Would Chen Yunlin Still Be Able to Visit with the DPP in Power?

Would Chen Yunlin Still Be Able to Visit with the DPP in Power?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 22, 2011

Chen Yunlin is not being allowed to visit Tainan City. Lai Ching-teh made this unfortunate declaration. But that is hardly the full extent of the problem. The problem goes far beyond this. If the DPP returns to power, will Chen Yunlin even be able to visit Taiwan? Will the SEF and ARATS still be able to conduct annual exchanges?

The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum debuted today at a spa in Chungli. Tomorrow Chen Yunlin will bring a group of Mainland entrepreneurs to Taiwan. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Forum is the official mechanism for Vice Ministerial-level economic consultation and dialogue. Chen Yunlin's visit is a symbol of continuing cross-Strait economic coopetition. These two phenomenon represent a watershed in cross-Strait relations. They represent continued progress toward multifront, full range interaction. They represent the consolidation of cross-Strait "peaceful development."

These interactions are taking place on many fronts. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were originally driven by a random search for profits. Now governments on both sides are overseeing mutually advantageous integration. But this scenario may not have a chance to gel. Because next year's presidential election may lead to a third change in ruling parties. Cross-Strait relations will inevitably be put to the test. Today, the cross-Strait situation is one of peaceful development. It is a banquet in progress. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will that mean the party is over? This is a serious question. It is not one that a Democratic Progressive Party administration can dismiss by promising to "continue the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration."

Suppose Chen Yunlin can no longer visit Taiwan. Suppose the OECD can no longer be held. The results will be unmistakable. In the language of the common people, "Who is going to buy grandma's hard boiled eggs?" "If we can't sell our groupers to the Mainland, to whom are we going to sell them?" In the language of politics and economics, "If cross-Strait economic and trade relations undergo a sea change, does Taiwan have an alternate plan?"

This is not scare-mongering. It may well be a case of history repeating itself. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "special state to state relations" thesis. ARATS President Wang Daohan was scheduled to visit Taiwan in three to four months. Instead he announced that the SEF and ARATS no longer had any basis on which they could conduct dialogue and exchanges, and canceled his plans to come to Taiwan. Soon afterwards, cross-Strait relations underwent swift deterioration. After Chen Shui-bian took office, he repudiated the 1992 Consensus. Relations between the two organizations went from bad to worse. Today, the two organizations are mending fences. This represents cross-Strait peace, win/win, and consensus. But what about next year?

If the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, will Chen Yunlin still be able to come? On the one hand, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would allow him to come. On the other hand, it depends upon whether he would want to come. First, consider whether the DPP would allow him to come. Chen Yunlin first visited Taiwan in 2009. Tsai Ing-wen led a mob and laid siege to the hotel, closing off all access. The streets ran with blood. Last year she provoked disturbances in Taichung. Recently, he was in danger of running into into Green Camp local officials. Under the circumstances, in the event the Democratic Progressive Party regains power, and Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, what could they possibly say that would induce Chen Yunlin to come?

Now let us consider whether he would want to come. Chen Yunlin said the Mainland's economic policy vis a vis Taiwan is predicated upon certain political conditions. "If one day opposition to Taiwan independence vanishes, if the 1992 Consensus evaporates, everything may be subject to reconsideration." Back then, Wang Daohan did not come. Will Chen Yunlin refuse to come next year?

Lai Ching-teh, under pressure from Taiwan independence elements, canceled Chen Yunlin's visit, One can imagine the dilemma the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP cannot simply say "If we return to office we will continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration." It cannot simply sweep its dilemma under the rug. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will Chen be able to come? Internally, it depends upon whether Deep Green hardliners take to the streets and make trouble. Externally, it depends upon whether a DPP regime would oppose Taiwan independence and uphold the 1992 Consensus. How would the DPP deal with these questions?

Should the DPP receive Chen Yunlin or not? That is the problem Lai Ching-teh faces. It is also the problem the Democratic Progressive Party would face in the event it returned to power. The DPP has harassed Chen Yunlin over the past several days. It may wait until the presidential election before it comes up with some plausible sounding rhetoric. If it returns to power and continues the previous administration's cross-Strait policy, will it continue to exchanges between the two organizations? Will it roll out the red carpet for Chen Yunlin, or will it attempt to humiliate him in the streets?

民進黨若執政 陳雲林還能來嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.22

陳雲林不能造訪台南市，但這不是賴清德一句遺憾即能交代。因此引申的問題是：民進黨若再執政，陳雲林會否再到台灣？海基會與海協會的每年互訪能否繼續下去？

兩岸經合會今天在中壢一家溫泉莊園登場，陳雲林明天帶著大陸一群大企業家訪台；經合會是兩岸次長級官員的經濟對話與協商機制，陳雲林訪台則象徵兩岸競合關係的繼續開展。這兩件事都代表兩岸關係又再翻過一個山頭，繼續走上多維度、全方位的交流互動，亦是兩岸「和平發展」的優化與固化。

進一步論，這個多維度的互動階段，表現於經濟上的特徵就是，兩岸經濟交流已由企業自主的隨機逐利、任意遇合，進入由兩岸政府共同政策主導的優勢整合。但是，這圖像卻可能無法進入恆定狀態，因為明年總統大選或許會出現第三次政黨輪替，兩岸關係勢將面臨新的考驗。兩岸如今締造的和平發展局面，就像一場進行中的筵席，但民進黨再次執政，有無可能出現鬧場翻桌的場面？這是嚴肅的問題，恐怕不是一句「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」即可交代。

陳雲林若不能訪台，經合會若不能續開，只是平鋪直敘，換成庶民語言則是：阿婆的茶葉蛋咁有人買？石斑魚嘸賣大陸要賣去叼位？若翻成政經語彙即是：兩岸經貿關係若生變化，台灣有何「替代方案」？

這個場景應非黑色預言，而可能會是一個歷史的複製品。1999年七月初李登輝提出「特殊國與國」關係論，原應在三、四個月後首度訪台的海協會長汪道涵宣布，海基海協兩會對話交流基礎已不復存在，取消來台計畫，自此兩岸關係即急轉直下；至陳水扁就任後否認「九二共識」，兩會關係更是每下愈況。如今，兩會之恢復運作，象徵著兩岸和平雙贏的共識，但會不會到了明年陳雲林就來不成了？

民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，一則要看民進黨政府要不要他來？一則要看他要不要來？先說要不要他來。陳雲林2009年首次來台，蔡英文以封鎖酒店、血濺街頭伺候，去年赴台中也鬧得風聲鶴唳，這次到南部連能不能與綠色地方首長「不期而遇」都搞不定。既是如此，倘民進黨執政，若蔡英文當了總統，將用什麼說詞讓陳雲林來或不來？

再說他要不要來。陳雲林說，大陸對台灣採取的經濟政策有一個政治前提，「如果有一天，反對台獨沒有了，九二共識沒有了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」當年，汪道涵不來；明年陳雲林來不來？

從賴清德受台獨選民的牽制而取消陳雲林往訪，可以想像民進黨若重掌執政權後進退兩難的場景。民進黨不可能只憑一句「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，就想將必會面對的困局掩飾過去。民進黨若執政，陳雲林來不來，對內言，要看鐵桿深綠是否仍然「一路嗆聲／如影隨形」？對外言，要看民進黨政府對「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」這兩項「前提與基礎」作何說法？

接不接待陳雲林？賴清德今日的難題，當然也必是民進黨若執政後的困局。民進黨這幾天可以儘管騷擾陳雲林的行程，待在總統大選時再想出一套說詞告訴國人：若執政是否延續前朝政策，是否繼續兩會互訪，並是否將在豪華會場而非以街頭羞辱來接待陳雲林的到訪？