Before Signing Any Peace Agreement, First Identify the Signatories

Before Signing Any Peace Agreement, First Identify the Signatories
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2011

Every now and again officials will talk about how they "look forward to strengthening cross-Strait political dialogue." The recent Obama/Hu Summit was no exception. Taipei's response was the same. "First economics, then politics. First the easy, then the hard." Everyone on both sides of the Strait knows that political dialogue cannot be avoided in the long run. The problem is that no one on either side knows where to begin. This newspaper suggests that the two sides should begin by concluding a "peace agreement," ending the civil war.

The concept of a cross-Strait peace agreement is an old one. Even Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have suggested it. Lee sent secret emissary Su Chih-cheng to Beijing to propose the signing of a peace agreement. Beijing refused because Lee insisted that the agreement be on a nation to nation basis. Subsequently, American scholar Kenneth Lieberthal proposed an interim agreement, in which Taipei would not declare independence, and Beijing would refrain from using force. This provoked many lively discussions. In 2005, Lien Chan met with Hu Jintao. They cited a peace agreement as one of their five main hopes for the future. Ma Ying-jeou made a peace agreement part of his presidential campaign platform. During his 2009 Chinese New Year's speech, Hu Jintao spoke at length of an "end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."

Hu Jintao said "Since 1949, the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, but this does not mean that China's territory and sovereignty have been divided. It merely means that since the late 1940s, the Chinese Civil War has resulted in continued political confrontation." Based on such an understanding, Hu Jintao called for "an end to hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement."

His reasoning accords with historical fact as well as with logic. In other words, the cross-Strait status quo is the legacy and continuation of the Chinese Civil War. Therefore it is necessary to sign a peace agreement, The Chinese Civil War of the previous century lasted from 1927 to 1949. It continued in fits and starts for 22 years. During the eight year long War of Resistance Against Japan, the Civil War was officially on hold, but in practice it went on regardless. The warring parties were the National Revolutionary Army of the Central Government, and the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese Communist Party. This evolved into cross-Strait confrontation between the Republic of China government on one side, and the People's Republic of China government on the other. As a result of the Civil War, the two sides refused to recognize each other. They sought to destroy each other. A peace agreement would end the Civil War. The two sides would agree not to destroy each other. They would recognize each other, both as belligerents, and as peacemakers. In other words, if one wishes to sign a peace agreement one must first affirm the status of the two warring governments. Without first doing so, how can one possibly sign a peace agreement?

Such thinking inspired Hu's Chinese New Year's Eve speech. Hu mentioned "China" twice during his speech. But the China he mentioned was the China of 1949, prior to internal division by the Chinese Civil War. A peace agreement would address the "legacy and continuation" of this internal division. It would reconstruct a future China, a Third Concept of Chjina, and provide a framework for mutual interaction.

Talking about a peace agreement today, "post 2008," is especially meaningful. Talk of a peace agreement often provokes conflict between the two sides. But the cross-Strait situation is already peaceful. Civil War hostilities have already ended. Talk of a peace agreement now can only help consolidate the peace.

In recent years, Beijing has made a genuine effort to promote "mutual non-denial." For this, it deserves recognition. It should now pick up the pace, and move toward "mutual recognition." Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Peaceful reunification is not the Mainland annexing Taiwan. Nor is it Taiwan annexing the Mainland." This is a concrete expression of Deng Xiaoping's "It is not about you gobbling me up, or me gobbling you up." What exactly does "ending the Civil War, and reaching a peace agreement" mean? What it means is that the Republic of China will not annex the Peoples Republic of China, and the Peoples Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. This is the only way to correctly identify the participants in the conflict, as well as the participants in any peace agreement.

Actually, the KMT and the CCP once signed a peace agreement, back in April 1949. At the time, the CCP had a military advantage. The CCP's proposed agreement called for the "abolition of the [ROC's] ersatz constitution and legal system." Talks broke down. Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River the very next day. The peace agreement was all about eliminating one's opponent. It was different from today's peace agreement.

Today, the two sides are "already peaceful." This is mainly because the two sides "do not repudiate each other, and are not annexing each other." The main reason for a peace agreement in an already peaceful environment, is to further consolidate the peace. It is to make that agreement explicit. It is to "put it in writing." Therefore we must acknowledge that we are dealing with the "legacy and continuation of the Civil War." We must identify the warring parties, and by extension, the parties that would be making peace. That is why we need a consensus on the "cessation of Civil War hostilities, and the reaching of a peace agreement." Only then can we establish a phased framework for a peace agreement. Only then can we make the proposition that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless still part of one China," a matter of established law.

Most people on Taiwan consider the Civil War a political cross they must bear, But we believe that citing the Civil War in order to promote a peace agreement can be a clever way to break the deadlock.

Beijing is aware of course that it cannot sign a peace agreement while simultaneously denying that the ROC government was one of the warring parties, and therefore one of the signatories of any peace agreement. Therefore, Beijing must overcome its resistance to "mutual recognition." It must see the peace agreement as a way to cut the Gordian Knot. This accords with historical fact. It also accords with logic.

欲談和平協議‧先談議和主體
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.02.15 03:15 am

每隔一陣子就傳出「期待兩岸加強政治領域對話」的說法，日前的歐胡會亦然；台北的反應仍是千篇一律：「先經後政，先易後難。」雖任人皆知兩岸的「政治對話」終究無可迴避，問題在於雙方皆找不到一個入手處。本文建議：可以考慮從結束內戰的《和平協議》著手。

《和平協議》是兩岸之間存在已久的解決方案構想，連李登輝、陳水扁都倡議過；李且遣密使蘇志誠向北京方面提議簽訂《和平協議》，為對方以事涉「國與國的條約行為」而拒絕；嗣後，美國學者李侃如以「台灣不獨／中國不武」為張本的《中程協議》，一度引起熱烈討論；至二○○五年連胡會，將《和平協議》列入了「五大願景」，馬英九又納入總統大選政見，而以胡錦濤二○○九年的除夕談話，對「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」的著墨最深。

胡錦濤說：「一九四九年以來大陸和台灣儘管尚未統一，但不是中國領土和主權的分裂，而是上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立。」胡錦濤是站在此一認知上，主張兩岸「結束敵對狀態，達成和平協議」。

這樣的論述，是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。也就是說：由於兩岸現狀仍是內戰的遺留及延續，所以始有議簽《和平協議》的必要。上世紀中國的國共內戰，自一九二七年至一九四九年，打打停停了二十二年（八年抗戰期間，「內戰」在形式上停止，實質上仍在進行）；交戰雙方，由中央政府的國民革命軍對中共的人民解放軍的當面廝殺，轉變至中華民國對中華人民共和國的隔海對抗。由於內戰之故，雙方互不承認，而欲毀滅對方；而《和平協議》則是要終止內戰，不再毀滅對方，因而必須先以承認對方的交戰地位及議和地位為前提。也就是說：若欲議簽《和平協議》，即須首先確認兩個交戰政府的地位；沒有這個基礎，如何簽《和平協議》？

倘朝這個方向思考，前引胡錦濤的除夕談話，其中兩次談到的「中國」，其實皆是一九四九年以前因內戰而分裂的「中國」；《和平協議》即是欲在這個分裂中國的「遺留及延續」上，重建兩岸在未來中國（第三概念）的互動架構。

在「二○○八年後」的今日談《和平協議》，尤其別具深意。因為，《和平協議》常是在雙方熾戰中啟動；但兩岸如今卻是在「已經如此和平」的態勢下提議，戰爭已經終止，只是要鞏固和平。

北京方面近年在「互不否認」上所做的努力值得肯定，應可再向「相互承認」移動腳步。國台辦主任王毅日前說：「和平統一，不是大陸併吞台灣，也不是台灣併吞大陸。」此說已較鄧小平說「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」具象化。唯若以「終止內戰／和平協議」的意旨而言，其實應當說成：不是中華民國併吞中華人民共和國，也不是中華人民共和國併吞中華民國。這樣才能正確表述交戰主體與議和主體。

其實，國共在一九四九年四月也議簽過一次《和平協定》。當時，中共取得軍事優勢，在《協定》中主張「廢除偽憲法／廢除偽法統」；雙方破裂，隔日共軍即南渡長江。當年的《和平協定》是在消滅對方，如今談《和平協議》自應有不同的思考。

兩岸今日「已經如此和平」，主要是因雙方「互不否認／互不併吞」；而在「已經如此和平」的今日談《和平協議》，主要是因認為「和平」不夠鞏固，須有一明文的「協議」加以支撐。因而，承認現狀是「內戰的遺留及延續」，亦即承認雙方為交戰主體及議和主體，這是「終止敵對內戰／達成和平協議」的必要共識；亦唯如此，始有可能在《和平協議》的階段性體制下，達成「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」的法制化及固定化。

台灣多數人認為國共內戰是一個政治負債，但我們卻認為，「由內戰論述轉到和平協議論述」，有可能成為化解兩岸僵局的「巧門」。

北京當然也應知道，不可能要簽《和平協議》，卻否定中華民國政府是交戰主體及議和主體。因而，北京若欲破解「相互承認」的難題，從《和平協議》著手亦不失為一「巧門」。因為，這是符合史實的，也是符合邏輯的。