Tuesday, December 21, 2010

A Tsai/Su Ticket? Or Su/Tsai Ticket?

A Tsai/Su Ticket? Or Su/Tsai Ticket?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 21, 2010

Tsai Ing-wen will represent the DPP in the 2012 presidential election. That is becoming clearer day by day. Su Tseng-chang's desire to "continue transcending" his current status is all too clear. As we examine at the overall situation, a Su/Tsai ticket is unlikely.

Why? First, a Su/Tsai ticket is impossible. Tsai Ing-wen would never agree to such a ticket. Secondly, a Tsai/Su ticket would probably embarrass Su. Su has already been Frank Hsieh's running mate. Also, Tsai would never agree to such a ticket.

Su and Tsai served in the Executive Yuan as Premier and Vice Premier, Tsai finds Su's political style distasteful. Will Tsai toss her hat in the ring? If she does, she will seek the presidency. She will hardly settle for being Su's vice presidential running mate. Besides, Tsai Ing-wen has been trumpeting her "Platform for the Coming Decade." She has obviously been setting her self up as presidential candidate in 2012. Today the political climate is right, She will hardly allow Su to usurp her "Platform for the Coming Decade." Su would not look the part in any event.

Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs in 2012. Ma Ying-jeou will be seeking a second term. The ECFA debate in April already covered most of the major issues likely to come up in the 2012 presidential election. It has also covered the qualifications of the candidates. Ma is apparently still the favorite. The Democratic Progressive Party nomination process will begin in May next year, less than six months from now. Tsai Ing-wen may not have time to resolve the differences between rival factions within the party. Will Su Tseng-chang acknowledge the difficulties he faces in seeking the party nomination, and simply step aside? Will the "Platform for the Coming Decade" be an asset or a deficit? Haste could well make waste. But Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy is a foregone conclusion. Chen Shui-bian, Koo Kuan-min, and others have already endorsed her candidacy, and are pessimistic about Su Tseng-chang's chances. The situation is urgent. Tsai will be forced to yield to the prevailing winds, just as she was forced to run for Xinbei City mayor. If Tsai is elected president in 2012, certain consequences will ensue. But what if her election bid is unsuccessful? What will the consequences for the DPP be then?

Suppose Tsai Ing-wen runs for president. That will be tantamount to a proclamation that the time for Su Tseng-chang and other Kaohsiung Incident figures has passed. But if Tsai Ing-wen runs and loses, advocates of reform may become targets inside the party. The chances of Tsai Ing-wen becoming the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate in 2016 will be greatly reduced. By the same token, the chances that the DPP might return to power in 2016 will also evaporate. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen has two choices. One. She can choose to remain out of the 2012 presidential race. Two. She can make a risky move by acquiescing to a Su/Tsai ticket. If the ticket loses, she will have all the more justification to make a run for the presidency in 2016. These choices are attractive for Tsai Ing-wen, because they enable her to avoid butting heads with Ma Ying-jeou in 2012. They allow her time to transform the DPP. But as mentioned above, the choice is no longer up to Tsai Ing-wen. She will almost certainly declare her candidacy for the 2012 presidential race. She cannot wait until 2012.

Will Tsai Ing-wen's candidacy be a plus or a minus? That depends on whether she can facilitate the transformation of the DPP. One. Beijing has reiterated its cross-Strait bottom line, namely, "Oppose Taiwan independence, uphold the 1992 Consensus." Two. Tsai Ing-wen advocated the two states theory, opposed the 1992 Consensus, and opposed ECFA. Three. The "Platform for the Coming Decade" is not a DPP party platform. It is not even a DPP party resolution. It is merely Tsai Ing-wen's personal political platform. Can it transcend, replace, or abrogate the Taiwan independence party platform, the Resolution on Taiwan's future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation? Four. Chen Shui-bian has already made "one nation on each side" synonymous with Taiwan independence. The "one nation on each side connection" has become the first unabashedly Taiwan independence faction within the DPP. Five. On the one hand Tsai accuses Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." On the other hand, she assures voters that "upon assuming power, she would perpetuate the previous administration's cross-Strait policies," How can she possibly reconcile these contradictions? Six. During the five cities elections, the DPP trumpeted its "ability to govern." Perhaps it was referring to local governance. But what are we to make of the DPP's alleged "ability to govern" at the central government level, between 2000 and 2008? These are just a few examples of the problems the DPP faces as it undergoes tranformation. They are hardly exhaustive. What sort of campaign does Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in 2012? Does she really intend to run merely by donning jeans and a pink T-shirt? Suppose she fails to get to the root of these problems? Can she really be elected? That will be a problem. Suppose she is elected and assumes power? Tragedy will surely ensue. That will be a far more serious problem.

The Democratic Progressive Party will hold its presidential primaries in May of next year. Before then, Tsai Ing-wen must resolve two major crises. One. The crisis that will ensue if the DPP loses in 2012. Two. The even greater crisis that will ensue if the DPP wins in 2012. The key is whether Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can take its "China policy" and change it back into what it is supposed to be, "cross-Strait policy." The DPP's so-called "China policy" implies "one nation on each side." It casts "China" as the enemy and as "the other." By contrast, "cross-Strait policy" implies "one China, different interpetations." It stresses a symbiotic win-win situation.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP opposed direct flights, opposed allowing Mainland tourists onto Taiwan, opposed the Chiang/Chen summits, and opposed ECFA. They opposed every measure, every step along the way. Today we have direct flights across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, summits between Chiang and Chen, and ECFA. Every one of these measures has been successfully implemented. Each has come to pass, naturally, in swift succession. In short, can Tsai Ing-wen really win the presidency merely by wearing a pink T-shirt, even as she demands that Taiwan turn the clock back to the Cold War?

蘇蔡配或蔡蘇配?
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.21

蔡英文代表民進黨競選二○一二總統的態勢日趨明朗,而蘇貞昌仍有「繼續超越」的意願亦昭然若揭。但是,盱衡大局,已不太可能出現「蘇蔡」搭檔。

因為:一、蘇正蔡副的「蘇蔡配」不可能,因蔡英文不會接受;二、至於蔡正蘇副的「蔡蘇配」,蘇大概也難為情(已經「配」過謝長廷),何況蔡也不會接受。

蘇蔡二人在行政院正副院長共事期間,蔡即對蘇的作風頗不以為然;爾今除非蔡不下水,如果要?下去,自然就直接選總統,而無可能作蘇的副手。何況,蔡英文自倡議「十年政綱」以來,已顯露在二○一二「自導自演」的企圖,如今氣候已成,難道會讓蘇來演「十年政綱」?蘇演了恐怕也不像。

然而,蔡英文若在二○一二角逐總統,將面對競選連任的馬英九;四月間的ECFA大辯論,已大致反映了二○一二大選的議題輪廓及馬蔡二人的主觀條件,馬似仍佔優勢。再者,如今至明年五月民進黨提名,只剩不到半年光景,蔡英文未必有充裕的時間來解決黨內權力傾軋及路線鬥爭(蘇貞昌會「知難而退」嗎?),何況「十年政綱」的得失亦難確定;如此倉卒出戰,陣腳即可能不夠堅實。不過,如今蔡英文出馬的形勢幾已確定,連陳水扁、辜寬敏等皆為她背書,而看衰蘇貞昌;形勢逼人,蔡恐怕必須順風扯帆,正如她不得不參選新北市長一般。然而,蔡若順利當選二○一二總統則罷,倘若落選,對民進黨又將有何種後果?

對民進黨而言,蔡英文若出馬競選,即宣告蘇貞昌等美麗島世代的人物皆已被徹底洗掉;但若蔡英文競選失敗,屆時其轉型路線可能成為黨內箭靶,則蔡英文再次代表民進黨轉戰二○一六總統選舉的機率就會大幅降低,相對地甚至亦使民進黨連在二○一六重返執政的可能性也告幻滅。因而,蔡英文現今的另兩個選擇是:一、不參加二○一二總統選舉;二、下險棋,接受「蘇蔡配」,若敗,即取得二○一六競選總統的較大正當性。對蔡英文來說,這兩個選擇的主要著眼是:避開二○一二與馬英九對決,爭取引導民進黨轉型的時間。然而,已如前述,現今的情勢恐已由不得蔡英文,她二○一二出馬的機率極大,拖不到二○一六。

蔡英文出馬的得失關鍵,仍在能否引導民進黨轉型。一、北京一再重申,兩岸底線是「反對台獨/堅持九二共識」。二、蔡英文曾主張兩國論、反對九二共識、反對ECFA。三、「十年政綱」不是「黨綱」,又不是「決議文」,只是高度「蔡英文個人化」的「政綱」;能否超越、取代或廢止台獨黨綱、台灣前途決議文,及正常國家決議文?四、「一邊一國」已被陳水扁據為台獨標籤,且「一邊一國連線」已成為民進黨內首見的旗幟鮮明的台獨派系。五、一方面指馬英九「傾中賣台」,另一方面又稱「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」,如何自圓其說?六、五都選舉標榜「治理能力」,那也許是指地方事務,但將如何解釋民進黨二○○○至二○○八年之間在中央執政的「國家治理」?這些只是略舉數例,而民進黨轉型面對的難題,尚絕不止這些。蔡英文難道仍想只憑一件粉紅T恤及一襲牛仔褲就殺進二○一二?如若不從根本處解決這些難題,會不會當選是一問題,倘使當選而執政則必是更大的悲劇。

蔡英文必須在明年五月民進黨總統候選人提名前,化解兩大危機。一、二○一二敗選的危機;二、若當選後執政而發生的更大危機。關鍵在於蔡英文與民進黨能否將其「中國政策」還原成「兩岸政策」。所謂「中國政策」,即有「一邊一國」的意涵,視「中國」為敵體及他者;而「兩岸政策」,即有「一中各表」的意涵,強調共生雙贏。

蔡英文及民進黨,自反直航、反陸客來台、反江陳會、反ECFA,一路反到底;如今卻是直航、陸客來台、江陳會、ECFA,一路通關,猶如堂堂溪水出前村。總結的問題是:蔡英文有可能穿著粉紅T恤以主張台灣倒撥時鐘就將自己送上總統大位嗎?

No comments: