Democracy and Foreign Relations will Test the Next Generation of Mainland Leaders

Democracy and Foreign Relations will Test the Next Generation of Mainland Leaders
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2010

On the 19th of this month, during the Fifth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping was elected Vice President of the Central Military Commission. This move confirmed his status as one of the next generation leaders of the CCP. Less than two weeks apart, both North Korea and Mainland China held elections, confirming successors for Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Neither government has an arrangement western governments would term democratic. But Mainland China has created its own unique system of elections. North Korea on the other hand, is entirely subject to the rule of men.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Eun, who is not even 30, has been made Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His sole qualification is that he is the grandson of Kim Il Sung, and the son of Kim Jong Il. Xi Jinping meanwhile, was not made a fifth-generation successor solely because his father Xi Zhongxun was a Communist Party elder. He is a seasoned veteran who has held both party and government positions. He is currently the leader most able to ensure a consensus within the Chinese Communist Party.

More importantly, the system of succession on Mainland China is predictable in nature. For example, the 70 year age limit for membership of the Politburo Standing Committee has become an iron law. The same is true of the system of succession. When Xi Jinping was made Vice President during the 17th Party Congress, everyone expected him to gradually assume control over both the party and the government. Now that he has been made Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he is following in the footsteps of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Because the system is predictable, the political situation should remain stable. This differs from North Korea. Kim Jong Eun may be the designated successor. But no one can predict when Kim Jong Il will die, and what sort of chaos might ensue. Mainland China has freed itself from such a chaotic fate. It may lack democratic institutions. But it has this political model unique to Mainland China.

Xi Jinping has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. We cannot ignore another question. Hu Jintao is still Chairman of the Central Military Commission. How long will he retain that position? Will he resign during the 18th Party Congress? Speculation is rife. But most likely he will remain Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

We are only two years away from the 8th Party Congress. Xi Jinping will then assume the role of General Secretary and State President. That much is known. But with only two years of experience in the Central Military Commission, the Vice Chairman will need to "be helped onto his horse, and accompanied part of the way." In the past Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin retained their positions as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. They continued to influence the Central Military Commission. Hu Jintao is not "retiring completely." There is a precedent for this as well.

Nevertheless, after the 18th Party Congress, fifth generation leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will be the successors. They will take over the reigns of government from fourth generation leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. They will face new challenges. Some of these challenges will be domestic, some foreign.

Committment to ongoing reform and liberalization is no longer in question. During the Hu and Wen era, a minority still had doubts. But today the entire party, the entire nation has reached a consensus. They disagree only about execution. Take the "ten two five plan" adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session. Some people still disagree about the future ratio of state-owned enterprises vs. private enterprises.

We must point out that the fifth generation leaders' real challenge comes from freedom and democracy. When Jiang Zemin passed the baton on to Hu Jintao, the only stipulation was "never reverse the verdict on the June 4 Tiananmen Incident." Now however, the situation is much more complicated. Liu Xiaopo has won the Nobel Peace Prize. That is merely one of many indicators. Others include grievances over the gap between rich and poor and uneven regional development. Wen Jiabao's repeated talks on democracy reflect differences in thinking within the party. Also, modern means of mobilization and communication could allow the situation to quickly spin out of control.

No consensus has been reached within the party regarding the development of democracy. The same is true of foreign policy, the currency war, territorial sovereignty, and maritime disputes. Mainland China wants a peaceful rise. But this is no easy task. In the face of so many international challenges directed at Mainland China, should it continue keeping a low profile, or should it stand up and speak out? Should it not be afraid of war, and engage in tit for tat with the world's great powers? The fourth generation leaders did not need to make such decisions. But the fifth generation leaders will not be able to avoid confronting these challenges.

Regarding cross-Strait relations, some are pinning their hopes on Xi Jinping. Xi worked for many years in Fujian. He has many Taiwanese friends. He has feelings for Taiwan. Therefore his Taiwan policy may involve new thinking.

Naturally we hope the new generation of Mainland Chinese leaders will have a good understanding of Taiwan. We hope they will have a first-hand grasp of the situation. But Mainland China's institutionalized system of succession means the institutionalization of decision-making. Major decisions will be made collectively. Taiwan policy will be no exception.

Past CCP leaders had absolute authority. "One word from Mao Zedong was the same as ten thousand." But with successive generations, the authority of individual leaders has diminished. Cross-Strait policy makers on Taiwan have focused their attention on Xi Jinping's personal character and leadership style. Instead, they should attempt to understand the background of the fifth generation leaders as a whole.

In particular, they must not overlook the role President Hu Jintao will play after stepping down. During Hu's final days in power, he will want to leave a legacy. That will be a driving force in cross-Strait relations.

民主、外交 考驗中共下一代接班人
2010-10-20
中國時報

中共十七屆五中全會十九日增補習近平為中央軍事委員會副主席，確認了他作為下一代中共權力核心領導人；相隔不到兩周，北韓與中國分別選出中央軍委會副主席，確定了接班人，雖然兩個國家的安排，不是西方所熟知的民主選舉，但是中國已經形成了自己獨特的制度，反觀北韓還是人治。

在北韓，不到三十歲的金正恩能夠擔任軍委會副主席，唯一的資格，就是因為他是金日成的孫子、金正日的兒子。但是習近平之所以成為第五代接班人，不僅僅是因為他的父親習仲勛是中共元老，更重要的是他歷經過黨、政要職，是考驗過的人選，也是此刻最能凝聚中國共產黨統治共識的領導人。

更重要的是，中國的這套接班制度是有可預期性的，就像政治局常委限齡七十歲，已經成了鐵律，接班也有類似的原則，從習近平在十七大擔任國家副主席之後，大家就期待他會逐步接掌黨權與政權，現在出任軍委會副主席，也是仿效過去江澤民與胡錦濤逐步接班的先例。

我們認為，就是因為制度有可預期性，政局得以穩定；不像北韓，即使安排了金正恩接班，沒有人能夠預測金正日一旦過世，北韓會出現怎樣的亂局。而中國卻已經擺脫了這樣的混亂宿命，雖然這未必是民主體制，卻是中國特有的政治模式。

然而在習近平出任中央軍委會副主席的同時，我們不能忽略另一面：胡錦濤仍然擔任軍委會主席；究竟他會當多久？是否會在十八大時也一併辭去？目前各方揣測很多，但以留任軍委主席的可能性最大。

由於距離十八大僅有兩年時間，習近平屆時接下總書記與國家主席的頭銜，當是確定。但是軍委副主席的歷練僅兩年，還需要「扶上馬、送一程」；過去鄧小平、江澤民都曾經留任軍委主席，也都曾以軍委主席的身分繼續發揮影響力；胡錦濤不「裸退」，是有前例可援的。

但無論如何，十八大之後，習近平與李克強等第五代，將成為接班人。他們接過了胡錦濤與溫家寶等第四代交予的權力，同時也將面臨新的挑戰。這些挑戰有些來是內部，有些來自外部。

持續堅定的改革開放，已經不成問題。在胡溫的時代，還有少數人質疑；現在全黨、全國上下都有共識。唯一差別僅在執行方式，譬如五中全會所通過的《十二五規畫》，就還有人爭論未來國營與民營企業孰輕孰重等。

但是我們必須指出，第五代領導人的內部真正挑戰，卻來自對自由與民主的要求。在江澤民交棒給胡錦濤時，僅要求對六四「永不翻案」，但現在情況複雜的太多。劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎，僅僅是表徵之一；社會對貧富差距的怨氣，發展所造成的地區不均衡，溫家寶的幾次關於民主講話，反映了黨內有不同思考；再加上，動員與傳播工具的多元與現代化，都更讓情況可能快速失控。

黨內除了對民主發展，未建立共識，對於外交政策，也步調不一。從貨幣戰爭，到領土領海主權爭議，中國要和平崛起，並不是件容易的事；面臨這麼多的衝著中國來的國際挑戰，是繼續韜光養晦，不強出頭？還是不畏戰、不懼戰，與世界強權針鋒相對？第四代領導人不須作決定，但第五代領導人卻無可迴避這個挑戰。

對於兩岸關係來說，有人寄希望於習近平，認為他曾經在福建工作多年，認識許多台灣朋友，對台灣是有感情的，因此對台政策會有新的思路。

我們當然期望，新一代中國領導人對台灣問題有善意的了解、有第一手的掌握。但是中國制度化的接班，意味著決策體制的制度化，主要決策會出自政治局集體的決定，對台政策自不例外。

過去的中共領導人有絕高的權威，毛澤東「說一句、頂萬句」，但是隨著領導人世代交替，個人權威色彩也逐漸褪去。台灣的兩岸決策人士，與其專注在習近平的個人特質與領導風格，不如從整體第五代出身背景來了解。

尤其不能忽略胡錦濤在卸下國家主席後，所扮演的角色；胡在最後當政時間，希望能夠留下歷史遺產，將會是推動兩岸關係的重要動力。