DPP Must Adopt a Pragmatic Cross-Strait Policy

DPP Must Adopt a Pragmatic Cross-Strait Policy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 27, 2010

When the Democratic Progressive Party kicks off its 2012 presidential campaign, it must change its cross-Strait policy.

Ideally, the DPP would: One. Abandon its goal of Taiwan independence. Two. Recognize the Republic of China Constitution, without reservation. Three. From this day forward, hold high the red, white, and blue Republic of China flag at all DPP rallies. Such a radical transformation however, is a pipe dream. Everyone knows the DPP cannot possibly implement such changes. Consider the problems, in ascending order. If ROC national flags still cannot be seen within the ranks of the DPP, how can one possibly expect the DPP to recognize the Republic of China -- without reservation? How can one possibly expect the DPP to forsake its goal of Taiwan independence? Conversely, suppose the DPP continues using the "Republic of China" as a fig leaf, even as it refuses to abandon Taiwan independence? Suppose "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue fluttering within the ranks of the DPP? How can the DPP possibly transform its cross-Strait policy?

The Chen regime ruled for eight years, and this was its cross-Strait policy. The ROC flag flew over the Presidential Palace. But at DPP rallies, one saw only a sea of green. The DPP was not a "loyal opposition party" when it was out of power. It was not even a "loyal ruling party" when it was in power. Therefore, when the DPP runs for election in 2012, it must jettison the Chen regime's cross-Strait policy. Chen Shui-bian once affirmed the "five noes." He even paid homage to his Mainland forebears. But later he clamored for the Rectification of Names, and made peace impossible. Therefore if the DPP hopes to return to power in 2012, it needs to undergo just such a radical transformation. Otherwise it will never be able to achieve cross-Strait mutual trust.

However, as we noted above, such an expectation is a pipe dream. Signs suggest that DPP cross-Strait policy is what it has always been. One. To the DPP, "One China" is the PRC. Two. The DPP rejects the "1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations." Three. The DPP expects Beijing to "make concessions" to its Taiwan compatriots, but simultaneously promotes Taiwan independence. Four. The DPP trumpets reform and transformation each time an election rolls around, but "Nation of Taiwan" flags continue to flutter above the heads of supporters. This approach may allow the DPP to win elections. But it will not allow it to govern. The DPP cannot simultaneously maintain economic exchanges while championing Taiwan independence. Cross-Strait relations involve a bottom line. Beijing opposes Taiwan independence. The ruling administration of the Republic of China cannot adopt a policy of Taiwan independence. But it can uphold the right of Taiwan independence advocates to exercise their freedom of speech. The ROC must support the 1992 consensus. Beijing can stress the One China Principle. Taipei can stress One China, Different Interpretations.

If the DPP returns to power because Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, it must abruptly alter its cross-Strait policy. Otherwise upon taking office, it will be hijacked by Beijing. One. Tsai champions the Two States Theory, rejects the 1992 Consensus, and opposes ECFA. If Tsai takes office, Beijing will naturally want to hear the president-elect's views on the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai fails to change her tune before the election, can she really change it after the election? If she does not change her tune, can she really pass muster? Two. Cross-strait economic and social exchanges have passed the point of no return. If the DPP fails to change its cross-Strait policy before the election, it will be forced to rethink it after it assumes power. It cannot repeat the mistake of the Chen regime. It cannot "win the election but lose its direction." Besides, the Chen regime merely had to obstruct the progress of cross-Strait relations. In 2012, a DPP administration must confront a fait accompli. That will be a different matter altogether.

In sum, the DPP's cross-Strait policy for 2012 must get past "backdoor listing." It must abandon its "Taiwan independence party platform." The existence of the "Taiwan independence party platform" has transformed the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" into a template for "backdoor listing." It has also provided a basis for the "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and the "Rectification of Names." If DPP cross-Strait rhetoric cannot get past this framework, how can the DPP achieve bilateral trust?

Suppose the DPP retains its "Taiwan independence party platform?" Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected president in 2012? She will immediately become a female counterpart of Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian could avoid being hijacked by Beijing. But Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to escape such a fate.

The DPPs fundamental problem remains its refusal to recognize the national flag. It is willing only to recognize the flag of the "Nation of Taiwan." This is how it feels, even as it attempts to seize power under the ROC Constitution. Its behavior involves an irreconcilable contradiction. The two sides experienced the consequences of this contradiction between 2000 and 2008. That experience is not something they will soon forget.

The DPP must jettison its existing cross-Strait policy. The DPP must think hard about what must be done. But myriad obstacles stand in the way. The DPP must think hard about how it can be done.

民進黨兩岸政策轉型的應然與實然
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.27

民進黨為迎對二○一二總統大選，必須調整其兩岸政策。

想像中，最極致的境界是：一、否棄台獨主張；二、不折不扣地回歸中華民國的國家憲政認同；三、從此，民進黨的集會中高舉中華民國青天白日滿地紅的國旗。

不過，這種「一步到位」的想像，是癡人說夢，任誰皆知是民進黨辦不到的。問題其實要從後面說起：如果民進黨的隊伍中仍然看不到國旗，則如何做到不折不扣的中華民國認同？又怎能、怎敢否棄台獨主張？倒過來說，如果仍只是用「中華民國」借殼上市，仍不否棄台獨，隊伍中仍是台灣國的旌旗迎風獵獵，則民進黨的兩岸政策豈有什麼調整轉型的空間？

其實，扁政府八年執政，操持的就是這一套兩岸政策：總統府上懸掛中華民國國旗，但民進黨的集會中仍是一片台獨綠色海洋；證明民進黨非但在野時不是「忠誠的反對黨」，主政時甚至也不是「忠誠的執政黨」。所以，民進黨若要迎對二○一二，即必須要有超越扁政府時代的兩岸政策。陳水扁說過「四不一沒有」，甚至還遙祭黃陵表態認祖歸宗，但後來卻將正名制憲鬧得國無寧日；因而，民進黨若要在二○一二重返執政，恐非做到前述的「最極致的境界」，不足以取信於兩岸之間。

但是，前面已經說過，這是癡人說夢。於是，就目前所見民進黨透露的零星訊息，其未來兩岸政策的輪廓仍是：一、「一個中國」即是中華人民共和國；二、反對「九二共識／一中各表」；三、要北京「讓利」，但也要「台獨」；四、只在選舉口號上求變化，但在群眾隊伍中台灣國的旗幟招展依舊……。這樣的手法，也許可以贏得選舉，但可斷言絕無可能藉以執政；因為，民進黨不可能維持一種既要維持經濟交流又要主張台獨的兩岸關係。兩岸的底線是：北京反對台獨，中華民國主政者則不採台獨政策，但保障台獨的政治言論自由；兩岸共同支持九二共識，大陸強調一中原則，台灣強調一中各表。

倘民進黨以蔡英文當選總統而執政，若不及早調整兩岸政策，在主政後必將受北京的挾制。一、蔡英文主張兩國論，反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ；蔡若主政後，北京自然想聽到新總統對九二共識的看法。蔡若在選前不改口，難道要在當選後才改口？不改口又豈能過關？二、兩岸經貿及社會各領域的交流已經通過了不可折返點，民進黨若不在選前調整其政治論述，執政後必將重創兩岸關係的運作，從而重蹈扁政府「贏了選舉／輸了路線」之覆轍。何況，扁政府時只是要阻擋兩岸關係的進展而已，但二○一二民進黨若執政則將面臨兩岸已經建立的關係是否切斷的問題，兩者自不可同日而語。

總之，面對二○一二，民進黨的兩岸政策必須超越「借殼上市」的思考，而關鍵則在於《台獨黨綱》的存廢。由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，《台灣前途決議文》即成了「借殼上市」的張本；亦由於《台獨黨綱》仍在，即成了《正常國家決議文》主張「正名制憲」的依據。如果民進黨二○一二的兩岸論述不能跳脫超越這個架構，如何取信於兩岸之間？

倘《台獨黨綱》仍保留，則蔡英文若選上二○一二總統，即成女版的陳水扁；而陳水扁當年尚可不受北京挾制，但蔡英文則無可逃避。

民進黨的根本問題仍在其隊伍中不見國旗、只見台灣國的旗幟；以這樣的體質而欲爭奪中華民國的主政權，其中存有不可克服的矛盾，何況兩岸在二○○○至二○○八已經刻骨銘心地領教過一次。

民進黨應當調整其兩岸政策，這是「應然」的思考；但民進黨的轉型亦存有許多自設的重大障礙，這則是「實然」的難題。