Do Not Poke Holes in the 1992 Consensus

Do Not Poke Holes in the 1992 ConsensusUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 9, 2010

A disagreement may be brewing between Taipei and Beijing. Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Lai Hsing-yuan made a number of remarks on cross-Strait relations during her recent visit to Washington, that according to reports, raised grave concerns in Beijing. A stern response reflecting Beijing's views on the matter cannot be ruled out. Lai Hsing-yuan's "flight to Los Angeles was cancelled" ostensibly "due to mechanical problems," and she is returning to Taipei ahead of schedule.

We would like say a few words before Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office holds its weekly press conference. We hope this incident will not damage relations between the two sides.

A second disagreement has also been brewing. Mainland China Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said that as long as the two sides abide by the One China Principle, issues such as the withdrawal of missiles and the redeployment of troops are all open to discussion. ROC Presidential Office Spokesman Luo Chi-chiang responded. He said that of Mainaland China is willing to abide by the 1992 Consensus, and relocates its missiles on its own initiative, the public on Taiwan would surely express approval. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou wrote a draft of his speech for the provisional plenary session. It too including mention of the 1992 Consensus, and called on Beijing to take the initiative to withdraw its missiles. But during his oral presentation, he skipped over them.

Over the past few days, comments issued by Hong Kong's Phoenix Satellite TV have pointed out that Taipei refers only to the "1992 Consensus" and avoids reference to "One China." Phoenix TV said that is why Ma Ying-jeou's conception of the 1992 Consensus "is probably not our conception of One China." The day before yesterday, ARATS President Chen Yunlin noted during a Xinhua News interview that cross-Strait relations are currently good, and "must be cherished and treated with care." The same remark has been repeated a number of times by different individuals. Chen added that some degree of instability and uncertainty still plagues cross-Strait relations. "Taiwan independence secessionist forces" continue to obstruct and undermine cross-Strait peace. It is generally believed that the Taiwan Affairs Office weekly press conference will deal with this topic.

We believe authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus . For Beijing, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Uphold the One China Principle, but refrain from politically defining "One China." For Taipei, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on "One China," but the two sides differ in their definition of "One China." In other words, Beijing says "Different Interpretations of One China." Taipei says "One China with Different Interpretations."

Su Chi, the creator of the "1992 Consensus" said 'When [I] invented the term "1992 Consensus," I was attempting to avoid the words "One China."' In other words the 1992 Consensus was a synonym for "One China." The only difference is that the two sides have different definitions of One China. When Beijing uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Taipei does not object. When Taipei uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Different Interpretations, Beijing has yet to make on open objection. Because the 1992 Consensus has so many different meanings, the two sides have been able to ensure "peaceful development" and a "favorable overall picture."

Assuming the above understanding is correct, Lo Chi-chang and Geng Yansheng may have misunderstood each other. Geng Yansheng spoke of the One China Principle. Lo Chi-chiang responded with the 1992 Consensus. This implies that the 1992 Consensus and One China are mutually exclusive, mutually hostile concepts. This was Phoenix TV's understanding. But the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not repudiate the principle of One China. It merely allows for Different Interpretations. Because the Ma government is not on the path to Taiwan independence, it must uphold One China, Different Interpretations. Ma's "no unification / no independence / no war" policies all fall within the framework of One China, Different Interpretations. Absent this strategic framework, one has no ground to stand on.

Let us return to Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks. Lai provoked two controversies. First, she called for the Mainland "to forsake the use of force against Taiwan, both in terms of thinking and in terms of law." Second, she said "the world needs Taiwan as a key... by which to influence the Chinese Mainland." Actually, as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman, Lai Hsing-yuan's second remark was redundant. In fact, if Taipei can contribute to the maintainance of "peaceful development" between Taiwan and Mainland China, that would be its greatest contribution to the world. Lai Hsing-yuan's first remark was an unintentional blunder. Beijing directed its Anti-Secession Law against "de jure Taiwan independence." When the Mainland Affairs Council makes such a comment, it is likely to make Beijing extremely suspicious.

The public has probably noticed that with the five cities elections approaching, the Ma administration's public remarks have also become increasingly pointed. For example, it denounced the Democratic Progressive Party for deceiving and harming the nation. It said that the DPP's "opposition to ECFA amounted to opposition to the people." Similarly, Lo Chi-chiang's response to Geng Yansheng, as well as Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks during her visit to the US, may have been efforts to shrug off the label of "cozying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But Lo and Lai must not unwittingly sacrifice one thing for another. They must not stretch matters beyond the breaking point.

The authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China Principle. Taipei likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations. It is precisely this ambiguity that has allowed "peaceful development," a major achievement.

The 1992 Consensus is a concept still in development, and still amenable to development. It is a paper window that lets in light but also separates. Neither side should poke holes in this translucent paper window.

不要捅破「九二共識」這扇紙窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.09


兩岸當局的一場齟齬可能正在發展之中。據報導，陸委會主委賴幸媛訪美對兩岸關係的公開談話，引起中共方面的嚴重關切，不排除在近日藉適當時機嚴肅回應，表達大陸方面的看法。賴幸媛因「飛洛杉磯班機故障」，已提前返國。

我們願在北京國台辦本周記者會之前，先說幾句話，希望雙方不要擦槍走火，壞了大局。

另一個同時發展的事件是：中國大陸國防部發言人耿雁生稱，只要堅持「一個中國原則」，撤飛彈、軍事部署等皆可進行討論；我總統府發言人羅智強回應：如果中國大陸願意在「九二共識」的基礎上，主動撤除飛彈，將會得到台灣人民的肯定。原本，馬英九主席接著在國民黨臨全會的書面講稿中，也有「九二共識下，對岸主動撤飛彈」等語，但在口頭演說時，卻略過未說。

也就在前幾天，香港鳳凰衛視的兩岸評論指出：台灣方面只談「九二共識」，卻迴避「一個中國」；所以，馬英九主張的「九二共識」，「很可能不是我們想像的一個中國」。前天，大陸海協會會長陳雲林又接受新華社專訪說：兩岸目前關係，值得「倍加珍惜、善加呵護」（這類用語，最近數日在不同的人口中頻見）；又稱：兩岸關係仍存在一些不穩定、不確定的因素，「台獨分裂勢力」不斷阻撓和破壞兩岸和平發展的大好局面。一般認為，本周國台辦記者會仍會處理此一話題。

我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。「九二共識」的原始意義，對北京來說是：「堅持一個中國原則，不討論『一個中國』的政治涵意。」對台北而言則是：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵意有所不同。」換句話說，就是北京「各表一中」，台北「一中各表」。

「九二共識」的創製者蘇起說：「（我）創造『九二共識』這個新名詞，企圖避免『一個中國』四個字。」也就是說，「九二共識」對兩岸而言，其實皆是「一個中國」的替代語，只是雙方對「一個中國」的意涵有不同的認知。一方面，北京以「九二共識」主張「一個中國原則」，台北可以理解；另一方面，台北藉「九二共識」表達「一中各表」，北京也迄未正面否定。正因「九二共識」四字有這種「求同存異」的包羅涵泳的功能，兩岸始能維持目前這個「和平發展」的「大好局面」。

倘若以上的理解無誤，我們認為羅智強與耿雁生的對話也許稍有閃失。耿雁生說「一個中國原則」，羅智強回以「九二共識」；如此一來，「九二共識」彷彿是「一個中國」的排斥詞或敵對詞（這正是鳳凰衛視的觀點）。但是，「九二共識／一中各表」並未否定「一中」，只是爭取「各表」的空間。馬政府若不走台獨路線，即必須持守「一中各表」；不論是「不統／不獨／不武」，皆是建構在「一中各表」的架構上。這是一種戰略的選擇，失此即無以立足。

再論賴幸媛的發言。引起議論者有二：一是呼籲大陸「放棄對台用武的思維及法律」，一是談到「世界各國需要台灣此一關鍵樞紐……以便發揮對中國大陸的影響力」。身為陸委會主委，賴幸媛的後一段話說得有一點贅餘，其實只消點出台灣若能維持與中國大陸的「和平發展」，就是對世界最大的貢獻即可；前一段話則說得有一點凸槌，北京自認「反分裂國家法」是針對「法理台獨」而發，陸委會主委作此評論，會使北京作出猜疑的解讀。

國人應已感覺到，隨著五都選舉迫近，馬政府的發言也越來越趨麻辣。例如，痛斥民進黨誤國害國，又稱「反對ＥＣＦＡ，就是與人民為敵」；同理，羅智強回應耿雁生，與賴幸媛的訪美發言，也可能是想摘掉「親中賣台」的帽子。但是，萬勿顧此失彼，捉襟見肘。

我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。北京傾向「九二共識／一中原則」，台北傾向「九二共識／一中各表」；正因此種「求同存異」的架構，推進了「和平發展」的重大成就。

「九二共識」是仍在發展及仍可發展的概念，這扇紙窗既有透光之效又有隔離之功，雙方都不要捅破了這一層朦朧的窗戶紙。