Why is Southern Taiwan Still Under Water?

Why is Southern Taiwan Still Under Water?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 11, 2009

Typhoon Morakot brought with it torrential rains that inundated southern Taiwan. The scenes of disaster were painful to behold. The ruling and opposition parties must follow-up on rescue efforts and post-disaster reconstruction. The government is not unaware of the importance of water management. It recently plunked down over 100 billion NT on the 1999 flood control budget. The baffling result was the more it spent the worse the flooding got. A number of missing links in the causal chain require closer examination. Only by re-thinking water management can the government prevent a repeat of the tragedy.
Typhoon Morakot and its accompanying southwest pressure system had alarming repercussions that far exceeded expectations. Over a year's worth of rainfall fell in a few short days. The rain coincided with the high tide. The accumulated water had trouble draining away. It turned out to be the flood of the century. To make matters worse, weather forecasts focused on disaster prevention in the north, to the neglect of the south. But leave these factors aside for the moment. What have the vast sums spent on water management accomplished? Based on the current disaster, one can only shake one's head.

The hardest hit area was Kaohsiung. Some townships, such as Chiatung, Linbian, and Chiahsien, were already prone to flooding. Three and a half years ago, the Chen Shui-bian administration proposed an eight year, 80 billion NT water management program. The legislature even threw in an extra 116 billion NT. The first phase allocated 30 billion NT to "areas prone to flooding." So why weren't these low-lying townships included in the improvement plan? Just where did those tens of billions in water management funds go? Perhaps the government merely tinkered around the edges, and worsened local flood conditions?

The claim that "Flood control takes big bucks" is a Big Lie. It is the product of Taiwan's populist politics. Add to this Blue vs. Green partisan infighting and central government funds finding their way into local level bid-rigging. The result is the more water management planning one engages in, the farther water management gets off track. Water management has never been amenable to quick fixes. In addition to money, it requires professional planning and regular maintenance. The billions squandered on water management clearly underscores several defects in Taiwan's water management system.

One. The government emphasizes the building of infrastructure, but overlooks routine maintenance. Too many funds must be consumed within a given time frame. Therefore water management districts continuously cook up infrastructure projects and find ways to bid them out. But water management infrastructure requires comprehensive planning. It requires constant maintenance. When discretionary funds have been spent on construction, they are no longer available for maintenance. Maintenance gets neglected. Typhoon Morakot turned southern Taiwan into "Waterworld," overnight. The main reason was at least 10 levees were breached. If one neglects the maintenance of levees, and frantically builds pumping stations willy nilly, isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Typhoon Morakot destroyed 20 bridges on Taiwan. These bridges had no personnel stationed on them to warn users of impending disaster. As a result, innocent people fell into the river. This was one more mind-boggling development.

Two. The water management system is "long on politics, short on management." Water management, including disaster prevention and disaster relief, is work requiring a great degree of professionalism. But over-politicization, the arrogance of power, and the abdication of professionals, have severed both lateral and vertical lines of communication within the system. The high speed rail system and several national highways have been built in the narrow corridor on the western half of the island. These have undermined the local hydrology. This shifts the burden onto others. How can the government prevent national infrastructure projects from destroying the hydrology? Does the Water Resources Agency have any say in the matter? Just look at the operations of the central government's disaster relief center. President Ma and Premier Liu got in each others' way during their tours of inspection. As we can see, no matter how high one's rank, one never has enough information, and the information one has, fails to provide a command of the overall situation. So why not let more professionals take charge of disaster relief?

Three. The government fails to discriminate between the essential and the trivial. Corruption is widespread. When the Eight Year 80 billion Discretionary Budget was first proposed, it was criticized as being short on specifics. Later, during implementation, it was difficult to avoid favoritism. This led to the inversion of water management priorities. Many high and low ranking officials were implicated in corruption scandals involving government/business collusion. Former Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Hou Ho-hsiung alone was implicated in seven cases of corruption, and sentenced to nearly seven years in prison. This reveals the magnitude of the economic interests involved. To prevent the continued abuse and squandering of the water management budget, the government must invite experts to set up a special committee to oversee discretionary budgets. Otherwise, big bucks will be spent, but the flood waters will continue to rise. Is that fair to the public?

Water management is not a popularity contest. It is not a contest to see who is the hardest worker. It is not a matter of throwing money at a problem. If one lacks the necessary vision for comprehensive national land use planning, if one lacks respect for the people and their property, if one lacks respect for Mother Nature, one cannot succeed in water management. A half century after the 8/7 Flood, the 8/8 Flood has given us a wake-up call.

投千億治水，何以南台灣仍成水鄉？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.11 06:25 am

莫拉克颱風引進豪雨，水淹南台，災情讓人不忍卒睹；朝野必須全力以赴，投入後續搶救及災後重建。其實，政府並非不了解水利之重要，近年更大手筆投入八年一千多億的治水預算，結果卻是越治越淹，讓人困惑。其間失落的環節，必須潛心反省，重整治水思維，才能防止悲劇一再重演。

這次莫拉克颱風和西南氣流產生的驚人牽引作用，遠遠超乎想像，短短幾天降下超過一年的雨量，又適逢大潮，積水難退，是這場世紀水患的大背景。再加上氣象預報一直將焦點防災地區放在北部，導致南台灣受到輕忽。撇開這些因素不談，若追問政府近年花大錢治水究竟發揮了什麼效用，就這次的災情檢視，恐怕只能令人搖頭。

以這次災情最慘重的高屏為例，有些鄉鎮如佳冬、林邊、甲仙，原本就是易致水患的地區。三年半前，扁政府提出八年八百億的治水條例，立法院還追加到一千一百六十億；其中首期三百億元就用在「易淹水地區」的水患治理，但為何這些低窪鄉鎮沒有被納入改善計畫？那數百億的龐大治水經費究竟被用到哪裡去了？或者政府只在周邊作了零星整治，卻反而集中強化了當地的災情？

要花大錢才能治水，這是台灣民粹政治的一張大牛皮；再加上藍綠惡鬥、中央用水利經費來綁樁地方，也就越發使治水的規劃和事權偏離正軌。事實上，治水從來不是一蹴可幾的工作，除了金錢，它更需要的是體系性的專業規劃，以及更多經常性的細心維護。但從「千億治水」的失利，我們分明看到台灣水利建設出現了許多畸形現象：

其一，只強調建設，卻輕忽保養。由於有太多經費要在限期內花掉，所以水利部門的工作就是不斷巧立工程名目，並想方設法將其發包出去。但水利建設是需要完整規劃、且高度維護的工程，特別預算被用在建設，水利部門的保養經費相對緊縮，維護工作便也受到輕忽。這次，南台灣一夕變成水鄉澤國，主因是至少有十條以上的溪流潰堤；試想，放著基礎的河川堤防不維護，卻拚命在那裡加蓋抽水站、買抽水機，這不是本末倒置嗎？再看，這次全台有廿座橋斷裂，有些橋樑完全沒有警示人員或設備，導致無辜民眾墜河，這也是難以想像的事。

其二，治水體系呈現「強政治、弱行政」。治水，包括防災和救災，都是高度專業的工作；但過度政治化的結果，就出現權力掛帥、專業退位的現象，體系的橫向乃至上下聯繫都支離破碎。狹窄的西部走廊興建了多條國道和高鐵，當然會破壞地方水文，形成以鄰為壑狀態；但要如何解決國家建設導致的水文破壞，水利署有發言權嗎？光看這次中央救災指揮中心的運作，馬總統和劉揆都在巡視途中受阻；可見，權位再高然而資訊依舊不足，無助於指揮大局。那麼，為何不讓更專業的人來指揮救災？

其三，輕重失調，弊端叢生：當年八年八百億特別預算提出時，即遭批評缺乏具體計畫；後來執行時更難免徇私，導致治水優先順序失度，而許多大小官員更因而捲入官商勾結及貪瀆的弊案。前經濟部次長侯和雄一人即身涉七案被判近七年，可見其中牽涉利益之龐大。若要防止治水預算繼續遭到濫用及虛擲，政府應邀集專家成立特別委員會，來監督並導正特別預算的運用。否則，花了大錢，大水照淹，這對得起人民嗎？

治水，不是在拚人氣，也不是比辛勞，更不是比砸錢。如果胸中沒有國土總體規劃的見識，沒有惜民愛物的襟懷，沒有敬畏天地的精神，不可能做好治水大業。在八七水災半個世紀後，八八水災又給了我們一次當頭棒喝。