Problems Even the Control Yuan Cannot Correct

Problems Even the Control Yuan Cannot Correct
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2009


Typhoon Morakot brought with it the heaviest rainfall in Taiwan's history. The volume far exceeded that of the 8/7 Flood more than half a century ago. The torrential rains refused to stop. They ravaged southern Taiwan. Before Typhoon Morakot swept through Taiwan, the Control Yuan had just finished reprimanding 14 ministry organs for flooding in central and southern Taiwan caused by last year's typhoons. Flood control measures were Ineffective. Weather forecasting was inaccurate. All were subject to Control Yuan criticism. Unfortunately Morakot proved yet again that typhoon disaster measures have never been improved. Force Majeure weather conditions are of course unavoidable. But what about the organizational defects and human errors that result in the same ineffectual typhoon disaster responses, year after year?

Using the Control Yuan's review of Typhoon Kalmaegi as a basis of comparison, Control Yuan members criticized the Central Weather Bureau rainfall forecasts as inaccurate. The Central Weather Bureau admitted that it needed to update its weather radar systems. But even after its radar system is updated, it will only provide "three additional hours" of advance warning. How much will that help disaster prevention? The Control Yuan has doubts. Forty-eight hours before Typhoon Morak arrived, CNN television headline news reported that it might "heavily impact Asia." Our own Central Weather Bureau however, did nothing but revise its rainfall estimates along the way. CNN used US Weather Bureau language such as "must take care to prevent flooding" in its reports. Our own ministries meanwhile, were cheering the fact that the typhoon would alleviate water shortages. Overnight, our Central Weather Bureau revised its rainfall estimates for Chiayi from 700 millimeters to 2900 millimeters. This is what led to disaster.

We expect the Central Weather Bureau's forecasts to be more precise. Is that so unreasonable? In fact the Central Weather Bureau, in addition to having access to its own forecasts, has access to the same information as the United States and Japan. Based on past experience it is better to err on the side of caution. It is better to underscore the possibility that the storm might become more serious. This ought to be Standard Operating Procedure for the Central Weather Bureau when dealing with typhoons.

It is difficult to completely prevent typhoon damage. Especially after a major earthquake such as the 9/21 Earthquake. It changed Taiwan's landscape. It loosened its geological structure. Even though ten years have passed, the most heavily hit disaster regions have yet to recover. Heavy rains can easily cause mudslides. This is a situation those in the mountain regions face every year. There is no short-term solution to the problem. Local leaders have overlooked the potential consequences of typhoons. When disaster struck, some of them weren't even in the country. Yet they pointed fingers at the Central Weather Bureau. forecasts. Such shirking of responsibility is totally unacceptable.

The Control Yuan severely criticized central and local government river management authorities and their lack of a unified command. This criticism can be summed up as "insightful nonsense." It is insightful because the Control Yuan is aware of the problem. It is nonsense because the problem has been around for years. When we still had a provincial government, the central government and local governments would scramble to provide disaster relief. Disaster relief was a means of showing off their administrative efficiency. Once the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen however, Taiwan found itself minus one provincial governor, one who roamed the island far and wide, and burst into tears upon meeting disaster victims. Without competition in disaster relief, river management became a thankless task. No one bothered to inquire about it. Each year when typhoons led to disaster, officials would go through the motions talking about it. After they talked about it, they shelved it. No one bothered to ask about how to unify the command.

Typhoon season is just around the corner. Government departments cannot possibly be unaware of this. Quite the contrary. two or three months ago, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan made a local inspection. He was keeping track of reconstruction on a damaged bridge. The contract for the bridge had not been issued. He was so concerned that he nearly threw a fit. Last year's damaged bridges were left unrepaired. As a result, Typhoon Morakot wound up destroying several major highway bridges in central and southern Taiwan. The problem is painful to contemplate. Over-development may already have damaged Taiwan's mountains and rivers beyond recovery.

River management is a major problem. Everyone knows its importance. But no one has the patience to suspend development. Following the 9/12 Earthquake, countless hot springs hotels, hotels, and bed and breakfast inns were built in both heavily and lightly damaged regions. Did no one think to ask whether these regions were suitable for such developments? The result? Every year storms topple at least one hot springs hotel. After they collapse, they are rebuilt. Is this to be the fate of Taiwan's disaster areas? Apart from mountain regions, low-lying areas are flooded every year during the rainy season. The worst disaster sites this time were Linbian and Chiatung. They were the star attractions. Alas, over the past three or four decades Pingtung has subsided 3.76 meters. The government has attempted to make improvements. It has provided job retraining. It has built pumping systems. But these are emergencies. Help delayed is help denied. Its benefits are limited. A similar situation prevailed in Yunlin Taihsi. It escaped the typhoon, but it could not escape the southward air turbulence once the typhoon departed. It was flooded anyway.

Nothing is as urgent as disaster relief. The Executive Yuan has set up a forward command center in the south to take control of disaster relief. More importantly, disaster relief truly requires that officials feel the public's pain, Officials must not engage in the cumbersome process of processing official documents. The president can take direct command of Taipei City's pumps. The premier and even southern region relief officials can ask the Department of Defense to deploy additional manpower. Local governments must not confine themselves to begging the central government for help, or shirking their responsibilities. They are the local disaster victims' first line of defense. If they aren't, they they have betrayed the voters' trust. Natural disasters are a harsh test. People need to set aside blue vs. green partisanship. Central and local governments need to work together to see everyone through difficult times.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.08.10
社論－監察院嚴厲糾正都治不了的老問題
本報訊

莫拉克颱風來襲，夾帶台灣有史以來的最大雨量，遠遠超過半世紀前的八七水災，暴雨不歇，重創南台灣。就在莫拉克席捲台灣前夕，監察院才剛剛為去年玫基颱風造成中南部水患，一口氣糾正了十四個部會機關，從治水不力到氣象預報不準，無一不是監委檢討的對象。很遺憾，莫拉克再次證明：年年颱風年年災的情況，顯然很難改善。除了不可抗力的天候因素，還有什麼結構因素或人為疏失，讓台灣年復一年地重蹈風災之覆轍？

從監察院對卡玫基風災的糾正，做為一個檢討的基礎，監委指責中央氣象局對雨量預測不準，氣象局坦承不諱，希望能更新降雨雷達，不過，這雷達更新後，頂多「提前三個小時」知道雨量，對防災有多大作用，監委持保留態度。對比這次莫拉克颱風登陸前四十八小時，美國電視台ＣＮＮ就用頭條報導這個莫拉克可能「重創亞洲」，台灣的氣象局卻只能一路上修降雨量，當ＣＮＮ以美國氣象資料，用「嚴防洪水」字眼報導的時候，我們的相關部會還在慶幸缺水旱象緩解，就在這一夜之間，嘉義甚至從七百毫米上修到二千九百毫米，災害就這麼發生了。

要求氣象預報「精準」，真的有這麼困難嗎？事實上，氣象局除了自己的預測，包括美、日的資料同樣都可掌握，累積過去寧可謹慎不可輕忽的經驗，嚴重化風災的可能性，幾乎是氣象局和相關部會面對颱風的基本動作。

颱風災害很難完全防堵，特別是在九二一大地震之後，台灣山川風貌改變，地質結構鬆動，即使經過十年休養生息，多數重災區地質仍未恢復健康，遇大雨輕易就爆發土石流，這幾乎是台灣山區年年都要面對、卻無短期解決之道的問題。至於地方首長輕忽颱風可能的災害，災情發生時人不在國內，卻把矛頭指向氣象局預測不準，就是完全不能接受的卸責說詞。

監委也嚴厲批評中央、地方河川治理事權不統一，這個批評可以用幾個字形容：「極有見地的廢話！」極有見地，是因為監委看到了問題，說這是廢話，因為這個問題存在多年，過去還有省政府的時代，是中央、地方搶勘災，拿勘災當政績；凍廢省之後，少了一位全台趴趴走遇災民就流淚的省長，勘災沒人爭先恐後，河川治理這種吃力不討好的工作，就更無人聞問了，每年颱風造成災害，行禮如儀再拿出來談一次，談完就又束之高閣，沒人再計較要如何事權統一。

政府部門對颱風季節即將來臨，絕對不是無知無覺，相反的，就在二、三個月前，行政院長劉兆玄到地方視察，追蹤危橋改建工程進度，當時他為了一座橋沒發包，急得大發雷霆，結果，去年斷的橋未及修復，莫拉克就又摧毀了中南部好幾座重要道路橋梁。沉痛點看這個問題，台灣的過度開發，可能已經讓台灣的山川地質，面臨永難復原的劫難。

河川治理是個大問題，每個人都知道其重要性，卻沒有人有這個耐心暫緩開發。九二一之後，從重災區到輕災區，無數溫泉飯店、旅館、民宿林立，沒有人思考這樣的開發適宜與否？於是年年風災都要倒毀一幢溫泉飯店，倒了再蓋，這就是台灣「災區」的宿命嗎？山區之外，低窪區更是年年遇雨年年淹，這次災情最慘烈的林邊、佳冬簡直可說是「明星淹水區」，沒辦法，這三、四十年來，屏東地層下陷已達三點七六公尺，政府想盡改善方案，從輔導養殖轉業到最簡單的建立抽排水系統，卻緩不濟急，效果有限，有類似情況的還有雲林台西，躲過了颱風，卻躲不過颱風出海後的迴南氣流，照淹不誤。

萬事莫如救災急，行政院在南部成立前進指揮中心，掌握救災時效，更重要的，救災真得苦民所苦，別再搞繁瑣的公文流程，總統可以直接指揮調度台北市的抽水機，就像行政院長、乃至南部救災指揮官都能要求國防部加派人力。至於地方政府絕對不能只是哀哀求告或卸責控訴的角色，做為地方父母官就得在第一線安定災民之心，否則就是有負選民付託。在天災的嚴厲考驗中，台灣需要摒除藍綠，中央與地方同心，共度難關。