The Impact of Cross-Strait Relations on the Five Cities Elections

The Impact of Cross-Strait Relations on the Five Cities Elections
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2010

During the five cities elections, the KMT received approximately 1.5 million fewer votes than during the 2008 presidential election. The candidates' individual qualifications, the state of society, and the state of the economy were part of the overall equation. But another factor was the impact of cross-Strait policy. This subject deserves closer scrutinizing.

One could say that the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is its "signature dish." Nevertheless it failed to give the KMT a significant boost at the polls. Candidates in the three northern cities found voter support hard to come by. Candidates in the two southern cities were thoroughly routed. As mentioned before, other factors were involved. Nevertheless this suggests that cross-Strait policy, generally considered one of the Ma administration's strengths, failed to prevent the loss of 1.5 million votes.

One reason may be the DPP's avoidance of cross-Strait issues. During election season it avoided debating the KMT altogether. As a result the KMT was denied the opportunity to underscore the merits of its cross-Strait policy. But there may be a deeper reason. The public knows that the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies have brought them peace and prosperity. But some believe the DPP must act as a buffer between the two sides, and check and balance the KMT. In other words, a considerable number of swing voters may accept the KMT's development of cross-Strait economic and trade relations. But they still feel the DPP provides a political firewall between the two sides.

The reactions of the three parties on the two sides of the Strait has been fascinating. The DPP announced that as part of its 2012 presidential campaign, it would set up a think tank. It would increase cross-Strait policy debate and exchanges with Mainland China. The most visible move by the KMT was by Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan, who declared that among "the seven core interests of the people of Taiwan" vis a vis cross-Strait relations, was the "right of 23 million people to continue participating in free elections under democracy." Beijing responded publicly to Lai Shing-yuan's statement on the same day. It posted a long article by Mainland Foreign Minister Dai Chenguo at its official web site, stating that Taiwan is a "core interest" of China that must not be violated and destroyed. It also mentioned it would "never renounce the use of force," a phrase not heard for at least two and a half years.

Among the three political parties on both sides of the Strait, the DPP is the one sitting pretty. All it needs to do is come up with a vote-winning political platform for the presidential election. Will its platform be able to withstand the test of reality following the election? The DPP can worry about that when the time comes.

Lai Shin-yuan "dialogued" with Dai Bingguo. Presumably the tit for tat was not mere coincidence. The two sides have at least publicly showed their hands regarding their "core interests." Assume that Lai Shin-yuan's statement was an indicator of policy. This suggests that the Ma administration realizes the public perceives "economic interests" and "political risk" as separate issues. That is why it touted "free elections" as "a core interest of the people of Taiwan." Dai Binguo may have been concerned that "free elections" overrode the Ma administration's self-proclaimed "no to Taiwan independence," and "One China Constitution," thereby harming "China's core interests." That may be why Dai reiterated the phrase "would never renounce the use of force." Dai's remarks may be seen as Beijing's preparations in case the Ma administration backslides, or the the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power.

The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has been a boon to Taiwan in terms of economic effectiveness. But ECFA has been denounced for allegedly "widening the gap between rich and poor." In fact, the gap between rich and poor has other, more complex causes. ECFA has also been blasted by the Green Camp as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan," and as furthering "eventual reunification." Elections on Taiwan are dogged by populist demagoguery. That is why the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy successes have not won as many votes as expected. The results of the recent five cities elections surprised the Ma administration. They also made Beijing wonder why their generous concessions were received with so little gratitude.

As mentioned earlier, the key may be that voters on Taiwan approach "cross-Strait economics and trade," and "cross-Strait politics" differently, as separte matters. The Ma administration has improved cross-strait economic and trade relations. But when it comes to national security, some voters remain skeptical about Ma's arguments regarding the "Republic of China," "one China constitution," "one China, different interpretations." The Ma administration was unable to allay the fears of these voters. That is precisely why Lai Shin-yuan reiterated concerns about "free elections." Her purpose was to pave the way for competition with the Democratic Progressive Party during the 2012 presidential election. The DPP sees how the Ma administration's arguments about "Republic of China," the "one China constitution," "one China, different interpretations," have not been as persuasive as hoped. As a result, newly-elected Tainan Mayor Lai Ching-teh now says the DPP will "advocate Taiwan independence, but engage in exchanges." This will be the main plank of its 2012 presidential campaign. The DPP will not advocate Taiwan independence explicitly, only implicitly. Its "Political Platform for the Coming Decade" may restate its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," and continue to practice backdoor Taiwan independence. It may also restate its "promise to continue cross-Strait [economic and trade exchanges] after it assumes power." In any event, it is all meely election rhetoric. It can all wait until after the DPP is reelected.

The DPP argues that adherence to the "Republic of China" has political risks. The DPP argues therefore that it must continue championing Taiwan independence. The DPP's sophistry may be useful during election season. But it is useless when attempting to govern the nation. The Ma administration on the other hand, must do a better job of championing the "Republic of China," the "One China Constitution," and "One China, different interpretations." It must strike a balance between cross-Strait economic and trade relations and political relations. Only then can it persuade enough voters to accept its cross-Strait policy. Beijing must not make economic concessions while taking a harder line politically. It must not harp on "never renouncing the use of force." Otherwise over two years of "peaceful development" may come to naught.

兩岸效應與五都選舉
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.12.10

五都選舉國民黨流失了約一五○萬張選票，除了候選人的個人條件，及整體社會或經濟的因素所致外，其中有無兩岸政策的影響，是一值得推敲的題目。

或許可以這麼說，馬政府的兩岸政策是其「招牌菜」，但並未使國民黨的選情因此獲得明顯的利益；北三都皆選得十分辛苦，南二都則是崩盤慘敗。如前所述，這些雖均有其他因素所致，但至少顯示，一般認為兩岸政策是馬政府的強項，卻未因而改變流失一五○萬票的事實。

原因之一，可能是民進黨迴避兩岸議題，在選季中沒有深刻的辯論，因此使國民黨未能凸顯兩岸政策的表現。更深一層的原因則可能是，民間雖認知馬政府的兩岸政策帶來和平與經貿利益，卻認為民進黨仍是兩岸之間制衡及緩衝的角色。也就是說，相當人數的游離選民雖可能接受國民黨發展兩岸經貿關係，但仍認為民進黨是兩岸之間的政治安全瓣。

選後，兩岸三黨的反應各饒意趣。民進黨說，為爭取二○一二總統大選的勝利，將成立智庫，強化兩岸政策論述及對中國交流的能量。國民黨方面最突出的動作，則是由陸委會主委賴幸媛宣示「台灣人民的七個核心利益」，其中包括「二千三百萬人民對兩岸關係的未來，有權利在民主的前提下自由選擇」。北京方面於賴幸媛談話見諸媒體當日，在外交部網站刊出國務院國務委員戴秉國的長文指出，台灣是中國不容侵犯及破壞的「核心利益」，且又冒出了至少兩年半以來聞所未聞的「絕不承諾放棄使用武力」。

兩岸三黨之中，相對以民進黨目前的處境比較寬裕。只須想出一套在總統大選中能換取選票的論述即可；至於在選後能否禁得起現實的考驗，則可屆時再說。

賴幸媛及戴秉國的「對話」，若非只因巧合而針鋒相對，則顯示雙方至少已公開揭示在「核心利益」上的歧異。賴幸媛的談話若是政策指標，似乎顯示，馬政府已警覺到民意對兩岸政策的「經濟利益」與「政治風險」是分別看待的；因此才會標舉「兩岸關係的自由選擇權」為「台灣人民的核心利益」。而戴秉國的論調則可能認為，「兩岸關係自由選擇權」已經超逾了馬政府自稱的「不獨」，亦與「一中憲法」有所矛盾，這是傷害了「中國的核心利益」，於是圖窮匕現而重申「絕不承諾放棄使用武力」。戴的談話，或許可視為，北京是在對馬政府的可能倒退及民進黨之可能執政，預作鋪墊。

馬政府的現行兩岸政策，在經貿效益上雖對台灣是大利多，卻也被批評成「ＥＣＦＡ拉大貧富差距」（其實貧富差距之形成另有複雜原因）；在政治上更被綠營指為「傾中賣台」、「終極統一」。因而，在台灣選舉的民粹氛圍中，未必能成為馬政府的吸票、固票因素。此次五都選舉的開票結果，非但使馬政府悚然一驚，也使北京覺得，何以如此讓利討好卻仍得不到預期的回應？

如前所述，關鍵可能在台灣選民將「兩岸經貿」與「兩岸政治」區隔看待。馬政府改善了兩岸經貿關係，但在政治安全上，包括「中華民國」、「一中憲法」及「一中各表」的論述，仍無明顯突破；而正因馬政府在兩岸政治安全論述上未有突破，所以又由賴幸媛折回「兩岸關係自由選擇權」的論述，來為與民進黨競爭二○一二總統大選預作鋪墊佈置。至於民進黨，既然馬政府在「中華民國」、「一中憲法」及「一中各表」上均無明顯進展，則仍可如台南市新科市長賴清德所說「主張台獨（不會明說，潛台詞）／願意交流（公開的台詞）」，作為二○一二總統大選的論述主調。「十年政綱」可能只是「台灣前途決議文」的翻版（借殼台獨），也可能是「執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」（經貿交流）的引申版。反正，這只是選舉語言，其他的待選上再說。

民進黨的操作空間是，由於「中華民國」有政治風險，所以須有民進黨來維持台獨意識；此一伎倆或許可用於「選舉」，卻無可能用以「治國」。相對而言，馬政府即必須在「中華民國」、「一中憲法」、「一中各表」上更有表現，以使兩岸經貿關係與政治關係取得平衡，這或許才是足以說服及感動民心的兩岸政策。北京則若只在經濟上讓利、卻在政治上反而倒退緊縮，甚至又冒出「絕不承諾不使用武力」這類的狠話，即很可能使兩年多來「和平發展」的世紀機遇歸於枉然。