Monday, October 5, 2009

The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions

The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 5, 2009


After being out of power for eight years, the Kuomintang has finally regained power. But it now faces a serious crisis with its political support at the local level.

The KMT lost the Miaoli County legislative by-election, and the Yunlin County legislative by-election. Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan announced her withdrawal from the election. The KMT failed to win passage of its referendum on legalized gambling in Penghu. This was only the beginning. Factional infighting soon erupted in the Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu, Nantou and Chiayi county elections. This is shaking the very foundations of the party, and its structure is in danger of collapse.

The Conventional Wisdom is that the problem is with "local factions." But that is only half the answer. Democracies throughout the world must cope with local factions. Factions can actually help political integration. They can actually help the public evaluate party performance. The real problem is factional style, quality, and image. The faction headed by Chang Jung-wei, the "King of Yunlin," is now ridiculted as "qing pu gong / zheng wan peng" (hogging everything for itself). Lin Ping-kun is the "King of Penghu." What government and business interests stand behind his investments in the gaming industry? Voters have their doubts. The Chang/Lin merger crystalizes public perceptions of the KMT's factional politics. Chang and Lin are both "non-partisan." Yet they are able to hijack the KMT. Such factions are clearly tails wagging the dog.

In 2008 the central government experienced a change in ruling parties. The main reason Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party lost power was their handling of corruption and Taiwan independence. They lost the people's trust. The KMT was presented with an opportunity to regain power. Now, however the KMT's local political machine faces a test of legitimacy. Kuang Li-chen in Taitung, Fu Kuen-chi in Hualien, Chang Yung-wei in Yunlin, and Lin Ping-kun in Penghu all represent the same problem.

Why has the KMT's local political machine broken into so many pieces? Let's compare the KMT to the DPP. One. The DPP's rise was due to national level political campaigns, to a strong, clear-cut political platform. Therefore its first and second generation political leaders have national level name recognition. They characterized themselves as "spokespersons for Taiwanese values." By contrast, the KMT central government and local government have long been two separate worlds. Local political leaders have long been concerned only with the distribution of political benefits. Almost none of them are "spokespersons for Taiwan." Almost none of them offer spiritual or ideological inspiration. They represent no political values, only the distribution of political benefits. This is one reason why the KMT finds it difficult to upgrade the quality of its local political leadership. Two. The DPP has national level political factions such as the Justice Alliance and the New Wave Faction. To a considerable extent, these national level political factions are able to moderate and control local factions. By contrast, today's KMT lacks the ideological fervor to generate political factions. The party's central leadership suppresses political factions, even as it remains incapable of restraining local factions. Three. The DPP's political factions have a training function. For example, they help city and county council members to become national legislators, their assistants to become council members, national legislators to become county executives and city mayors, and their assistants to become national legislators. Local KMT factions, on the other hand, are predominantly family enterprises that help spouses or offspring run for office, or worse, allow the family to hog everything for itself. Therefore the problem is not factions, but factional style. The public has seen Wang Yu-yun and Yu Teng-fa style factions come and go. The Chang Jung-wei and Lin Ping-kun style factions will also eventually run their course.

Take Yunlin for example. The KMT can no longer consider Chang Jung-wei its spokesperson. By the same token, Chang Yung-wei is no longer the KMT's political tool. This is not a question of who is willing to do business with whom. Society has evolved to the point where such games are no longer acceptable.

President Ma has assumed the party chairmanship. The central government is already stretched to its limits. It is in no position to deal effectively with the fragmentation of its local political machine. Chang Li-shan, Fu Kun-chi, and Kuang Li-chen are giving Ma headaches. Former Hualien and Hsinchu county executives have opposed the party's primary candidates. As we can see, the KMT Central Committee is neither able to deter local political bosses, nor inspire the party leadership to do better. Chang Jung-wei is hardly alone. Anyone can confidently declare "I no longer want to do business with the party leadership."

The KMT cannot eliminate local factions. But it should ask itself a fundamental question. Why are local DPP leaders, even low-ranking ones, afraid to criticize the mess Chen Shui-bian left behind, while simultaneously boasting that they represent "Taiwan's values?" Why can't bona fide, local KMT grass-roots leaders claim that they represent "Taiwan's values" and "Taiwan's spirit?" Why can't they extricate themselves from their quagmire? Why are they content to do nothing except distribute benefits? When the KMT handles local disputes, why can't it appeal to the voters on a higher level, and force local political bosses to back down? Why is even Chang Hui-yuan able to "campaign on behalf of his son" and hold the KMT leadership in utter contempt

Both are Taiwanese. So why are "DPP Taiwanese" more equal than "KMT Taiwanese?" This is a question for which the KMT has no answer. Even if it had an answer, it feels no urgency concerning the answer. But this is one of the most fundamental questions confronting the KMT, and one for which it must find an answer, sooner or later.

派系不是問題,問題在派系的風格
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.05 11:58 am

剛爭回喪失了八年中央執政權的國民黨,現正面臨地方根基動搖的嚴重危機。

輸掉苗栗立委補選,再輸掉雲林立委補選,雲林縣長提名候選人張麗善又宣布退選,澎湖博弈公投亦告失敗……。事情還沒完,花蓮、台東、新竹、南投及嘉義的縣長選舉皆出現分裂內訌……。根基動搖,大廈亦岌岌告危。

一般認為,問題出在「地方派系」。此說似只說對了一半。在全世界的民主政治中,地方派系皆不能免,且派系有助政治整合及政績的累積;所以,問題其實出在派系的風格、品質與形象。「雲林王」張榮味的派系,如今落得「青埔宮/整碗捧」的譏評,引起了選民的質疑;「澎湖王」林炳坤對博弈產業的投入,其背後的政商結構也使選民疑懼。而張、林二人的派系形象,可謂正是一般國人對國民黨地方派系的既成印象。何況,張、林皆是「無黨籍」,卻能挾制國民黨,可見派系已是尾大不掉。

二○○八年中央政權的政黨輪替,主要是因陳水扁的民進黨政權在貪腐失政及操作台獨上,失去了國人的信任;國民黨因而有了取而代之的機遇。現在眼前出現的問題則是:國民黨在地方政治上的正當性面臨了社會的考驗,從台東鄺麗貞、花蓮傅?萁、雲林張榮味到澎湖林炳坤,皆是同樣的課題。

為什麼國民黨的地方政治會出現這種四分五裂、捉襟見肘的現象?試與民進黨相較,探其隱微。一、民進黨崛起於全國性的政治運動,一直有強烈鮮明的政治號召,因而第一、二代的地方政治人物亦有全國性的知名度,皆以「台灣價值的代言人」自居;反觀國民黨,中央與地方幾乎一直是井水不犯河水的兩個世界,因而地方政治人物一向以利益分配為政治操作的主題,幾乎無人能在精神感召或意識形態上成為「台灣的代言人」。沒有政治號召的精神主題,只有利益分配,這是國民黨地方政治人物及地方派系難以提升的因素之一。二、民進黨內有全國性的「政治派系」(如正義連線、新潮流),相當程度地疏導及節制了「地方派系」;相對而言,國民黨的精神主題不足以分化出政治派系,黨中央亦壓制政治派系,卻無力節制地方派系。三、民進黨的「政治派系」亦有人才培訓的功能;例如:議員選上立委,助理即選議員;立委選上縣市長,助理即選立委。反觀國民黨,比較凸顯的印象是家族世襲,代夫出征、代子出征,甚至「青埔宮/全碗捧」。因而,派系不是問題,問題在於風格。王玉雲、余登發那類的派系,國人都眼看它樓起樓塌;張榮味、林炳坤之類的派系亦必有強弩之末的時候。

以雲林的例子來看,國民黨再也不能以張榮味為「代理人」,張榮味亦再也不能以國民黨為「政治工具」。這不是誰不跟誰玩的問題,而是社會發展至今日,已經不容許這樣的玩法。

馬英九總統兼黨主席,中央大局已是捉襟見肘,遑論有效處理分崩離析的地方政治。現在不只張麗善、傅?萁、鄺麗貞給他出難題,連花蓮及新竹縣也出現老縣長力挺否定初選者;可見,國民黨中央既無強人以威懾地方,又無精神號召或優異的中央政績以感召地方,何只張榮味,任何人皆可理直氣壯地宣示:「不跟黨中央玩下去!」這般情狀,如何了得?

國民黨不可能終結地方派系,但應當回頭問一個最根本的問題:為什麼民進黨的地方人物,不論什麼小蘿蔔頭,都敢不問陳水扁的爛攤子,而大言不慚地說:我代表台灣價值!而為什麼國民黨的真正草根地方人物卻不能說:我代表台灣價值,我代表台灣精神?為什麼不能從利益分配的泥淖中走出來?又為什麼國民黨在處理地方傾軋時,不能向選民訴諸一個更高遠的價值目標,使地方投機人物知難而退?以致連張輝元也敢玩「代子出征」,視黨中央如無物。

平平是台灣人,難道「國民黨的台灣人」不如「民進黨的台灣人」?這個問題很大,且現在也找不出答案,即使找出答案亦已無濟於燃眉之急。但是,這卻是一個最根本的問題,對國民黨而言,不找出答案不行。

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