Thursday, February 17, 2011

One China: Undivided But Separately Administered

One China: Undivided But Separately Administered
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2011

President Ma spoke out recently at a Chinese New Years tea party. He said that in order to comply with the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations," from this day forward the government would refer to Beijing as "the other side" or "the Mainland," and not "China."

Ma's comments can be interpreted two ways. One. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to the Republic of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China." Two. The "One China" in "One China, Different Interpretations," refers to a third concept of China, one that transcends both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of this Third Concept of China. Therefore the other side must not be referred to as "China."

Beijing has also moved toward this Third Concept of One China in recent years. The media on Taiwan is already in the habit of referring to the other side as "China." This has alarmed and worried the Beijing authorities. Such usage smacks of "Taiwan and China, One Nation on Each Side." In cross-Strait relations, when the public on Taiwan refers to the Mainland as "China," it reflects a sense of alienation and differentiation.

In the past Beijing proclaimed that "The PRC Government is the sole government of all China," and that "One China means the People's Republic of China." As a result, the Republic of China found it difficult to persuade other nations that it still represented China. Besides, Beijing was determined to "annihilate the Republic of China." As a result, Beijing "de-Sinized" the name "Republic of China," both internationally, and on Taiwan. This frustrated the public on Taiwan. They gave up all hope of being "China" or being "Chinese." They had been humiliated. They were fearful. Their political identity as "China" and "Chinese" was steadily diluted. It was gradually replaced by a sense of being "Taiwanese." In other words, Beijing's past insistence that "One China means the Peoples Republic of China" was the the root cause of the de-Sinicization of the Republic of China and the de-Sinicization of the public on Taiwan. In recent years, Beijing has begun to realize this. This is the main reason it has begun leaning toward a "Third Concept of One China."

Beijing has made several attempts to do so. For example, the so-called "Three New Phrases" argued that "There is only one China in the world. Both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of this one China." This definition of China connotes and denotes the "roof theory" and the "Third Concept." In another example, Beijing argued that "the cross-Strait status quo is defined in existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." Beijing was referring to the Republic of China's "One China Constitution." In yet another example, Hu Jintao reiterated that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless belong to one China." The status quo is perceived a "continued political confrontation -- a legacy of the Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s." The status quo is perceived as "an undivided but separately administered China." One might say that after 2008, new opportunities have been present to both sides. Beijing's cross-Strait policy has changed from the "annihilation of the Republic of China," to the "preservation of the Republic of China."

Compare President Ma's recent declaration to Beijing's. Both sides have have subtly altered their definitions of "One China." They no longer insist that either the Republic of China or the Peoples Republic of China is the sole government of China. Instead, they are attempting to establish a new way of thinking, in which Taiwan and the Mainland, or the ROC and the PRC, are both part of one China. They both view "One China" as a "Third Concept" or as the "Roof Theory."

The Ma administration speaks of "One China, Different Interpretations." Hu Jintao speaks of a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." Both are describing an "undivided but separately administered China," that is a "Third Concept of China." Do the two sides want "peaceful development?" Do they want to uphold "One China, Different Interpretations," or a China which "has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China?" If so, then the public on Taiwan must feel that the Republic of China is part of China. Only then will they feel that they are part of China and that they are Chinese. If on the other hand, Beijing de-Sinicizes the Republic of China, it will de-Sinicize Taiwan. It will de-Sinicize the public on Taiwan. Consider cross-Strait affairs. A recent editorial argued that if we wish to sign a "peace agreement," we cannot refuse to recognize that the ROC government was one of the two warring parties, and must be one of the two peacemaking parties. This newspaper spoke of the "Glass Theory," in which Taiwan is the water, and the ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains, so does the water. Once the glass is broken, the water spills out.

Neither side rules out cross-Strait reunification. But reunification will not be easy. We have been presented with a rare and fleeting opportunity. The two sides' "interim goal" should be to institutionalize and concretize "One China, Different Interpretations," or "One China which has yet to be reunified, but nevertheless remains a single China." This newspaper spoke of "connectedness," and how it was better than "unity." This is what it meant. "One China" must be promoted to the level of "roof theory," to the level of a "Third Concept." Actually this is merely an extension of President Ma's demand that the other side be referred to as "the Mainland," rather than "China." It is merely an extension of Beijing's statement that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," It is what this newspaper meant by "Three New Phrases." "There is only one China in the world. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of that one China, China's sovereignty and territory must not be divided."

A New Concept has presented itself: an undivided but separately administered China. We urge both the ruling administration and opposition parties to consider this new direction.

一中新解:一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.17

馬總統在新春茶會中指出,為符合「九二共識」、「一個中國/各自表述」,今後政府機關用語,一律稱「對岸」或「大陸」,不稱「中國」。

此語可能作兩種解讀。一、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」,是指中華民國,因此不可稱對岸為「中國」;二、「一中各表」中的「一個中國」,是指超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」的「中國」,中華民國與中華人民共和國皆是這個「第三概念」的「中國」的一部分,因此不可稱對岸為「中國」。

將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」,也是北京近年來持續探討的方向。台灣的媒體用語已經習以「中國」指稱對岸,這使北京當局頗生警覺與憂慮;因為,這種用語儼然已成「台灣中國/一邊一國」的洗腦藥水;在兩岸關係上,台灣人民將大陸稱為「中國」,其實反映出一種疏離與區隔的意識。

北京過去稱「中華人民共和國政府是代表中國的唯一政府」,「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。中華民國因在國際上難與對岸競爭代表「中國」的地位,而北京又以「消滅中華民國」為主軸政策,致「中華民國」在國際上及台灣內部皆被北京「去中國化」;因而使台灣人民對成為「中國」或「中國人」非但絕望,且亦感到恐懼及被羞辱,遂在政治認同上與「中國」及「中國人」漸行漸遠,而台灣的主體意識則愈來愈高。也就是說,北京過去的「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的政策,正是使中華民國及台灣人民「去中國化」的根本原因;而這也正是北京方面近年持續探究,欲將「一個中國」朝向「第三概念化」的主要原因。

北京方面做過多種嘗試。例如,所謂的「新三句」即稱「世界上只有一個中國,大陸和台灣同屬一個中國」;此處所指的「中國」,即有「屋頂理論」及「第三概念」的內涵及外延。又如,謂「(兩岸)現狀就是見之於台灣現行規定及文件的現狀」;此處是指中華民國的「一中憲法」。再如,胡錦濤多次提及「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」;這是視現狀為「上個世紀四十年代中後期中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」,亦即視現狀為「分治而不分裂的中國」。可以這麼說:在二○○八後的兩岸新機遇中,北京的兩岸政策已從「消滅中華民國」轉移至「維持中華民國」。

比較馬總統的此次宣示與北京近年所做嘗試,可見雙方都在對「一個中國」的涵義進行調整;主要的方向皆在不再強調「中華民國(或中華人民共和國)是代表中國的唯一政府」,而欲創造一個「台灣(中華民國)及大陸(中華人民共和國)皆是一部分的中國」的新思維;此即將「一個中國」視為「第三概念」或「屋頂理論」。

其實,無論馬政府的「一中各表」,或胡錦濤的「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」,用意皆在描繪「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念中國」。兩岸若欲「和平發展」,並維持「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」;至少必須讓台灣人民覺得「中華民國是一部分的中國」,始能讓台灣人民有「中國」及「中國人」的認同;反之,北京若欲將中華民國「去中國化」,也就是將台灣「去中國化」及將台灣人民「去中國人化」。至於在兩岸實務上,如日前社論所言,即使欲簽定《和平協議》,亦不可否認中華民國政府為交戰主體及議和主體。此即本報主張的「杯子理論」:台灣是水,中華民國是杯;杯在水在,杯破水覆。

兩岸不必排除統一,但統一不易達成。在這個亙古一遇、稍縱即逝的機遇期中,兩岸的「中程目標」,應在設法使「一中各表」或「儘管尚未統一,仍是一個中國」達到法制化及固定化。此即本報所指「連結論」先於並優於「統一論」的道理。欲臻此境,「一個中國」即須昇華為「屋頂理論」的「第三概念」;這其實只是馬總統所說「稱大陸,不稱中國」,及北京所說「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」的引伸;亦是本報所提「新新三句」的意旨:「世界上只有一個中國,中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國,中國的主權和領土不容分割。」

一中新解:一個分治而不分裂的中國。建議兩岸朝野皆朝此方向想想看吧!

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