Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's Gobbledygook

Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's Gobbledygook
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2011

Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen presided over the opening ceremony of a think tank. Many people were eager to hear her views on cross-Strait policy. But what she said left them in an impenetrable fog.

Tsai Ing-wen said that the KMT is moving toward "peace and reunification," and toward "peace and inevitable reunification." She said the DPP advocates "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." Tsai Ing-wen was setting herself in opposition to the KMT. Logically speaking therefore, she should have said that she advocated "peace without reunification." She said others advocated "peace and reunification." But she lacked the guts to say that she advocated "peace without reunification." Instead, she said that she advocated "peace and differentiation." What is she doing, other than playing evasive word games?

Ma Ying-jeou has never advocated "peace and reunification," and "peace and inevitable reunification." These are charges leveled against him by Tsai Ing-wen. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." He loudly proclaimed "no reunification." Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, indulged in tongue twisting word games, and spoke of "peace and differentiation." She was afraid to say "peace without reunification." Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to say "no independence," the way Ma Ying-jeou did. But why was she afraid to say "no reunification?" What is she evading? What is she hiding?

Tsai Ing-wen has often played the "strategic vision" card. In April of 2010, during the "Two Ying's Debate," she played the "strategic vision" card. She argued that ECFA would cost the United States its strategic regional advantage. Instead, the US praised ECFA to the skies. She claimed that Taipei/Washington relations and cross-Strait relations were the best they have ever been. Professor Tsai appears oblivious about her own limitations. Once again, she has played her "strategic vision" card. She said "Taiwan must be positioned within the international framework. Only by giving political consideration to future relationships can we ensure the necessary strategic depth."

What is this, if not incomprehensible gobbledygook? How can such arguments unseat Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy? Does the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy not position the Republic of China within the international framework? Globalization and the rise of Mainland China have heavily skewed the two sides' economic status, Under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwan independence movement rushed headlong into a brick wall. Attitudes regarding the two sides have changed on Taiwan. Otherwise, how could the two sides have reached a consensus on "peaceful development?" How could they have signed ECFA? What is all this, if not "positioning Taiwan within the international framework?" What is all this, if not the ensuring of "strategic depth?" In fact, Tsai Ing-wen's pretensions of "strategic vision" were discredited during the Two Ying's Debate. Now all we see, is the emptiness of her rhetoric.

Tsai Ing-wen criticized Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. She said the Ma administration had fallen into "a trap set by [Mainland] China." But she did not say that Beijing had also fallen into a "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" trap set by Ma Ying-jeou. Tsai Ing-wen condemned the Ma administration for its "Chinese identity and Chinese core values." But she did not say that the Ma administration's 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations reaffirm the Republic of China and the core values of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is the one who is trapped within a fallacy. She mistakenly equates opposition to the Peoples Republic of China wtih opposition to the Republic of China. That is both sad and ridiculous.

Frank Hsieh advocates an "Overlapping Consensus on the Constitution" and "One Constitution, Different Interpretations." His proposals may be considered esoteric. But it is one way of looking at things. Su Tseng-chang advocates "survival as the highest value," and "democracy as the foundation." It too, is empty rhetoric, But at least he knows enough to conceal the fact. He does not attempt to spin it as evidence of "strategic vision." By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen, who has been playing word games for years, could offer only an incomprehensible "peace and differentiation," and "peace while seeking differentiation." As a result, those who expected the most from her, are the ones most deeply disappointed.

Tsai Ing-wen should let the public know what she favors and opposes vis a vis cross-Strait relations. She once advocated the two states theory. What about now? She once objected to the 1992 Consensus and ECFA. What about now? Beijing says that opposition to Taiwan independence and adherence to the 1992 Consensus are prerequisites for cross-Strait exchanges and interaction. What about Tsai Ing-wen? The Ma administration advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It upholds the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations. What about Tsai Ing-wen? Or, as a recent editorial asked, Tsai Ing-wen once led bloody street protests against Chen Yunlin. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, will it agree to let him visit?

National identity, constitutional interpretation, and cross-Strait policy are major issues. The Democratic Progressive Party must provide the public with a thorough accounting of its positions on these issues, before the 2012 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to muddle through by playing word games with "peace with differentiation" and "peace while seeking differentiation." This is irresponsible, dishonest, incompetent, or all three.

Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen announced this incomprehensible policy. She failed even to mention her promise to "continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration in the event she is elected." That is how irresponsible she has been. She has become a great disappointment to many voters. We feel compelled to ask Tsai Ing-wen, "Are even you satisfied with your own performance?"

且聽蔡英文的不知所云
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.02.24

蔡英文昨日主持智庫揭牌儀式，許多人都準備洗耳恭聽她發表兩岸政策觀點，結果卻是雲山霧罩，不知所云。

蔡英文說，國民黨走的是「和而要統」、「和而必統」；又稱民進黨主張的是「和而不同」、「和而求同」。照理說，蔡英文既說國民黨是「和而要統」，則蔡英文站在對立面，至少就該主張「和而不統」。然而，反對別人「和而要統」，卻又不敢主張「和而不統」，轉個彎竟說是「和而不同」。這豈不擺明了是避重就輕的文字遊戲？

馬英九從未主張過「和而要統」、「和而必統」，這些都是蔡英文栽贓的罪名。馬英九主張的是「不統／不獨／不武」，可以大聲地說「不統」；但蔡英文竟玩繞口令的諧音遊戲說成「和而不同」，連一句「和而不統」都不敢說。蔡英文若不便如馬英九說「不獨」，卻為何連「不統」也不敢說；妳在躲什麼？妳又在瞞什麼？

蔡英文動輒玩弄「國際戰略觀」的花腔。二○一○年四月的「雙英辯」上，她就搬出一套「國際戰略觀」；謂ＥＣＦＡ將使美國失去區域優勢；結果美方迄今數度高調稱許ＥＣＦＡ，並謂此際是台美關係及兩岸關係最佳時刻。現在，蔡教授不揣譾陋，再次端出她的「國際戰略觀」。她說：「必須把台灣放在國際的結構當中，把政策思考著眼於未來關係的建構，才能拉出必要的戰略縱深。」

這不是不知所云是什麼？況且，這套說法又豈能扳倒馬英九的兩岸政策。難道馬政府的兩岸政策不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」？倘若不是全球化、中國崛起、兩岸經濟地位嚴重傾斜、台獨在李扁任內已經推車撞壁，且台灣內部的兩岸認知已經移變，則兩岸豈會出現「和平發展」的共識，又豈能簽訂ＥＣＦＡ？這一切難道不是「把台灣放在國際的結構當中」所建立的「戰略縱深」？其實，蔡英文的「國際戰略觀」在「雙英辯」後已經無處立足，現則益見其言之無物。

蔡英文批評馬英九的兩岸政策。說馬政府陷入「中國設定的框框裡」；她卻為何不說，其實北京也陷於馬英九「不統／不獨／不武」的「框框」裡。蔡英文又指馬政府一切皆以「中國認同、中國價值為核心」；卻為何不說，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，其實是「一切以中華民國認同及中華民國價值為核心」。蔡英文竟至今日仍陷於「把反中華民國當成反中華人民共和國」的謬誤中，豈不可悲亦復可笑？

謝長廷提出「憲法重疊共識」及「憲法各表」，雖屬玄妙，但畢竟也是一家之言；蘇貞昌謂「生存是王道、民主是基石」，縱然也是虛晃一招，卻懂得藏拙，未曾用「國際戰略」來濃妝艷抹。相對而言，蔡英文煮字經年，竟然只是熬出不知所云的「和而不同／和而求同」八個字；由於眾人對她的寄望最深，不免亦失望最大。

蔡英文至少要讓大家知道，在兩岸關係上，她贊成什麼？反對什麼？她曾主張兩國論，現在呢？她曾反對九二共識、反對ＥＣＦＡ，現在呢？北京說「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」是兩岸互動交流的前提與基礎，蔡英文是同意或反對？馬政府主張「不統／不獨／不武」、「九二共識／一中各表」，蔡英文又是同意或反對？或者，如日前社論所問：曾以街頭喋血反對陳雲林來訪的蔡英文，在民進黨若再執政後是否同意他繼續來訪？

國家認同、憲法認知及兩岸政策，這是民進黨在二○一二總統大選前，必須徹底明白交代的重大議題。蔡英文欲以「和而不同／和而求同」八個字矇混過關，這若不是不負責，就是不誠實，要不就是無能，或三者兼之。

蔡英文昨天的這場不知所云的政策宣示，居然連「若執政後將延續前朝兩岸政策」這一句話都不見了。敷衍至此地步，恐怕令許多中間選民大失所望。且問蔡英文：妳自己滿意自己的表現嗎？？