Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009
The impact of the Dalai Lama's visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA's pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA's pilot plan may be the key to ECFA's successful implementation.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to "support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone." Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is "total integration with Taiwan's economic resources, via a comprehensive interface." Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a "Fujian-Taiwan interface." From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.
Now let's take a look at our side's single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don't want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy "Super-WTO treatment." During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would "get more and give less." Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA's linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.
Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side "wants too much," and even it if wants only "normalization" of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region's special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO's MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against "going West." Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland's coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.
海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am
達賴效應降溫,吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA)的討論將重回檯面,中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ECFA的先行先試區域,則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示,ECFA和海西區是兩回事;但現實恐非如此,海西區與ECFA的關係不只緊密,海西區成為ECFA的試點,更可能是順利推展ECFA的關鍵之一。
海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區,以福建為主,並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分,最早於二○○四年提出,但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」,才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑,但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」,因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業,無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月,中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施,其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明,無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要,或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖,北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看,海西試點與ECFA是兩回事,可各自獨立發展。
現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ECFA。從國際經貿實務而言,ECFA是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架,終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定(FTA);果能如此,台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中,北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知;但就我方而言,ECFA若採立即對等開放市場原則,卻絕非我方所願,對台灣更是利弊參半,因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待,都是希望透過協商所達成的ECFA,在大陸享有「超WTO(世貿組織)待遇」,在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態,就讓ECFA與海西經濟區有了連結。
再一個現實的障礙是,當年兩岸加入世貿組織(WTO)的身分不同,我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家,中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家,如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ECFA,台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制,將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題;就算對方「要」的不多,只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」,我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下,ECFA與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。
海西經濟區的特區化及地區化,讓兩岸間不只可以避開WTO的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超WTO待遇期待,更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時,以此建立緩衝的地帶;亦即雙方在協商ECFA時,可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點,以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊,爭取產業調適的時間。此外,運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢,縱使無法後發先至,至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此,海西經濟區與ECFA的連結對我方是有其積極意義的,這一點,應予列入考慮。
不可諱言的是,海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的,這固然是它的潛力所在,但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制;北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察,我方自不能以此為限。此外,既是特區,我方也應以特區對應,以避免港澳化疑慮;在作法上,則應將兩岸試點列為ECFA的經濟合作項目,與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用,爭取最有利的協商結果。
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