The 1992 Consensus Remains Intact

The 1992 Consensus Remains IntactUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2010

Yesterday Li Yafei, deputy chairman of the Mainland China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), proclaimed a soft landing for the recent discord over the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus is a "paper window." Recently this newspaper published an editorial urging the two sides not to poke holes in this paper window. Fortunately, it appears that the paper window is still intact.

Our editorial on the 9th urged authorities on both sides to return to the 1992 Consensus. We said that the 1992 Consensus is a work in progress, that has more room for development. It is a translucent paper window that permits the passage of light, but also provides a degree of separateness. We urged the two sides not to poke holes in this paper window.

Li Yafei's latest statement made two points. One. Opposing Taiwan independence. Two. Upholding the 1992 Consensus. But Li Yafei repeatedly stressed an even more important point. He said we should "seek commonalities, not differences." In other words, we should "shelve disputes and seek common ground."

Li Yafei said that since 2008, the basis of cross-Strait mutual trust has been: One. Opposing Taiwan independence. Two. Upholding the 1992 Consensus. Actually these are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the 1992 Consensus equals opposition to Taiwan independence. On the other hand, the motive for supporting the 1992 Consensus in the first place, is opposition to Taiwan independence. The question has always been how the 1992 Consensus should be interpreted. The answer depends on how one defines "One China." For Li Yafei the 1992 Consensus means that "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have agreed to express their different interpretations of the One China Principle orally."

Newspapers in Taipei however published two different versions of his talk. One version was mentioned above. Another version appeared in the media that hosted his talk. Li Yafei supposedly said "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait agree to express their different interpretations of One China orally." One version says the "One China Principle." The other says "One China." The "One China Principle" has been proven correct.

One China and the One China Principle are not the same. Beijing's current expression, the "One China Principle," is broader. It sees "One China" as a deeper concept that can be further developed. In the past Beijing spoke only of One China, which had a narrower meaning. But no matter how the two sides interpret One China, the concept of One China has become a work in progress. It is no longer a rigid concept, but rather a fact that all can see. It is also the central pillar of cross-Strait "peaceful development."

In the "three old catchphrases," One China was narrowly defined to mean "There is only one China. Taiwan is a part of China. The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China." Today however, One China has evolved. Today Beijing speaks of "the two sides have yet to be reunified, but they are nevertheless part of One China." "Maintaining the status quo means maintaining the status of existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." "Both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of One China," "A in-progress style One China." "Contemplating the status of the Republic of China." As we can see, One China is a work in progress. It is more akin to the One China Principle, rather than the arbitrary and rigid One China of yesteryear.

Li Yafei stressed "seeking commonalities, not differences," and "shelving disputes, seeking common ground." Based on this premise, and separated by the paper window of the 1992 Consensus, Beijing speaks of "One China, different interpretations," while Taipei speaks of "different interpretations of One China." "One China, different interpretations" is subsumed under the One China Principle. "Different interpretations of One China" is also subsumed under the One China Principle. As long as the two sides "seek commonalities, not differences," this translucent paper window will allow in light while remaining intact.

Examine Li Yafei's statement under a magnifying glass. What Li Yafei said was that Beijing's interpretation of the 1992 Consensus was "different interpetations of One China." But Li said it allowed room to "seek commonalities, not differences." Taipei's interpretation of the 1992 Consensus remains "One China, different interpretations." Li Yafei may have pressed against the paper window with his finger, but he did not poke any holes in it.

For the past two decades, Taiwan has been immersed in a certain manipulative political atmosphere, one predicated upon the notion that "Taiwan independence equals love for Taiwan," that "subverting the Republic of China equals love for Taiwan." This notion argues that "not to be annexed and reunified by China equals love for Taiwan." Society on Taiwan has a severe "China Complex." One could say we have been seeking a cure for a disease that has bedeviled Taiwan for the past 60 years. Therefore, before Beijing can talk about the One China Principle, it must first forsake its "decapitation principle," which calls for the decapitation of the Republic of China. Only then can we gradually change the minds of an obdurate but influential minority calling for the "recapitation" of the Republic of China by changing it to a Republic of Taiwan. Beijing must realize that without the Republic of China, the One China Principle will lose its backing.

Allow us to once again quote this newspaper's editorial of the 7th, entitled "The One China Principle: The Undeniable Republic of China." The key to the One China Principle is how the public on Taiwan "feels about China." One may wish to consider this newspaper's "Newest Three Catchphrases." "There is only one China. The ROC and the PRC are both part of China, China's territory and sovereignty are indivisible."

What is this, if not "different expressions of One China" plus "One China, different expressions," both taken from the 1992 Consensus?

沒有捅破九二共識那扇紙窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.13 02:59 am

大陸海協會副會長李亞飛日昨對「九二共識」的談話，形同使得近日兩岸當局的一段齟齬軟著陸；本報社論在事前期待雙方不要捅破「九二共識」那扇紙窗，還好現在那層窗戶紙也未戳破。

九日社論說：兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。……「九二共識」是仍在發展及仍可發展的概念，這扇紙窗既有透光之效又有隔離之功，雙方都不要捅破了這一層朦朧的窗戶紙。

李亞飛的最新論述，一般指出，有兩個焦點。一、反對台獨；二、堅持九二共識。但我們認為，尚有一個更重要的焦點是，李亞飛幾度強調：「要求同／不挑異」、亦即「擱置爭議／求同存異」。

李亞飛說，二○○八年以來，兩岸的互信基礎是：一、反對台獨；二、堅持九二共識。其實，這兩個觀點是一體兩面：一方面，九二共識就是反台獨；另一方面，因反台獨所以認可九二共識。問題仍在如何解讀九二共識，關鍵則在如何定義「一個中國」。李亞飛對九二共識的解讀是：九二共識，就是「各自以口頭方式，表述海峽兩岸一個中國原則」的共識。

台北的報紙對這段關鍵談話竟出現兩種版本。一種版本已如上述，另一種版本出自主辦演說的媒體，則稱李亞飛說的是：「各自以口頭方式表述一個中國的共識。」兩者對比，少了「原則」二字。經查證，「一個中國原則」才是正確版本。

「一個中國」和「一個中國原則」，是不一樣的。北京現在說「一個中國原則」，外延較大，可視「一個中國」為一包羅涵泳的、可待發展的概念；但北京過去只說「一個中國」，則內涵較窄，排他性較大。不過，無論兩岸各自就「一個中國」如何分別闡釋，「一個中國」已然成為一個「發展性概念」，而不再是「僵固性概念」，當是有目共睹的事實，這也是兩岸得以「和平發展」的最重要支柱。

比如說，「一個中國」在「老三句」中被固化成：「世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分，中華人民共和國是代表中國的唯一合法政府」。然而，今日歷經發展演化後的「一個中國」卻是：「兩岸尚未統一／仍是一個中國」、「維持現狀就是維持見之於台灣現行規定及文件的現狀」、「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」、「現在進行式的一個中國」、「思考中華民國的定位問題」等等……。可見，「一個中國」已是一個發展性的概念，比較近似「一個中國原則」，而不再是對「一個中國」給予武斷的僵固的定義。

所以，李亞飛談話的重點是：「要求同／不挑異」、「擱置爭議／求同存異」。在這個前提下，隔著「九二共識」這一扇紙窗，北京「各表一中」，台北「一中各表」；「各表一中」在「一中原則」之內，「一中各表」也在「一中原則」之內。只要雙方「要求同／不挑異」，這一層朦朧的窗戶紙就能透光但不戳破。

若用放大鏡來看，李亞飛是在強調北京對「九二共識」的詮釋為「各表一中」；但是，也同時維持了「求同存異」的空間，所以台北對「九二共識」的詮釋仍是「一中各表」。倘係如此，李亞飛的談話，即使像是在紙窗上用手指沾了一點唾沫，但畢竟並未戳破。

二十年來，台灣始終有一股人為操作的政治氛圍，認為「台獨等於愛台灣」、「顛覆中華民國就是愛台灣」，其根源則皆來自「不被中國併吞統一就是愛台灣」。台灣社會的「中國感情」傷得如此深重，可謂是六十年之疾而求百年之艾；因此，若要談「一個中國原則」，北京首應改變其「砍頭論」（砍中華民國的頭），始有可能逐漸改變台灣社會中雖非占多數卻極端頑強且頗具政治輻輳效應的「換頭論」；應知，若無中華民國，「一個中國原則」即失依託。

再借用本報七日社論〈一中原則：不可否認中華民國〉一文的結語：「一中原則」的關鍵在台灣人民的「中國感情」，何妨再思考本報提出的「新新三句」：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的領土與主權不可分割。」

其實，這不正是九二共識的「各表一中」加「一中各表」？