Just What Are James Soong's Intentions?

Just What Are James Soong's Intentions?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2010

James Soong has thrown his support behind Yang Chiu-hsing. He is attempting to persuade voters to "dump Huang to save Yang." He either wants to split the Blue Camp, or to ensure that Yang is elected.

But given the bigger picture, such tactics may not guarantee Yang Chiu-hsing's victory. The move has already led to a complete break between Ma and Soong, and may ensure that Chen Chu is elected.

The reasons are simple. James Soong's move will leave the KMT with even less room to maneuver. Now all the KMT can do, is limit the damage James Soong has inflicted upon the Blue Camp. Soong has clearly made his play. His is attempting to "dump Huang to save Yang" in Kaohsiuing. He has blasted Hau Lung-ping for "failure to make Taipei look like a national capital." Soong has already precipitated a complete schism. This forces the KMT to back Huang Chao-shun in Kaohsiung to the bitter end. The KMT now has no choice but to prevent the "James Soong factor" from spreading to Taipei and Xinbei City. If the situation persists, if both Huang and Yang remain in the race to the very end, if both manage to retain over 10% of their diehard supporters, then Huang Chao-hsun stands no chance of getting elected. James Soong's attempt to ensure that Yang gets elected will fail. Therefore James Soong's move is really intended to split the Blue Camp. His attempt to get Yang elected is merely a pretext

The real problem is that Blue Camp voters no longer have the same opinion of James Soong they once did. Any attempt to promote a "dump/save effect" in Kaohsiung hinges on Pan Blue voters' desire to bring down Chen Chu. But this collective desire rests on the premise of "Blue Camp solidarity." James Soong's attempt to exploit this "dump/save effect" involves flagrant attempts to discredit Ma and Hao. These may be unacceptable to most Blue Camp voters. Therefore Soong's attempt to play the "dump/save card" may on the one hand incite "defeat Chen Chu above all else" sentiment among Blue Camp voters. They may intensify support for Yang Chiu-hsing. They may on the other hand may provoke intense Blue Camp voter anger against James Soong, and persuade them to support Huang to the bitter end. Another possibility is that such offensive tactics may alienate them so badly they boycott the election altogether. These are all reasons why Soong's attempt to persuade voters to "dump Huang to save Yang" may not succeed.

With this "shot in the arm," Yang Chiu-hsing may have overplayed his hand. He has forced the KMT's hand. Now there is no turning back. The KMT must now fight him to the end. Yang's move will inevitably provoke a backlash. It will inevitably incite Blue Camp anger against a common enemy. Also, the Chen Chu camp, seeing Soong and Yang come together, is bound to point to this move and attempt to dissuade Green Camp voters from dumping Chen Chu to save Yang. This will reduce Yang's final vote count. Therefore, once the dust settles, Yang Chiu-hsing may find that his piece of the pie has actually shrunk. The Blue Camp initially had a chance to play the "dump/save card" in the Greater Kaohsiung election. But James Soong's move has mired the Blue Camp in a deadlock.

This is not the first time James Soong has sprung such a surprise. His February 24, 2005 "Bian/Soong meeting" was a classic case. The purpose of the "Bian/Soong meeting" was to "dump the KMT to save the PFP." Soong's methods have not changed. First, he wanted to split the Blue Camp. Secondly, he wanted the People First Party and Chen Shui-bian to agree to "DPP/PFP co-rule." Eventually the "Bian/Soong meeting" led to James Soong's downfall. Why? Because voters disapproved of James Soong's attempt to "sell out the Blue Camp for selfish gain." Even People First Party legislators were troubled. James Soong overestimated his personal charm. In the end, he was forced to withdraw in disgrace.

James Soong's image is not what it used to be. It is no longer what it was years ago. Therefore persuading voters to "dump Huang to save Yang" will be correspondingly difficult. When Soong lashed out, he immediately impacted the larger political picture. Even Hau Lung-bin was dragged in. Soong's public pronouncements will inevitably become increasingly intemperate. This of course will affect the feelings of Blue Camp voters. Some may agree with Soong. But others may become even more contemptuous of him. In short, for Blue Camp voters, this is highly emotional matter. The impact of Soong's move is not limited to "dump Huang to save Yang" in Kaohsiung. It is bound to impact every one of the five cities elections. It is bound to impact the Ma administration's 2012 re-election bid.

In the twenty years since martial law was lifted, the most prominent feature of politics on Taiwan has been "trickery above all." As a result, political moves are never rooted in moral principles, but in political calculation. Lee Teng-hui was once "a party chairman and a half." He was full chairman of the KMT, plus a half chairman of the DPP. In the end however, this was also the cause of Lee's downfall. The aforementioned "Bian/Soong meeting" was classic Machiavelli. In the end however, Soong ended up with nothing. Politicians overestimate their own charm. They underestimate the people's intelligence. They come to believe they can perform miracles, that they can control the political weather in a god-like manner. In fact, voters will not necessarily permit themselves to be manipulated. Twenty years of experience since the lifting of martial law has confirmed that those who live by trickery, will die by trickery.

Yang Chiu-hsing recruited James Soong. Has this made it easier for him to play the "dump/save card?" Or more difficult? James Soong has backed Yang Chiu-hsing. Has this destroyed the Blue Camp, or has it destroyed his own image and credibility? Has he helped out Yang Chiu-hsing, or hindered him? The answer will soon become apparent.

宋楚瑜又想幹什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.19

宋楚瑜挺楊秋興，是要催動「棄黃保楊」的效應。亦即：一要撕裂藍營，二要拱楊當選。

然而，就大局大勢看來，此種操作卻未必能使楊秋興當選。也就是說，此舉已使馬宋自此徹底決裂，卻可能更加鞏固了陳菊必定當選的情勢。

道理很簡單，宋楚瑜來這麼一手，使國民黨更無轉圜空間；如今國民黨能做的，只有回過頭來設法使宋楚瑜撕裂藍營的傷害減低。因為，宋顯然已經豁了出去，他不僅在高雄操作「棄黃保楊」，且先一手砲轟郝龍斌「沒有首都格局」，已是全面決裂的態勢；這使得國民黨在大高雄只有力挺黃昭順寧為玉碎地選到底，並力拒「宋楚瑜因素」感染到北二都，別無選擇。這個情勢發展下去，只要黃楊二人都選到底，並只要各自保有十％的鐵票，則黃昭順固然恐怕當選無望，宋楚瑜要「保」楊上壘的意圖亦將落空。因而，宋的舉動，大概撕裂藍營是真，也許保楊當選是幻。

問題的關鍵在藍營選民對宋楚瑜人格形象的評價已今非昔比。大高雄若要操作棄保，其槓桿是在藍營選民希望扳倒陳菊；但這樣的群眾心理，仍是建立在「藍營整合」的想像之上。然而，如今由宋楚瑜出面操作棄保，卻是批馬斥郝以血淋淋的撕裂為手段，這恐未必是多數藍營選民所能接受。所以，宋的棄保操作，一方面可能煽動「倒菊為上」的藍營選民倒向楊秋興，另一方面卻也可能激發藍營選民升高對宋楚瑜的反感而致敵愾同仇挺黃到底，或因厭惡權謀、失望疏離而乾脆不投票。這些因素皆是宋楚瑜操作「棄黃保楊」未必會得逞的原因。

楊秋興的這一劑強心針似乎打得猛過了頭，他逼使國民黨沒有回頭路，只有死戰到底，且必回過頭來運用宋的倒戈來激發藍營同仇敵愾；何況，菊營見宋楊合流，則必將藉此削弱綠營選民挺楊棄菊的動機，壓低楊的得票。如此一來，待情勢沉澱後，楊秋興可能發現餅反而變小了。其實，藍營在大高雄原本不無操作棄保的空間，如今因宋楚瑜出面反而陷入僵局。

這不是宋楚瑜第一次有驚人之舉，二○○五年二月二十四日的「扁宋會」即是經典之作。若此次宋操作的是「棄黃保楊」，則「扁宋會」操作的即是「棄國民黨／保親民黨」，手法如出一轍：一要撕裂藍營，二要保親民黨取得與陳水扁「民親共治」的地位。後來，「扁宋會」搞得宋楚瑜身敗名裂的原因正是：非但藍營選民不贊同宋楚瑜「賣藍求榮」的操作，且親民黨立委也難苟同；宋楚瑜高估了他的形象魅力，終以灰頭土臉收場。

現在的宋楚瑜，其形象魅力大幅折損，更已不復當年，因而「棄黃保楊」的難度亦相對攀高。就宋的手法言，他一出手就將打擊面推擴到全局全面，連郝龍斌也要拖進來，且宋必將愈來愈口不擇言；這當然對藍營選民的心理平衡會有影響，有人可能呼應宋楚瑜，但也有人可能更鄙棄宋楚瑜。總之，對藍營選民而言，這是一個親痛仇快之局；因為，宋的操作，其效應不僅在高雄一隅的「棄黃保楊」，且勢將衝擊整個五都選情，亦是直指整個馬政府二○一二的政權保衛戰而來。

解嚴二十幾年來，台灣政治最凸出的特質就是「權謀掛帥」。因而，政治上的縱橫捭闔，亦非根據義理，而往往淪於權謀。李登輝曾是「一又二分之一個黨主席」（國民黨加半個民進黨），但最後李登輝的覆敗亦植根於此。前述「扁宋會」亦是權謀經典之作，結果也是竹籃打水一場空。政治人物高估了自己的魅力，低估了民眾的理智，以為真有「翻手為雲覆手雨」之類的政治奇蹟；其實，選民未必接受翻雲覆雨的操作，解嚴二十幾年來的經歷已經證實，成於權謀者終亦敗於權謀。

楊秋興找來宋楚瑜，究竟是寬鬆了棄保的形勢？或反而緊縮了棄保的空間？宋楚瑜挺楊秋興，究竟是在撕裂藍營或在撕裂自己的人格形象？究竟是幫了楊秋興或是幫了倒忙？一切均待且戰且看了。