. military has advocated as early as 1993, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The U.S. military believes that with the end of the Cold War, there is only a 50% probability of a large-scale war. The probability of small-scale conventional wars and non-military operations on the other hand, is 100%. Therefore, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, emergency rescue, emergency evacuation, counter-terrorism, anti-smuggling, riot suppression and other non-military operations, are now functions of the armed forces. This is a global trend.

Each year the U.S. military holds tropical storm exercises in the vicinity of Guam, at random intervals. The purpose of these exercises is tropical storm disaster prevention. The U.S. military and its allies the world over have launched many such exercises, too numerous to mention. Among neighboring countries, Japan's Self-Defense Forces Law lists disaster response as an SDF military operation. Two years Indonesia revised its national disaster management agency protocols. The Vice President has been put in charge of disaster management. Rapid reaction disaster relief forces have been set up. In 2005 the mainland authorities announced their "Articles for Armed Forces Disaster Relief Participation." Floods, fires, and other non-military operations have been incorporated into their regular training. All responsible governments see disaster relief and emergency rescue as one of their armed forces' central tasks.

Since the 9/21 Earthquake and the SARS Incident, the Republic of China government has also included disaster response as one of the military's many responsibilities. If the different branches of the military establish public affairs groups, they can maintain links with rural district and county civic affairs bureaus and civic affairs sections in their defense districts. They can hold quarterly corps commander and civil magistrate co-ordination sessions. The different branches of the military can also set up civic affairs districts that overlap with their combat zones. In the event of a disaster, they should be able to switch from peacetime mode to wartime mode, and initiate emergency mobilization.

In terms of organization, the corps of engineers of the different branches of the armed forces should each establish reaction and relief battalions, equipped with Bobcats, excavators, 15 ton dump trucks, assault boats, and other rescue equipment. The chemical warfare groups of each branch of the military also have reconnaissance battalions with some disaster prevention and disaster relief capabilities. Four years ago central and southern Taiwan was hit by the 7/2 Flood. The armed forces Fifth Battle District did not wait for orders. It began disaster relief on its own. Its boldness impressed the public. The question is, if the military could they do it back then, why can't it do so now?

Disaster prevention and relief has been made a responsibility of the armed forces. But in general it is not taken seriously. The military does not understand global trends and public needs. It continues to think of disaster relief and emergency rescue as a sideline. It mistakenly assumes that too much emphasis on it will undermine combat readiness for normal missions. The result is a passive attitude toward natural disasters. The armed forces' active response to the 7/2 Flood was not dictated by the system, but by the personal judgment and personal dedication of the official in charge. It was an isolated case. It was the exception to the rule. This reveals the inadequacies of the existing mechanisms.

According to regulations, ground forces include standing forces, reserve forces, special warfare units, technical support, garrisoned troops, and military police. Naval fleets include individual warships, battle groups, and vessel groups. They also include airmen, air defense and electronic intelligence groups. These are already receiving disaster relief training. But these military units receive no more than 10 hours of training every six months. In terms of organization, the armed forces have some degree of disaster response capability. They may be able to deal with normal disasters. But when they encounter extraordinary floods or typhoons, they have trouble coping.

The armed forces were ineffective at disaster relief. They were criticized heavily because their military spokesmen did nothing. The armed forces were unable to provide timely disaster reports. They were unable to explain the situation to the public. They were criticized from beginning to end. Military "soft power" was non-existent. The morale of the armed forces suffered a serious setback. Some generals are lamenting the plan. They say it may as well be aborted. They consider it more humiliating than being defeated in battle. But how can a military unable to defend its own rights and privileges in times of peace, possible convince people it can defend the people in times of war?

President Ma and the Department of Defense have been skinned alive. Yesterday Ma finally issued a policy statement regarding the duties of the armed forces. He made clear that henceforth disaster prevention and disaster relief will be its "central task." Military strategy, military tactics, force structures, budgets, machinery, and equipment should be part of future disaster prevention and relief efforts. This will facilitate disaster relief, emergency rescue, and other non-military operations.

Talk is cheap. What people want to see is action, swift action. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis, unlike wars, happen suddenly. They are difficult to predict. Typhoon season is not over yet. a disaster could strike at any time. If the government and the armed forces disappoint the people again, then a change in administrations is not far off.

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中國時報 　2009.08.26
國軍早該將災害防救列為「中心任務」了
本報訊

八八水災，重創南台灣，國軍反應不及，又諉過辯解，洪水過後雖努力救災，形象已一落千丈。今後國軍要挽回民眾的信心，除了強化「非戰爭軍事行動」的能力，看不出有第二條路可走，而這一切的作為，必須從思維認知、任務賦予、準則教令、救災演訓到籌購機具做起，進行一次通盤性部署。否則，軍隊平時不能救災應援，戰時民眾又如何寄望它能保國衛民？

「非戰爭軍事行動」，早於一九九三年由美軍提出，是蘇聯解體後的產物。美軍認為，冷戰結束世界發生大規模戰爭的機率只剩五○％，而小規模的常規戰爭和「非戰爭」形態行動的可能性為一○○％，因此人道救援、救災搶險、撤僑、反恐、緝私、鎮壓暴亂等「非戰爭軍事行動」，開始納入軍隊職能的範疇，至今成為世界趨勢。

美軍每年不定期在關島附近舉行「風暴」演習，就是因應防災抗颱之用，美軍與友邦國家在全球展開類似的演練更是不勝枚舉。以周邊國家來說，日本在《自衛隊法》明定「災害派遣」為自衛隊的軍事行動之一；印尼二年前修改國家災害管理機構規程，由副總統負責，並成立救災快速反應部隊；對岸亦於二 ○○五年頒布《軍隊參加搶險救災條例》，將抗洪、救火等非戰爭行動任務納入部隊經常性訓練。可以說，任何負責任的政府，都視救災搶險為軍隊的中心任務之一。

自「九二一」大地震、ＳＡＲＳ事件以來，我國也把災害防救列為國軍多重任務的一環。如各軍團均設公共事務組，平時與防區內各縣民政局和鄉民政科聯繫，每季舉行由軍團指揮官和縣長參加的民事協調會報，各軍團同時成立與作戰區重疊的民事責任區，災情出現，應能做到平戰轉換，應急動員。

在組織編裝方面，國軍各軍團所屬工兵群均設一個應援營，配備小山貓、怪手、十五噸傾卸車和突擊舟等救災應援機具；各軍團所屬化學兵群亦有一個偵消營，具備起碼的災害防救能量。四年前，中南部發生「七二水災」，國軍第五作戰區發現緊急狀態時，不待命令就主動救災，勇於任事的做法令人印象深刻。問題是，當年做得到，今年何以荒腔走板？

首先，災害防救雖列入國軍任務之一，但總體上不受重視，軍方未能體察國際趨勢和民眾的切身需要，總以為救災搶險是副業，甚至誤認過於重視它會影響正常的戰備任務，以致被動面對災情。國軍在「七二水災」主動應援，並非制度使然，而是主事者的個人判斷和使命驅使，僅為個案，未能形成通則，說明既有的機制並不成熟。

按規定，三軍地面部隊包括常備、後備、特戰、技勤、衛戍、警衛；艦艇部隊涵蓋單艦、戰隊和艦隊；以及陸航、防空和資電部隊等等，均實施支援災害救援訓練，但各部隊每半年訓練時數不超過十小時。就組織編裝而言，各軍團雖有一定的救災應援能量，一般災情或可勝任，遇到非比尋常的洪水風災就難堪大任了。

這次國軍救災不力最為人所詬病的是，軍事發言人毫無作為，既不能即時提供國軍救災最新情資，又無法引導輿論，一路被打，軍事「軟實力」蕩然無存，國軍士氣嚴重受挫，一些將領感嘆之餘，萌生不如歸去之意，感覺比戰敗還要窩囊。試問，一個平時不能自我保護權益的軍隊，如何讓人相信戰時軍隊能保護人民！

馬總統和國防部被罵得體無完膚之後，日前終於對國軍的任務做出政策宣示，指明國軍今後要將災害防救列為「中心任務」；未來國軍在戰略、戰術、兵力結構、經費預算和機具裝備等方面，應納入防災救災的考慮，藉以全面精進救災搶險等「非戰爭軍事行動」的能力。

口說無憑，人民要看的是行動，而且動作要快。因為災情不像戰爭，如地震、海嘯突發而至，難以預警。颱風季節尚未結束，不能預測的災情隨時可能爆發。如果政府和國軍的表現再令人民失望，換人執政的日子就不遠了。 了。