How Should Beijing View the Five Cities Elections

How Should Beijing View the Five Cities Elections?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 3, 2010

The day before yesterday this newspaper published an editorial. It said that during the recent elections, the Blues voted for a government, the Greens voted for a nation. That is why major elections often have a direct impact on issues of national identity and cross-Strait policy. During the recent five cities elections, the KMT experienced something of a fright. Fortunately cross-Strait relations will not undergo any sudden changes. Beijing has probably breathed a sigh of relief.

The DPP vehemently denounced ECFA -- at first. But during the current election it fell silent. It was afraid to even mention the subject. Clearly the Ma administration's implementation of direct flights, visits by Mainland tourists to Taiwan, ECFA, and a long list of similar policies, is basically correct. Otherwise, why would the DPP, which never passes up an opportunity to pounce on its political opponents, give the Ma administration a free pass? Instead, it avoided the subject out of fear.

The public has been generally satisfied with the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy over the past two and a half years. Nevertheless support for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, which disagrees about national identity and cross-Strait policy, has increased. This shows that those in office on Taiwan will not necessarily be able to remain in office merely because they advocate correct and effective cross-Strait policies. If the political climate changes, and leads to a change in ruling parties, national identity and cross-Strait relations may be subjected to further shocks.

Domestic politics may remain stable. Even cross-Strait relations may remain stable. But elections on Taiwan invariably revert to "voting for a government" or "voting for a nation." In other words, if elections were not mired in struggles over national and constitutional identity, but were merely about choosing a ruling party, cross-Strait policy debates would be mere policy debates. In that case, the Republic of China's democracy could undergo a process of normalization. Cross-Strait relations would no longer remain under a dark cloud.

The key lies in our definition of the Republic of China. Our editorial the day before yesterday addressed the issue of Taiwan independence. The Kuomintang and some segments of society on Taiwan have historical grievances, mainly because the Republic of China was unable to resist threats from Beijing, and because the Republic of China was forced to endure international humiliation. The more Beijing suppressed the Republic of China, the more Taiwan independence sentiment intensified. The Ma administration's new policies improved the Republic of China's cross-Strait situation, on and off Taiwan. But many cling to the belief that the DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric provides them with an escape clause.

Beijing once spoke of "decapitation," meaning it would destroy the Republic of China, This encouraged the Taiwan independence movement to speak of "changing heads," meaning it would found a Nation of Taiwan. We have repeatedly pointed out that Beijing's cross-Strait policy must be changed. It must be changed from "destroying the Republic of China" to "safeguarding the Republic of China." In fact, this is happening as we speak. But greater efforts are needed. For example, during the recent elections, the KMT was still running television ads asking "Where is our national flag?" Think about it. The arrival of Mainland visitors provokes controversies over whether we can fly our national flag. Under these circumstances, how can anyone experience a sense of national identity or national pride? This humiliation and indignation enourages people to sympathize with Taiwan independence, even when they disagree with it.

During the recent elections, the Chiang Ping incident and the Yang Shu-chun incident impacted peoples' hearts and minds. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said that the Chiang Ping incident was something "We do not want to see happen." It said that the Yang Shu-chun incident "was not a case of friction between officials on the two sides." Its reaction was swift. As we can see, the Mainland was unwilling to allow cross-Strait factors to affect the elections. Furthermore, when the EU approved visa-free treatment for Republic of China passport holders, "without objection," its attitude was also friendly. When news that El Salvador was establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing emerged, the immediate response of the Taiwan Affairs Office was, "There is absolutely no such thing. We have never heard of it. It is absolutely impossible." Its tone was urgent, as if it feared a conflagration. This was unprecedented, and revealed how closely attuned officials in Beijing were to the elections on Taiwan.

Elections on Taiwan should be about "voting for a government" rather than "voting for a nation." If so, then the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have much work to do. What Beijing can do is work harder on "defending the Republic of China." Only by defending the "one China Constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," can it help the public on Taiwan identify with the Republic of China, and experience civic pride and a sense of mission. Only then can it dilute Taiwan independence consciousness. Only then can the public on Taiwan feel that "The Republic of China is part of China," i.e., that "Taiwan and the Mainland are both part of one China." Only then can the public on Taiwan begin to think of themselves as "People of China."

During the recent elections, Beijing reacted appropriately to the Chiang Ping incident, the Yang Shu-chun incident, EU visa-free entry approval, and rumors concerning diplomatic relations with El Salvador. Its efforts should have a cumulative effect. Hopefully President Ma Ying-jeou and General Secretary Hu Jintao can soon meet officially.

Elections on Taiwan must not be permitted to undermine the nation and provoke cross-Strait hostilities. Therefore this newspaper offers its "glass theory" for you consideration. Taiwan is the water. The ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains inside. Once the glass is shattered, the water is released, and who knows where it will end up.

北京如何解讀五都選舉
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.12.03 01:44 am

前天社論說，台灣的選舉，藍的是在選政府，綠的卻是在選國家。因而，重要的選舉可直接影響國家定位及兩岸政策。此次五都選舉，國民黨有驚無險，兩岸關係不致遽變，大概連北京也鬆了一口氣。

民進黨原本大力抨擊ECFA，但到了選季卻偃旗息鼓，根本不敢碰這個題目；可見馬政府直航、陸客來台、ECFA等一路下來的兩岸新政，在大體上是正確的。否則，見縫就插針的民進黨豈會平白放過，竟反而是避談之猶恐不及。

然而，民意雖對馬政府兩年半來的兩岸政策表現大體上滿意，但對迄今仍在國家定位及兩岸政策抱持異議的民進黨之支持度亦相對上升。這顯示台灣的主政者未必能憑正確有效的兩岸政策即穩住政權；一旦選舉變天、政黨輪替，國家定位及兩岸政策即可能再受衝擊，再生震盪。

無論就台灣內政的安定而言，或就兩岸關係的穩健而言，台灣皆須設法使選舉回歸到「選政府」，而不再是「選國家」。也就是說，選舉若不再陷於國家定位及憲政認同的鬥爭，只是對「政府」的選擇，兩岸關係亦只是政策的辯論，那麼台灣的民主憲政始可能正常化，而兩岸關係也不致陰晴吉凶不定。

關鍵在於「中華民國的定位問題」。前天社論談到台獨存在的因由，除了國民黨與台灣民間的歷史恩怨外，主要是因中華民國未能抵擋大陸的威脅，及中華民國的國際人格遭受屈辱。中華民國愈受大陸打壓，民間台獨的意識就愈升高；即使馬政府的兩岸新政改善了台灣的內外處境，但有許多人依然覺得民進黨的台獨路線仍有作為安全瓣的作用。

北京過去的「砍頭論」（消滅中華民國），造成了台獨的「換頭論」（建立台灣國）。我們曾屢次指出，北京的兩岸政策，應從「消滅中華民國」轉到「維護中華民國」。其實，這已是現在進行式，但力度還不夠。例如，在選舉期間，國民黨還在打「國旗在哪裡就在那裡」的電視廣告，試想，一個當陸客來訪時連在國境內可否掛國旗也成了爭議的政府，如何教國民有認同感與光榮感？而這種屈辱與悲憤，又如何能使台獨意識不受同情（即使不同意）？

在選舉期間，江平事件及楊淑君事件，皆是牽動台灣人心緒的事件；北京國台辦在第一時間說江平事件「是我們不願看到的」，又說楊淑君件事件「不是兩岸（官方）摩擦」，反應迅速，可見不願見兩岸因素影響選情。再者，對歐盟通過台灣免簽證待遇，表示「不持異議」，態度亦甚友善；至於傳出薩爾瓦多將與北京建交的消息，國台辦的立即反應是「絕無此事，從未聽說，絕無可能發生」，這種幾近是救火般緊迫的口吻，更可謂是聞所未聞，透露出北京對台灣選情的敏銳感觸。

若欲使台灣的選舉成為「選政府」，而不是「選國家」；台灣朝野均有極大的努力空間。北京可以做的，就是更進一步在「維護中華民國」上著力。唯有使護守「一中憲法」及「一中各表」的中華民國在台灣人民中建立認同感、光榮感及使命感，台獨意識始有可能化解；亦唯有使台灣人覺得「中華民國是一部分的中國」（此說與「台灣與大陸同屬一個中國」不同），始有可能使台灣人認同自己為「中國人」。

選舉期間，北京對江平事件、楊淑君事件、歐盟免簽證，及薩爾瓦多建交傳聞的處理，皆可視為朝向正確的方向進行；期望這一方面的努力可有日積月累的效果，而在不日以馬英九總統與胡錦濤國家主席以官式職銜會面為目標。

不欲使台灣的選舉存有顛覆國家及兩岸翻臉的風險，本報主張的「杯子理論」可供思考：台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。