Conditions and Timing for a Ma/Hu Summit

Conditions and Timing for a Ma/Hu Summit
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2010

Do we want a "Ma/Hu Summit?" If so, when would it be held? Consider last weekend's controversy over the Tokyo Film Festival, and the answers to these questions should be clear.

In response to talk of a Ma/Hu Summit, President Ma said, "If we fail to do our homework, it would be better not to have a summit at all." Premier Wu Den-yih said, "The conditions have not been met, and the timing is not right." Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Let nature take its course. When the time is ripe, things will happen of their own accord."

In our opinion the real obstacle to a Ma/Hu Summit is the inability of the two sides to define their political status in a pragmatic and equitable manner. In other words, in what capacity should Ma and Hu, or any other future cross-Strait heads of state meet? Surely they cannot meet as "Mr. Ma" and "Mr. Hu." Nor can they meet in their capacity as "KMT Chairman" and "Communist Party General Secretary." Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung have already done that. The expressions, "the leader of Taiwan" and "the leader of the Mainland" were coined by the Mainland media. They are not titles specified in the Constitution of the ROC and the Constitution of the PRC. Therefore, as long as we cannot refer to things by their proper names, we will inevitably find it difficult to get things done.

A Ma/Hu Summit is difficult not merely because Ma and Hu have been unable to reach an agreement regarding their political status as individuals. It is difficult due to other issues related to political identity, including "Taiwan vs. the Mainland," or "the Republic of China vs. the Peoples Republic of China." The Tokyo International Film Festival issue is the Ma/Hu Summit issue. When Chen Yunlin met Ma Ying-jeou, he could only address Ma as "you." If Ma and Hu meet under the same circumstances, why bother? How could they meet in the first place? How the two sides address each other may appear to be a superficial matter. In fact it encapsulates one of the most fundamental problems in cross-Strait relations. It is not merely a matter of nomenclature, but a matter of substance.

If cross-Strait relations are to reach new heights, the two heads of state must meet. People are well aware that significant progress has been made in cross-Strait relations, for example, with ECFA. But the Big Picture remains deadlocked over the issue of political identity, with no way out. A solution will require policy goals and conscious planning. One cannot simply "Let nature take its course" in the hope that "When the time is ripe, things will happen of their own accord." Even the Tokyo Film Festival ended in deadlock. One can only imagine what might happen with a Ma/Hu Summit.

We need "liberation of thinking" and "policy innovation." For example, Beijing says the cross-Strait status quo is the legacy of civil war. It has used this as a basis for the "One China Principle." It agrees that the civil war led to "divided rule within the same nation." In this case, perhaps we can use the "legacy of civil war" premise to establish a political framework for cross-Strait relations. It is difficult to imagine the President of the Republic of China meeting with the President of the Peoples Republic of China as "Taiwan's leader." Unless this obstacle can be overcome, it really would be better not to meet at all.

In the event a Ma/Hu Summit is held, Ma Ying-jeou says he has no problem addressing Hu Jintao as "Chairman Hu." The question is whether Hu Jintao would have a problem addressing Ma Ying-jeou as "President Ma." A deeper problem is whether the two sides can find a way to adhere to the "One China Principle" even as Ma and Hu address each other as "Chairman Hu" and "President Ma." This is why we have repeatedly called for the two sides to seek a solution through an "in progress form of One China." Such thinking is hardly unreasonable. After all, East and West Germany, South and North Vietnam in the past, and South and North Korea in the present, never referred to each other as "German Berlin," i.e., "Chinese Taipei." They referred to each other as "President Kim" rather than "the leader of Taiwan." Yet they were able to adhere to a One Germany, One Vietnam, or One Korea principle. Why shouldn't the two sides of the Taiwan Strait be able to do the same?

The Hu/Wen regime is already preparing for the transfer of power. The transfer of power includes two important items. First, political reforms. Second, cross-Strait issues. First, allow us to address the former. In terms of reform and liberalization, Hu and Wen's achievements have been brillant. Add to them the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Expo, and Hu and Wen's historical legacy is assured. But on the eve of the handover, Wen Jiabao seems unwilling to remain silent. He has loudly called for "political reform." Apparently Hu and Wen are deeply aware of the risks that loom, and are concerned about their successors. That is why they have spoken so bluntly. They are paving the way for future generations of political reformers. After all, these things are better broached by Hu and Wen, rather than left for future generations. In fact, Hu and Wen could do the same with cross-Strait policy.

Hu and Wen's policy of "peaceful development" coincides with the rare opportunity presented by Ma Ying-jeou's election as president in 2008. This has made cross-Strait relations the best they have been in 60 years. This can be considered an achievement of the Hu/Wen regime. However no significant progress has been made in establishing an "in progress form of One China" or defining the two sides' political status. Hu and Wen are about to consolidate their historical legacy. If at this moment they could make a major breakthrough regarding the status of the Republic of China, they would clear the way for cross-Strait relations in a hundred different ways. That would be the finest legacy they could leave their successors.

If that is possible, then the preconditions for a Ma/Hu Summit will have been met.

馬胡會的因緣與時機
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.25

要不要「馬胡會」？什麼時候「馬胡會」？但看上周末東京影展的爭議，即知癥結何在。

回應「馬胡會」的議論，馬總統說：「如果沒有把這些工作做好……相見不如不見。」閣揆吳敦義說：「因緣未到，時機不宜。」北京國台辦主任王毅則說：「順其自然，水到渠成。」

我們認為，阻擋「馬胡會」的真正障礙，仍在兩岸未能建立一個務實而對等的「身分架構」；也就是說，馬胡二人（或未來任何兩岸元首），該以什麼身分見面？總不能以「馬先生」及「胡先生」的身分見面吧？也不宜用「國民黨主席」及「中共總書記」的身分見面，因為連戰及吳伯雄皆已做到；至於若用「台灣領導人」及「大陸領導人」的身分見面，那是大陸媒體使用的名詞，但不是中華民國憲法及中華人民共和國憲法上規定的職銜，所以也是名不正，言不順，因而恐怕見不成。

「馬胡會」所反映的兩岸「身分架構」的障礙，不止涉及了馬胡二人的身分對等問題，其實也是反映了「台灣／大陸」或「中華民國／中華人民共和國」之間的身分對等問題。「東京影展」的問題，就是「馬胡會」的問題。試想，倘若馬胡相會，卻如陳雲林見馬英九，居然詞窮以「您」相稱；則何必會面？又豈能會面？雙方的身分稱謂，看似是最表層的問題，卻是一個總結兩岸關係總體架構最深層的問題。也就是說，這其實不只是一個名目上的問題，而是一個牽涉實質的問題。

如果兩岸關係要更上層樓，一定要經歷雙方元首會面的歷程；然而，眾所皆知的是，兩岸關係在下位領域已經大有進展（如ＥＣＦＡ），但大局大勢卻卡在上位的「身分架構」仍然覓無出路。這方面倘不在政策上加以有目標、有意識地規劃引導，似無可能只靠「順其自然，水到渠成」，就能期待出現「因緣已成，時宜已至」的機遇。連東京影展都鬧僵，遑論馬胡會？

也就是說，在這方面須有「思想解放」及「政策創新」。比如說，北京既以兩岸現狀為內戰的遺留，並以此作為「一個中國原則」的解釋基準，則即應接受內戰所形成的「分治而不分裂」的現今情勢，如此或許即能以「內戰遺留」的理論，建立兩岸對等的「身分架構」。我們不易想像，「台灣的領導人」有可能以「中華民國總統」以外的身分與「中華人民共和國主席」會面。這個結若不打開，那就真是「相見不如不見」。

如果「馬胡會」，馬英九稱胡錦濤為「胡主席」的問題不大，問題是在胡錦濤是否稱馬英九為「馬總統」。深一層的問題在於：雙方能否找出一個方法，在馬胡以「主席／總統」互稱時，仍然可以固守「一個中國原則」。這也是我們一再呼籲，應當在「現在進行式的一個中國」找出路的原因。這樣的思考，其實一點也不突兀；因為，過去東西德、南北越及現在的南北韓，皆未曾稱對方是「德意志柏林」（中華台北？），而是稱對方「金大中總統」（台灣領導人？），但亦能維持「一個德國／一個越南／一個韓國」的原則，為何兩岸就不可？

胡溫體制已經進入準備交班的階段，最重要的交接項目有二：一、政治體制改革；二、兩岸問題。先言前者，就改革開放言，胡溫的成就可謂是相當輝煌的，加上京奧及上海世博兩場世紀盛會，皆為胡溫的歷史地位加分；但是，在交接前夕，溫家寶似乎不想持盈保泰，而強烈鼓吹「政治體制改革」，此應視為胡溫深知操危慮患，為後繼者憂，所以想說幾句重話，為後人的政治改革預作鋪墊。畢竟由胡溫先說，好過留給後人說。其實，在兩岸政策上，胡溫亦可作同樣思考。

胡溫的「和平發展」政策，準確呼應千載難逢的「零八機遇」（馬英九當選總統），使兩岸關係臻至六十年來的最佳境界，這可謂是胡溫體制的成績。但是，在如何營造「現在進行式的一個中國」，及發展兩岸對等「身分架構」上，仍無重大進展。其實，在胡溫準備向歷史交卷之際，若能對「中華民國的定位問題」作出重大突破，將可促成兩岸關係一脈通百脈通，這也是贈予後繼者的最佳禮物。

倘能如此，馬胡會的因緣就到了。