Moment of Truth for DPP Cross-Strait Policy

Moment of Truth for DPP Cross-Strait Policy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 23, 2010

The sixth Chiang/Chen summit will be held this week at the Grand Hotel in Taipei. ARATS President Chen Yunlin felt compelled to comment. He said, "History sometimes brings surprising coincidences." Two years ago, Chiang and Chen met for the first time, at the same time of year, a the same location. At that time however, the DPP staged violent protests. The ruling administration placed tens of thousands of police on full alert. The enemy was at the gates. Given intense political and social polarization on Taiwan, a conflagration could have broken out at any moment.

Two years later however, things are moving along with ease. The two sides have signed ECFA, the most historic agreement since the two sides instituted separate rule. Five hundred and fifty-seven items on the early harvest list will enjoy tax breaks starting on New Year's Day next year. Industry tariffs will be cut by over one billion NT in the first year. More importantly, DPP legislators might continue protesting in the Legislative Yuan. But DPP party chairman Tsai Ing-wen has already assured the media that if she is elected president in 2012, she "will continue the previous administration's policies." During the recent five cities elections, not a single Green Camp candidate challenged ECFA. This was true even in the Deep Green bastions of Tainan and Kaohsiung. Why? Because according to the DPP's own polls, over half the public on Taiwan supports ECFA. The DPP is nothing if not adept at electioneering. It is not about to shoot itself in the foot at election time.

Chiang and Chen have already met six times. Cross-Strait economic exchanges are now closer than ever. Some industries are even further along in their integration. They have passed the point of no return. The two sides might not engage in political talks for the time being. But attempts to promote a referendum to author a new constitution failed during the Chen Shui-bian era. De jure independence is no longer a possibility. That is a reality the DPP cannot ignore. This political and economic situation is consistent with the wishes of most of the public, which prefers to maintain the status quo, No political party or politician can ignore this reality.

The DPP may attempt to spin the five cities elections as a contest over "governing ability." It may attempt to deliberately avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. But during the upcoming presidential election, it cannot fall back on the catechism, "we will continue the former administration's policies." The sixth Chiang/Chen summit is now discussing matters of practical policy. Officials from the two sides are negotiating ECFA and financial sector MOUs. The two sides are even signing mutual legal assistance agreements, expressing respect for each others' jurisdiction. Meanwhile, all the DPP can talk about is Taiwan independence ideology, rather than concrete, pragmatic cross-Strait policy. How can the DPP possibly persuade the public it has "governing ability?"

Following the five cities elections, "China policy" has reportedly become a hot topic within the DPP. Green Camp think tanks are experiencing a wave of "China fever." As a matter of fact, "DPP fever," a complementary phenomenon on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, is also in full swing. Both sides appear to be taking a closer look at each other. From the perspective of cross-Strait peace and development, we of course welcome this new atmosphere of closer communication. Communication of course does not equate with policy change. In fact, exchanges between private sector think tanks on the Mainland and the DPP have been going on for years. But DPP cross-Strait policy strategy has yet to catch up with the times. If the DPP wants to adopt a pragmatic cross-Strait policy, the key will be its leaders' will power.

This is surely Tsai Ing-wen's most difficult challenge. Ever since Chen Shui-bian overturned his own "five noes" during his last days in office, the DPP has avoided the topic of cross-Strait policy. As a result, extreme Sinophobia has been the DPP's guiding concept. The presidential election is just around the corner. The DPP is an eleventh hour convert. But how will it breach the topic of cross-Strait policy, without touching off internecine warfare? That will be something of a feat.

This is especially true because Taiwan independence extremism has already taken hold within the DPP. Members of the "one nation on each side connection" carried signs expressing support for Chen Shui-bian. During the recent five cities elections, they comprised nearly 9% of the vote. This means they have already crossed the 5% legal threshold for recognition as a political party. Even if they withdrew from the DPP, they could still make their strength felt. Therefore they have enough strength to threaten Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwan independence extremists within the DPP have considerable organzational ability. This makes compromise within the DPP extremely difficult.

Compromise may be urgent and difficult. But the 2012 presidential election looms. The DPP cannot avoid the issue of cross-Strait policy. It desperately wants to win this office. Over the past year, the DPP has managed to hold its ground. The public may not support the party's cross-Strait policy. But it is dissatisfied with the worsening gap between rich and poor. Therefore it demanded that the KMT pay the price.

"It's the inequality, stupid!" This is the lesson of the five cities elections. The DPP has nearly enough strength to achieve a simple majority. If it can cash in on this resentment, and propose relevant economic and fiscal policies, it may even win over Pale Blue voters. On the other hand, if the DPP reverts to its old hatreds, it will probably lose the swing voters who supported it during the past year. Can the DPP's Platform for the Coming Decade set a new tone for 2012? The moment of truth has arrived.

民進黨兩岸路線 已到關鍵時刻
2010-12-23 中國時報

六次江陳會本周在台北圓山飯店舉行，大陸海協會會長陳雲林有感而發的說，「歷史有時會出現令人驚奇的巧合」，和兩年前首次江陳會同樣的季節、同樣的地點，但是當時民進黨帶頭烽火抗爭，執政黨派出上萬員警嚴陣以待、如臨大敵，台灣政治、社會在這樣的激烈對決中，衝突可能一觸即發。

兩年後的今天，卻是輕舟已過萬重山，兩岸簽下分治以來最具歷史性的ＥＣＦＡ經貿協定，有五百五十七項早收清單將自明年元旦起降稅，第一年的產業降稅利益達百億以上，更重要的是，民進黨立委雖在立院強烈抗爭，但民進黨黨主席蔡英文之後接受媒體專訪時卻表達「將延續前朝政策」。這次五都選舉時沒有任何綠營選將質疑ＥＣＦＡ，即使在深綠大本營的台南、高雄亦然，因為，根據民進黨內部民調，台灣民眾超過五成支持兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，擅長選舉的民進黨，當然不會在選舉時攖其鋒。

可以說，六次江陳會下來，現階段兩岸經濟上的密切交流、甚至部分產業的進一步整合，已是無法回頭的趨勢；另一個民進黨無法忽視的現實是，即使兩岸短期內不會進行政治談判，但經過陳水扁時代的公投制憲暴衝實驗失敗，法理台獨的可能性也完全斷絕。這樣的政治經濟情勢，頗符合目前維持現狀的多數民意，也是任何政黨或政治人物無法忽視的政治現實。

民進黨可以將五都選舉定調為治理能力之爭，刻意迴避兩岸政策，但接下來的總統大選，卻不能只靠「延續前朝政策」就一語帶過，當六次江陳會已走到實際政策層面，不但兩岸官員參與ＥＣＦＡ及金融ＭＯＵ談判，兩岸甚至簽下司法互助協定、尊重對岸的司法管轄權時，民進黨若只能空談極獨意識形態，而不能提出具體務實的兩岸政策，如何讓人民相信民進黨有治理能力？

五都選後，據傳中國政策已成民進黨新顯學，綠營智庫興起中國熱。其實，和這個現象互補的則是對岸的民進黨熱，雙方似乎重新正視對方，站在兩岸和平發展的角度，我們對這樣的交流氣氛當然樂觀其成，但是，交流不代表政策調整，事實上對岸智庫與民進黨人士私下交流，這幾年從未斷過，但民進黨的兩岸方向卻還是無法與時俱進，可以說，民進黨要提出務實的兩岸政策，最重要的關鍵還是領導人的意志力。

對蔡英文來說，這確實是艱困的挑戰，畢竟自從陳水扁在任期末推翻自己提出的「四不一沒有」後，民進黨內一直迴避討論兩岸政策，因此極端反中、仇中才是民進黨內的主導意見，現在，總統大選在即，民進黨臨陣抱佛腳，但如何討論兩岸政策的同時，不跟著引爆民進黨內鬨，這是相當高難度的挑戰。

尤其，民進黨內極獨勢力已經卓然成形，扛著扁招牌的一邊一國連線，這次初試啼聲就拿下將近百分之九的選票，這個數字的意涵是，他們已跨過政黨得票百分之五的門檻，即使離開民進黨也有進軍國會的實力，因此也就具足以要脅蔡英文的實力，民進黨內極獨勢力的組織化，其實就預告了民進黨內部協調的難度。

只是，時間再急迫，協調再困難，面對二○一二總統大選，民進黨終究不可能跳過兩岸政策，就想要直攻大位。畢竟，這一年來，民進黨之所以能在歷次選舉中保持佳績，並非人民支持該黨的兩岸政策，最主要的原因在於人民不滿日漸惡化的貧富差距，因此要求執政的國民黨付出代價。

問題在分配！這是五都大選給政治人物的教訓，若能以這股民怨做為選戰主軸，提出相關經濟、財稅措施，已接近過半實力的民進黨，還可能再爭取到淺藍選票；相反的，民進黨若又走回仇中的老路，只怕這一年來爭取到的中間選票，也會流失。民進黨的十年政綱，如何為二○一二定調，現在真的已到關鍵時刻。